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Joseph Hutton.

LEXILOGUS;

OR

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

OF

THE MEANING AND ETYMOLOGY OF NUMEROUS GREEK
WORDS AND PASSAGES,

INTENDED PRINCIPALLY FOR

HOMER AND HESIOD.

By PHILIP BUTTMANN, LL.D.

LATE PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN, AND LIBRARIAN OF THE
ROYAL LIBRARY.

TRANSLATED AND EDITED,
WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES AND COPIOUS INDEXES,
By the Rev. J. R. FISHLAKE,
LATE FELLOW OF WADHAM COLLEGE, OXFORD.

SECOND EDITION, REVISED.

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

A TRANSLATOR is generally expected to preface his Work by some account of his Author, and some explanation of his subject. In the present instance information on either of these points is less than usually requisite. With regard to the former, the name of Buttmann needs no introduction wherever ancient Greek is studied; and for the latter, the Author's own Preface will explain the nature of his Work far better than can be done for him. A few words on one or two minor details are all therefore which can be necessary.

Buttmann very modestly entitled his Work, a "Lexilogus, or Helps to the Explanation of Greek words, intended principally for Homer and Hesiod." Fearing that so indefinite a title might induce a belief of the Work being merely an elementary book for younger students, a larger kind of Clavis Homerica for school-boys, I have endeavoured to alter it to one more declaratory of its true character. For while *every* reader of Homer, nay, *every* student of Greek, will find in the philological investigations of the Lexilogus new and valuable information, without which he can never thoroughly understand the language either in its Epic infancy or its Attic vigour,—at the same time it will prove to the really *critical* student an invaluable guide and companion in exploring the deeply-hidden treasures of ancient Greek literature. He will be delighted and astonished at the profound research, the extensive erudition, and solid judgement with which each word and each family of words is examined and traced from the old Epic poetry through every succeeding stage of the language, through every writer in which it occurs, and every analogy in which it can be advantageously compared. He will find a novel system of investigation, admirably calculated to ascertain on the surest grounds the true sense of an author, reconciling discrepancies, and solving difficulties which have baffled the ingenuity of ancients and moderns. But by enlarging on these points I shall be only doing an injustice to my author: the Work will better speak for itself.

I have made another minor alteration by a fresh arrangement of the Articles. Buttmann wrote and published as he met with a difficult or doubtful word in the course of his readings. I have arranged the Articles alphabetically; a change which I could not have ventured to make, had there been a chance of the Lexilogus being continued at any future time: but as the Author, alas! has been taken away in the midst of his literary career, all hopes of that nature are for ever at an end.

The additions which I have made are very trifling: here and there a few short notes explanatory of German words or phrases, which I have taken care to distinguish from those of the Author by inserting them within brackets, and marking them with "Ed." I have likewise added the opinions of the German lexicographers Schneider and Passow whenever they happen to differ from or elucidate those of Buttmann. When references are made to *German* writers, I have generally given a translation of the passage referred to; as in the case of Schneider's Lexicon and Buttmann's large Grammar which he entitles "Ausführliche Sprachlehre." When, however, he refers to his Grammar, properly so called, of which an English translation has been published, I have thought it sufficient to give the reference only.

And here I might perhaps be excused were I tempted to extend this Preface by indulging in the recollection of past days, and dedicating a page or two to the memory of the Author, whose friendship I enjoyed, and in whose literary acquirements I found delight and assistance during the greater part of three years: but I must content myself with referring those who wish to see some account of his life or character to a short biographical memoir of him prefixed to the translation of his Greek Grammar. Meanwhile let me indulge in the hope, that by the following version of his Lexilogus I may be raising an honourable and lasting tribute to his memory; confident as I am, that if the present publication do not raise his literary fame in this country to the same proud pre-eminence which it enjoys in Germany, the fault will be not in the Author but in the Translator.

J. R. F.

Little Cheverel, Wilts. December, 1835.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND EDITION.

IN preparing this second Edition of the Lexilogus, I have carefully read and compared it anew with the original, by which I have been able to correct some errors of translation, and to render, I hope, more intelligible many passages which were obscure or ambiguous. I have also added a few Notes and Illustrations, for some of which I am indebted to the kindness of a young Cambridge Friend, whose communications I take this opportunity of acknowledging, both in justice to the contributor, as well as with the hope that others may be induced to confer on me the same favour.

J. R. F.

Little Cheverel, Wilts. January, 1840.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

WHENEVER I have been engaged in examining Homer somewhat more critically than usual, an observation has always forced itself upon me, that with regard to the explanation of his language more remained to be done, and might be done, than is generally supposed. In particular, I found that many very superior philologists, swayed partly by the authority of tradition, partly by the undoubted meaning which some words have in the later writers, and partly by an etymology apparently made out to their satisfaction, have imagined that in many words they saw their way perfectly clear, or at least in the main, and have therefore never instituted a more accurate examination, of which such words are still capable.

And although I was aware that short accounts and concise explanations may generally be sufficient for the more advanced scholar, yet, at the same time, I thought that I might find an opportunity of being useful to young philologists also, by setting them the example of a mode of investigation which cannot be sufficiently recommended; namely, that of unravelling an author's usage of words as much as possible from himself. In the case of Homer there is the strongest inducement to follow this method, nay, we are driven to it of necessity, as we have nothing cotemporary with him. At the same time however this plan is rendered easier in Homer than in most other writers by a work of rare industry, the merits of which are not known so generally as they ought to be,—Damm's Homeric Dictionary[1]. It is true that the book has great and striking defects, of which the principal is that want of order in the arrangement of words which makes it so inconvenient for use. And what renders this fault the more striking is, that the author, who had no idea of a perfect arrangement, unless it were opposed to the usual plan of dictionaries, in which system is sacrificed to alphabetical order, and unless it were grounded on etymological arrangement, as the only method calculated to attain its object and produce advantageous results,—that he, in the praiseworthy attempt to put this idea into execution, should fall into the opposite error, and ground his arrangement on an etymology not merely speculative from beginning to end, but (which no one will dispute) completely arbitrary[2]. This defect is however for the most part compensated, on the one hand by the great advantage resulting from those words which are known and acknowledged to belong to each other being thus brought into one and the same point of view, and on the other hand by an alphabetical Index. Far more perplexing is the want of arrangement in the Articles themselves, particularly the longer ones, where the author gives, it is true, at the beginning of each a short review of the different turns which the meaning takes, but afterwards adds in detail the individual passages, principally according to the forms (i. e. the cases, tenses, &c.) which occur, and according to the numerical order of the books; a plan useful in one respect, but by which the far more important and principal object, the chain of meanings, is lost, and the most tiresome repetitions are introduced. Yet it is but fair that we should reflect, that as an arrangement combining all advantages would have been far more difficult and laborious, it would probably have been impossible for the diligent schoolman to have compiled this useful work without those looser and lighter details[3]. These very defects however again give occasion, as is commonly the case, to an exertion calculated in the highest degree to promote the study of Homer, in as much as whoever uses the book for a slow and critical reading of his works, can now arrange every such article according to his own ideas and views, and elicit more accurate results. And it is in this labour that I principally wish to set an example to young philologists in this little book[4]; still however in such a manner, that while I recommend with full conviction, as contributing in the highest degree to a more intimate knowledge of Homer's language, that even the most common and universally known words should be treated in this way, I have here selected those only in which I discovered in the course of my experience erroneous views and opinions more or less common, or in which I have hoped to be able to bring forward something which has generally been overlooked.

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[1] This ought to be its title, if it were named from that which constitutes its peculiar merit: it is now entitled "Novum Lexicon Græcum etymologicum et reale, cui pro basi substratæ sunt concordantiæ Homericæ et Pindaricæ. Collegit C. T. Damm. Berol. 1765." 4to.

[2] If compilers of not only large and small dictionaries, but also of verbal indexes to particular authors, should ever adopt an arrangement grounded on etymology as the only method of bringing perfectly before the student the true richness and extent of a language, I certainly do not anticipate their falling into the same extreme as the excellent Damm has done; but mischief is to be apprehended wherever the true principle of etymological arrangement is misunderstood, even though it be to a less extent, as we see in Stephens's Thesaurus and in many vocabularies. A lexicographer should follow, not that etymology which is true and capable of proof, but that which is acknowledged and felt. Nay, even families of words, whose mutual relationship cannot be doubted, must still be separated (if a separation can be easily made) for practical purposes, without however each being injured in its particular circle, and the separation must be pointed out by references. Gesner's caution on this point in his Latin Thesaurus might be recommended for imitation, if he had not destroyed the greatest part of the advantage of this method by separating the compounds from the simples.

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[3] I should wish that in every article the passages should follow according to their meaning; and then at the end of the longer articles the different forms might be placed together, with some references, for the more unusual ones, to the passages as quoted before. For a correct review of all the forms of a word which occur in a writer is indispensable to the critic.

I am however so far from disdaining the other ways in which the sense of an old Epic word may be critically examined, that I think it much rather coincides with my general object to give an example of these also. In all cases then in which Homer himself does not furnish sufficient materials for a comparison, I have consulted the nearest succeeding period, and that not only in the other old Epic Records and Fragments (the Hesiodic, Homeridic, and Cyclic*), which must also be included in the plan of an Homeric Dictionary, but I have examined likewise with great confidence the poets of the flourishing periods of Greece; for I become more and more persuaded every day by constant experience, that in judging of and explaining the works of genius of Homer's pure time, there is little or perhaps no reason whatever for supposing a usage of succeeding poets to have arisen from their having misunderstood the meaning of Homer's words, in as much as these poets had not yet begun to search with the coldness of art for dead words, but used those only which came down to them from antiquity through living tradition.

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[4] As I have here undertaken to recommend this mode of studying an author, it appears to me worth while to add one or two rules for the instruction of those who have had less experience than myself. In the first place, in order to understand the leading senses, we should take a cursory review of the whole article with Damm's explanations, which, being mostly old traditionary ones, are necessary to be known; afterwards, every passage quoted by Damm should be again examined, as far as possible, in Homer himself; not only because corrected readings are not unfrequently received into our present text, but because it cannot but happen that, in such a list, passages by being separated from the context sometimes serve to give an erroneous idea of the author's meaning, and somtimes, being taken by the reader in only one point of view, lead him into fresh mistakes. I would also recommend to every one who can obtain that rare book, "W. Seberi Argus Homericus, s. Index Vocabulorum in omnia Homeri Poemata. Amst. 1649." 4to., to use it with Damm, because each not unfrequently supplies the defects of the other, and the older work often furnishes the student with a quicker review of passages than the later one.

* [For an explanation of this term, see note, p. 457.—Ed.]

The third rank in my investigation belongs to grammatical tradition, as it is undeniable that in this also much has been transplanted from that olden time when poets and rhapsodists still felt with certainty the language of Homer. But as philosophical and grammatical subtleties by degrees disturbed the purity of those sources, the true sense was frequently driven out by false interpretations springing from an unhistorical mode of treatment, or else it is found buried under a confused heap of explanations, and must be developed by having recourse to whatever may be offered by the other sources. Still, I frequently commence my inquiry with those common interpretations which are for the most part known to all, in order that by calling attention to their insufficiency and faultiness I may show the necessity of a more fundamental investigation. But to this same grammatical tradition belongs also, as every one knows, the usage of the later poets after Alexander. In them, we feel at once, from the slightest perusal of their works, every spark of rhapsodical tradition is extinguished. We see that they learned as we do from written pages, and sought to make the language of the poets their own, as they understood it by a process of study, which consequently rendered it to them a dead language. Hence I have made another use of those poets, and one of much greater importance toward the object of this book, by showing in a variety of instances that their use of language was of that nature, in order that it might become the more evident how cautious we ought to be in every critical and grammatical use to which we wish to apply those writers. And if in doing this I should have here and there, in an esthetic sense, done any one of them an injustice by attributing to ignorance deviations from Homer which proceeded from poetical powers of invention, others will soon be found ready to assist in honouring him. But to spend my time among the later of those late poets, even for this object, appeared to me a superfluous labour.

Grammatical and etymological inquiries made by the moderns should always be our last resource. I do not think that this principle is attended to by every one as it ought to be; for myself I have made it an invariable rule. Where the meanings of words cannot be discovered at all, or not with sufficient certainty, by the former methods, I then introduce, and then only, etymological investigation, which is naturally more or less decisive according to circumstances, and, I may add, according to the reader. It is true, that where the meaning is made sufficiently clear by the utmost possible comparison of passages and writers, there I certainly do not hesitate to introduce anything which I may think I have discovered respecting the descent or derivation of a word, whether it be in confirmation of or as a supplement to this branch of the science: but in that case I generally place it, as something not strictly belonging to the object of my book, either in the notes or separated in some other manner, that the reader may be fully convinced of the independence and internal certainty of the rest of the investigation; or if he sees neither charm nor utility in an etymological examination, he may pass it over unnoticed. I have felt myself the more impelled to oppose thus pointedly that mode which sets out with speculation, as I have seen during the course of my investigations many instances of a superficial etymology (consequently one which presented itself very early), either obstructing the knowledge of the true and exact sense of a word, or, in cases where the sense is evident, mixing up with it collateral ideas quite foreign to Homer, and thence interpolating into a number of passages thoughts which he never had, and consequently falsifying his poetry,—a worse fault than leaving it unintelligible.

In laying before the public a number of these investigations, I call this volume the first, only because it admits of repeated continuations, without knowing whether or when I shall be able to produce even a second, and whether, if I should, it will be desired. In a book therefore which is only a first part, any choice or arrangement of articles was indifferent; consequently I found it best, in order to accomplish a definite object with this little volume, to begin my search in the first book of the Iliad for words on which I might say something satisfactory, or at least useful. And every word which came in my way in this manner, I not only examined as fully as I could for the whole of Homer, and for other authors, as far as they belonged to my plan, but I frequently included (and generally with equal copiousness) cognate words also, or others which might in any way throw light upon an Homeric word, or which might be embraced in the same inquiry; and I have also added some articles whose objects do not occur so soon as the beginning of the Iliad, but to which I was led thus early by the free unshackled nature of my investigation. All words, however, in which I could add but little information to what is easily accessible in dictionaries or in explanatory and other grammatical works, I have passed over entirely, as I always suppose my reader to have some experience, and to be not entirely without books; and I wish at the same time also to lay occasionally before the scholar something not unworthy of his attention. I thus proceeded far in the Second Book of the Iliad, and stopped when I thought I had enough for my first volume. Every one, therefore, who has experienced the use of such investigations as these for the understanding of Homer, may take my book and begin his Homer anew: and he will find, with regard to the explanation of words, nothing unexamined which needed a certain degree of investigation, but at the same time enough to make him acquainted with my method; so that if he is satisfied with it, he may take it up where I have left off. And as I proceed further (if indeed I ever continue my work,) I may gradually leave this didactic object more and more out of sight, confining myself as I go on to those words which admit of being treated in a more scientific way, or in which I have to introduce some particular views of my own. In these examinations opportunities could not but occasionally present themselves for contributing something toward the criticism of the readings, and in some articles (in 13. 23. 24. 46. 53. 58.*, for instance,) this is the principal object in view.

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* [In the alphabetical arrangement of the translation these articles stand thus: 30. 43. 71. 81. 97. 104.—Ed.]

And lastly, in composing this little book a most suitable opportunity has offered itself for discharging an old debt. In the third edition of my Grammar I subjoined an Excursus on the old Epic forms ἀνήνοθα and ἐνήνοθα with some other anomalous perfects, and I there offered my explanation of them, which I drew out as much in detail as appeared to me necessary with regard to some other digressions there made. It so happens that we frequently omit grounds which lead too far into generalities, because we wait to ascertain whether the same combinations, which are familiar to us, will occur to others also. The objections of an acute and learned critic proved to me the necessity of my giving a perfect detail of every thing belonging to my theory; for which, as most of the objects belong to the verbal criticism of the oldest Epic poets quite as much as to any others, I think this a most suitable place. It may be supposed that in the course of thirteen years I have made many corrections in particular parts of this investigation; at the same time I will not adduce as a confirmation of it, that I have adhered to it on the whole and in all essential points; although I feel confident that no one will accuse me of petty self-conceit, which is unpardonable in a writer.

The text of Homer, which I have always followed, is, as may be supposed, that of Wolf, the edition of the Iliad of 1804, the Odyssey of 1807, of which it is necessary to remind my readers, as it is said that a new edition is in the press, in which it is possible that some points of which I have here treated may be different from what I have supposed them to be.

Berlin, 1818.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND EDITION.

As a Second Edition of this First Volume was called for before I could add a Second, I thought it due to the possessors of the First Edition to make no additions, even where they might be required, but to defer everything of that kind to a Supplement to be added to the Second Volume. I have therefore confined myself entirely to corrections and amendments of narration and expression; here and there I have supplied a hasty omission, or chosen a more suitable example, and done whatever in other respects appeared too trifling to be reserved for the Supplement.

Berlin, November 1824.

BUTTMANN'S LEXILOGUS.

1. Ἀάατος, ἄατος, ἆτος.

1. IN these forms we have a striking proof of the uncertainty of both old and modern grammarians. Without any grounds they explain each of these alphas, sometimes as a mere diæresis, sometimes as a contraction, sometimes as *α* privative, and sometimes as *α* intensive, and even, where it appears convenient, the two first alphas as two privatives neutralizing each other (vid. Eustath. ad Il. ξ, 271.): and the consequence is, that either of the above forms, with one, two, or three alphas, may thus be derived from the verb *to satiate* or the verb *to harm*, may have a negative, positive, transitive, or intransitive sense, and thence in different passages of doubtful meaning, the same word would be explained in opposite senses. Every language however is extensively governed even in its daily usage by fixed principles, from which it were well never to deviate without an absolute necessity.

2. One such established principle, which must be always attended to, is this, that the resolution of the long *α* into two can only take place, where it arose originally from contraction, whether from *αα* or *αε*, but never where the *α* is long in itself and by mere formation: we may therefore have ἐάᾳ, ὁράᾳν, ὁράασθαι, but the resolution can never take place in ἐᾱσω, ὅρᾱμα, ὁρᾱτός[1]. Let us apply this principle to the radical

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[1] The form κεράατα may possibly be adduced as contrary to this rule, since we cannot adopt κέραας κεράατος as the original form, but must allow that κεράατα is lengthened from κέρᾱτα. I might leave this with-

verbs of these forms, and we shall see that ἀάσασθαι is not a mere lengthened form of ἄσασθαι, because before the termination σα, σάσθαι, there is no contraction but mere formation. Ἀάω is therefore the ground-form of ἀάσασθαι; and this is confirmed by the digamma in the Pindaric αὐάτα. The verbal adjective in τός from this verb is consequently ἀατός.

3. There are some verbal forms with the meaning of *to satiate*, which lead us to a theme ἄω, ἆσαι, ἄμεναι; pass. ἆται; adv. ἄδην· formed from the root with the adverbial termination δην. The Hesiodic third person ἄᾰται (see note 1. on ἀντιᾷν) is an unusual and even doubtful resolution of ἆται: but whatever it may be, it cannot be sufficient to warrant our adopting an older form ἀάω (ἄημι, ἄαμαι) with this meaning also. The verbal adjective in τός is therefore ἀτός, and cannot be resolved into two alphas any more than can ὁρατός.

4. According to this ἀάατος means *invulnerable, inviolable*; ἄατος *insatiable*. From ἄατος came by contraction ἆτος. In the same way, indeed, from ἀάατος *might* have been formed ἄατος, but it is easily conceivable that experience would teach the Greeks to refrain from this, lest it might create confusion; and thus the meaning of ἀάατος was fixed to be *inviolable*, &c., that of ἄατος, ἆτος, *insatiable*.

5. Of the two last forms ἆτος alone occurs frequently in Homer, both in Hesiod. But if we compare the two verses of Hesiod

Sc. 59. Αὐτὸν καὶ πατέρα ὃν Ἄρην ἆτον πολέμοιο.
Theog. 714. Κόττος τε, Βριάρεώς τε, Γύης τ' ἄατος πολέμοιο[2],

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out further remark as one of those exceptions, which may occur in any rule, without misleading a translator who goes on sure grounds. But the case is otherwise. None but the later grammarian Epic poets have κεράατα, τεράατα, which they considered as an imitation of the Homeric κράατα. In this they were mistaken: for in such words as κρᾶας, λᾶας, the roots are κρα, λα; and κρᾶας, λᾶας, is the perfect, κρᾶς, λᾶς the contracted form. On the contrary, in κέρατος as well as in φρέατος, the penultima, if long, is to be considered merely as it is in ὄρνιθος, κνημῖδος, &c. Such resolutions are certainly, therefore, contrary to the rule given above; but it is to be recollected that Aratus, who uses them, is not Homer, and his forms are not, as Homer's are, founded in truth.

[2] On the orthography of Γύης, left uncertain by Bentley on Hor. Od. 2, 17, 14., I am unwilling to speak decisively. I am of opinion,

suspicion falls on the form ἄατος, which never occurs elsewhere; and this suspicion is strengthened by the second radical α being short, while in the inflexions of the verb (ἆσαι, ἄσαιμι) it is constantly long[3]. None however will think these arguments decisive unless they are first satisfied that the two poems were written by the same person.

6. Having now fixed the meaning of ἀάατος, we find a difficulty in adapting it to the three passages of Homer where it occurs. In Il. ξ, 271. it is the epithet of the Styx, where Somnus says to Juno,

> Ἄγρει νῦν μοι ὄμοσσον ἀάατον Στυγὸς ὕδωρ.

But in the Odyssey it is the epithet of a contest; first in φ, 91., where Penelope delivers to the suitors the bow and the quoits, and promises herself as the prize of the victor. At the sight of their master's bow the two herdsmen burst into tears, at which Antinous exclaims,

> Κλαίετον ἐξελθόντε, καταυτόθι τόξα λιπόντε
> Μνηστήρεσσιν ἄεθλον ἀάατον· οὐ γὰρ ὀΐω
> Ῥηϊδίως τόδε τόξον ἐΰξοον ἐντανύεσθαι.

The second passage is in χ, 5., where Ulysses, after he has succeeded in the contest, says,

> Οὗτος μὲν δὴ ἄεθλος ἀάατος ἐκτετέλεσται.

How unsatisfactory the explanations of this word in these passages have generally been may be seen in the contradictory glosses and notes of translators and commentators. They who very properly sought after some one term suited to all three passages, found only the idea of *terrible*, to force which they were obliged to have recourse to the α *intensive*, taking the word in an active sense, and rendering it *very dangerous, very hurtful, very dreadful*. All this force, however, produced no epithet suited to the contest; for how could that be called *dangerous* or *terrible* which brought with it no other danger than that which accompanies every contest, the danger of losing the prize? It could have, therefore, no meaning in the mouth

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however, that it is contracted from γυῖον; and I think Γύης the original and more correct form, as being more agreeable to analogy, Γύγης a corruption which arose very naturally from the Lydian name Gyges.

[3] Vid. also ἄατος in Note 3. on ἀδῆσαι.

of Ulysses. Hence some of the grammarians did not blush to explain the word in the first passage, where it is the epithet of the contest, by πολυβλαβές, in the second; where it is the epithet of the same contest, by ἀβλαβές.

7. It seems to me, that if of three passages one most readily and easily admits the literal and simple meaning of the word, that meaning must be at once adopted. Such a one is undoubtedly, *inviolable*; and this is exactly the epithet most suited to the Styx, the swearing by which was the most inviolable of all oaths. And the thing is so clear, that this single passage fixes the sense of the word in the Iliad without troubling ourselves about the Odyssey. With regard to this latter, unwilling to depart too far from the meaning in the Iliad, I at first thought of adopting, with Schneider, the active sense of *not bringing or causing harm, harmless,* an epithet not unsuited to such a contest as opposed to a combat of life and death. But then I saw that the immediate context, in the former of the two passages, connected with it by γάρ, became by this translation totally unconnected. In οὐ γὰρ ῥηϊδίως then we must look for the ground of the meaning of ἀάατος, and that can be no other than *not to be despised, not to be thought lightly of,* or some such meaning. It is perfectly agreeable with the analogy of the Greek language, that ἀάατος with the sense of *inviolable* should take an ethical or moral meaning. *Inviolable,* therefore, may give us the idea of *that which we ought not to offend, ought not to speak ill or slightingly of*; in short ἀάατον in these two passages seems to me to be much the same as οὐκ ὀνοστόν in Il. ι, 164., *an honourable, distinguished contest, one not to be despised or treated slightingly**.

8. The only other passage where ἀάατος occurs in the old writers, is in Apoll. Rhod. 2, 77., where it has its natural meaning of *invincible,* as opposed to χερείων in the sense of *vincible.* The word, indeed, seems to have long remained in use

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* [Schneider in his Lexicon takes it in these two passages in an active sense, as *not bringing harm, harmless*; though in the latter, Od. χ, 5., he admits that the interpretation of Eustath. πολυβλαβής may be adopted. Passow in his excellent abridged and amended edition of Schneider calls it *a decisive contest, the result of which must be valid and irrevocable.*—Ed.]

in some of the dialects, but in a form not easily recognised. Hesychius has the gloss *ἀάβακτοι, ἀβλαβεῖς*, which the commentators have sadly maltreated, nay, some have at once altered to *ἀάατοι*, though it is a genuine Laconian gloss. The *β* arose from the digamma between the two alphas of *ἀάω* (vid. 2.), and *κτος* is the well-known Doric termination of adjectives formed from verbs in *άζω* or *άω*; therefore, *ἀάβακτοι, ἀάατοι, ἀβλαβεῖς*, *uninjured, unhurt* (used probably of men).

9. Thus far in the pure Greek writers. Anything occurring in the later Epic poets at variance with what has been said above, belongs probably to them alone. Apoll. Rhod. 1, 459. has also *ἄατος* (–◡◡) *ὕβρις*; but I cannot believe that he formed *ἄατος*, as the Scholiast tells us, with *α* intensive, using the second *α*, which must come from the double *α* of the verb *ἀᾶσαι*, as short. I rather conjecture that he accented it *ἀατός*, which gives the same sense without the unnecessary idea of intensiveness, and that he has merely taken the liberty of using the verbal adjective in *τός* in an active sense. Quintus 1, 217. has *θάρσος ἄᾱτον*; which is evidently the *θάρσος ἄητον* of Il. *φ*, 395. Either then Quintus wrote *ἀητόν* or read in Homer *ἄατον*. Whichever he did is to us of no importance. The Homeric form *ἄητος* deserves, however, a separate article.

2. Ἀᾶσαι, ἄτη, ἀτέων, ἀεσίφρων.

1. In my Grammar I have touched on the form of the verb *ἀάω*, as far as relates to the doubtful quantity of the two alphas, and have stated that the form in which both alphas are expressed is to be considered as the ground or radical form. This last I have also had occasion to confirm in treating on *ἀάατος*.

2. If we look through all the different passages in Homer in which the verb and its derivatives occur, it is impossible not to observe, beside the universal idea of *harm* and *suffering harm*, an occasional one of its being through the person's own *fault, error*, or *imprudence*. Some have supposed this latter to be an original idea necessarily and inseparably connected with the word, and have therefore more or less twisted and forced all the passages of Homer to suit it (vid. Damm's Lexicon); but

the old derivative ἀάατος, the more exact meaning of which has been discussed at some length in the preceding article, is completely at variance with this supposition, and cannot possibly admit of this occasional idea either as an epithet of the Styx, Il. ξ, 271., or of the contest with the bow of Ulysses, Od. φ, 91. χ, 5. The passages, in which this occasional idea can most plainly be dispensed with, are in Hes. Op. 229.

Οὐδέποτ' ἰθυδίκαισι μετ' ἀνδράσι λιμὸς ὀπηδεῖ
Οὐδ' ἄτη,

and in 350.

. . . . . . κακὰ κέρδεα ἶσ' ἄτῃσιν.

But there are in Homer also passages, in which the thought must be unnaturally forced to make it admit of *fault or imprudence*, as in Il. θ, 237., where the verb and the substantive are joined;

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἦ ῥά τιν' ἤδη ὑπερμενέων βασιλήων
Τῇδ' ἄτῃ ἄασας, καί μιν μέγα κῦδος ἀπηύρας;

Agamemnon says this without any reference to his early misconduct in having quarrelled with Achilles; it is merely an exclamation on seeing the Greeks flying without any fault of him. It is the same in Il. β, 111., where he says to the Greeks,

Ζεύς με μέγα Κρονίδης ἄτῃ ἐνέδησε βαρείῃ,

and where he immediately afterwards attributes this injury to the deceitful promises of Jove. All these passages show that the general idea of *to harm or injure, harm or injury*, is the only one necessarily and inseparably belonging to these words.

3. This original idea, however, (by means of the phrase ἀᾶσαι φρένας, *to injure the understanding, mislead, render foolish, stupify,*) was transferred to the mind or understanding, so that, whenever the context led that way, ἀᾶσαι alone gave the same idea as when joined with φρένας, still always with a decided reference to some harm or injury arising from that state of mind. We may see this particularly exemplified in Od. φ, 293., where expressions of this kind occur repeatedly in the same passage;

Οἶνός σε τρώει μελιήδης, ὅστε καὶ ἄλλους
Βλάπτει, ὃς ἄν μιν χανδὸν ἕλῃ, μηδ' αἴσιμα πίνῃ.

Οἶνος καὶ Κένταυρον ἀγάκλυτον Εὐρυτίωνα
Ἄασεν ἐν μεγάρῳ μεγαθύμου Πειριθόοιο
Ἐς Λαπίθας ἐλθόνθ'· ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ φρένας ἄασεν οἴνῳ,
Μαινόμενος κάκ' ἔρεξε δόμον κατὰ Πειριθόοιο.

The Centaur was then dragged out of the house, and there mutilated. The poet goes on to say,

. . . . . ὁ δὲ φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἀασθεὶς
Ἤϊεν ἣν ἄτην ὀχέων ἀεσίφρονι θυμῷ.

4. That the word *ἀεσίφρων* (striking as the repetition may appear in the two last verses,) gives the same idea as *ἀᾶσαι φρένας*, is certain from other passages; e. g. from Il. *υ*, 183. *ψ*, 603. Od. *ο*, 470. And yet, notwithstanding this, some, as Schneider, derive it from *ἆναι to blow*; others, as Apoll. Lex. from *ἀέσαι to sleep*. How forced these derivations are, must be felt by any one who examines the original passages. Schneider, indeed, has also the same derivation which is given here, and so has Apollonius, but in the latter it is under the word *ἀασίφρων*. Let no one, however, suppose, that this latter form, though found also in Hesychius and Eustathius, is a genuine reading. It is a correction of the grammarians, who saw the true derivation, and thought this the only manner in which they might legitimate it; that is to say, because the verb has either two alphas or one long (*ἆσε*), but the adjective *ἀεσίφρων* has one short. This difficulty, however, might be more easily removed. It is certain that *ἀασίφρων* is the regularly grammatical form; but the second *α* was changed to *ε*, from the ear being accustomed to such forms as *ἀλφεσίβοιος, ταμεσίχροος, φαεσίμβροτος*.

5. Let us now go back to the verb, and to the passage of Od. *φ*, 293. quoted at length in section 3.; and by comparing it with Od. λ, 61.

Ἆσέ με δαίμονος αἶσα κακὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος οἶνος,

and with *κ*, 68.

Ἄασάν μ' ἕταροί τε κακοὶ πρὸς τοῖσί τε ὕπνος,

we may observe that it is not quite clear and decided whether the active, *ἀᾶσαι τινα*, admits of the transition from the general meaning *to hurt*, to the more limited one *to mislead, render* *foolish, stupify*, &c. The passive ἀασθῆναι occurs frequently in the former and general sense. The middle, on the contrary, ἀάσασθαι, takes wholly and exclusively the latter, that which relates to the mind or understanding. And, indeed, since ἀασάμην literally signifies, *I have misled myself, made myself foolish*, &c., this form throughout gives the idea of its being the person's *own fault*, or, according to the philosophy of the times, the fault is attributed to the *misguidance of some Deity*. Hence then the passive ἀασθῆναι is also frequently used like the middle. This is quite clear in Il. τ, 136. 137., where Agamemnon thus speaks of his former misconduct in his quarrel with Achilles; "Thus also I," says he, "when Hector was slaughtering the Argives at the ships,

> *Οὐ δυνάμην λελαθέσθ' ἄτης, ᾗ πρῶτον ἀάσθην.*"

This plainly refers to the origin of all their misfortune, to his *unreasonable* conduct in the beginning of the quarrel. He then proceeds to say,

> *'Αλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀασάμην, καί μευ φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς.*

Again he uses ἀασάμην alone in precisely the same sense in Il. ι, 116. 119., for which in another place (Il. λ, 340.), where mention is made of foolish thoughtless conduct, the idea is more fully expressed by ἀάσατο δὲ μέγα θυμῷ. The passive ἀασθῆναι, however, in the remaining passages where it occurs (Il. τ, 113. π, 685. Od. δ, 503. Hymn. Ven. 254. Hes. Op. 281.), and where foolish, thoughtless, or wicked conduct is spoken of, bears a reference, more or less, to the folly of the action as well as to the injurious consequences resulting from it. But I will not, by passing judgement on each separate passage, prevent the reflecting reader from exercising his own judgement.

6. It remains only to remark that in Il. τ, 91. ἄτη, ἣ πάντας ἀᾶται, at verse 129. where the same phrase is repeated, and at verse 95. καὶ γὰρ δή νύ ποτε Ζῆν' ἄσατο, τόνπερ ἄριστον, &c.[1], the *middle* occurs in a purely *active* sense.

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[1] This use of the middle voice, repeated three times in one book, and in the same Episode, and never occurring again in Homer, might raise a critical question in examining individual parts of Homer's works; but I will not enter on such an examination here. I will only remark how easily forms, which were not originally in Homer, might have crept into

7. The passages, in which the substantive *ἄτη* occurs in the original and general sense, have been mentioned at the beginning of this article. With reference to the mind or understanding it occurs much more frequently; sometimes with the full construction as in Il. *π*, 805. *ἄτη φρένας εἷλε*, spoken of Patroclus standing as stupified; in *τ*, 88. where Agamemnon says, the Gods in the beginning of that quarrel *μοὶ φρεσὶν ἔμβαλον ἄτην·* and in *κ*, 391. where Dolon complains

Πολλῇσι μ' ἄτῃσι παρὲκ νόον ἤγαγεν Ἕκτωρ . . . . . .

and sometimes *ἄτη* stands alone with the possessive pronoun, as in Il. *α*, 412. that Agamemnon

Γνῷ . . . .
Ἣν ἄτην, ὅτ' ἄριστον Ἀχαιῶν οὐδὲν ἔτισεν·

in *ι*, 115.

Ὦ γέρον, οὔτι ψεῦδος ἐμὰς ἄτας κατέλεξας.
Ἀασάμην, &c.

and in Hes. Op. 93. This reference to the understanding remains then also the sense, where such errors or follies are attributed to the misguidance of the Gods, as in the passage quoted at the beginning of this paragraph from Il. *τ*, 88. and again at v. 270. still with the same reference to the understanding, but in a more general sense;

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἦ μεγάλας ἄτας ἄνδρεσσι διδοῖσθα·

and where Helen says in Od. δ, 261.

. . . . . . *ἄτην δὲ μετέστενον, ἣν Ἀφροδίτη*
Δῶχ' ὅτε μ' ἤγαγε κεῖσε, &c.

This comparison of parallel passages shows a regular use of language, and should therefore teach us, that in separate passages of this kind, where the context admits of both meanings,

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even the old text, and pushed out others. The reading of Aristarchus in v. 95. *Ζεὺς ἄσατο* is indeed condemned by the context (vid. Heyne); but who can depend on *ἄσατο, τὸν* in a passage where *ἄασε, τὸν* might have stood, and would have been more natural and more Homeric? And as to *ἀᾶται*, if we consider that the pres. act. *ἀᾷ* would admit of its last syllable being lengthened, as *ὁρᾷ ἐᾷ* do, it shows the possibility, that an old form *ἀάᾳ* might have existed in the mouths of the rhapsodists, but have been thrust out by the more convenient *ἀᾶται*.

we ought not to translate ἄτη in its general sense, but to give the poet credit for having used it in its more accurate and limited one. For instance, Voss thus translates the former of the two last-quoted passages, "O Father Jove, thou dost indeed cause men to commit great *errors,*" but the latter passage, where the expression is precisely the same, he renders less satisfactorily with this very different meaning, "And I lamented the *harm* which Venus caused, when she induced me to leave my country*."

8. In an usage which has produced two such different meanings as *misfortune* and *fault*, it is conceivable that cases may have occurred, in which both ideas were at the same moment present to the mind of the poet, and which would so much the more naturally coalesce and appear as one, in as much as the things themselves, represented by those ideas, were in those times often confounded together, and sometimes natural evil was punished as moral, sometimes (as we have repeatedly seen above) faults were excused as being the effect of fate. Such an inseparable union of these two ideas seems to be in ἄτη at Il. ω, 480. where it expresses the situation of one who has fled from his country for having killed a man; or at ι, 501. where ἄτη is personified. From the German language not having one word to represent the two ideas, Voss in translating these passages was obliged to choose between them, and he judiciously preferred that of *fault*.

9. Among the derivations of ἄτη with α[2] short is ἀτέω; of which I wish to correct the common acceptation, that it is the same as ἀτάω. The Ionic change of the termination άω with έω ought not alone to be a sufficient ground for such an

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* [The original German runs thus, Vater Zeus, traun grosse *Verblendungen* gibst du den Männern.—Und ich beseufzte das *Unheil,* das Afrodite gab, da sie dorthin mich vom Vaterlande geführet, &c.—Ed.]

[2] Ἀτάω, ἀτέω, ἀτύζω, ἀτέμβω, ἀτάσθαλος. The shortening of a vowel, even when that vowel arose from contraction, as in ἄτη, was very natural in the ancient state of the Greek language, whenever a word was lengthened in its derivatives, and the accent withdrawn from the long syllable. The adoption of a root ἄτω with α short, from which those lengthened forms would be produced, and again of ἀτάω, from which would be formed, by dropping the τ, ἀάω and ἄω, presents improbabilities which strike us at first sight.

acceptation in our lexicons, unless meaning and usage corroborate it, which is not the case here. Ἀτέω is a verb occurring only in the Ionic writers, Homer (Il. υ, 332.) and Herodotus (7, 223.), and always in an intransitive sense; which sense is deduced from the particular meaning of ἄτη (*folly, thoughtlessness*); and of which ἀτύζω is a term of stronger meaning. In the two passages of Homer and Herodotus mentioned above the participle only (ἀτέοντα, ἀτέοντες) occurs, which consequently means *thoughtless, foolishly rash, desperate.* The verb ἀτάω, on the contrary, which occurs only in the Attic drama, is always found in the passive, and in a purely passive sense; therefore, if we suppose an active ἀτάω, it must have a transitive meaning, deduced from the general sense of ἄτη (*harm, injury*); ἀτῶμαι therefore will be, *I suffer harm or injury, experience misfortune,* as in Soph. Antig. 17. Eurip. Suppl. 182. The two verbs active are therefore; ἀτέω, *I am thoughtless, foolish,* &c.; ἀτάω, *I bring into harm or misfortune*[3].

Ἄατος; vid. ἀάατος.

Ἀβροτάζειν, ἀβρότη; vid. ἀμβρόσιος.

3. Ἀγγελίη, ἀγγελίης.

1. The word ἀγγελίη occurs frequently in the Epic poets in this its undisputed form and meaning: sometimes, however, we find ἀγγελίης and ἀγγελίην in a construction unusual for ἀγγελίη, of which the prevailing explanation handed down to us was by means of a substantive, ὁ ἀγγελίας, Ion. ἀγγελίης, the

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[3] The words added in Schneider's Lexicon to the meaning of ἀτάω, "particularly of such harm as thoughtlessness causes," proceeded from a hasty comparison of this ἀτῶμαι with the Homeric ἀάσασθαι. In all the passages of the Tragedians where it is found, there is never the slightest reason for supposing the idea of thoughtlessness to be implied in the verb, even though the action or conduct described might have proceeded from thoughtlessness; and in many passages, as in the two just quoted above, the idea is impossible.

messenger, which made all those passages easy and the construction consistent. In later times, however, this masculine substantive has been rejected, and Hermann Tollius in a particular Excursus to Apollonii Lex. has transferred them all back to ἀγγελίη. In some instances he has not succeeded satisfactorily; and Hermann in his treatise De Ellipsi et Pl. p. 158. has endeavoured with the same view to explain them more grammatically. Still, however, as all doubt and difficulty appear to me very far from having been removed, a more accurate examination may not be superfluous.

2. In entering on this discussion I think it will be best to begin by giving some examples of ἀγγελίη where the usage and construction are plain and undisputed. In Od. κ, 245. Eurylochus comes to Ulysses with the information of Circe having changed his companions into swine, which is thus expressed,

> Εὐρύλοχος δ' αἶψ' ἦλθε . . . .
> Ἀγγελίην ἑτάρων ἐρέων καὶ ἀδευκέα πότμον.

literally translated, "bringing him tidings and the fate of his companions," instead of "tidings *of* his companions and *of* their fate." In Od. η, 263. Ulysses relates of Calypso,

> Καὶ τότε δή με κέλευσεν ἐποτρύνουσα νέεσθαι,
> Ζηνὸς ὑπ' ἀγγελίης, ἢ καὶ νόος ἐτράπετ' αὐτῆς.

i. e. "under the influence of a message from Jupiter to her." In Od. π, 334.

> Τὼ δὲ συναντήτην, κῆρυξ καὶ δῖος ὑφορβὸς,
> Τῆς αὐτῆς ἕνεκ' ἀγγελίης, ἐρέοντε γυναικί.

where the union of two constructions is observable; "on account of the same message, that is, to announce it to the lady." Thus also ὀτρύνειν or ἐποτρύνειν ἀγγελίην τινί, Od. π, 355. ω, 353. means, "to send a hasty message to any one"; and again more fully in ο, 41.

> . . . . τὸν δ' ὀτρῦναι πόλιν εἴσω
> Ἀγγελίην ἐρέοντα περίφρονι Πηνελοπείῃ,

"send him (Eumæus) to carry a hasty message . . . . . ."

3. On the other hand, the passages in which ἀγγελίης and ἀγγελίην have been explained (as mentioned above) by a mas-

culine substantive ὁ ἀγγελίης, are the following. And first of the *nominative*. In Il. γ, 206. Antenor thus speaks to Helen,

> Ἤδη γὰρ καὶ δεῦρο ποτ' ἤλυθε δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς,
> Σεῦ ἕνεκ' ἀγγελίης, σὺν ἀρηϊφίλῳ Μενελάῳ.

the construction here would be, Ὀδυσσεὺς ἤλυθεν ἀγγελίης (for ἄγγελος), σεῦ ἕνεκα. In ν, 252. Idomeneus says to Meriones, who was entering the camp, "Art thou wounded,

> Ἠέ τευ ἀγγελίης μετ' ἔμ' ἤλυθες;"

ἀγγελίης τινός, "as the announcer of something." In Il. ο, 640. speaking of Copreus,

> . . . . ὃς Εὐρυσθῆος ἄνακτος
> Ἀγγελίης οἴχνεσκε βίῃ Ἡρακληείῃ,

"who was accustomed to go as the messenger of Eurystheus to Hercules." The *accusative* is found in the two following passages. In Il. δ, 384.

> Ἔνθ' αὖτ' ἀγγελίην ἐπὶ Τυδῆ στεῖλαν Ἀχαιοί.

the construction would be, Ἀχαιοὶ ἐπέστειλαν Τυδέα ἀγγελίην, "they sent Tydeus as their ambassador." In λ, 140. Agamemnon says of Antimachus,

> Ὅς ποτ' ἐνὶ Τρώων ἀγορῇ Μενέλαον ἄνωγεν
> Ἀγγελίην ἐλθόντα σὺν ἀντιθέῳ Ὀδυσῆϊ
> Αὖθι κατακτεῖναι.

the construction would be, ὃς ἄνωγε κατακτεῖναι Μενέλαον ἀγγελίην ἐλθόντα, "to kill Menelaus, who was come as ambassador."

4. If we do not adopt this mode of explanation, we must suppose two forms of speech expressing the same leading idea; ἔρχομαι, οἰχνῶ ἀγγελίης (genitive), and ἔρχομαι ἀγγελίην, ἐπιστέλλω σε ἀγγελίην. The old and usual manner of explaining such a case is, to suppose that preposition, which suits most naturally the thought, to be omitted; thus here in the case of the genitive, ἕνεκα is supplied, which we see expressed in the example quoted above from Od. π, 334.; and in the case of the accusative, we must supply εἰς, which we also find added in Schol. ad Il. λ, 140. Generally speaking, and without reference to the present question, I do not object to this mode of explanation, provided it be handled philosophically. That is

to say, such a preposition is not, properly speaking, omitted; but as every oblique case is a noun containing in itself the idea of a preposition, the genitive or the accusative takes, in such a situation as we are speaking of, that preposition which the context requires. Thus in ἔρχεσθαι ἀγγελίην, the accusative, as in so many other Greek constructions, is the case of the more distant object, as we say in English, "*to go an errand, go a journey**," for "*to go on an errand, on a journey*," without, therefore, the preposition being really omitted[1]. In the same manner the *genitive* expresses different meanings of a sentence, of which some are so peculiar to that particular case, that it can be brought by syntax under certain leading ideas as rules; others are more isolated, and of these some remain only in poetry, as κονίοντες πεδίοιο, θέρεσθαι πυρός, ὡρμήθη Ἀκάμαντος (Il. ξ, 488.); others have maintained their place in prose, as ζηλῶ σε τοῦ πλούτου, λαβέσθαι ποδός, οὕτως ἀνοίας ἔχει: and with these we may very fairly class ἔρχομαι ἀγγελίης†, since the idea of the preposition, which is not expressed, arises of itself from the context. We have only to add, that in all the passages above quoted, this mode of explanation, as compared with the former, alters nothing in the construction, in as much as the nominative ἀγγελίης taken for ἄγγελος, and the oblique case ἀγγελίης or ἀγγελίην standing like an adverb, are both attached to the verb. In the first passage, then, the construction must be ἤλυθεν ἀγγελίης, "he came with a message" or "in an embassy," σεῦ ἕνεκα "on thy account"; and in the fourth passage, ἐπέστειλαν Τυδῆ ἀγγελίην, "they sent him on an embassy." And in the second only it seems more agreeable to this mode of explanation to join ἀγγελίης τευ "with some kind of message," not to consider them as two separate genitives, the one governing the other, "with a message of something."

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* [. . . . From them I go
This uncouth errand.—MILTON's *Paradise Lost.*

The corresponding illustration used by Buttmann is, *Botschaft laufen* for *auf Botschaft laufen.*—ED.]

[1] This is also the meaning of Hermann's explanation, that here we have one of those mixtures of two modes of expression so common in Greek; that is to say, ἔρχεσθαι with φέρειν ἀγγελίαν, because this latter consists in going as well as the former. In other words, ἔρχεσθαι, which elsewhere takes after itself only a remote object with the aid of a preposition, takes here the case of the nearer object, as in the expression φέρειν ἀγγελίαν.

† [So in vulgar English, to go *of* a message.—ED.]

5. I think I have now put this mode of explanation also in a full and clear light. And presenting, as it does, even taking any passage separately, little more unusual than we see in many other Homeric constructions, with which commentators feel no difficulty, it must appear surprising that the adoption of a masculine substantive ὁ ἀγγελίης should have been introduced merely by means of these passages; and that too, not by the casual conjecture of a grammarian, (as some are ascribed to Zenodotus,) but, as far as we can ascertain, a mode of explanation handed down from remote antiquity. For wherever we search with the expectation of finding that mode which is the older, in the Scholia, in Apollonius, in Hesychius, &c., this is the established one; while Eustathius is quite silent on it, and only once (γ, 206.) speaks expressly of the other, which we will in future for the sake of brevity call the feminine mode of explanation. This latter, on the contrary, is announced only as an opinion of Zenodotus; for it is expressly said, that at Il. ο, 640. where the doubt is whether ἀγγελίης was considered to be a genitive or a nominative, he read ἀγγελίην, which in that place can only be the accusative of ἡ ἀγγελίη; and at Il. γ, 206. where Σεῦ ἕνεκ' ἀγγελίης has given rise to the same doubt, that he read Σῆς, evidently in agreement with the genitive ἀγγελίης, but as evidently a mere artificial reading. For in this last passage the masculine mode of explanation is indisputably the most natural construction, ἤλυθεν ἀγγελίης, σεῦ ἕνεκα: not, indeed, that the other is incorrect, if we keep to the reading σεῦ; ἤλυθεν ἀγγελίης (with a message) σεῦ ἕνεκα*, whereas ἤλυθεν σεῦ ἕνεκ' ἀγγελίης is harsh and obscure: hence the construction, ἤλυθεν ἕνεκα ἀγγελίης σεῦ, appeared preferable; (vid. Eustathius;) but then the language required, instead of the personal σεῦ, the possessive σῆς, which accordingly Zenodotus placed in the text. For it was supposed that ἀγγελίη σεῦ or σὴ ἀγγελίη might here mean "the message concerning thee," in the same

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* [Thus also Passow in his excellent Greek and German Lexicon explains the construction by χάριν ἀγγελίας σοῦ ἕνεκα.—Ed.]

way as in Od. κ, 245. quoted at p. 12. ἀγγελίην ἑτάρων means "tidings of or concerning thy companions." But in this latter the tidings are of the absent companions of Ulysses, and of their fate, while in the former Ulysses comes to Troy, where Helen was, with *a commission which concerns her*: now this also must be ἀγγελίη Ἑλένης, or, if addressed to her, ἀγγελίη σή*. Apollonius, who gives the preference to the masculine mode of explanation, speaks thus in dispraise of the opinion of Zenodotus: Ζηνόδοτος δὲ τοῦτο ἀγνοήσας γράφει, &c. And the Schol. A. runs thus: ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει, σῆς ἕνεκ' ἀγγελίης. Οὐ λέγει δὲ (scil. ὁ ποιητὴς) συνήθως ἡμῖν, τῆς σῆς ἀγγελίας χάριν, ἀλλ' ἀγγελίης ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄγγελος.

6. It is clear, then, that in the time of the Alexandrine grammarians the masculine mode of explanation was the established one. And when we recollect that the feminine mode employed the most familiar form, and, as we have seen before, seemed to offer itself for adoption so easily by the mere omission of a preposition, we can hardly conceive that the masculine mode of explanation would have been the established one, if it had not been handed down from the most remote antiquity. Besides, if the feminine explanation be considered the genuine one, there is this very striking and singular appearance, that Homer, without any reason, uses indiscriminately ἐλθεῖν ἀγγελίην and ἐλθεῖν ἀγγελίης: which remark becomes of more importance, when we consider that, on the other hand, by the adoption of the masculine ὁ ἀγγελίης the difference of case is in every instance required by the construction, though the construction is *always of a similar kind.* And in the same way other doubts may also present themselves; as, for instance, in γ, 206. ἤλυθε σεῦ ἕνεκ' ἀγγελίης, where, as has been remarked before, the only natural explanation is that which adopts the masculine ὁ ἀγγελίης; whereas, if we take the feminine ἡ ἀγγελίη, the passage requires the accusative rather than the genitive, ἤλυθε....σεῦ ἕνεκ' ἀγγελίην: a remark which must be exactly reversed in δ, 384., and hence the before-mentioned indiscriminate use of the two cases becomes much worse than if the construction admitted either indifferently. Again, in ο,

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* [Thus we find ἀγγελίη ἐμή, "information concerning me," Il. τ, 336.—Ed.]

640. the singular ἀγγελίης, if by it we understand a message, and not a messenger, is unnatural, because the context implies a repetition of messages, so that one might in that case be induced to propose as a correction, ὃς Εὐρυσθῆος ἄνακτος Ἀγγελίας οἴχνεσκε.....

7. We must now examine the only passage out of Homer which belongs to this disquisition. In the Theogonia 781. are these verses, not very well connected with the context, it is true, but therefore the less to be suspected :

> *Παῦρα δὲ Θαύμαντος θυγάτηρ πόδας ὠκέα Ἶρις*
> *Ἀγγελίης πωλεῖται ἐπ' εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης.*

Here the genitive ἀγγελίης is as admissible in construction with πωλεῖται as it is in the Homeric passages, while, on the contrary, the masculine explanation is not possible. But then here is a various reading, Ἀγγελίη. One should certainly be rather unwilling to suppose that ἀγγελίη meant both "a message" and "a female messenger." But if, on the other hand, we consider that words with such a twofold meaning are by no means uncommon in all languages,—for instance, in the Latin in the case of the masculine *nuntius* ; if we consider that ἀγγελίη in this sense bears the same relation to the masculine ἀγγελίης as ταμίη does to ταμίης ; that, further, since ἄγγελος did not suit the verse, the phrase Ἶρις Ἀγγελίη πωλεῖται seemed to offer itself naturally as a parallel of the other masculine ἀγγελίης, and was perfectly intelligible ; that, on the other hand, without adopting this, the origin of that various reading must be ascribed to mere accident,—for what grammarian would have dared make it for the occasion ?—if we consider all this, I think we must class this passage with the others of Homer; and then it only remains for us to choose between the two modes of explanation which have formed the great question of this article. For my own part, I do not hesitate to declare in favour of that which I also believe to be the most ancient.

8. Meantime I will endeavour to spare others trouble by laying down briefly what I consider to be the most probable manner of resolving the points in question. Let us suppose that in the older Greek language ἐλθεῖν ἀγγελίης and ἀγγελίην (gn. and accus. fem.) were both in use, and that the doubt as

to which was the more correct usage arose in the time of the rhapsodists, not in that of the poet. In that case, in some passage where either the one or the other of these words occurred, and where the construction was harsh, there might have arisen an idea of a substantive ὁ ἀγγελίης even in times of very remote antiquity. If this mode of explanation were afterwards adopted by some great authority, as, for instance, by Aristarchus, all those passages would be for the first time brought into uniformity by establishing a nominative -ης, and an accusative -ην, according to the construction; and even ἀγγελίη might have been admitted into the Theogonia. The reading of Zenodotus, ἀγγελίην in ο, 640. is then by this supposition to be looked upon as one of those doubtful points handed down to him, and of which he maintained the correctness. Any observations, however, as to the one or the other of these constructions being more or less natural, must on the whole depend, as it does in so many other cases of Epic criticism, on the greater or less improbability of its acceptation; and this must be left for each to determine according to his own judgement *.

4. Ἀγέρωχος.

1. The grammarians have taken sufficient care to let us know that this word is used by Homer in a good sense, but by the later writers in a bad one. The Lex. Etym. begins its article with these words, ῥητορικὴ ἡ λέξις: that is to say, the word, which occurs frequently in Homer and Pindar, is never found, as far as I am aware of, in pure Attic Greek, but from the time of Polybius it is very common in prose as well as verse. Doubtless, then, the word had always remained in use in the dialects of Asia, and from them passed, by means of the Asiatic schools of rhetoric, into the language of the rhetoricians, who formed the later prose, and whose style, even in words and forms, was always contrary to the Attic.

2. In these later writers the meaning of ἀγέρωχος is *wild*,

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* [Passow rejects entirely the masculine substantive as quite unnecessary.—Ed.]

untamed, unmanageable; a sense which, as applied to animals only, is good as well as bad[1], but when applied to men becomes most generally some such meaning as *arrogant, haughty*, e. g. Plut. Am. Fratr. c. extr. The observation of the grammarians that Homer uses ἀγέρωχος always in a good sense is certainly correct; but from the varied nature of their explanations, as ἔντιμος, σεμνός, ἀνδρεῖος, it would be difficult to ascertain the exact meaning of the word, or in what sense they understood it in the different passages where it is found; nay, they have even given a different etymology as the foundation of different meanings. In Homer we find ἀγέρωχος a frequent epithet of the *Trojans*, and once of the *Mysians* (κ, 430.), but always as soldiers and warriors; again, in the catalogue of the ships, of the *Rhodians*; beside which it is given only to *Periclymenus*. Now from these passages we can gather nothing more than that it is an epithet suited to soldiers and warriors as such; but they do not enable us to ascertain the exact sense which lies at the root of the word. The mythological account of Periclymenus (the only hero who has this epithet, and to whom Hesiod also has given it in Fragm. 22. Gaisf.) is not come down to us with sufficient minuteness to enable us to say that it is a personal epithet peculiar to him. Mythology only tells us that Neptune had given him the power of changing himself into any kind of animal, by which he was able to resist Hercules for a long time. One hint we may perhaps gain, that when the word is used as an epithet of a people, they are generally Asiatics, still without implying any want of courage, for the Mysians are called in other places ἀγχέμαχοι and καρτερόθυμοι.

3. Pindar has it as an epithet of illustrious actions, ἀγερώχων ἐργμάτων, Nem. 6, 56.; of victory in general, Ol. 10, 96.; and of riches, πλούτου στεφάνωμ' ἀγέρωχον, Pyth. 1, 96.; which last passage may perhaps bring to our recollection that the only Greek nation which has this epithet in Homer is the

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[1] There is a gloss in Lex. Seg. 6. p. 336. Ἀγέρωχος ταῦρος· σεμνὸς ὑπερόπτης, θρασύς. However correct the expression ταῦρος ἀγέρωχος may be (vid. Himer. Ecl. 12, 6.), still the explanation does not accord with it. Undoubtedly it ought to be Ἀγέρωχος· γαῦρος, σεμνὸς, &c., for these meanings occur in different glossaries, and Hesychius has, amongst others, γαῦρος.

wealthy Rhodians. Add to this, that its later sense, in which it was rather a term of reproach, was *ὑπερηφανία* and *αὐθαδία*, and I think I see the one idea which pervades all this in *haughtiness*, which, among the Asiatic nations and the wealthy, showed itself in external display: when, therefore, the more ancient Greeks expressed this sense by *ἀγέρωχος*, they attached to it no idea of reproach; so that the explanation *σεμνός* appears to me to have a particular reference to external dignity and show[2]. Besides this, it is worthy of remark that while Pindar uses the word only in a good sense, Archilochus and Alcæus used it even as early as their times in a reproachful one. Vid. Eustath. in note 2.

4. On the derivation of *ἀγέρωχος* I can say nothing to confirm or assist what others have said before, which is the more singular, as the word appears to be formed of such plain elements. Of all the attempts of the grammarians, the most passable is that of *γεράοχος* with *α* intensive. And if I were to render it by *an honourable man*, many would no doubt be satisfied with the translation. This explanation accords, however, too little with established usage for me to adopt it as my own, which I could only do by substituting the *α* redundant for the *α* intensive, which indeed in some words does take place, but here has too little analogy to be supported.

5. Ἄγρα, ἀγρεῖν.

1. Of the verb *ἀγρεῖν* Homer has only the imperative *ἄγρει*, which he uses as a mere interjection, *age!* "come!"; but he has many evident derivatives from it, as *παλινάγρετος*, *ζωγρεῖν*, &c. However, the real use of the verb in ancient Greek, with the simple meaning of *to take*, is put beyond a doubt by the fragment of Archilochus, *Ἄγρει δ' οἶνον ἐρυθρὸν ἀπὸ τρυγός*, Brunck's Anal 1, 41.

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[2] Eustath. ad Il. *β*, 654. *δηλοῖ δέ φασιν ἡ λέξις οὕτως τοὺς σεμνοὺς, ὡς Ἀλκμὰν βούλεται.* This last expression is new to me, although it must point to the meaning of the word in Alkman, since immediately after *βούλεται* follows *Ἀλκαῖος δέ φασι καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος ἀγέρωχον τὸν ἄκοσμον καὶ ἀλάζονα οἶδεν.*

2. The almost exact agreement of meaning between this verb and *ἄγρα, ἀγρεύειν* (game, prey, to catch, to seize,) can leave no doubt of their immediate connexion. My object in the present article is only to prevent a mistake which frequently occurs in the derivation. In general *ἄγρα* is derived either from *ἄγρος* or from *ἀγείρω*, with either of which the word coincides as to meaning very well, yet with neither so exactly as to make one feel that such derivation must necessarily be the true one. And there is this disadvantage in it, that as soon as one of these derivations is adopted, the sense of *ἀγρεῖν*, and whatever is formed from it, must be deduced from that particular meaning of *ἄγρα*, *hunting* or *game*, as being the only sense favourable to it. In that case we must trace it thus: *ἀγρεῖν* is properly *to hunt* game in the fields, then it comes to mean generally *to catch* or *lay hold on*, and thence simply *to take*; which last sense is contained in *παλινάγρετος*, Il. *α*, 526., where Jupiter says, *Οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν παλινάγρετον*, " none of my resolutions can be *taken back again*, they are irrevocable" ; and the other sense is in *πυράγρα*, an instrument for *laying hold on* things in the fire, a pair of tongs. But this way of tracing the meanings of a word is one which must offend any one at all skilled in etymological investigation, though others may be satisfied with it, and may think it quite agreeable to the simple language of antiquity to call a resolution *παλινάγρετον*, taking the metaphor from an animal, which the hunter, whenever it escapes from him, pursues and endeavours to retake. To correct such misrepresentations, which frequently confuse and obscure the explanation of a word, I here offer my opinion.

3. The sense of *to hunt* is not a pure ancient meaning of *ἀγρεῖν*. Stephanus quotes but one instance of it, viz. in an epigram of Phanias in Brunck's Anal. 2. p. 54. ; and since it was a verb become quite obsolete in common language, it is evident that only such a poet would have allowed himself, common as the change of *έω* and *εύω* otherwise is, to have used, even once, for the sake of the metre, *ἀγρεῖν* for *ἀγρεύειν*. The proper meaning of the verb *ἀγρεῖν* (of which, as has been said before, only the imperative in its particular interjectional usage remained in the common language of the older times,) was undoubtedly *to take hold on, to take*; and it was nothing more

than another form of αἱρεῖν, as is evident from the intimate connexion of the vowel *i* with the consonants *j* and *g*. Thus, from ΡΑΓΩ, whence ῥήγνυμι, came another form ῥαίω, with a similar meaning.

4. The imperative of this ἀγρεῖν became (like *age* in Latin, or *tenez* in French,) a common interjectional particle; the rest of the verb disappeared before the other form αἱρέω, leaving behind some derivatives, at the head of which stands ἄγρα, literally meaning *a catch*, whence, 1st, *game*, 2nd, *hunting*; and hence ἀγρεύειν, to which some poet or other added ἀγρεῖν as a sister form. Without further investigation we may now trace from the true radical word and radical meaning ἀγρεῖν, *to take* or *lay hold on*, the other derivatives πυράγρα, ζωάγριον, ζωγρεῖν, παλινάγρετος, αὐτάγρετος; and this last in particular strikingly confirms my opinion; for the αὐτάγρετος of Homer, Od. π, 148. Εἰ γάρ πως εἴη αὐτάγρετα πάντα βροτοῖσιν, is, as every one knows, the αὐθαίρετος of common language.

6. Ἀδῆσαι, ἄμεναι, ἑῶμεν, ἄδην, ἄδος, ἀδημονεῖν.

1. In Homer, but nowhere else, are found the forms ἀδήσειεν and ἀδηκότες, from a verb ἀδεῖν, ἀδῆσαι, *to feel disgust or dislike*. With this is joined another Homeric word, a complete ἅπαξ εἰρημένον, from Il. λ, 88. ἄδος, *disgust, weariness*. And as this last has the first syllable short, and the others the first syllable long, some of the grammarians have introduced into Homer the reading ἀδδήσειεν, ἀδδηκότες, similar to what we see in ἔδδεισεν and ἀδδεές. (See note 1. on θεουδής.) Again, the substantive ἄδος is brought into connexion with the Epic verb ἆσαι, *to satiate*. To make this grammatical we must adopt a theme ΑΔΩ, from which on the one side shall come the verbal substantive ἄδος, on the other the formation ἆσαι; but then the quantity is against it. We see, therefore, that the connexion of these forms with each other, and with that which seems to follow so naturally, with *satur*, is by no means free from difficulties.

2. The participle ἀδηκότες is always found in the construction καμάτῳ ἀδηκότες, and the idea attached to it is *disgusted,*

wearied, satiated, which connects it with ἆσαι. But twice (Il. κ, 98., Od. μ, 281.) we find joined καμάτῳ ἀδηκότες ἠδὲ καὶ ὕπνῳ. The Scholiast in a straightforward manner explains ὕπνῳ at once by ἀγρυπνίᾳ. Heyne, following the example of Eustathius, says the same with great circumlocution, that the thing very often stands for the want or deficiency of it, as if one should say that a ship was lost through the steersman, that is to say, through his not being at the helm. Therefore, *satiated, wearied with sleep* is to mean *with the want of it!* Impossible[1]. On the other hand, we may say, to be *oppressed* with sleep (a word generally implying a painful feeling); and Horace's well-known imitation of Homer, *ludo fatigatumque somno* (Ode 3, 4, 11.), though the expression be somewhat bolder than the original, yet, if translated thus, makes the sense good and complete, which it could not be if rendered by *satiatum.* In short ἀδηκότες does not give the idea of satiety, but that of pain, disgust, dislike; and this meaning is confirmed by the exactly parallel passage in Od. ζ, 2. ὕπνῳ καὶ καμάτῳ ἀρημένος. If, however, any one still inclines to the usual interpretation of ἀδηκότες, and supposes ὕπνῳ to have been added by the poet without thought, let him examine ἀδήσειε in Od. α, 134. a little more accurately than seems to have been generally done. The stranger guest arrives; Telemachus prepares him a seat apart from the suitors,

μὴ ξεῖνος ἀνιηθεὶς ὀρυμαγδῷ
Δείπνῳ ἀδήσειεν ὑπερφιάλοισι μετελθών.

The idea of satiety cannot possibly find a place here; and whoever reads the passage, without having previously made up his mind as to the meaning of ἀδήσειεν, must at once feel that it can only express mere disgust or dislike.

3. Thus much as regards the meaning. That ἀδηκότες, from whatever verb it come, cannot have the α short; and consequently that the grammatical assistance of the δδ, making ἀδδηκότες, is superfluous and ungrammatical, follows of itself

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[1] Another Scholiast compares with it the expression μεστὸς ὕπνου: the comparison is very fair; but no one can mean that the expressions *full of sleep* and *satiated with sleep* can be used for each other.

from the perfect form. The temporal augment, which supplies the place of the reduplication of the perfect, is never omitted in the Epic poets when the vowel is short, with the single exception of the verb ἄνωγα, which no longer occurs as a perfect: it is, therefore, impossible that so evident a perfect as the participle before us can throw it aside. But where the vowel was long by nature, there the augment was never wanted; as, for instance, the long *α* does without the augment *η* (which otherwise is only visible when it lengthens a word), in the aor. ᾱ̓σα (whatever be its meaning), and in the part. pf. ᾱρημένος. The true formation of the verb before us is, therefore, ἀδέω, ἄδησα, ἄδηκα, all with *α* long.

4. As far as relates to the quantity, then, there is no reason for rejecting the connexion of the verbs ἀδῆσαι and ἆσαι. The substantive ἄδος, which in this respect differs from both, shall be considered hereafter. At present let us examine the meaning of ἆσαι, which in the active voice has both a transitive and an intransitive sense. The spears fly, λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἆσαι, "*to feed on* human flesh." Phœnix, reminding Achilles of his childhood, says to him, Il. ι, 489. "Thou wouldst not partake of any meal unless I took thee on my knee and

> Ὄψον τ' ἄσαιμι προταμὼν καὶ οἶνον ἐπισχών."

Again, in Il. τ, 307. the sorrowing Achilles begs the chiefs

> Μή με πρὶν σίτοιο κελεύετε μηδὲ ποτῆτος
> Ἄσασθαι φίλον ἦτορ . . . .

Strong contraries these to that ἀδῆσαι δείπνῳ, all of them expressing an agreeable pleasurable feeling of satiety. And if this verb is once used with a sarcastic insinuation of getting too much, yet this, as in our expression of "getting enough of a thing," is easily to be observed; as when Polydamas, Il. σ, 281. says of the Greeks, that if any one of them shall choose to try an attack under the walls of Troy, he will have to return,

> ἐπεί κ' ἐριαύχενας ἵππους
> Παντοίου δρόμου ἄσῃ ὑπὸ πτόλιν ἠλασκάζων·

where an ironical allusion is made to the pleasure which the spirited horses would feel in galloping about. Similar to this, but without any sarcastic insinuation, is Il. ω, 717. ἄσεσθε *κλαυθμοῖο*, "then you may take your fill of weeping," and ψ, 157. *γόοιο μὲν ἔστι καὶ ἆσαι*, "it is possible for one even to have enough of weeping." In all these passages there is no idea of dislike or disgust, but always of pleasure and satisfaction.

5. These forms just quoted with the meaning of satiety point decidedly to a theme ΑΔΩ, which, however, must necessarily have the *α* long. But some other forms lead us away from that theme, e. g. Il. φ, 70.

> *ἐγχείη . . . .*
> *. . . . ἱεμένη χροὸς ἄμεναι ἀνδρομέοιο.*

That this form belongs through its meaning to the intransitive *ἆσαι*, is clear; as also that it is the infin. pres. for *ἄειν*, *ἀέμεναι*. Those who adopt a present ΑΔΩ wish to read or pronounce it *ἄμμεναι*, contrary to all analogy; much rather would the analogy of *ἔδμεναι* give *ἄδμεναι*. To *ἄμεναι* may be added the pres. pass. *ἆται* according to Hesychius, or *ἄαται* with the sense of the future from Scut. Herc. 101. (vid. note on *ἀντιᾷν*.): and the pres. *ἄω* is therefore to be considered as in use in the language of the Epic poets. From the same theme is evidently derived the adj. *ἆτος*, *insatiable*, compounded of *ἀ* and *ἀτός*.

6. Here we must also mention the unusual form *ἑῶμεν* in Il. τ, 402. in the address of Achilles to his horses: "Take care to carry your master safe in a very different way (from what you did Patroclus)*

> *"Ἂψ Δαναῶν ἐς ὅμιλον, ἐπεί χ' ἑῶμεν πολέμοιο."*

The various readings worth mentioning are *ἕωμεν*, *ὦμεν* (Hesych. in Ἐπεί—, p. 1321.), and *κ' ἐῶμεν*. Of *ἐῶμεν* from *ἐάω*, none of the commentators, as far as I know, ever had a thought; and indeed the construction would be against it. If we read *ἕωμεν*, it must be the aor. 2. subjunct. of *ἵημι*: but this also is unknown in this construction. For my part, I think it may be a question, whether *ἵημι*, which, it is true, in Homer is invariably both itself and in its compounds transitive only, may not have had also the neuter meaning, *to go from*, *to leave*

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* [I have translated the passage according to its generally received meaning, but Buttmann renders it thus: "At other times you were accustomed to carry your master back safe to the Greeks whenever we had had enough of war."—Ed.]

behind, which in later Greek *ἀνίημι* had. For instance, we see that *ἐρωεῖν* (which I shall examine in its turn) has properly the positive meaning of, "to move, to rush forwards," but by the addition of the genitive it has the sense of *ἐξερωεῖν*, "to move away from, move backwards from....": in the same way might *ἵημι πολέμοιο* in Homer have the same meaning as the more complete construction *ἀνίημι* afterwards had. But I leave this as a mere possibility, and proceed to that for which I introduced the mention of *ἑῶμεν*.—By a rare coincidence, all the scholiasts and glossators, without one exception, explain the word by *πληρωθῶμεν, κορεσθῶμεν*. Heyne is satisfied with that explanation, and supposes an ellipsis taken from *ἐξ ἔρον εἶναι*, which occurs elsewhere in the sense of *to be full, satisfied*: but certainly of all ellipses the most incomprehensible, "I send of the war" for "I send away," i. e. "I drive away from myself the desire of war." In the grammarians, it is true, both these expressions are found mentioned together (vid. Eustath. ad l. and Hesych. in Ἐπεί–, p. 1323.); but what is there not to be found in the grammarians? It is impossible that those who explained *ἑῶμεν* simply by *κορεσθῶμεν* should have wished to be understood in that way: the fact is, they had this translation of the old word by tradition, and some one of them, reversing the usual mode of explanation, tried among other things to explain the translation by quoting the original.

7. The Etym. M. under the word Ἄδην gives quite different explanations of *ἑῶμεν*, from which we will cite only two, according to the one of which we must adopt a verb *ἕω*, *I satiate,* according to the other *ἄω, ὧ, ᾇς, ᾇ*, with the same meaning, whence *ἄσειν*, &c. Setting aside, then, the mistakes and misconceptions of the later grammarians, we see that there was an old admitted tradition, that *ἐῶμεν* meant *κορεσθῶμεν*, and that it belonged to that *ἄω*, to which belong *ἄμεναι* and *ἆσαι χροός*: from *ἄω* comes the subjunctive *ἄωμεν* with *α* long, and thence according to a well-known analogy may come *ἕωμεν*. With accent and aspirate, which were an amusement of the grammarians, we need not trouble ourselves. If we follow this derivation, the reading must be *ἐπεί κ' ἕωμεν*; and in any case it is clear that an old tradition as early as the most ancient commentators admitted the theme to be not

ἄδω but ἄω. On the other hand, if my former supposition be preferred, we must read ἐπεί χ' ἕωμεν: for the *properispomenon* there is no ground whatever. Again, in the one case it is the aorist, in the other the present; either sense, "when we have left" or "when we have had enough of—the war," suits the context. After having well considered it, I prefer the latter, as a very ancient traditionary explanation.

8. The adverb ἄδην, *fully, enough, to satiety*, belongs also to this inquiry. The first syllable of this word is generally short; as in Il. ν, 315. οἵ μιν ἄδην ἐλόωσι, and in Hes. ap. Ath. 10, p. 428. c. ὅστις ἄδην πίνει. But as it occurs long at Il. ε, 203., it is there written ἄδδην. This word also is by some derived from ΑΔΩ, which theme on account of the before-mentioned ἄδος is taken to be short, contrary to the quantity of ἆσαι: and a substantive is supposed, ἄδη, of which this adverb is the accusative.—But δην is undoubtedly a common adverbial ending, as in βάδην. Now, as we have seen ἄ-μεναι and ἀ-τός, so is ἄ-δην clear and confirmatory of all which has been said above. Ἄδδην is therefore an unnecessary addition; for ἄδην with α long from ἄω, ἆσαι, is much more agreeable to analogy than with α short; and ἄδην with α short arose from the syllable being shortened, as βάδην and the dual βάτην were shortened from βήδην, βήτην[2]. Still it is singular that the derivative of this adverb ἀδηφάγος should be so commonly found written ἀδδηφάγος in the MSS. and in the later writers even in prose. If it were found long in verse, the same observations would apply to it as to ἄδην, but I find it universally short; in Soph. Philoct. 313. Theocr. 22, 115. Callim. Dian. 160.; and therefore now the good editions, at least of the old writers, have judiciously restored ἀδηφάγος[3]. This adverb, then, pro-

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[2] It comes to the same thing, whether this account be admitted, or whether we suppose that ἄω in its flexions has α short as well as α long: in which latter case, the form ἄᾰτος, which has been mentioned before in its place, might easily be justified. Vid. ἀάατος sect. 5.

[3] Probably the being accustomed to see in Il. ε, 203. (which passage plainly contains the etymology of ἀδηφάγος) εἰωθότες ἔδμεναι ἄδδην, written with δδ, was the cause why we so often find ἀδδηφάγος. In Ælian V. H. 1, 27. and 9, 13. this last is the reading of the text, as well as in Athen. 10. p. 416. b., where, however, we may conclude from Schweighäuser's note, the reading in the MS. to be the correct one.

perly signifies, *enough*, *fully*, as when Il. ε, 203. Pandarus says of his horses εἰωθότες ἔδμεναι ἄδην, "accustomed to eat their fill"; but the idea soon passes to over-fullness, or too much, (so with us, *to satiate* is used in both senses,) as in the fragment of Hesiod quoted above, ὅστις ἄδην πίνει, οἶνος δέ οἱ ἔπλετο μάργος, and the same therefore holds good in ἀδηφάγος.

9. Not so clear is another expression in which this word occurs three times in Homer; as in Il. ν, 315. οἵ μιν ἄδην ἐλόωσι καὶ ἐσσύμενον πολέμοιο. in τ, 423. οὐ λήξω πρὶν Τρῶας ἄδην ἐλάσαι πολέμοιο. in Od. ε, 290. ἀλλ' ἔτι μέν μίν φημι ἄδην ἐλάᾳν κακότητος. These passages seem to favour the opinion of those who look on ἄδην as an accusative: for the explanation given is, ἐλαύνειν εἰς ἄδην τοῦ πολέμου. This explanation, however, is certainly not sufficient to induce us to abandon the view which we have before taken of ἄδην, and which is so agreeable to analogy. Ἄδην ἐλαύνειν appears to me to mean, *probe exercitare*, and the genitive to determine the thought to the particular object in the Homeric manner, as λούεσθαι ποταμοῖο, πρῆσαι πυρός.

10. Since, then, in all the forms belonging to ἆσαι there is nothing to indicate a root ΑΔ-, and, although in certain passages the meanings of ἆσαι and ἀδῆσαι approximate very nearly to each other, still ἀδῆσαι, as we have seen, has not the idea of satiety and pleasurable repletion; we must consider these two as separate verbs. Let us now class with ἀδῆσαι the word ἀδολέσχης, which cannot well be derived from ἄδην, and besides, notwithstanding its length, has its first syllable always long, and we shall see great probability in the observation of the old grammarians, that ἀδῆσαι is contracted from ἀηδῆσαι*. The strongest testimony in proof of this is Phrynichus in App. Soph. p. 22. who, speaking of the word ἀδολεσχεῖν, expressly says that the Ionians pronounced ἀηδία as a trisyllable. And in Hesychius we find the glosses ἀδής, ἀδές, and ἀδίᾳ in a sense confirmatory of this derivation[4]. The verb in its first form

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* [Passow in his Lexicon says, "Buttmann considers ἀδέω as con-"tracted from ἀηδέω, and thus accounts for the length of the alpha: "but this contraction with the alpha privative is contrary to all ana-"logy."—Ed.]

[4] See a long note in Hesych. p. 94.

ἀηδέω is incapable of admitting the augment (vid. Buttmann's ausf. Sprach. sect. 84. obs. 4.[5]), and therefore the α remained unchanged in the contraction (ἀδηκότες).

11. We must now come to some decision on the substantive ἄδος. The only passage where the word occurs is Il. λ, 88. speaking of a woodman,

> Ἦμος δὲ δρυτόμος περ ἀνὴρ ὡπλίσσατο δεῖπνον
> Οὔρεος ἐν βήσσῃσιν, ἐπεί τ' ἐκορέσσατο χεῖρας
> Τάμνων δένδρεα μακρὰ, ἄδος τέ μιν ἵκετο θυμόν.

It must be confessed that ἄδος here, considered by itself, may, as well as ἐκορέσσατο, arise out of the simple idea of enough or sufficiency. But as ἐκορέσσατο precedes, and the word θυμός is joined with the word ἄδος, we see that the one general idea is divided into two. The man has laboured *enough*, and begins to feel a *dislike and unwillingness* to labour any longer. The quantity of ἄδος, which is equally opposed to both ἀδῆσαι and ἆσαι, need not embarrass us; for as the word never occurs elsewhere, there is nothing to hinder us from reading with Heyne,

> Τάμνων δένδρεα μάκρ', ἆδός τέ, &c.

That is to say, the forms ἀδής, ἀδέω, even supposing them to have been no older than that which is to us the earliest period of the Greek language, were yet quite old enough for a substantive neut. in ος to be formed from them: which indeed, in a word known to be a compound as soon as uttered, would be contrary to all analogy.

12. The derivation of another word, generally admitted to be from ἀδῆσαι, I must, however, reject; namely, that of the verb ἀδημονεῖν, which has α short, as in Nicand. ap. Ath. 7, p. 282. *f*. and Strato. epigr. 68. The syllable may, indeed, have become short, as in ἀτῶμαι, ἀτάσθαλος; but to admit this supposition, the derivation of the verb ἀδημονεῖν from ἀδῆσαι must be as natural and easy as the derivation of those words is from ἄτη. Whereas so far from that being the case, this is one

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[5] In verbs beginning with ευ the augment ηυ is more used by the Attics than by any others: where, indeed, the ευ is an integral part of the verb, as in εὔχεσθαι, the Attics preferred ηὐχόμην, ηὐξάμην, while the common usage was εὐχόμην, εὐξάμην: but in the case of εὑρίσκω, we seldom find even in the Attic writers ηὕρισκον, ηὑρέθην, generally εὕρισκον, εὗρον, εὑρέθην, and the perfect is always εὕρηκα.

of those derivations, to diminish the number of which will be rendering a great service to philology; I mean such words as have been classed together under the same root from a mere similarity of letters and syllables, and then suffered, in the explanation of passages and in the lexicons, torturings and twistings of meaning, which the word never had, in order to bring the idea nearer to the supposed root. *Wearisomeness of mind, disgust, trouble, anxiety*, &c., are the leading meanings of ἀδημονεῖν in the lexicons, and prevent the right understanding of passages; while the old glosses give the true explanations, such as ἀγωνιᾷν, ἀπορεῖν, ἀμηχανεῖν, θαυμάζειν, ideas which are quite inapplicable to ἀδῆσαι, although it is generally by disagreeable events that men are brought into *great perplexity leading to trouble and distress of mind*; for this is the meaning which the word has in Plato, Xenophon, Demosthenes, as well as all the later writers. In Plato Theæt. p. 175., "if a common lawyer is once drawn into the district of philosophy, he is like a man who finds himself on a giddy height; ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων γέλωτα παρέχει." In Xen. Hell. 4, 4, 3. ὥστ' ἐνίους . . . ἀδημονῆσαι τὰς ψυχὰς ἰδόντας τὴν ἀσέβειαν. In Dem. de f. L. p. 402., speaking of a woman threatened with violence, ἀδημονούσης δὲ τῆς ἀνθρώπου. The lexicographer, then, would do well to strike out of the lexicons every word which does not express this idea, and then erase entirely the adjective ἀδήμων, which, as Stephanus remarks, was adopted by Eustathius only that he might through it derive ἀδημονεῖν and ἀδημονία from ἀδῆσαι.

13. But as I have once introduced these words, I will endeavour to give as full and satisfactory an account of them as possible. The form ἀδημονία may suggest to us that ἀδήμων, if such a word ever existed, was not a verbal adjective, which might be formed from ἀδῆσαι like νοήμων from νοῆσαι; nor like ἀπράγμων, which, whether it be traced through πρᾶγμα or not, must be a verbal adjective from πρᾶξαι, as ἀνοήμων is from νοῆσαι. Now these verbal adjectives usually form their abstract in -οσύνη, as μνημοσύνη, ἀπραγμοσύνη. On the contrary, εὐδαίμων, δεισιδαίμων, which are not verbal adjectives, form εὐδαιμονία, δεισιδαιμονία; and with these corresponds ἀδημονία. That the Greeks always had these analogical rules in their

mind whenever they spoke and wrote, is not to be expected; but I mention this only as a suggestion and not a proof. Let us examine, however, the examples which are contrary to this. First, *ἡγεμών* is certainly a verbal word, and yet it forms *ἡγεμονία*; but in answer to this, *ἡγεμών* is not an adjective like *νοήμων* expressing some property, (whence there is a difference in the accent,) nor is *ἡγεμονία*, the abstract noun, expressive of such property; but *ἡγεμών* is a substantive, and *ἡγεμονία* an office or occupation. Again, from *ἀπήμων* Schneider has *ἀπημονία* and *ἀπημοσύνη*; the latter only is agreeable to analogy; for *πῆμα* comes from *πήθω, πάσχω*; but *πῆμα, ἀπήμων* were poetical words, from which Callimachus formed for himself a new poetical word; *ἀπημονίη* therefore, which he chose to form according to the more common analogy of words in *-ία*, belongs to him and not to the Greek language. A much more striking expression is *ἀδαημονίη* in Od. *ω*, 244. But there, independently of any observations of mine, the text ought long ago to have admitted *ἀδαημοσύνη* from the Cod. Harlej. and Apollonii Lex. in v.—On the other hand, what I am saying on *ἀδημονία* would be contradicted by the form *ἀδημοσύνη* being actually used by Democritus (ap. Stob. Serm. 6. p. 82. Gesn.), if this were not a single instance from which no general usage can be established[6]. Supposing, then, that there always was an unattic form *ἀδημοσύνη* besides *ἀδημονία*, I suspect, from this latter being the regular and usual form, that *ἀδημονεῖν* came from a very different source from those verbal adjectives. I have two grounds to strengthen this suspicion. The first is, that this word is extremely rare in poetry, and in general is not frequent in the older writers, while in the later authors we see it always becoming more common as we descend, and it is therefore probable that it had been formed in the language of common life only. The other is, that Hesychius, besides ἀδημονῶ, has also this gloss; Ἀδημεῖν· θαυμάζειν, ἀπορεῖν, ἀδημονεῖν. We know that with the word δῆμος is joined the idea of *home*. It appears to me therefore that ἄδημος, ἀδημεῖν, ἀδημονεῖν arose from some phrase in familiar language like our jocular expression *not to be at home*, meaning that one is ignorant of the thing in question, and *I am not at home in this*, it is all strange and perplexing to me*. The explanatory word, θαυμάζειν is to be understood in a similar sense, of one to whom everything around is strange, who is surprised at everything he sees or hears. Compare Plutarch de Exil. 6.= 8, 372. Reiske. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς, ὥσπερ μύρμηκες ἢ μέλιτται μυρμηκίας μιᾶς ἢ κυψέλης, ἀδημονοῦμεν καὶ ξενοπαθοῦμεν, οὐκ εἰδότες οἰκεῖα πάντα ποιεῖσθαι καὶ νομίζειν ὥσπερ ἐστίν.

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[6] It is singular that the Antiatticist p. 80. should assert that *ἀδημοσύνη* is found in Xenophon's Memorabilia. Ruhnken conjectured *ἀδαημοσύνη*, so that Xenophon must have used 3, 9, 6. this poetical word for *ἀνεπιστημοσύνη*. He did not however himself put much value on this conjecture, which in fact cannot be received; for the Antiatticist's sole design was to restore by examples drawn from Attic writers words and forms which have been rejected by the Atticists as unattic and common; but *ἀδαημοσύνη* can have nothing to do with that kind of rejection, nor, consequently, anything with the restoration.

7. Ἀδινός.

1. In order to comprehend rightly the difficulties offered by the word ἀδινός, I shall begin by taking a general review of the senses in which it is used in Homer. It is an epithet, sometimes as an adjective, sometimes as an adverb,

1st,) *of the heart*, ἀδινὸν κῆρ, Il. π, 481. Od. τ, 516. The former passage, where it is found in the account of a wound, shows that it is used entirely in a physical sense:

2nd,) *of a swarm of bees*, Il. β, 87. ἠΰτε ἔθνεα εἶσι μελισσάων ἀδινάων· *or of flies*, ib. 469. ἠΰτε μυιάων ἀδινάων ἔθνεα πολλά, where a comparison is made between these and a moving mass of combatants:

3rd,) *of the number of sheep* constantly consumed by the suitors of Penelope, Od. α, 92. δ, 320. οἵ τέ μοι αἰεὶ Μῆλ' ἀδινὰ σφάζουσι καὶ εἰλίποδας ἕλικας βοῦς:

4th,) *of sighing and groaning*, Il. τ, 314. μνησάμενος δ' ἀδινῶς ἀνενείκατο· σ, 124. ἀδινὸν στοναχῆσαι· ψ, 225. and Od. ω, 317. ἀδινὰ στοναχίζων· Il. ω, 123. and Od. η, 274. ἀδινὰ στενάχοντα:

5th,) *of crying and lamenting*, Il. ω, 510. κλαῖ' ἀδινά·

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* [The German expressions used by Buttmann are "*nicht daheim sein*, not to be at home," and "*mir ist unheimlich*, I am not at home here, all is strange to me."—Ed.]

Od. δ, 721. ἀδινὸν γοόωσα· Il. σ, 316. χ, 430. ψ, 17. ω, 747. ἀδινοῦ ἐξῆργε γόοιο. Under this head we must also class Od. π, 216. Κλαῖον δὲ λιγέως, ἀδινώτερον ἤτ' οἰωνοὶ, Φῆναι ἢ αἰγυπιοὶ γαμψώνυχες, οἷσί τε τέκνα Ἀγρόται ἐξείλοντο· for although in this passage the comparison lies between ἀδινὸν and the *cry of birds*, yet κλαῖον is to be understood before ἀδινώτερον, and also the cry with which the comparison is made is a cry of lamentation :

6th,) *of the lowing of young kine*, Od. κ. 413. which ἀδινὸν μυκώμεναι ἀμφιθέουσιν Μητέρας· consequently, as the context shows, not a lowing of sorrow, but of joy :

7th,) *of the Sirens*, Od. ψ, 326. Ἠδ' ὡς Σειρήνων ἀδινάων φθόγγον ἄκουσεν.

2. Although by this review of the different passages we may not be able to fix at once the meaning in each with sufficient accuracy, yet, from thus comparing them together, one thing is clear, that all the meanings which can occur in them proceed from one, and that one is the epithet of the heart, *dense* or *compact*; which physical idea the word retains, according to the Homeric usage, in the other passage Od. τ, 516. as a fixed epithet of the heart, although there its physical state has nothing to do with the context : πυκιναὶ δέ μοι ἀμφ' ἀδινὸν κῆρ Ὀξεῖαι μελεδῶναι ὀδυρομένην ἐρέθουσιν. In this sense the etymological agreement of this word with ἁδρός seems to me as clear as the light, and both forms are connected together, like κυδρός and κυδνός[1], ψυδρός and ψυδνός. The difference of the spiritus (which in the Ionic dialect is in itself immaterial,) is quite done away by the Scholium on Il. β, 87. δασυντέον τὸ ἁδινάων. ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ ἅδην καὶ ἅδηνος (*sic*) ἡ κίνησις, and by other similar remarks : for if this pronunciation had not been equally in use with the other, the grammarian would not have fixed it in this way for the sake of the mere etymology, since also ἆλτο, for instance, in spite of its derivation from ἅλλομαι, retains the *lenis*[2].

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[1] Hesiod has always κυδνή, ε, 257. θ, 328. 442. which Grævius, contrary to the authority of almost all the MSS., would change into the Homeric κυδρή.

[2] Ἁδήν, ἁδένος, a gland or acorn, (for this is one of the derivations of the grammarian,) was also written both with and without the aspirate.

3. From this idea proceeded those of *numerous, strong, violent*, and, speaking of the voice, *loud, loud-sounding*. That this is the most simple road by which we can at all find our way through all the passages to the epithet of the *Sirens*, is manifest; and it is entirely a mistake of the grammarians, which ought not to be repeated, to explain ἀδινός (merely for the sake of that one passage) by ἡδύς, ἡδύφωνος, even though the derivation from ἡδύς considered separately were not contrary to analogy. In the same way all the other explanations of the grammarians come to nothing (vid. Hesych. in v. et Intpp. Eustath. ad Il. β, 87. p. 195. ed. Basil.): for their οἰκτρόν was intended, without any etymological foundation for it, merely for the passage where ἀδινός is an epithet of sighs and lamentations; their λεπτόν merely for the epithet of the bees, flies, and even of the sheep, which were thus to be placed in opposition to the oxen; their ἠρέμα for an explanation of ἀδινῶς ἀνενείκατο (vid. Eustath. as above); their ἁπαλόν for the epithet of the Sirens[3].

4. The difficulty is now to affix to each particular passage the meanings given above. But these run so into each other, that if one were to begin with the epithet of the Sirens, *loud, loud-sounding*, one should be able to bring with great ease all the other passages, with the exception of the first, under this same idea; for the bees and flies from their humming, and the sheep from their shrill bleating, might very well take this as a fixed and regular epithet. If, on the other hand, we were to reverse this order, and, beginning with the epithet of the heart, proceed thus, *thick, dense, numerous, abundant*, all the passages, with the exception of the last, would be explained most easily and satisfactorily. And this latter I consider to be the correct way, partly because it accords exactly with the probable line which etymology would take, partly because by this mode most of the passages would preserve their poetical imagery. Where mention is made of the bees, flies, and sheep, the idea which immediately occurs in all three passages is that of numbers. Consequently ἀδινός there is the same as ἀθρόος, *con-*

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[3] The explanatory word λευκόν is, as the commentators on Hesychius justly remark, merely a corruption of λεπτόν.

fertus. In the passage of the sheep *ἀδινά* has indeed been taken adverbially to mean "the suitors slaughtered them *incessantly*;" but this after *αἰεί* is completely inadmissible, and particularly as it is separated from *αἰεί* by other words. It must therefore be an adjective; and this perhaps might have induced some to look in *ἀδινά* for a regular epithet of sheep, as there is, in the latter member of the sentence, of oxen, *καὶ εἰλίποδας ἕλικας βοῦς.* But it is not at all necessary that the former substantive should have such an epithet because the latter has. The word *ἀδινός* is here a particular epithet descriptive of this particular case; the cattle which the suitors slaughtered were *always* (*αἰεί*) driven thither *in herds or numbers* (*ἀδινά*).

5. In the passages classed under the numbers 4, 5, 6. the leading idea is indisputably that of quantity; but it is not easy to decide whether *ἀριθμῷ* or *ὄγκῳ*. The commentators incline generally to the former, and to the idea of a *repeated and continued* groaning, lamenting, lowing, &c. But let any one examine some of these passages a little more accurately, and he will immediately feel that the more suitable epithet is that of a *violent, deep, heavy* sound. For instance, in Il. *τ*, 314. (Achilles) Μνησάμενος δ' ἀδινῶς ἀνενείκατο, φώνησέν τε.... How ill does a *repeated, continued* sighing suit as the prelude to a speech! on the other hand, how beautifully does it sound, "he sighed *deeply*"! In the same way, *κλαῖ' ἀδινά*, Il. *ω*, 510., spoken of Priam at the feet of Achilles weeping for Hector, is much more natural as, "he wept *violently, bitterly, a flood of tears*," than a *long and repeated* weeping. And when in Od. *π*, 216. the weeping of Ulysses and Telemachus (which, indeed, like every violent lamentation, must be of some continuance,) is compared with that of birds lamenting the loss of their young, in these words, Κλαῖον δὲ λιγέως, *ἀδινώτερον ἤτ' οἰωνοί*, it is evident at first sight that it would be impossible to translate it, "they wept loudly, *more continuously—longer—more repeatedly*—than birds, whose, &c." On the contrary, it is plain that the idea given by *ἀδινώτερον* must correspond with that of *λιγέως*. It can therefore be no other than that of *violently*, in which is comprehended also the meaning of *λιγύ*. We see, then, that in all these passages we must confine ourselves to the

ideas of *violent, strong, abundant, plentiful,* and that through these the other ideas of *long-continued, loud,* &c. do naturally introduce themselves into the different passages, according to the particular circumstances of each.

6. But we must not pass over unnoticed, that an usage, on which the epithet of the Sirens here depends, had fixed this ἀδινός with its meaning of *violent, plentiful,* (as far as related to actions,) wholly to the operations of the *voice.* Otherwise how could it have been used in Homer in this combination fourteen times, but never in connexion with any other powerful, violent, or continued action or operation? But as soon as this usage was established, it followed as a necessary consequence, that the idea of *loud,* which, in sound, is properly included in that of *violent,* became the leading idea. I understand therefore by ἀδινὸν μυκώμεναι, ἀδινὸς γόος, κλαῖ' ἀδινά, a *loud* lowing, lamentation, or weeping. And this is the only way of explaining how *persons* can be called ἀδινάς, and how we can arrive with certainty at the expression of the *loud-* or *clear-singing* Sirens; while the grammarians, who cannot give up their συνεχές, explain it, in a manner inconceivable to all but themselves, by συνεχῶς ἀειδούσας; as indeed in one of the passages of ἀδινὸν κῆρ they have not hesitated to give συνεχῶς λυπούμενον.

7. The usage of the poets nearest in point of age to Homer varies in some slight degree from his, but always so that the ground-idea still remains. In the Hymn. Cerer. 67. where Ceres says of her daughter to the Sun, Τῆς ἀδινὴν ὄπ' ἄκουσα δι' αἰθέρος ἀτρυγέτοιο Ὥστε βιαζομένης, it is exactly the Homeric meaning: for to understand it perfectly we want only to hear the *violent, loud* cry of Proserpine; its being a cry of *lamentation* or *complaint* is implied in the thing itself. In Sophocl. Trach. 847. ἀδινὰ δάκρυα are not to be compared exactly with the Homeric κλαίειν ἀδινά, because the latter evidently points to sound, to lament *violently,* i.e. *loudly*; while the former is a *violent,* i. e. a *plentiful* flood of tears, which idea the Scholiast acknowledges. And, lastly, Pindar in Pyth. 2, 98. plainly means by δάκος ἀδινὸν κακαγοριᾶν, the *violent, deep*-piercing bite of calumny, and the κακόν of the Scholiasts is, as an explanatory word, decidedly bad.

8. In Apollon. Rhod. on the contrary, who takes great delight in a learned expression, we recognise immediately the ignorant imitator, when, for instance, at 3, 1104. in a quiet tranquil conversation of Medea with Jason he says, Καί μιν ἀκηχεμένη ἀδινῷ προσπτύξατο μύθῳ, using ἀδινός entirely on account of the speech being of a *plaintive* nature. Again, at 4, 1422. (speaking of Orpheus begging water for the Greeks,) Ὣς φάτο λισσόμενος ἀδινῇ ὀπί, where the Scholiast is of opinion that the word expresses the *weak* voice of the thirsty petitioner; certainly the words cannot express, as in the former passage, anything *mournful*, though they may imply *supplicating*. At all events, ἀδινός stands here in strong contrast with the passages where it expresses something *strong*, *violent*, *fixed*, as 4, 1528. in ἄτη ; 2, 240. in κῆδος ; and 3, 616. and elsewhere, in ὕπνος. Lastly, at 3, 1206. where mention is made of a garment, which Hypsipyle gave to Jason ἀδινῆς μνημήϊον εὐνῆς, it stands most probably for ἡδύς. With such uncertainty has this word been used by so learned a poet, who knew his Homer by heart!

Ἄδος ; vid. ἀδῆσαι.

Ἀεσίφρων ; vid. ἀᾶσαι.

8. Ἀήρ, ἠέριος.

1. Voss in his critique on Heyne's Homer, p. 327. has brought forward certain things on ἀήρ and ἠέριος, by which many old mistakes have been corrected. But as I do not agree with him in all he says there, I will go through the whole according to my view of it; wishing it to be understood that wherever I say anything in common with Voss, I am indebted to him for it.

2. I must first remind my readers of what Damm has remarked before, that we must adopt for Homer the declension ἀήρ, ἠέρος, and that arising from evident causes, which, however, in the later Ionic dialect ceased to have any influence; hence Hippocrates (de Aër. Aq. Loc. p. 453, 43. 454, 23. ed.

Basil.) has in the nom. ἠήρ.—As to the gender, some have supposed it twofold, according to the two meanings attributed to the word, that when it signifies *air* it is masculine, when *darkness* it is feminine. Dorville in the Crit. Vann. p. 108. and Voss as quoted at the beginning of this article, give a more correct account. Without any reference to its meaning, the feminine is the Epic usage, the masculine that of the later writers; an observation which was overlooked, because the word so seldom occurs in Homer and Hesiod in the sense of *air* without the collateral idea of *fog* or *mist*. On the other hand, it has the appearance of a masculine in Homer in the sense of darkness, when on account of the metre the masculine adjective stands instead of the feminine; ἠέρα πουλὺν ἔχευεν*.

3. But when Voss says that "ἀήρ in Homer and Hesiod "never means *air* in our sense of it, but *haze* or *mist*, and that, "as this extends according to their idea of it from the earth to "the clouds and ether, it thence means, *the misty atmosphere* "*which surrounds the earth*, and thence again generally *obscurity*," this appears to me to be a mode of representing it, by which the interpretation gains nothing, but only the limited character of the idea is changed. This is most evident by the translation which Voss gives in support of his opinion of Il. ξ, 288., where Homer is describing in plain and simple words the lofty fir on which Somnus was perched, ἣ τότ' ἐν Ἴδῃ Μακροτάτη πεφυυῖα δι' ἠέρος αἰθέρ' ἵκανεν, "which highest of Ida's firs rose through the *thick haze* to ether." Whether the ancients held particular opinions of the nature of our air, and of its relation to the clouds and to ether, whether they considered *air* less abstractedly than we do, these are different physical and philosophical considerations, but not a different usage of language between ἀήρ and *air*. It may be asked, What Greek word then can be found exactly synonymous with any English one? I answer, We could then only acknowledge a difference of usage, if the word which the ancients used for our air contained something *etymological*, which, as soon

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* [It would appear that originally βαθύς and πουλύς were adjectives of two endings.—Ed.]

as it reached the ear, should bring to the mind dampness and *thick haze.* But ἀήρ comes as plainly from the idea of ἄειν *to blow,* as αἰθήρ does from αἴθειν *to burn, glow,* by which the relation of the one to the other is expressed ; because the ancients, who thought, and with justice, that our atmosphere was thicker and damper, represented the perfect purity and clearness of the upper regions of the air as of a fiery nature. And how can there be imagined a more exact agreement with our usage than where Hesiod, θ, 697. describing the earth set on fire by the lightning of Jupiter, says φλὸξ δ' ἠέρα δῖαν ἵκανεν, which Voss translates, "the flame mounts into the sacred air"?

4. I am of opinion that the way to explain it more correctly is this, that the ancients considered *fog* to be nothing more than a thickened air, and again, *darkness* to be a very thick fog deceiving the eye-sight. According to this, ἀήρ in Homer has not a twofold sense, as we know some words have, where ideas essentially different are represented by the same expression, without thereby appearing to the mind as essentially the same : but ἀήρ is in reality in that old language of Homer throughout the same, and only modified as to quality and quantity by additional ideas, which are sometimes given in express epithets, as πολλή, μέλαινα, sometimes show themselves in their operations and effects. Homer, therefore, and Hippocrates too, may have used ἀήρ or ἠήρ, without any additional expression, sometimes for air, sometimes for fog or vapour, without being conscious that they were giving it a twofold meaning. And if we take passages from the oldest Epic poets and arrange them in a certain order, we may gradually go from our idea of *air* through the others, *fog* and *darkness,* without in any way remarking a radical separation. Trace it, for instance, through Hes. θ, 697. Hom. Il. ξ, 288. ε, 770. (ἠεροειδές like the distant hazy air.) Hes. ε, 546. 7. Hom. Od. ν, 189. 352. Il. ε, 864. Od. ι, 144. Il. ρ, 368—71. ε, 776. υ, 444. 446. Hes. θ, 9., until we have the full idea of darkness in the epithet ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐριννύς[1].

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[1] The old grammarians illustrate ἀήρ in the sense of *fog, darkness,* by ἀορασία, which seems to be one of their usual etymologies come to light again.

5. From ἀήρ comes as a regular adjective in common use ἀέριος, consequently Ionicè ἠέριος; which form occurs in Homer four times. Il. *α*, 497. and 557. of Thetis

> Ἠερίη δ' ἀνέβη μέγαν οὐρανὸν Οὔλυμπόν τε

and

> Ἠερίη γὰρ σοίγε παρέζετο, καὶ λάβε γούνων.

γ, 7. of the Cranes warring against the Pygmies

> Ἠερίαι δ' ἄρα ταίγε κακὴν ἔριδα προφέρονται.

Od. ι, 52. of the Cicones, who, after having been driven off, get reinforcements and return;

> Ἦλθον ἔπειθ', ὅσα φύλλα καὶ ἄνθεα γίγνεται ὥρῃ,
> Ἠέριοι.

Of these passages the third appears to preserve completely the usual meaning as derived from ἀήρ; and also in the first ἠερίη might be explained by δι' ἠέρος, as some old grammarians do both passages in Eustathius. But except those, all the opinions of the grammarians, which have come down to us, explain ἠέριος in all four passages by ὀρθρινός, deriving it from ἦρι *early* with ε inserted. That this is really the sense of the word in the second passage cannot be doubted; the first must necessarily be the same as the second; and in the fourth both analogy and context leave no doubt of the meaning being the same as the first and second. But in the third the context seems as evidently to require the meaning derived from ἀήρ, *air*, and even to point out a contrast between the Cranes and the Trojans hastening to the combat, the former *in the air**, the latter *on the earth*. Now it is not the same word having a twofold meaning which should prevent our adopting this last interpretation; the great point is, whether the construction agrees or not. If we find but once in Homer's language ἠέριος ποιῶ in the sense of *I do it early in the morning*, there seems no reason why the same construction should not be translated here in the same sense. But the case before us is still stronger, for this construction not only admits of this translation, but it does not admit of any other. Whoever has observed with attention the Homeric language and the language in common use, will grant me that the mode of speaking, according to which a verb is joined with an adjective instead of an adverb, must be limited to ideas of *time*, as ἐννύχιος, ἠμερινός, τριταῖος ποιῶ, &c.*, except indeed some certain words particularized by usage, as ἄσμενος, ἐθελοντής, and some ideas of order, as πρῶτος, ὕστερος. But ideas of *place* in such a construction, as ἐνάλιος πολεμίζει, χερσαῖος φύεται, and such like, are never found in prose nor in Homer; they occur only as poetical expressions in the poets of the succeeding age; as Eurip. Med. 441. *αἰθερία δ' ἀνέπτα* (Αἰδώς), Arat. 134. (of justice) ἔπτατ' ἐπουρανίη[2], a poetical expression for "she flew to heaven." For these poets make for themselves bold and ornamented expressions; whereas the old Epic poets have, on the contrary, a fixed usage of language, which they never change in order to become poetical. To translate ἠέριος ποιῶ in the sense of *I do it in the air*, is as contrary to this usage as the other translation, *I do it early in the morning*, is agreeable to it. Homer figures to himself, therefore, in the passage in question, that the Cranes in the southern parts of the world, like our birds of passage in the northern, arrive in the night, and fall on the Pygmies early in the morning.

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* [" The meaning of *in the air, through the air, &c.* is quite unknown " to this form :" Passow's Lexicon.—Ed.]

6. The passage of Virgil's Georg. 1, 375. (imbrem) Aëriæ fugere grues, must not be cited as a fresh proof of the Roman poet having misunderstood Homer contrary to the general explanation of the critics; because in Virgil it is not a description of the annual passage of the Cranes, but a single casual appearance of them, and because *aërius* is so common in Virgil (aëriæ palumbes, aëria ulmus, &c.), that he might very well have used it in this passage, where it suits the sense so exactly, without being liable to the imputation of having mistaken (even supposing that he had the Homeric passage in his mind,) Homer's similar expression and different meaning.

7. But there is a general unwillingness to separate ἠέριος from ἀήρ. Voss, who understands all the four passages of

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* [So ἔνδιος, Il. λ, 725.—Ed.]

[2] This reading of the MSS. is supported by the context against the common reading ὑπουρανίη.

ἠέριος in Homer of *the early morning*, speaks of the *morning haze*, and translates ἠέριος "*in the hazy dawn of morning*"[*]. In support of this meaning it may be said, "This is exactly the case which was wanted to confirm the meaning of *thick vapour* as given before to ἀήρ; ἠέριος expresses etymologically to the ear, *fog*, ἀήρ, and this both poets and their hearers immediately connected with the idea of *early in the morning*." But in answer to this it may be said, the two first passages, particularly the second, prove to the impartial reader that usage has confined this word wholly to ideas of time. Supposing, then, the word to come plainly and indisputably from ἀήρ; supposing the lively fancy of Nature's observers to connect *fog* always with the idea of morning; still language must distinguish the case where the poet wishes to mention expressly fog from that where he does not wish to mention it. Now in the second passage it is impossible that Juno can say, "for in the *misty* morning Thetis embraced thy knees." Ἠέριος, therefore, in this passage is nothing more than *early in the morning*, or, to be more particular, *early this morning*; consequently in the other passages it must also be *early in the morning*; and as long as the other idea (which indeed lies in the thing, though not in the expression,) is not indispensably necessary for the understanding of the context, neither explanation nor translation ought to introduce it.

8. But must, then, ἠέριος be derived from ἀήρ, ἠέρος? The grammarians derive it from ἦρι, *early*, to which it bears the same relation as ἠέλιος to ἥλιος, ἠέ to ἤ. Well-known analogous sounds very frequently fix in unlearned times the formation of words; from ἤριος was formed ἠέριος, because it sounded so fluently, in the same way as from εἶμι (ἴμεν, &c.), the infin. of which must necessarily have sounded like ἴναι, was formed ἰέναι, which was apparently favoured by the analogy of ἱέναι (from ἵημι, ἵεμεν). But if we suppose that the adverb ἦρι itself is contracted from ἠέρι, then I should say, at least according to my ideas of etymological proceeding, that these forms

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[*] [Passow in his lexicon prefers, with Voss, deriving it from ἀήρ to Buttmann's derivation from ἦρι; which last he would also trace back to ἀήρ.—Ed.]

of words, ἠώς, ἀώς, αὐώς, *aurora*, ἦρι, αὔριον[3], εὖρος[4], ought not to be separated from each other. Again, all these may be connected (particularly if we compare the word αὔρα,) with ἄω and ἀήρ by thinking of the fresh morning air: but we cannot proceed far on such ground as this without feeling how uncertain our etymological steps must be. This consideration alone prevents me from ranking ἔαρ with the above words with that confidence with which others do it, probable as this connexion certainly is both in itself, and by the analogy of the German, in which *früh* means 'early', *Frühling* 'the spring'[5].

9. Beside ἠέριος in the sense of *matutinus* as derived from ἦρι, the language of Homer could very well dispense with an ἠέριος derived from ἀήρ; and thus all ambiguity arising from one word with two meanings was completely avoided. In the later Epic poets, indeed, it is quite otherwise: they were fond of, and sought after, this ambiguity of usage as a mark of learning. Thus in Apoll. Rhod. 3, 417. Ἠέριος ζεύγνυμι βόας

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[3] Exactly as in German *morgen* as an adverb means *tomorrow*, as a substantive, *morning*. The Bœotians used ἄας for *tomorrow*, Hesych. [In English too the original meaning of *morrow* seems to have been *morning*, as in the old phrase of "good-morrow". So in Scott's Rokeby, "Smiling noon for sullen morrow". On the other hand, the Scotch still use *the morn* for *the morrow*. And we find in the old ballad of Sir Patrick Spens, published in Scott's Border Minstrelsy, "Our gude ship sails the *morn*."—Ed.]

[4] From ἠώς and ζόφος, the two cardinal points of the compass in the Homeric age, are evidently derived the names εὖρος and ζέφυρος.

[5] Lexicographers place without hesitation ἦρ as a nominative with the twofold meaning of *morning* and *spring*. On this subject one remark is worthy of notice, that ἔαρ, ἔαρος (*spring*), is not usually found contracted in the Epic poets; for only in Hesiod ε, 460. and 490. we find ἔαρ and ἔαρι shortened by synæresis, and Stesichorus is, perhaps, the first poet in which ἦρος (twice in Schol. Aristoph. Pac. 797. and 800. Suchf. p. 37. 38.) occurs as a common flexion. On the contrary, the adverb ἦρι, *in the morning*, is found only in this form, and in the lengthened one of the adjective ἠέριος. Therefore the word ἔαρ must have been contracted very early in this sense, but late in the sense of *spring*. This is certainly not impossible; but the line of connexion as traced above makes the immediate affinity of ἦρι with ἠώς very much more probable. The old rude form HOP, AYOP, *morning*, dropped the vowel in its derivations, ἦρι, αὔριον, which latter adverbial neuter of αὔριος and this were synonymous with the Homeric ἠέριος. That Ἠώς was personified by the poets under the name ἠριγένεια, proves only that this derivation of the word ἦρι, as is very easily to be conceived, had long been forgotten.

καὶ δείελον ὥρην Παύομαι ἀμήτοιο, the meaning is evidently *early in the morning*; but then in other places it as evidently means *misty, hazy*; thus, 1, 580. Thessaly lying in the distant horizon, and 4, 267. 270. Egypt are called *ἠερίη*; which last country, with some other countries and islands, is said to have originally had the name of *ἀερία* or *ἠερίη* (vid. Hesych. v. *ἀερία*, Etym. M. v. *ἠερίη*); an appellation which appears to me, like most such old names of countries found in the ancient geographers, to be explicable only by references to the epithets of old Epic poets. In the sense of *dark*, and exactly synonymous with *ἠερόεις*, it is used by Aratus 349. speaking of a space without any stars. But the grammarians give us still a third meaning: in Hesych. we find, *ἠέριον· μέγα, λεπτόν, μέλαν*; with which we may compare *ἀερόεν· μέλαν, βαθύ, μέγα*. The Scholiast, indeed, explains the passage of Apoll. Rhod. 4, 1239. where mention is made of the sandy coast of the Syrtes, *Ἠερίη δ' ἄμαθος παρακέκλιται*, by the following gloss, *πᾶν τὸ πολὺ καὶ δαψιλὲς ἠερόεν λέγεται*; but other proofs of this meaning I have not found*. However, the explanatory word *μέγα* appears to be meant of such flat lands stretching far into the distant haze; as *ἠερίη* in the passage quoted above is explained by the context, v. 1245—7...... *ἄχος δ' ἕλεν εἰσορόωντας Ἠέρα καὶ μεγάλης νῶτα χθονὸς, ἠέρι δ' ἶσα Τηλοῦ ὑπερτείνοντα διηνεκές·* where the *δ'* before *ἶσα*, and the comma before *ἠέρι*, should be erased.

9. Ἄητος, αἴητος.

1. Each of these two forms is in the old Epic poetry a *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον*; the former in Il. *φ*, 395. as an epithet of daring or boldness, addressed by Mars to Minerva,

> *Τίπτ' αὖτ' ὦ κυνάμυια θεοὺς ἔριδι ξυνέλαυνεις*
> *Θάρσος ἄητον ἔχουσα, μέγας δέ σε θυμὸς ἀνῆκεν;*

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* [In Schneider's Lexicon under *ἀέριος* I find the following: " Even " in prose Diod. Sic. allows himself to use such expressions as, *ἀέριον* " *μέγεθος, μῆκος, ἀέρια πέδια τὸ μέγεθος, θῖνες ἄμμου ἀέριοι*, to express " size or magnitude, the word originally signifying only a great height." It would seem, therefore, that *ἀέριος* was frequently used in this way, but not *ἠέριος*.—Ed.]

the latter in Il. σ, 410. spoken of Vulcan,

Ἦ, καὶ ἀπ' ἀκμοθέτοιο πέλωρ αἴητον ἀνέστη.

Numerous as the accounts are which the grammarians have given of these forms, most of them amount to this, that both are the same, and signify *great*; which is most evident in the Venet. Schol. to σ, 410. So that this alone gives one an idea of its being an old tradition.

2. This most simple interpretation has at least one advantage, that by adopting it we shall have no need of following etymology in a vain conjectural search after some particular meaning for each of the two passages; as, for instance, in such a search some of the grammarians seem to have found, for αἴητον, πυρῶδες, which in this sense and construction is evidently forced from ἄημι[1]. As little satisfactory is, for ἄητον, the explanation *insatiable*, which, although in some respects suited to θάρσος, still is not grammatical. It must, however, be old, as Nicander in his Ther. 783. uses the word precisely in the particular sense of insatiable, probably grounding it on this passage. But the θάρσος ἄᾱτον of Quintus (mentioned above at the end of the article on ἀάατος,) leads us to conjecture for Il. φ, 395. a twofold reading of the old grammarians, some of whom, indeed, explained ἄητον as Ionic for ἄᾱτον, but others at once read ἄᾱτον; a reading which hardly deserves mention. Still less did the grammarians succeed in obtaining from etymology one interpretation common to both passages, although some tried the idea of καταπνεόμενον, πνευστικόν for that purpose; in which it is ludicrous to observe how Vulcan and his bellows must work together; vid. Damm. But when Apollonius in his lexicon, setting out with this derivation, makes the extraordinary addition, τὸ γὰρ φυσώμενον (that which is inflated) μέγα γίνεται, it is quite evident that the meaning of *great* was familiar to the commentators, and most of them only tried how they might discover some etymological ground for it[2].

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[1] Schneider's explanation of αἴητον, *sooty*, as he gives no derivation for it, I can only suppose to be borrowed from this πυρῶδες, as more adapted to a person like Vulcan. Schneider himself does not seem to place much reliance on it.

[2] I do not mention all the other different attempts made with this

3. That is to say, doubtless the Greeks of the old classical age understood the word and both the passages in the sense of *great*. Of this we have a most express testimony in Hesychius, who says that Æschylus used it in this sense, Ἀήτους, μεγάλας, Αἰσχύλος Ἀθάμαντι. We see that Æschylus used the word so clearly and simply to express something great, that the grammarians had no doubt or hesitation in so stating it. And the usage of the poets of that time has this very strong proof, that they did not adopt the old Epic expressions with grammatical learning, but took them with a lively feeling of their meaning.

4. Still it is impossible that the word αἴητος can have had so exactly the mere prosaic idea of *great*; it must have represented that idea in a poetical manner. We must therefore endeavour to find out the proper sense by a little induction, still attending to etymology. That the idea of greatness exists in both the passages of Homer is certain; but in one of them this idea is already expressed by the word πέλωρ: we must therefore look for an idea which in this passage may be an idea of greatness so naturally strengthened and made more forcible, that in the other passage it may in itself express greatness. Such is, in the language of the people, the idea of *astonishing, terrible, prodigious**. Let us now compare with it the old Epic word αἰνός. The termination νός is, as we see plainly in στυγνός, σεμνός from σέβομαι, &c., an old passive verbal form. As, then, δεινός from δεῖσαι means something large and terrible, so αἰνός certainly comes from some verb in a similar manner and has a similar sense. Another such passive termination is τός. By all this the connexion of αἰνός and αιητός becomes evident, and our principal object is attained, viz. that of ascertaining in both those passages a πέλωρ δεινόν and a θάρσος δεινόν. In order,

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same object; they may be sought for in their proper places by any one who thinks it worth his while to look for them. The moderns appear to think that the surest way to succeed is by means of the idea of ἄᾱτος, *invulnerable*, consequently *powerful*, &c. Vid. Heyne and Schneider.

* [This last adjective is not in Buttmann, but it seems to me to answer exactly his description of the epithet which he was in search of.—Ed.]

however, at last to come nearer to the radical verb, I will compare with αἴητος another word ἀγητός, which approaches very nearly to it in form and meaning, differing only in containing the laudatory sense of the verb ἄγαμαι. This subsidiary idea is, however, formed only by usage; *astonishment* is evidently that which lies at the root of all these words; as it does also in the form ἅζομαι, which has gone over to the meaning of reverence, and so has formed again, in a manner similar to the others, an adjective ἁγνός. We can now very well adopt the supposition that the ι in αἴητος, as in ῥαίω (vid. ἄγρα, sect. 3.), arose from the γ, and was quite lost in ἄητος. We may also adopt a form ΑΩ, ΑΙΩ, ΑΖΩ, ΑΓΩ, with which the analogy of the verbal terminations -άω, and -άζω sufficiently agrees.

5. According to this account, the accenting of the word αἴητος is the only thing to surprise us, as far indeed as accents in the Homeric text can surprise. And this also will cease, when we see in the Schol. to σ, 410. that the grammarians were as divided in opinion on the accenting of the word as they were on the other points. The accent, which ἄητος and αἴητος commonly have, arose from the supposition that they were, properly speaking, compounded with α. Here we must leave the question (as we easily may); for the accenting of the Homeric text is to the learned only a part of its history.

Ἀθέσφατος; vid. θέσκελος.

10. Ἀΐδηλος, ἀρίζηλος.

1. The meaning of the word ἀΐδηλος in Homer is placed beyond a doubt by a review of the passages in which it occurs. Three times it is an epithet of *fire*, Il. β, 455. ι, 436. λ, 155., twice of *Mars*, and once of *Pallas* as reproached by Mars, Il. ε, 880. 897. Od. θ, 309., twice of the crowd of *suitors* wooing Penelope, Od. π, 29. ψ, 303., and once of *Melanthius*, as he was conveying arms to the suitors, χ, 165.; to which may be added the adverbial form Il. φ, 220. of Achilles incessantly

slaughtering the Trojans, σὺ δὲ κτείνεις ἀϊδήλως. In many of these passages the idea plainly is *consuming, destroying, destructive*; and since this is the only one which suits all the passages, and suits them extremely well, it must stand as the established meaning in Homer. The other explanations of the grammarians are evidently mere etymological attempts to find meanings suited to certain passages; particularly where it is explained by *dazzling*, which only suits the passages where it is an epithet of fire; and against this there is one weighty objection, that in all three passages the fire is mentioned as in destructive operation[1].

2. To the Homeric usage belongs also the old various reading in Il. ε, 757. The text has, Ζεῦ πάτερ, οὐ νεμεσίζῃ Ἄρει τάδε καρτερὰ ἔργα; Instead of this reading, which, through the undeserved authority of Aristarchus, has become the prevailing one, there was another, τάδε ἔργ' ἀΐδηλα, to which Heyne gives the preference, and which, in the sense established above, is here particularly suitable, as agreeing with the exegetical verse following, Ὁσσάτιόν τε καὶ οἷον ἀπώλεσε λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν. On the contrary, καρτερὰ ἔργα, 872. in a similarly sounding verse, Ζεῦ πάτερ, οὐ νεμεσίζῃ ὁρῶν τάδε καρτερὰ ἔργα; where there is no various reading, is much better suited to a passage which speaks only of the daring attacks of Diomede on the Gods.

3. But when the old lexicographers explain ἀΐδηλος by ἄδηλος also, this is an explanation which by nothing but force can be made to suit any of the passages in Homer; there is, however, good foundation for it, not in Homer, but in Hesiod ε, 754. where the advice is given

μηδ' ἱεροῖσιν ἐπ' αἰθομένοισι κυρήσας
Μωμεύειν ἀΐδηλα· θεός νύ τι καὶ τὰ νεμεσσᾷ.

Interpreters have never succeeded in explaining these words, on account of *ἀΐδηλα*. In order to discover in them the Homeric meaning of *ἀΐδηλος* they took it adverbially, and sometimes joined it with *νεμεσσᾷ*, sometimes with *μωμεύειν*. In the former case the construction would be contrary to the language of these didactic aphorisms, which are never obscured by a complicated structure of the sentence, but by their brevity and simplicity. The latter they explained by *ἀξίως ἀφανισμοῦ*, "ridicule not to your own destruction." One can suppose it possible that it might have been an ancient mode to add immediately after a verb signifying some wicked conduct, an adverb specifying the consequence of such conduct; but then there would hardly follow an exegetical sentence joined to it by *νύ*, which here answers to the Latin *quippe*. At any rate, *μωμεύειν ἀΐδηλα*, "ridicule to thine own destruction," must always be a forced translation. Nor is there in either of these two interpretations any reason for the use of the word *μωμεύειν*; for who would have had an idea of ridiculing a sacrifice? The fact is, that in every part of the religion of the ancients there were sacred customs, the origin of which was *concealed* from the people, and sometimes *unknown* even to the priests and prophets; there were certain of these peculiar to each people, to each family, and even to each house. It was very possible, therefore, that a thoughtless person who met with such by chance (*κυρήσας*), might ridicule what he did not understand. This meaning of the poet, Clerk saw for once correctly; but he must needs say something foolish, and therefore defended against Hesiod the supposed derider of heathenish and superstitious customs*.

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[1] In an old epigram which (with the stone on which it was engraved) is come down to us, and is in Brunck's Adesp. 692., τύχα is called *ἀΐδαλος*, that is, not *dark, uncertain*, as it has been explained, but *destructive*, by a mere mechanical imitation of Homer. The person on whom the inscription was written was taken off by an early death, and therefore fortune is reproached as taking away whatever it gives us.

4. Again, when in a fragment of the Ἠοίαις in the Schol. Pind. Pyth. 3, 14. it is said of the crow that he

> ἔφρασεν ἔργ' ἀΐδηλα
> Φοίβῳ ἀκερσεκόμῃ, ὅτ' ἄρ' Ἰσχὺς ἔγημε Κόρωνιν,

we cannot avoid thinking of and comparing with it the *ἔργ' ἀΐδηλα* which is the various reading of Il. ε, 757. as quoted above. But the sense of that passage is evidently too strong for this, where nothing *annihilating* or *destructive* can be meant, but only something offensive to Apollo; and though these ἔργ' ἀΐδηλα might very naturally prove afterwards *destructive* to the actors, yet that could not be introduced into this account of the information given by the crow: ἔφρασεν ἔργ' ἀΐδηλα. Indisputably, therefore, the meaning of ἀΐδηλα is here also *secret things*, things concealed in darkness. For ἔγημε is merely a modest term to express the illicit intercourse of Ischys and Coronis*, as we know from history; see Apollod. 3, 10, 3. Paus. 2, 26. p. 171.—In what sense Sophocles has used the word in Ajax 608. seems to me more doubtful. The Chorus there expresses its fear of being sent to Hades, which it calls τὸν ἀπότροπον ἀΐδηλον ᾅδαν. The context favours either meaning; but the Scholiast explains it only by *dark*.—The sense in which Apollonius Rhodius uses it may be seen in his writings; the meaning of *invisible*, if not the sole, is the prevailing one.

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* [In the small edition of Hesiod by Schrevelius, with a Latin translation, and with a lexicon of the words used in Hesiod by Pasor, published at Leyden in 1750, *ἀΐδηλα* is correctly translated *arcana*, but derived from *ἀΐδης*, *infernus*.—Ed.]

5. To unite these two meanings (*destructive* and *invisible*) by etymology, the deriving the word from Ἀΐδης, as some have done, might seem very suitable; that is to say, as ὑδρηλός, ὑπνηλός, mean full of water, full of sleep, so ἀΐδηλος would be *full of Hades*, i. e. full of destruction or full of invisibility. But this appears to me a strange kind of origin for a word in common use; and that it was so is easily seen, particularly in Hesiod. To this derivation is also opposed the accent, which must have been handed down genuine, otherwise the grammarians would not have always written it so contrary to analogy. But the accent will be quite regular, if we adopt the following line of formation, ἰδεῖν, ἰδηλός, ἀΐδηλος. It is true, the verbal adjectives of this kind (μιμηλός, σιγηλός, ἀπατηλός, &c.) have an active sense, which is inapplicable here. But these established analogies between form and meaning arose by degrees, and in those older times of the Greek language ἰδηλός might as well have been *visible*, ἀΐδηλος *invisible*. More striking is the transition to the causative meaning, *making*

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* [It is used in the same way in Od. α, 36. of Ægisthus and Clytemnestra.—Ed.]

*invisible, destroying, destructive**. But this transition also occurs frequently in the older language; and it is difficult to imagine any other way of deriving this idea (which we are sure the word has) from the negative of ἰδεῖν, which, we are equally sure, is in ἀΐδηλος; and this way is, as far as I can see, the one most generally adopted[2].

6. On the other hand, I am fully sensible that what I have said of the passages out of Homer is not so conclusive but that some may suppose the meaning of *invisible*, even although it had been the proper meaning of ἀΐδηλος, to have become quite extinct, and that they can bring all the older passages mentioned above (for Apollon. Rhod. would then be put out of the question) under the other idea of *destructive*. For instance, let it be supposed that the idea of *exterminating, destructive*, made a transition to the more general one of *bad, wicked, impious*; then the epithet of Hades in Sophocles may be ranked under the former, while under the latter and more general sense, still however in use as early as Homer's time, would come the epithet of the suitors, and of Melanthius, with the two passages of the ἔργ' ἀΐδηλα; and then, if μωμεύειν ἀΐδηλα be supposed to mean *to indulge in impious ridicule*, the other difficulties which I mentioned above in speaking of that passage will appear more easily surmountable. This plan certainly does not satisfy me; but I have mentioned it in order to make the following investigation independent of it. For, by follow-

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* [Passow, in his last improved edition of Schneider's Lexicon, has adopted Buttmann's derivation and explanation. "Ἀΐδηλος, ον, (α priv. and ἰδεῖν) making invisible; hence exterminating, annihilating, destructive; this is always its sense in Homer as epithet of Mars, of the suitors, of fire. (2nd. pass. invisible, obscure, unknown, Hes. Op. 754. Soph. Aj. 608. Secret, unforeseen, unhoped for. See Buttmann's Lexil."—Ed.]

[2] The corresponding epithet ἄϊστος seems to have taken exactly the same line. In Homer it has the sense belonging to it as an adjective in τος, that of "one of whom no one knows anything more," whence *annihilated, destroyed*, Il. ξ, 258. But in the beginning of the lost Hymn to Pallas by Lamprocles or Stesichorus it is an epithet of this goddess, according to a reading not very certain, it is true, but very difficult to be altered. Vid. Stesich. Fragm. ed. Suchfort. p. 41. In that passage the word can have no other than the causative meaning ἀϊστοῦσα (see Od. υ, 79. ἀϊστώσειαν) *exterminating*; and so it expresses in a respectful manner the same idea, which ἀΐδηλος does in a reproachful one, when applied to Pallas in Homer.

ing that plan ἀΐδηλος with its second syllable short, and with the meaning of *exterminating, bad, wicked,* is to be kept quite separate for all the passages quoted above; but the meaning of *invisible* is not, therefore, less sure in the cognate forms now to be mentioned, of which the quantity is different. I leave that plan, therefore, to the private judgement of each individual, and will now continue my investigation according to the view which I first took of it.

7. There are full grounds in the old Epic poetry for a form ἀείδελος in the sense of *invisible*; for the grammarian in the Etym. M. in v. quotes a verse from a poem of Hesiod, where it is said of the thievish Autolycus,

> Ὅ,ττι κε χερσὶ λάβεσκεν, ἀείδελα πάντα τίθεσκεν.

This form is evidently analogous to εἴκελος, ἴκελος from εἴκω, and at the same time is connected with ἀΐδηλος; for ἀείδελος, ἀΐδηλος, are nothing more than another example of words in which two neighbouring syllables change their quantity, as ἀπειρέσιος, ἀπερείσιος. But this ἀείδελος was found in some poems now lost in the other leading sense as well as in that of *invisible*. Cyrill. Lex. ms. ap. Tittm. ad Zonar. v. Ἀΐδηλος: Ἀείδελον, φοβερόν, πονηρόν. ἀΐδηλον, ἄδηλον, ἀφανῆ. See also Etym. M. 21, 35. The lengthened form ἀειδέλιος had also the same twofold meaning. Etym. M. Ἀειδέλιον, κακὸν, κρυφαῖον, ἄδηλον. Ἀειδέλιος, κατάρατος. Hesych. Ἀειδέλιος, κατάρατος, δεινός. This last form, again, answers exactly to the ἀεικέλιος of the Epic poets, which has become more in use than ἀείκελος; and Ruhnken's correction to Ἀΐδηλος in Hesychius was therefore too hasty[3].

8. I shall here introduce a form, of which there are plain traces in the grammarians. Hesych. Αἰζηλός, ἄδηλος. Etym.

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[3] The word ἀείδελος has a new meaning in Nicand. Ther. 1, 20. where it is said of the constellation Orion that ἀείδελον ἐστήρικται in the heavens. Here the sense evidently is *shining*; and Ἀείδεμα, λαμπρά in Hesychius has been very properly amended to Ἀείδελα. But this meaning is not to be explained, as the grammarians do, either by α intensive or by ἀεὶ δῆλος: but these later Epic poets gave to the form ἀείδελος the same meaning which they acknowledged ἀΐδηλος to have as an epithet of fire; νῶροψ, *dazzling*.

M. Αΐζηλον[4], ἄφαντον. Heindorf, when quite young, proposed to apply this to Il. β, 318., and to read

Τὸν μὲν ἀΐζηλον[5] θῆκεν θεὸς ὅσπερ ἔφηνεν,

instead of ἀρίζηλον, now the universal reading of the text. That the gloss, as it stands in the Etym. M., relates to this verse, is beyond a doubt. This is quite clear from the gloss in Apollonii Lexicon, where to the one explanation of 'Αΐδηλον, ἀφανές, is added: ὅπερ καὶ ἀείζηλον λέγει· Τὸν μὲν ἀείζηλον θῆκεν θεὸς ὅσπερ ἔφηνεν. And the Etym. M. in another place, i.e. under ἀΐδηλος, p. 41, 44. quotes the same passage thus: ὁμοίως καὶ Τὸν μὲν ἀΐδηλον θῆκε θεός. On this point we must consult the following scholia in the Venetian Manuscript which follow close on each other:

Τὸν μὲν ἀρίζηλον θῆκεν θεὸς ὅσπερ ἔφηνε] ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ἀρίδηλον, καὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον προσέθηκεν. τὸ γὰρ ἀρίδηλον ἄγαν ἐμφανὲς, ὅπερ ἀπίθανον. ὃ γὰρ ἐὰν (a later and worse expression for ὃ γὰρ ἂν) πλάσῃ τοῦτο ἀναιρεῖ. λέγει μέντοιγε ὅτι ὁ φήνας αὐτὸν θεὸς καὶ ἄδηλον ἐποίησεν.

Λᾶαν γάρ μιν ἔθηκε Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεω] ἀθετεῖται· προείρηται δὲ αἰτία.

Here is a great want of connexion. But first, so far is clear and certain, that some rejected the verse 319. but Zenodotus retained it. "The cause of the rejection," says the second Scholiast, "has been already mentioned." But this is nowhere to be found, and there seems to have been lost some such passage as stands in the Victorian Scholia (Heyn. Add. ad lib. 2. p. 687.); "because it is more probable that the god who had been the cause of the serpent's appearing was the cause of his sudden disappearance" (πιθανώτερον γὰρ, αὐτὸν καθάπαξ ἀφανῆ πεποιηκέναι τὸν καὶ φήναντα θεόν).

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[4] The reading ἀΐζηλον (with the diæresis) in the last Leipsic edition is a decision which may possibly be made on some good grounds, but such a one ought not to be introduced into books hastily or with any appearance of force. The more accurately copies are made from the originals, the better and more useful.

[5] That this is really an old reading, we know now from the Ambrosian Fragments of the Iliad published by Mai, in which the verse was so written at first hand. See Buttmann's edition of them at the end of his scholia of the Odyssey, p. 589.

Hence, then, it is clear that the author of this criticism read in the preceding verse some word which meant ἀφανῆ. Let us read now the first scholium without regard to the ἀρίζηλον in the preceding verse, and I think, without spending much time in criticizing the pointing and the reading, we may consider this to be its meaning: "Zenodotus reads ἀρίδηλον, and "retains the following verse; for ἀρίδηλον means, very con- "spicuous. But this is improbable; for by this expression he "does away what he had first said." The meaning of which is, that this commentator considers the transformation of the serpent into a stone as contradictory to the expression ἀρίδηλον. Zenodotus, on the contrary, one plainly sees, thought there was a contradiction between the serpent being made to *disappear* by being turned into a stone which was *visible*. The conclusion of the scholium fixes the following antithesis as the true sense of Homer, that "the same god which had made "the serpent appear, made it also disappear." The commentator, whose opinion is expressed in this scholium, evidently, therefore, explains the Homeric word by ἄδηλον; and yet the universal reading of the text is ἀρίζηλον. Hence one is tempted, in order to bring the lemma to agree with the scholium, to read, instead of ἀρίζηλον, one of the forms which we have brought forward from Hesych. Etym. M. and Apollon. Lexicon. But this attempt is again obstructed by our reading, not without great surprise, in Etym. M. v. ἀρίζηλος, that certain grammarians thought ἀρίζηλος to have also the meaning of ἄδηλος by supposing the ρ to be inserted. Aristarchus, however, whose school we principally recognise in these scholia, was not satisfied with this mode of proceeding. Without, therefore, troubling myself with the lemma, I see plainly in the scholium itself the two contrary opinions of Aristarchus and Zenodotus, the former reading ἀΐδηλον (with ι long) or some form of similar meaning, the latter reading ἀρίδηλον. Whether the rejection of the following verse, and the grounds for doing it referred to in the second scholium, proceeded also from Aristarchus, must be left undecided. At all events it is agreed that the verse (318.) is genuine and ancient, and that, consequently, before these criticisms, it appeared very passable with the meaning of ἀΐδηλος. Nay, that this, if not the common reading, was at least a very general one down to Cicero's time, is plain from his translation of these verses, de Divin. 2, 30.

> Qui luci ediderat, genitor Saturnius, idem
> *Abdidit*, et duro firmavit[6] tegmina saxo.

9. Now first, as far as the word ἀρίζηλος belongs to this investigation, it is apparently connected with ζῆλος; according to which derivation it would give here and there an apparent sense to the passage. But as Homer uses it also as an epithet of lightning, of the sound of the trumpet and such like, it is clear that it accords with δῆλος, and that some cause or other in this its compound state (instead of ἀρίδηλος with ι short, which never occurs in Homer,) made the second syllable in the old Ionic language long; from which then (whether by actual pronunciation, or by the old poets committing it to writing, or, lastly, by the filing down of the grammarians,) came ἀρίζηλος, by the change of the δ into ζ, or, which is the same thing, by the insertion of a σ before the δ[7]. It is, however, possible that Zenodotus always wrote ἀρίδηλος pronounced with a long ι; whence in the scholium quoted above, where the word is mentioned as his reading, it appears written according to his orthography[8].

10. Of ἀΐδηλος we have already seen that the quantity of both its second and third syllable is changeable; ἀΐδηλος, ἀείδελος. In the passage in question (Il. β, 318.), where it is an old various reading with ἀρίζηλος, it must have both its second and third syllable long; which, however, need not create any doubt or hesitation, when we see in Homer Ὀδυσῆος, Ὀδυσσέος, and Ὀδυσσῆος. From this name, indeed, occurring so often in these three forms, they have become the only established and acknowledged manner of writing it; but

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[6] See below at note 10.

[7] See my opinion stated somewhat more definitely under note 12.

[8] In the post-Homeric poets ἀρίδηλος is also found with ι short. Simonides has it so in Epig. 59. (65.) Brunck's Anal. 1, 139. μέγα Πήλιον ἅ τ' ἀρίδαλος Ὄσσα; so has also Apoll. Rhod. and the still later poets. But ἀρίζηλος also occurs in the sense of ζῆλος; not, however, earlier than Callimachus, Epig. 54., also in Meleag. Epig. 1. and in others. This meaning ought, therefore, no longer to have precedence in the lexicons, still less to be quoted as Homer's.

otherwise there is nothing to prevent its being written also Ὀδῡσῆος, Ὀδῡσεῖος, Ὀδυσσεῖος. For the word ἀΐδηλος, which does not occur again in this quantity ⏑––⏑ in Homer, a threefold reading may be adopted for those texts which had it in this passage; viz. ἀΐδηλος, by which the quantity is left to the reader (see the passage as quoted above at Sect. 8. from the Etym. M.); ἀΐζηλος (see also Hesych. and Etym. M. quoted at the same place); and ἀείδηλος, which recommended itself by its analogy with ἀείδελος. From a confusion of the two last forms arose in Apollon. Lexic. the inadmissible form ἀείζηλον[9].

11. The common reading ἀρίζηλος is thus explained: "Jupiter has turned the serpent into a stone, and this serpent of "stone remains as a monument." But how can it be supposed that an Epic poet could have represented such a play of the imagination with so little of the distinctness of a picture? He would have undoubtedly brought before the mind of the hearer this miraculous figure, whether standing or lying, which was to remain as a monument of the transformation, and not have merely said, "He turned it into stone." Besides, there is another circumstance which would be almost as astonishing, that I find in the ancients themselves, down to Eustathius, not the least trace of this view and explanation: for the ἀρίδηλος, which Zenodotus or others before him thought they must write in reference to the λᾶαν ἔθηκε, was evidently only a help to reconcile the contradiction which they found between the invisibility and the stone[10]. To this we must also add the perfectly

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[9] Tollius on Apollon. Lex. seeing the inadmissibility of this form, thinks he can furnish his author (from Eustath. ad Od. θ, 309.) with the form ἀείδηλος, which I have given above only from analogy. But he mistakes, and so does Heyne. The form there is ἀείδελος.

[10] Some further trace of the common acceptation of this passage may possibly be thought to exist in the latter of the two verses of Cicero quoted above, which is now written in all the editions

Abdidit, et duro *formavit* tegmina saxo.

But even if this were the true reading, still the word *Abdidit* would prevent anything confirmatory of that acceptation being drawn from the subsequent clause of the sentence, and *formavit* would be, therefore, nothing more than *fecit*. This, indeed, is not probable; still less can we approve of giving up the reading of all the old editions and some of the manuscripts to favour a various reading which was obliged to useless expression ὅσπερ ἔφηνεν; of which, if we read ἀΐδηλος, we see at once the object and the sense by means of the antithesis, as shown in the Scholium above quoted. The words λᾶαν γάρ μιν ἔθηκεν have, then, the sense which the words plainly bear: "he turned it into a stone." That is to say, this is one of the more definite forms by which the imagination sometimes makes the *appearance* and *disappearance* of things in tales of wonder, not less wonderful, for that must not be, but, as it were, more on a level with common sense, and more proportioned to the power of thought; so that sometimes the former seems to be a magical production from one of the stones lying about in the field, sometimes the latter is imagined to be a transformation into one of them.

12. Whether this reading ought to be restored to our text or not I leave to others, if it were only to spare myself the

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come almost mechanically to *firmavit*. But this same defective criticism has been actually put in practice in Tibull. 2, 5, 23. *Romulus æternæ nondum formaverat urbis Mœnia consorti non habitanda Remo*. Wyttenbach, Bibl. Crit. 1, 3, p. 84. has doubts, and with justice, of the expression *formare mœnia*. But the reading *firmaverat* he appears to consider, and I think incorrectly, as referring to the walls being made secure or made sacred by the death of Remus; so apt is one to be seduced into this meaning by the words of Propertius, 3, 8, 50. *et cæso mœnia firma Remo*. For as the sense in Tibullus must be, "Rome was not yet built," it would be most strange to express that sense by a circumstance which was completely an accessory to its building, although it might be very well added afterwards as a poetical exuberance. The words *mœnia firma cæso Remo* do also express very well the thing which was brought to pass by means of the death of Remus; but *firmat mœnia non habitanda Remo* could at most signify only that the safety of the city had depended on the removal of Remus; which was the meaning neither of Propertius nor Tibullus. In short, every one feels that *formaverat* or *firmaverat* can stand only for *struxerat*. On the other hand, Wyttenbach has brought forward a passage very much to the purpose, with the same variety of reading, from Claudian's Rapt. Proserp. 1, 236. *Devenere locum, Cereris quo tecta nitebant Cyclopum firmata manu*. *Formata* would be as tame and poor an expression in this passage as it is in Tibullus; and yet *firmata* is not to be understood as meaning merely strengthened, but it is evidently a full poetical expression for *firmiter exstructa*; in the same way is *firmaverat mœnia* for *mœnia firma exstruxerat*; and therefore again in Cicero *firmavit tegmina* is the same as *indidit tegmina firma—duro saxo*: for the transformation into stone, whatever the reading may be, is described as having taken place by the being covered over with stone, which is literally expressed by *Abdidit*.

deciding in which of the three ways we ought now to write it. The analogy which produced the reading ἀΐζηλον I consider doubtful; for if the ι in ἀρί-δηλον is to be lengthened, one analogy is introduced; if in ἀ-ίδηλον, another is necessary. To write ἀΐδηλον is contrary to common usage, which does not allow of a long ι in forms coming from εἴδω. And lastly, as to ἀείδηλος, the principles of sound criticism forbid our using any form, least of all introducing it into Homer, unless it has come down to us in a sure and authentic manner. And in this case there is reason to suppose that Homer never did use this form, but that as soon as he wanted the second syllable long, he used (fourthly) the form ἀειδέλιος, which has all the meanings in common with the others[11], but is too different from any of the readings which have actually come down to us, for us to propose its adoption in the passage in question. Here, then, we have a most striking example how almost impossible it is in Homeric criticism, with all our best wishes and exertions, to surmount the difficulties of the standing text. And although fully convinced that ἀρίζηλος was not originally in this passage in Homer's verse, still we must retain this reading, as the only one which has come down to us grounded on authentic documents[12].

Αἴητος; vid. ἄητος.

11. Αἶνος, ἐπαινή.

1. The word αἶνος is in its principal meaning nearly synonymous with *μῦθος, a speech, narration*; but it has also the par-

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[11] See above at note 3.

[12] I will here add my etymological conjectures on these forms. I think the form ἰδηλός lies at the root of both compounds; for I consider the common word δῆλος to be only an abbreviation of ἰδηλός, as in ἔκηλος, κηλεῖν, where will be found a similar opinion. The compound with ἀρι- was therefore properly ἀρι-ίδηλος, from which the second ι disappeared, and the digamma remaining before the δ, made the preceding syllable long; whence it is very possible that this digamma before δ changed itself into σ, and ἀρίζηλος is therefore a genuine old form. In the compounding of ἀΐδηλος there are less analogical grounds for the lengthening of the second syllable by means of σ or ζ, particularly as the forms εἴδω, εἶδος already offer instances of the lengthening of ι into ει.

ticular idea of *praise,* which is established as one of its senses in the language of Epic poetry by the two passages of Od. φ, 110. *τί με χρὴ μητέρος αἴνου*; and Il. ψ, 795. In Herodotus, 8, 112. praise is called *αἴνη*. These are evidently verbal substantives, which according to all analogy suppose a verb *αἴνω,* and in it the meaning of praise; with which, indeed, the gloss in Hesychius agrees: Αἴνων[1], βαρυτόνως, ἐπαινῶν τι. The verb *αἰνέω,* which is the one in common use, has taken, as is frequently the case, the derivative form after the substantive. This verb means only *to praise*; but in the stem or radical verb *αἴνω* there was undoubtedly also the meaning of *to say,* and that too as the radical sense, from which proceeded the meaning of *praise*; much the same as in Latin *laudare* originally meant *to name aloud, name* or *mention*[2]. That ἀναίνομαι is no compound of this *αἴνω,* see art. 21. sect. 10[3].

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[1] In the printed copies of Hesychius it is *αἰνὼν,* by a misunderstanding of the word *βαρυτόνως.*

[2] See Gellius 2, 6. where, although badly, the *illaudatus Busiris* of Virgil is explained by this original meaning of *laudo.* In the common language of the Roman authors we never find *laudo* in this sense except it is joined with the word *testem* or *auctorem*; and only in modern Latin is *laudare* alone used in the sense of *to quote* or *make mention of.* Adelung in his German Dictionary makes a very just comparison between this word and the German participles *obbelobt, oftbelobt,* [used in the technical language of German law, for *above-mentioned, often-mentioned,* while in common language *belobt* merely means *be-praised*]: and if any one should suppose that the idea of praise is properly the ground of all these expressions, because, strictly speaking, we rely as authorities only on those whom we can *praise* and *recommend* as worthy of credit, I answer, that I do not think it probable the ancients would have said, "I praise as a witness, I extol as an authority such and such a one;" but much rather the reverse, that in this, as in all languages, from the weaker sense arose gradually, by the repetition of single cases, the more forcible meaning; and so from the idea of *to name aloud, quote, mention,* came that of *to praise, extol**. If now we search after cognate words of the verb *αἴνειν* in the simple sense of speaking, we find the Latin *aio*; and the Greek *αἶσα* is in respect to its derivation exactly like the Latin *fatum.*

[3] Of the two ways of compounding there rejected I would remark,

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* [Thus, "I have heard it much spoken of" is almost equivalent to "I have heard it much praised."—Ed.]

2. The epithet of Ulysses πολύαινος is generally understood of *praise*; and thence the more ancient commentators saw in Il. λ, 430. where Socus says,

> Ὦ 'Οδυσεῦ πολύαινε, δόλων ἆτ' ἠδὲ πόνοιο,

an irony, for which they have been blamed, and not without justice, if their rejection of the regular sense arose from their objection to praise in the mouth of an enemy. But it cannot be denied, that, if πολύαινος means much praised or celebrated, the expressions in that passage do not suit well together. Some of the ancients, however, explained the word by πολύμυθος also; which, if understood to mean *loquacious*, might be an epithet suited to Nestor, but by no means to Ulysses. But the word αἶνος in its sense of *a speech* has a particular and limited meaning. Μῦθος is in general any speech, conversation, narration; αἶνος is only a speech full of meaning, or cunningly imagined. Such it is in the only passage of Homer where it has not the meaning of praise, Od. ξ, 508. It is there used of the short and pithy narrative of Ulysses, the cunning object of which Eumæus understands and applauds. In Hesiod, ε, 200. it is a moral fable, and in other old writers sometimes a fable, sometimes a proverb. How, then, can it be for a moment doubted, that πολύαινος, an epithet given exclusively to Ulysses, relates solely to that particular sort of speeches which marks so strikingly his character?

3. Much more difficult is the explanation of the Epic epithet of *Proserpine* ἐπαινή, which occurs twice in the Iliad, four

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however, that the one with the negative ἀν would be the preferable; first from the analogy of the Latin *nego* formed from *ne* and *aio*; in which, however, the transition to the first conjugation answers to that which in Greek is required by the regular rule. For as from *dicere* is formed not *judicere* but *judicare,* as from *ne* and *aio* not *negere* but *negare,* so also in Greek nothing could be regularly compounded of αἴνω by the addition of the negative particle but ἀναινέω. In this case, therefore, recourse must be had to examples of irregular composition, which certainly do occur; vid. ἀτίειν in Theogn. 621. and Macrob. de Verbo; ἀνειμάρθαι, Plut. de Plac. I. 27. But in investigating the derivation of any common usage of language we must consider not single exceptions, which are very generally somewhat too individual, but as much as possible only fixed analogies.

times in the Odyssey, and twice in the Theogonia. Except in these passages it is never met with. First then, the lexicons must be corrected, in which ἐπαινός, ή, όν stands with two regular and distinct meanings, which, however, are taken only from the different explanations given by the grammarians of the same passages, without any mention of the word being confined entirely to Proserpine[4].

4. Of these two explanations (for a third given by Eustathius is not worth mentioning) the one is, that it stands for ἐπαινετή, in which case it is generally taken for an euphemismus; the other is, that it is the same as αἰνή. That the old grammarians, who were so much in the dark about the formation of words, should have proposed such explanations, does not astonish me; but from the moderns I should have expected some discussion or some hesitation expressed at such explanations. Of the two, the latter is more generally approved of, on account of the sense. But that ancient language of Homer's time knows nothing whatever of the mere compounding of an adjective with a preposition, which is not explained by some sentence or expression, as ἐπιδέξιος from ἐπὶ δεξιά, or ἐπαίτιος, which properly does not come from αἴτιος but from αἰτίαν ἐπιφέρειν. To say that the ἐπί in ἐπαινός is redundant, or that it adds to the force of the simple, is mere words and not criticism. As for the other meaning of ἐπαινετή, I know of no other admissible way of explaining it, but by supposing that ἔπαινος (for so it must be accented in every case) comes from αἶνος in the same way as the above-mentioned ἐπαίτιος, ἐπίχρυσος and the like; that is to say, in the sense of ᾧτινι αἶνος ἔπεστιν or ἐπιφέρεται. Certainly not an analogy conclusive enough to oblige us to admit so tame and unmeaning an adjective as *praiseworthy* for an epithet of the infernal goddess Proserpine. These considerations appear to me weighty enough to justify my offering a conjecture of my own, which, however, is ready in its turn to yield to any new opinion better than those which have hitherto been handed down to us.

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[4] An assertion made in the notes of Jacob's Anthologia, on occasion of a conjecture of Scaliger on Epigr. 30. of Crinagoras, that this epithet was given to both goddesses who presided over the Mysteries, has neither ground nor authority.

5. We have seen that this epithet has been given only to Proserpine, but I would also observe that she has it only when she is joined in the construction with Pluto. Il. ι, 457.

θεοὶ δ' ἐτέλειον ἐπαρὰς
Ζεύς τε καταχθόνιος καὶ ἐπαινὴ Περσεφόνεια.

ι, 569.

Κικλήσκουσ' Ἀΐδην καὶ ἐπαινὴν Περσεφόνειαν.

Od. κ, 534. λ, 47.

ἐπεύξασθαι δὲ θεοῖσιν
Ἰφθίμῳ τ' Ἀΐδῃ καὶ ἐπαινῇ Περσεφονείᾳ.

κ, 491. 563. of such who go

Εἰς Ἀΐδαο δόμους καὶ ἐπαινῆς Περσεφονείας.

Hes. θ, 768.

Ἔνθα θεοῦ χθονίου πρόσθεν δόμοι ἠχήεντες
Ἰφθίμου τ' Ἀΐδεω, καὶ ἐπαινῆς Περσεφονείας.

and a little further, 774. in the same words,

πυλέων ἔκτοσθεν ἰόντα
Ἰφθίμου τ' Ἀΐδεω καὶ ἐπαινῆς Περσεφονείας.

And as if to prove that this epithet is inadmissible except in this connexion, we find that in the same book of the Odyssey, where it does so occur once, viz. λ. 47., the goddess is named alone three times, 212. 225. 634. and though in the same part of the verse and where the same epithet would suit the rhythm, yet it is always ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνεια. From this, however, so much is evident, that this way of joining the name of Proserpine with that of Pluto was an old Epic formula handed down even to Homer and our oldest Greek poets from still earlier times, and which they used unchanged. Now at the first of the passages quoted above, Il. ι, 457. the old Scholia in Heyne have preserved the reading

καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ Περσεφόνεια.

My conjecture, therefore, is that this ἐπ' αὐτῷ is an old gloss of ἐπ' alone, and that the old formula was this

Ἴφθιμος τ' Ἀΐδης καὶ ἐπ' αἰνὴ Περσεφόνεια.

Compare among other similar passages Il. ν, 800. πρὸ μὲν *ἄλλοι ἀρηρότες, αὐτὰρ ἐπ’ ἄλλοι.* On this simple idea others have certainly fallen, but they covered and obscured it, because this *ἐπί* does not suit equally well all the above-mentioned passages. Now it appears to me an imaginable case, that this formula, which suits excellently well in connexion with *κικλήσκειν* and *ἐπεύξασθαι*, became, by the ear and the mouth being from old times accustomed to it, established in passages where it was less natural; as, for instance, in the genitives of the last-quoted passages. And, trifling as such a confirmation may seem, I will not withhold it, that at Od. *κ*, 534. a Vienna manuscript actually has, *καὶ ἐπ’ αἰνῇ* Περσεφονείᾳ.

6. It appears to me also worthy of remark, *first*, that in one of the passages where *ἀγαυή* stands, Od. λ, 634. there existed a various reading *ἐπαινή* (vid. Clarke ad l. and Hemst. ad Lucian. Necyom. 10.) but without taking root; *secondly*, that in one of the old magical formulas in Lucian, as mentioned above, which gives Proserpine this same epithet, it stands as before in connexion, not indeed with Pluto, but with another of the infernal deities,

> Καὶ *νυχίαν* Ἑ*κάτην, καὶ ἐπαινὴν* Περσεφόνειαν.

For so have the critics restored it from *αἰπείνην*, (a mistake easily made in transcribing,) yet without remarking, at least without recording the remark, that it is an hexameter verse interwoven with the prose context.

12. Αἰόλος, ἐόλητο.

1. Αἰόλος is one of those words on which everything essential with regard to its sense in Homer has long since been said and acknowledged to be said, and yet neither in the lexicons nor the notes of commentators are to be found the requisite fixedness and certainty of meaning; arising solely from the fault, that in explaining separate passages the force of the word in all the passages of Homer taken together is not kept sufficiently concentrated in one point of view. Αἰόλος vibrates in meaning between diversity in time—*moveable*,—and diversity in space—*different, of different colours.* It may very well be

imagined that these two relative senses might have been found together as early as Homer. This, however, must not be decided from separate passages, where it is possible that one person might prefer (for instance in *αἰόλος ὄφις*) the idea of *flexible*, another the idea of *varicoloured* ; but from one view of its usage in all the passages of Homer taken collectively.

2. The most decisive passage for the meaning of *moveable* is Il. *τ*, 404. *πόδας αἰόλος ἵππος*, the *nimble*-footed horse; and next to this the verb *αἰόλλω* in Od. *υ*, 27. which stands for *the turning* of a piece of meat *backwards and forwards* before the fire, *ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα αἰόλλει*. With this we may join *κορυθαίολος*, which has never been taken by any judicious interpreter in any other sense than the above; and we have then ample proofs to establish this meaning. The *wasps* might very well bear the epithet of *varicoloured*; but since in Il. *μ*, 167. the expression is *σφῆκες μέσον αἰόλοι*, none but a grammarian could have given it this meaning when joined with *μέσον* (see Schol. and Apollon. Lex.). In no insect is flexibility more evident than in the wasp, where the lower part of its body is joined as it were by a point with the upper. The gadfly, indeed, has the epithet simply in Od. χ, 300.

> Τὰς (the cows) *μέν τ' αἰόλος οἶστρος ἐφορμηθεὶς ἐδόνησεν·*

but the expression of *varicoloured* suits this insect far less than the former; and, on the other hand, the quick motion of the insect, continually flying backwards and forwards, repeatedly driven off and as often returning, is so characteristic, and the idea of all this so appropriate to the passage, that here also it seems impossible to hesitate. The *maggots*, or *worms*, which are eating a dead body, Il. χ, 509. *Νῦν δέ σε.... Αἰόλαι εὐλαὶ ἔδονται*, admit, indeed, of the idea of a diversity in space; but every one must have observed, that in this passage the quick motion of this multitude of reptiles is the great, prominent, and striking point in the description; the proper meaning, therefore is, *moving* swarms of maggots. Much more probable is it, as I have already mentioned, that a doubt should arise concerning the *serpent*; but still, when it is considered that the spiral windings of the serpent are characteristic of that reptile, and that the effect of the picture is much stronger, if we represent to ourselves the Trojans seized with terror at seeing the serpent dropped by the eagle, and lying before them (as Voss translates it) *coiling himself up*, we shall see no necessity for translating the epithet in this passage otherwise than we have rendered it before of the other animals.

3. There remains now only the *armour*, which we will first take as we find it collectively in Il. ε, 295. ἀράβησε δὲ τεύχε' ἐπ' αὐτῷ Αἰόλα παμφανόωντα. Again, we find separately at λ, 374., θώρηκα....Αἴνυτ' ἀπὸ στήθεσφι παναίολον· at δ, 186. Εἰρύσατο ζωστὴρ....παναίολος· at η, 222. Ὅς οἱ ἐποίησεν σάκος αἰόλον ἑπταβόειον. Here, then, indecision in the explanation of αἰόλος is very natural; nay, as its other meaning does exist in the language, it is easily to be conceived that in speaking of such things as these it would have the preference, particularly as τεύχεα ποικίλα χαλκῷ are so frequent, and as shield, coat of mail, and belt are so distinguished amidst the armour by splendour, ornament, and diversity of workmanship; whence also a superior coat of mail, Il. π, 134., is called ποικίλος ἀστερόεις, and at κ, 149. the σάκος is ποικίλον. Nor should one be inclined without hesitation to call the heavy shield of Ajax, with Voss, *agile*. I grant that these are the passages where the two ideas most of all play into each other; but then only because it is the flexibility of the whole armour, which properly causes its diversity of colour and the quick transition from one shade to another. To instance this in particulars, it is essential to the coat of mail that all its parts should favour the different motions of the body. Consequently it is composed of different parts, and those parts are composed of rings and scales; these, when put together, necessarily cause a diversity of appearance, which, however, is only visible by the motion of the armour. The shield, indeed, is firm and solid in itself, but the constant motion of the arm which carries it produces the same effect; and however large a shield may be, still the skilful armourer was obliged to make it proportionably light and wieldy; and the hero who bore it must have been able to manage it with ease, or it would not have done him the service of a shield, which in its very nature must be αἰόλος or easily moved in any direction. The same results are found also in the compounds of αἰόλος. Thus αἰολόπωλος refers to the quick

and active guiding of the horses, *αἰολοθώρηξ* is one who moves his coat of mail easily or moves himself easily in his coat of mail, an expression which becomes more clear by being compared with *κορυθαίολος*, which admits of no other meaning, and would certainly have been *αἰολόκορυς* if the metre had allowed it. The belt, which must go tight round the waist, is composed of parts and very flexible: in the same way what is called by Homer *μίτρη*, is likewise made of metal and worn under the *ζωστήρ*; therefore, the idea of varicoloured is never once attached to it. Il. δ, 185. *ἀλλὰ πάροιθεν Εἰρύσατο ζωστήρ τε παναίολος ἠδ᾽ ὑπένερθεν Ζῶμα τε καὶ μίτρη, τὴν χαλκῆες κάμον ἄνδρες.* Now in this part of the body above all others suppleness and flexibility are essential, and on that is founded also the epithet *αἰολομίτρης*, Il. ϵ, 707.—Because, therefore, as we have said before, the idea of varicoloured and of changing quickly from shade to shade does of itself accompany the idea of moveableness, this latter alone is to be admitted as the radical meaning in all these passages of Homer.

4. In a multiplicity of other things also *ποικίλος* and *αἰόλος* may be used with the same leading sense; as when Ulysses is called by Homer *ποικιλομήτης* and Sisyphus by Hesiod in Fr. ap. Schol. Pind. Pyth. 4, 252. *αἰολομήτης*; that is to say, the former gives an idea of a diversity of plans, the latter of a rapidity of change from one plan to another. But in the same way as *ποικίλος* is an epithet of things to which the idea of moveableness does not belong, or which it does not suit as a poetical epithet, for instance, couches, garments, Od. α, 132. Il. ϵ, 735., a curiously-tied fastening, Od. θ, 448.; so we have seen above *αἰόλος* joined to things which are not *ποικίλα*. Thus, then, judicious criticism requires, that in passages where both ideas suit the sense, that alone should be selected which the word has elsewhere.

5. Another circumstance tends to prove the uniformity of the meaning of this word in Homer, that in very old poems immediately succeeding his age the word is used for *varicoloured* so decisively as it never is met with in his writings. For in Hymn. Merc. 33. the shell of the *tortoise*, the slowest of all animals, is called *αἰόλον ὄστρακον*. I will not bring forward the passage of Hesiod's Shield of Hercules to prove that the grapes

being *of different colours* as they ripen in summer is expressed by *ὅτ᾽ ὄμφακες αἰόλλονται*; for by this expression we need not understand their difference of colour, but the rapid change of their colours as they ripen; at the same time we see here a transition from the first meaning to the second, such as we have not found in Homer. Besides, as a convincing proof that the meaning of *moveable* is the only original one, it prevails so decisively through every period of the Greek language, that the other is to be regarded only as a poetical extension of it. In prose, indeed, the word very seldom occurs: Schneider, however, in his Lexicon quotes from Aristotle *αἰόλας ἡμέρας*, "*changeable* days"; and the word *αἰέλουρος, αἴλουρος* arises most certainly from that strong and snake-like motion of the tail which is so characteristic of cats, and not from its being of different colours, which might as well be said of any other part of its body[1].

6. The *αἰόλα νύξ* of Sophocles Trach. 94. 132. is brought into comparison with the *θοὴ νύξ* of Homer by one of the explanations of the Scholiast. And certainly when one sees that in both these passages, the first of which is an address to the sun, *Ὃν αἰόλα νὺξ ἐναριζομένα τίκτει, κατευνάζει τε*, and in the other, *μένει γὰρ οὔτ᾽ αἰόλα νὺξ βροτοῖσιν....*, that in both these the night is represented as in its passage and in a state of change, there seems considerable ground for thinking that Sophocles used *αἰόλα* as a learned imitation of the *θοή* of Homer. However, considering that the same poet certainly uses *αἰόλος* for *varicoloured*, when he makes Philoctetes say (Philoct. 1157.) "the birds glut themselves *ἐμᾶς σαρκὸς αἰόλας*," which can admit of no other meaning; and that Euripides in the second fragment of his Pirithous gives to the night the epithet of *αἰολόχρως*; I cannot but decide in favour of the other interpretation for Sophocles, "the starry night." And certainly it is more suitable that in both passages the night should borrow an epithet from anything else, rather than from what is said in the remainder of the sentence itself*.

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[1] The derivation brought forward by Salmasius (Ex. Plin. p. 1009.) from *αἰλεῖν, θωπεύειν* (Hesych.) and *οὐρά* springs from the same original idea. See the note at the end of this article.

* [Passow in his improved edition of Schneider's Lexicon gives the

7. I join with this word the verb ἐόλητο in Apoll. Rhod., which modern commentators generally derive from αἰόλος. I had compared it in my Grammar with μεμόρηται, δεδόκημαι, βεβόλητο, and derived it from εἴλω in the sense of, *was squeezed, pressed.* Böckh has upon this the following remark on Pind. Pyth. 4, 414. *mihi simplicior et magis perspicua a voce* ἐολέω (αἰολέω) *derivatio videtur, quanquam* ἐολεῖν *et* εἰλεῖν *affinia esse non nego.* Hence with reference to this form of Apollonius Rhod. he changes in Pindar αἰόλλει, which was contrary to the metre, into ἐόλει, and adds, *constat enim veteres sic et pronunciasse et partim scripsisse.* All this requires a more accurate discussion.

8. To the genuineness of the verb αἰολεῖν no objection can be made. In the lexicons may be seen αἰολᾶσθαι and ἀπαιολεῖν with its derivatives. Hippocrates uses αἰολᾶσθαι τῇ γνώμῃ of the changeable mind of a sick person, and Euripides Ion. 549. has ταῦτά με ἀπαιολεῖ, "this makes me uncertain what to say, puzzles me." It was therefore very natural, in the two passages to which Böckh's note refers, to think of this verb. But that it is also a *more simple* derivation to derive ἐόλητο from αἰολέω than from any other verb, I cannot allow. The more simple derivation is not that which meets the eye or the ear more quickly than another, but that which accords with well-known rules and analogies, bringing with it the fewest things to be taken for granted. In the present case the first thing to be taken for granted is that ε comes from αι, a thing by no means grounded on any satisfactory analogy. That the ancients pro-

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following meanings of αἰόλος: 1st, quick, agile, turning or moving itself easily or quickly; πόδας αἰόλος, nimble-footed, Il. τ, 404. Used elsewhere in Homer of serpents, worms or maggots, and gadflies. Μέσον αἰόλοι, applied to wasps, as being particularly flexible in the middle of their body, Il. μ, 167. Homer has also αἰόλα τεύχεα and αἰόλον σάκος, by which some understand, "easily or quickly moved, light"; others, "varicoloured," of colours shifting quickly from shade to shade. 2nd, of many colours, varicoloured, of colours which shift quickly from one shade to another; νύξ αἰόλος, the starry night, Sophocl. Multiform, varied. Metaph. changeable, uncertain, crafty, cunning, deceitful, ψεῦδος, Pind. N. 8, 42. as compared with ποικίλοις ψεύδεσι, Olymp. 1, 46. Αἰόλοι ἡμέραι, changeable, uncertain days on account of the weather, Aristot. Probl. 26, 14.—Ed.]

nounced αι like ε cannot be asserted so unequivocally as Böckh does. For no one will maintain that the same mouth pronounced παῖς like *pēs*, and also made by diæresis πάϊς; or that the ancients, whom we are here reviewing, could have pronounced Μαία like *Mea*. It is only within certain limitations carefully marked out, particularly when we are speaking of a period of such antiquity, that we can adopt the supposition, that in a part of the dialects the pronunciation of ε for αι did take place in those early times. (Vid. Buttmann's Ausführ. Sprach., sect. 5. obs. 6*.) The analogy of αἰώρα ἐώρα, and γαῖα γέα, is not sufficient to prove it; for in these two cases we have not the pronunciation of αι for ε, but the change of αι into ε, exactly as α is changed into ε in λᾱός λεώς, μνᾱα μνέα. According to this analogy, from αἰολεῖν could come only ἐωλεῖν; and therefore the ω must be again shortened to form ἐόλει.

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* The Latins write the Greek αι and οι by *æ* and *œ*; e. g. Φαῖδρος *Phædrus*, Ἀχαιός *Achæus*, Κοίλη *Cœle*, Ποίας *Pœas*. Only some few names in αια, οια retain the *i* in the Latin, probably because it passed into *aj*; as Μαῖα, Τροία, *Maja, Troja*, (Ἀχαία was in pure Greek a word of four syllables, Ἀχαΐα, whence it naturally became in Latin *Achaïa, Achaja*: Αἴας also became *Ajax*). In the same way the Greeks wrote for *Cæsar* Καῖσαρ, for *Clœlia* Κλοιλία. Necessarily, therefore, these diphthongs must have been very similar to each other in the old pronunciation of both languages; the cause of which lay undoubtedly in this, that *æ, œ* had not originally the sounds which they have generally now in German and English, but as true diphthongs came very near the sounds αι, οι[a]. This becomes more certain by the writing of *Comœdus*, as it is still less conceivable that the long ῳ should have been pronounced by the Latins like *œ*. Further, as such contractions and resolutions as πάϊς and παῖς, ὄϊς and οἶς, and even in the Latin poets *Albaï* and *Albæ*, always remained familiar to the ear; all this added to the names *Maja, Troja*, shows that the sounds αι, οι were at all events the older pronunciation, but by no means an obsolete one, which, therefore, we are justified in adhering to in Greek. In later times the pronunciation of *æ* for *ai* became the current one in Greece; while for οι, they took not *æ*, but the long *i*.—*Buttm. A. S.* 5, 6.

[a] In order to see the possibility of this, we may compare the Flemish *ae*, which is written differently from the *aa* of the Dutch, and consequently is a diphthong, while the latter is purely a lengthening of the *a*. The *oe* has in these languages no corresponding pronunciation but the sound of *u*: and it is remarkable, that in Latin *pœna* passed over into *punio*, *mœnia* into *munio*. Rigidius, in Gell. 19, 14., expressly says that in *æ*, an *e* was sounded after the *a*.

This also is possible; provided there were but *one thing to be granted* to favour this derivation. But then again ἐόλητο must stand for ἠόλητο, which third supposition is still more arbitrary than the others. That is to say, if there existed such a verb as ἐολέω for αἰολέω, the imperfects without the augment would indisputably be ἐόλει, ἐολεῖτο; but ἐόλητο is according to its termination a plusquam-perfectum, and contrary to all Epic analogy, without the augment arising from the reduplication of the perfect, and to adapt its time to the sense and the passage in question other suppositions must be granted which would destroy all simplicity of explanation. On the contrary, with regard to form, my derivation is perfectly simple; for I have only to say, as δέδεγμαι has a similar form of the same meaning δεδόκημαι (compare Il. δ, 107. with ο, 730.), exactly so has ἔελμαι (Il. ν, 524. and elsewhere)—ἐόλημαι. (Vid. Buttmann's Ausführ. Sprach., sect. 112, 9*.)

9. But to explain this more in detail. The verb εἴλω, with the meanings of *to push, press, drive, beat*, is, in its more simple forms ἔλσαι, ἔελμαι, &c., an old Epic word, which I shall discuss in its turn in a separate article. With this verb, then, which has the digamma, as is clear from the form ἔελμαι, I compare the verb ἐόλητο, and understand it to mean in Apollonius Rhod. 3, 471.

> Ἡ μὲν ἄρ' ὣς ἐόλητο νόον μελεδήμασι κούρη,

she was pressed down, oppressed; with which the explanations of the scholiasts and old lexicographers, ἐτετάρακτο, ἐν ἀγωνίᾳ ἦν, ἐπτόητο, ὠδύνητο, agree remarkably well. Only in the Etym. M. there is a remark, that it is also written with αι; and the idea of connecting it with *αἰολεῖσθαι* was strengthened by observing that in the speech of the damsel immediately before the verse in question there is a considerable hesitation of purpose shown by her first trying to banish from her mind all sympathy for Jason, and then giving utterance to it. An imperfect, therefore, (but no plusquam-perfectum,) with the sense of *αἰολεῖτο*, might stand here perfectly well; at the same time it is anything but necessary: for the expression, "her mind *was pressed*, or *weighed down* (ἔελτο, ἐόλητο) with cares," brings before our eyes those feelings of the damsel as a necessary consequence of it, and as depicted in the preceding speech.

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* Many barytone dissyllables, which have an ϵ in the radical syllable, make sister-forms by changing the vowel into ο, and taking the termination εω: φέρω and φορέω, τρέμω and τρομέω, φέβομαι commonly φοβέομαι; so also πορθέω, δομέω, βρομέω, ποτέομαι. Or the radical syllable has ω, and the termination is άω: στρωφάω for στρέφω, τρωχάω for τρέχω; so also δωμάω, βρωμάω, νωμάω, τρωπάω, πωτάομαι. According to the first formation some have sister-forms in the perfect only: δεδοκημένος for δεδεγμένος from δέκομαι or δέχομαι; and therefore also ἐκτόνηκα, μεμόρηται, ἐόλητο, from κτείνω, μείρομαι, εἴλω; also βεβόλημαι from βάλλω.—*Buttm. A. S.* 112, 9.

10. Without doubt, then, Apollonius Rhod. found this word in the older Epic language; one plain proof of which is the Pindaric ἐόλει; for the certainty of this amendment of Böckh is rendered by the metre unquestionable, and the reading of the manuscripts, *αἰόλλει*, has no more weight against it than the various reading *αἰόλητο* has in the verse of Apollonius Rhod. before us. This ἐόλει is therefore the regular imperfect of the digammaed verb ὀλεῖν—ἐόλουν, ἐόλει. The sense too is equally correct; Πῦρ δέ νιν οὐκ ἐόλει παμφαρμάκου ξείνας ἐφετμαῖς, "the flame (from the fire-breathing steeds) did not oppress, disturb, drive away Jason:" for that the sense of *αἰόλλειν*, *αἰολεῖν*, "he did not suffer himself to be moved from his purpose," also suits this passage, arises only from this circumstance, that these ideas taken in a moral sense are always united or connected together. For the full confirmation, however, of this reading we have only to consult the gloss of Hesychius, which gives us the present of this verb: Ὀλεῖ, ἐνοχλεῖ, ἐξολοθρεύει. Undoubtedly this gloss has generally been overlooked, from an idea that it belonged to ὀλλύναι, ὀλεῖν; and perhaps some may have been inclined to consider it as a comic expression, as we say of a troublesome or tiresome person, "he is enough to kill one." But ὀλεῖ from ὄλλυμι can only be the future. And the explanation ἐξολοθρεύει, being solely a word of the later Greek, must have been placed there by one of the late grammarians. Ἐνοχλεῖ is therefore without doubt the only old explanation; and in two other glosses of Hesychius it actually does stand alone, Ὀλαεῖ, ἐνοχλεῖ, καὶ Ὀλαθεῖ ὁμοίως.

The accent of these two last forms is without doubt incorrect; for a form ὀλαέω is scarcely conceivable. On the contrary, Ὀλέω, Ὀλάω, and Ὀλάθω are perfectly analogous forms, the two first like ποτέομαι and ποτάομαι from πέτομαι, the last like ὁρμάθω and others. To prove that the idea of ἐνοχλεῖν, *to be troublesome* or *burdensome*, is very near akin to that of *to press down, oppress*, will require no discussion. I think, therefore, I may now confidently propose the three forms ὀλεῖ, ἐόλει, and ἐόλητο as all coming from the verb Ἕλω, εἵλω with the idea of, *to press, press down, oppress*[2].

11. As to the verbs αἰόλλειν and εἰλεῖν having been originally the same, I see nothing to indicate it. The latter verb we may find plain enough as a root in Ἕλω, ἕλσαι, *to beat, strike, push*, &c., if we look to art. 87. sect. 4. But αἰόλλω comes according to all analogy from αἰόλος, which is undoubtedly an adjectival form with its root in the first syllable: and the old comparison of this word with ἄελλα appears to me by no means to be rejected; for ἄελλα comes already recommended to our notice by its connexion with Αἴολος, the god of the winds. All these, then, come from ἄω: the diphthong αι is the very common change of α before a vowel, and αἰόλος therefore means *blowing, flapping, moving*, &c[3].

13. Ἀκέων, ἀκήν.

1. As Homer uses not only ἀκέων, but also certain of its cases, such as ἀκέουσα, Il. α, 565. 569. ἀκέοντε, Od. ξ, 195., no doubt has been entertained of its being the participle of a

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[2] Whether the gloss of Hesychius εὔλητο, ἐπέφυρτο, ἐτετάρακτο, is to be explained as an error of transcription for ἐόλητο, or a various reading of it, or whether this latter form, after the disappearance of the digamma, was contracted in the dialects to εὔλητο, I leave to others to determine.

[3] Compare with this in the Etym. M. ἀείλλειν, θωπεύειν καὶ αἰκάλλειν: in Hesych. ἀελλεῖ, φιλεῖ, κολακεύει: αἰλεῖν, θωπεύειν, with the notes. For it is clear that these meanings come from the idea of σαίνειν, and therefore from the motion of the dog's tail betokening fondness.

verb ἀκέω; which, with the substantive ἀκή, and its supposed accusative ἀκήν, has been compared with ἧκα, and all considered as of the same family of words, with the idea of *rest, stillness.* I shall hope to show in a separate article in its proper place, that ἧκα belongs to another root with a very different radical idea. As for ἀκέων, if it be properly a participle, it is difficult to explain how it ever could have come to pass that this singular and masculine form should have been, contrary to all analogy, used and joined both with the feminine and the plural; as in Il. θ, 459.

> Ἤτοι Ἀθηναίη ἀκέων ἦν οὔτε τι εἶπεν.

and in Od. φ, 89.

> Ἀλλ' ἀκέων δαίνυσθε καθήμενοι.

I follow, therefore, the explanation of those who have derived ἀκήν from χαίνειν with the α privative. The Ionic change of χ and κ is familiar enough by such words as κέκαδον, δέκομαι, &c., and in this family of words in particular is confirmed by the verb κεάζω, I cleave, i. e. χαίνειν ποιῶ. Ἀκήν, therefore, is an adverbial form from χάειν, χαίνειν, confirmed by the analogy of ἀπριάτην. For instead of adverbs were used, particularly in the older Greek, many cases of adjectives; for instance, the accus. sing. and plur. of the neuter, and the dative and accus. sing. of the feminine, as δεινόν, ἔκπαγλα, κοινῇ, μακράν. In the same way we may account for many adverbial forms derived from *lost* adjectives, as πλησίον, διχῆ (for διχῇ) and δίχα, πέραν. Let us now suppose an adjective ἄκαος, *non hiscens, silent*; then the ἀκᾶ of Pindar (vid. article ἧκα, &c.) will be either the neuter plur. of it for ἄκαα, or the dat. fem. for ἀκάᾳ. From the accus. fem. ἀκάαν would have come in the Ionic dialect ἀκέην and ἀκήν, and from the neut. sing. ἄκαον would be formed ἀκέων, according to the analogy of ἵλαον ἵλεων. It is true that in these forms we see a difference of accent; but that we see in many others also, of whose origin we have now lost all traces (compare διχῆ and δίχα); nor is it possible for us to ascertain how much of the accenting of these old poetical forms was genuine ancient tradition, and how much arose from the etymological suppositions of the grammarians. The etymological sense of the forms before us was indisputably no longer felt even in a very early period of the Greek language. And this was the cause of ἀκέων, so frequently found in sentences whose subject was a masc. sing., being considered as an adjective or participle, and inflected accordingly. In the German language there is a very similar case in the old interjection *lieber*! which certainly almost every German would at once say is the masc. sing. of an adjective, and consequently would look upon its use in those passages of Scripture where it is addressed to a female or to more persons than one (as in Genesis xii. 13. and xxxiv. 8.) as a grammatical error. But *lieber*, like *leider*, is an adverbial form, originating in the old dative. *Leider* means *mir zum Leide*, *lieber* means *mir zur Liebe**. And as from the mistake in supposing ἀκέων to be a participle, arose ἀκέουσα, ἀκέοντε even as early as Homer's time, so the later writers went further, and Apollonius Rhod. 1, 765. has even the verb ἀκέοις. From a similar source must have come that solitary instance of the subst. ἀκή, in the Hesychian gloss ἀκὴν ἦγες, ἡσυχίαν ἦγες. The adj. ἀκαλός comes from ἀκήν. The transition of meaning from *silent*, *quiet*, to the idea of *tranquil*, *quiet*, *without being disturbed or interrupted*, which, however, in Homer is not a very apparent sense except in Od. ξ, 195., is so natural that it requires no discussion.

2. From this explanation of ἀκέων as an adverb it may perhaps be allowed that ἀκέων δαίνυσθε is a very natural expression; but ἀκέων joined with a verb substantive may possibly

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* [To make this illustration somewhat intelligible to the English scholar who may not understand German, it should be observed, that the German adjectives are inflected like the Greek and Latin, with different terminations for case, gender, and number; that *lieber*, as an adjective, is the nom. masc. sing. answering to the Lat. *carus*; but that in old German, as in the translation of the Bible, it is used as an interjection or adverb. In the two passages referred to above in Genesis it is translated in our Bible, "I pray you," in the former of which it is addressed by Abraham to Sarah, in the latter by Hamor to the sons of Jacob; consequently, as masc. sing. it does not appear to accord grammatically with either of these passages. But as an adverb or interjection taken from the dative, and signifying, as literally as it can be translated, "for my pleasure or gratification, to please or gratify me," it is an admirable illustration, as addressed to a German scholar, of ἀκᾶ, ἀκήν, or ἀκέων, according to Buttmann's derivation of them.—Ed.]

be objected to, and it may be said that in that case it should be an adjective (consequently, according to my supposition, *ἄκεως* for *ἄκαος*,) and not an adverb. But the expressions *πλησίον ἦν*, where the adjective *πλησίος* might be used, and *σῖγα ἔστω*, will satisfy this doubt, and remove all objection to the unnatural masc. sing. in *ων* in those constructions.

14. Ἀκοστήσας.

1. The verb *ἀκοστήσας* is a *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον*, being found only in a simile which occurs twice in Homer, Il. ζ, 506. ο, 263.

> *Ὡς δ' ὅτε τις στατὸς ἵππος ἀκοστήσας ἐπὶ φάτνῃ*
> *Δεσμὸν ἀποῤῥήξας θείῃ πεδίοιο κροαίνων,*

&c. The accounts given by the grammarians of this word, which has so completely disappeared in the post-Homeric writers, and which offers no comparison of passages, must be examined with great caution, since there are no external evidences to guide us in distinguishing between what is of an historical nature and what is mere etymological speculation. Amidst a mixed mass of this kind (vid. Eustath., Schneider, &c.) there is one and only one derivation, from *ἀκοστή*, *barley*, which at once strikes so forcibly both the eyes and the understanding, that we are impelled to examine whether there is any foundation for it, and whether it will bear investigation. I shall therefore collect from the Scholia and glosses whatever bears essentially on this particular derivation. Hesych. *Ἀκοστή· κριθὴ παρὰ Κυπρίοις. Ἀκοστήσας· κριθιάσας, ἀδηφαγήσας.* Eustath. *Ἀκοστῆσαι δὲ τὸ πολυκριθῆσαι κατὰ τοὺς παλαιοὺς, ἤγουν τὸ κριθιᾶσαι. ἀκοσταὶ γὰρ αἱ κριθαί. ὅπερ φασὶν ἐξ Ὁμήρου μὲν οὐ δείκνυται*[1], *παρὰ δέ γε Νικάνδρῳ* (Alexiph. 106.) *καὶ ἄλλοις κεῖται. οἱ δὲ παλαιοί φασι, καὶ*

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[1] In Apollonius, where the same gloss stands in an abbreviated shape, it ought to be written thus: *ὅπερ ἐξ Ὁμήρου [δεικνύναι οὐ] δυνήσονται.* The words in brackets are not in Apollonius. The grammarian rejects this explanation.

πάσας τὰς τροφὰς παρὰ Θεσσαλοῖς ἀκοστὰς λέγεσθαι. Schol. Ven. B. *οἱ δὲ τὰς κριθάς φασι παρὰ Θεσσαλοῖς ἀκοστὰς εἶναι.*

2. From these accounts we can have no doubt of the occurrence of the word *ἀκοστή*, *barley* ; and a very probable derivation of it from *ἀκή*, on account of the beards which distinguish this species of grain, furnishes a confirmation not to be rejected[2]. That Homer never used the word *ἀκοστή* itself is no objection to this derivation, nor that it was borrowed from the Cyprians or Thessalians. Heyne has judiciously observed, that old words which disappeared from common use were still visible much later in certain dialects. Idioms of this kind were noted while Greek was still a living language, partly for the very purpose of explaining Homer and other ancient writers ; and thus such words as this were introduced into the glossaries. *Ἀκοστή*, therefore, was a genuine old name for barley ; and though in Homer's time and in his particular country it might not have been the common name for it, still an expression taken from this word might very well have been in use in the language of common life[3].

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[2] Heyne gives this derivation ; but in one respect he has just reversed the real fact by setting out with it as though it had been historically transmitted down to us. "*Melior ratio* (says he) *extat in Schol. br. ἀκοστεῖν ductum ab ἀκοστή spica, arista, et ipsæ fruges, hordeum, voce antiqua ab ἀκή, acies, ducta ; unde fuit ἀκόω acuo, ἀκοστή spica acuminata : agnoscit hoc etymon etiam Valcken.*," *&c.* From this one should of course conclude that all the above was quoted from the old grammarians : but no such thing. From *spica* inclusive to the end it is all etymological reasoning of Valckenaer, which indeed is essentially correct. So in the lexicons, that which appears to the lexicographer to be the original meaning generally stands first, and then comes a chain of intermediate senses, until at last we find that which is in common use, which frequently is the only true one. In this manner a great deal of false information is sent into the world and finds admission into the heads of students, where it keeps firm hold from the correctness of the method by which it is traced. Thus in this case the first meaning given to *ἀκοστή*, namely, *spica, arista*, is false. *Ἀκοστή*, *acuta*, certainly meant only this one species of grain, and was therefore synonymous with *κριθή*, on which see note on art. 87. sect. 9. That Hesychius has also a gloss, *Κοσταί, κριθαί*, is no objection to this derivation : it only shows that this name was in such common use, that he has served it as he has so many other words, viz. lopped off its first syllable.

[3] The assertion that *food* in general was called by the Thessalians *ἀκοσταί* appears to me suspicious, although, as is frequently the case,

3. Such a common familiar expression, therefore, was ἀκοστήσας, according to the opinion of those who explained it by

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it is repeated many times in the Scholia and glosses. In the greater Scholia it is thus joined with one of the false derivations of ἀκοστήσας: Ἀκοστήσας, ἄκος τῆς στάσεως λαβών, τουτέστιν ἴαμα. καὶ κριθιάσας. κυρίως αἱ πᾶσαι τροφαὶ ἀκοσταὶ καλοῦνται παρὰ Θεσσαλοῖς. ὡς καὶ Νίκανδρος. παρὰ τὸ ἵστασθαι τὰ σώματα τρεφόμενα ἐν ἄλλῳ καιρῷ παραλαβών. Here is a number of mutilated sentences which prove nothing. Of these that which ends with παρὰ Θεσσαλοῖς cannot well have κυρίως, which, therefore, Eustathius left out. But in the smaller Scholia, παρὰ Θεσσαλοῖς, as well as a great deal besides, does not appear; by the omission of which the remainder is more connected and seems to draw nearer the truth. Ἄκος—ἴαμα. κυρίως δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ τροφαὶ ἀκοσταὶ καλοῦνται, παρὰ τὸ ἵστασθαι τὰ σώματα τρεφόμενα ἐν ἄλλῳ καιρῷ. For this the Schol. Ven. B. which I have quoted above, merely says that barley was called by the Thessalians ἀκοσταί; and this is the only passage, among so many, which ὡς καὶ Νίκανδρος suits, for this writer speaks only of roasted barley, ὀπταλέῃσιν ἀκοσταῖς. Those words, then, παρὰ Θ., ὡς καὶ N., must be taken away, and καλοῦνται will then be immediately followed by παρὰ τὸ ἵστασθαι, &c., as it is in the lesser Scholium. I suppose, therefore, that in the old commentary the explanation of ἄκος τῆς στάσεως probably stood first; next followed that of κριθιάσας and of ἀκοστή, barley; to which was added, not from historical information but from etymological sagacity, " κυρίως, i. e. *properly speaking* ἀκοσταί was the name for food in general"; and then comes the ground of this in the words παρὰ τὸ ἵστασθαι, &c., which however are still obscure, probably because the unlearned collector omitted something essential. But it is *highly probable* that ἀκοστή again was *derived* from ἄκος, of which idea those words (without παραλαβών, which is not in the lesser Schol. nor in the Etym. Gud. v. ἀκοστήσας, and was probably tacked on from misunderstanding the meaning of ἐν ἄλλῳ καιρῷ) appear to be a periphrasis; thus, " food is called ἀκοσταί from ἄκος, because bodies by means of food (τρεφόμενα) are placed in a different state from what they were before." Compare Aristot. Polit. 7, 16. Schneid. 7, 14, 7. (in marriages we must take the advice of medical men with regard to the procreation of children;) οἱ γὰρ ἰατροὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τῶν σωμάτων ἱκανῶς λέγουσιν. I grant that in some particulars it may have been very different from what I have conjectured; one thing, however, I think is certain, that this grammarian derived ἀκοστή from ἄκος, and particularly when I compare with it the following gloss in Etym. Gud.: Ἄκος, θεράπευμα· κυρίως δὲ τῷ σιδήρῳ θεραπεύειν εἰς ἀκὴν ἀπεξυσμένῳ (as ἀκεστής is both a mender and a physician) ἔνθεν καὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν Φρύγες ἀκουστὴν λέγουσιν. In the index it is incorrectly altered to ἀκεστήν, as if the Phrygian tongue must follow the analogy of the Greek. In the gloss is also mentioned the Greek word ἀκέστρια, and in conclusion is added, οὕτως εὗρον ἐν ὑπομνήματι τῆς Ἰλιάδος. It is possible that this may be taken from a remark on ἄκος Il. ι, 250. but more probably from some detailed obκριθιάσας; for I do not consider this explanation to be an historical tradition, but an idea of the grammarians; an idea, however, by no means to be rejected. The word κριθιᾷν was mostly used to express the ill effects occasioned by horses being overfed. Κριθᾷν was also a correct form like χολᾷν. And this form is used by Æschylus in Agam. 1633. (1652.) exactly in the sense which suits the passage in Homer, κριθῶντα πῶλον, "the high-fed steed." Pollux, who, lib. 7. cap. 5., quotes this passage with one from Sophocles, introduces it with these words: Τὸ ὑπερεμπεπλῆσθαι καὶ ὑπερκεκορέσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς μάζης ὑπερμαζᾷν ἔλεγον οἱ παλαιοὶ, οἱ δὲ νέοι κριθιᾷν[4]. Without racking our brains about those writers older than Æschylus, who used the word ὑπερμαζᾷν, so much we see with certainty that the form ending in -ᾷν with this meaning is very old. The supposition, therefore, that in those earliest periods of the language a verb ἀκοστᾷν with this sense was in use, and that this ἀκοστήσας came from it, has certainly great probability. Only the aorist being used raises some doubt; for according to that analogy one should have expected ἀκοστάων ἐπὶ φάτνῃ. The past tense points rather to a verb with some such meaning as "to have good feeding, have plenty of barley"; but here again there is a want of clear analogy. In this respect, therefore, the explanation is not so satisfactory as might be wished[5].

4. A very erroneous assertion is made by Schneider in his lexicon, that the reading of ἀκοστήσας is *extremely uncertain.*

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servation on the verse which contains ἀκοστήσας, in which ἀκοσταί was derived from ἄκος in the manner mentioned above, and the Phrygian word ἀκοστής, a physician, was compared with it.

[4] This form, as quoted by Pollux from Æschylus, offends against the metre, κριθιῶντα πῶλον; but in the fragment of Sophocles stands κριθώσης, which is also unmetrical and corrupt, ἕως ὅτου κριθώσης οἴνου: perhaps it should be ἕως ὅτου κριθῶσαν οἴνου, consequently a bold application of the word to the insolence arising from wine and high living.

[5] The verb πολυκριθήσας in Eustathius would express very nearly the last-quoted idea: such a verb, however, nowhere occurs, and it was therefore certainly formed in order to explain something. What this was I find from the gloss quoted above in note 2, Κοσταί, κριθαί; for this also has a relation to the Homeric word. That is to say, in order to make the above desirable sense applicable to this word, some explained the α as an α intensive, by the help of which might be traced the origin of the form κοσταί, ἀκοστέω, i. e. πολυκριθέω.

On the contrary, not only is this the sole reading in all the existing editions of Homer, but no other is quoted by any of the old critics. Schneider in his haste mistook for real readings the forms by which the grammarians in their attempts to amend this questionable word sometimes tried to explain it etymologically. Thus, for instance, the οἱονεὶ ἀχοστήσας of the grammarian Aristonichus (vid. Etym. M. and Hesych.) was intended only to embody in a sensible and visible shape the supposition of the κ in ἀκοστήσας originally coming from χ, and that the word meant as much as ἐν ἄχει γενόμενος διὰ τὴν στάσιν; a derivation, bad as it is, far better than the others which Eustathius brings forward. Another and a much worse attempt, as mentioned by Schneider, would suppose the word to mean the dirty state of the horse from standing long in the stable. Undoubtedly these two ideas, the being weary of standing in the stable, and the feeling of dirtiness which raises a wish for bathing, are the two which, as far as regards the sense, one should most naturally guess at. But much as I have turned and twisted the word ἀκοστήσας within the limits of analogy, it has baffled every attempt. I think, therefore, that we must rest satisfied with the result of what has been stated above, although it may leave something to be desired; and so much the more, as from the repetition of οἱ παλαιοί in the quotations of Eustathius, it appears very evident that this explanation has in its favour the oldest tradition.

Ἀλέξειν; vid. χραισμεῖν.

Ἀλῆναι; vid. εἰλεῖν.

Ἀλίαστος; vid. λιάζω.

15. Ἀμβρόσιος, ἄμβροτος, ἀβρότη, ἀβροτάζειν, ἤμβροτον.

1. In general there is too great an inclination to derive the epithet ἀμβρόσιος from ambrosia, and to connect it almost every-

where with the idea of a delicious odour or vapour; which, when it is the epithet of hair, garments, ointment, and such like, is certainly a very natural one. To understand, however, its true meaning, we must first dismiss entirely all idea of this *ambrosia,* which has established itself completely in the later poetry. In Homer ἀμβρόσιος is never a mere poetical word by which earthly odours and the like are compared with ambrosia, like νεκτάρεος in Il. γ, 385. That such is not the case with ἀμβρόσιος is evident from this, that in his poetry those objects never have this epithet, except when they are the hair, garments, and ointments of deities. If, further, we compare Il. ω, 341. and Od. α, 97. where it is the epithet of the sandals of Mercury, and observe that the garments and ointments of the deities take the epithet of ἄμβροτος (Il. π, 670. Od. θ, 365.) quite as well as that of ἀμβρόσιος; it will be evident that these two words are in fact synonymous, and that the idea of ambrosia is not in the word, but only in particular cases in the thing.

2. *That is to say,* ἄμβροτος means *immortal*; θεὸς ἄμβροτος, ἵπποι ἄμβροτοι, αἷμα ἄμβροτον, and the like. Everything also which belongs to the gods, and is around them, partakes of the immortal nature; everything is imperishable, and has in itself a power which makes it imperishable and insusceptible of hurt: εἵματα ἄμβροτα, ἔλαιον ἄμβροτον, &c., particularly in Od. ε, 346. the κρήδεμνον ἄμβροτον, which secured Ulysses from danger as long as he had it around him. Now it would be but natural for such objects to be joined with an adjective immediately derived from ἄμβροτος; such as ἀμβρόσιος, *of an immortal nature, rendering immortal,* or in a general sense, *divine, proceeding from a divinity.* Thus it is used of the song of the Muses in Hesiod θ, 69. ἀμβροσίῃ μολπῇ, and in one of Homer's Hymns to Diana (27, 18. Wolf.), αἱ δ' ἀμβροσίην ὄπ' ἱεῖσαι....; and so generally in the older poets, as ὕδατος ἀμβροσίοιο, of the sea in the Cyclic Titanomachia in Athen. 7. p. 277. d. Again in Pindar we have ἀμβρόσια ἔπεα, ἀμβρόσιαι φιλότατες Ἀφροδῖτας, Pyth. 4, 532. Nem. 8, 2. Nay, in the Hymn to Mercury 230. Maia herself is called νύμφη ἀμβροσίη, consequently exactly synonymous with ἄμβροτος, *immortal.*

3. First then, in the ἀμβρόσιος πέπλος of Venus there is

as little idea of any ambrosial odour as in the ἀμβροσίοις πεδίλοις of Mercury. And although in the ἀμβροσίοις πλοκάμοις of Juno decking and beautifying herself to captivate Jupiter (Il. ξ, 177.) there could not but have been the divine odour of ointment, an idea which naturally offers itself to the imagination; yet here, as well as in the ἀμβροσίοις χαίταις of Jupiter ratifying his promise by his nod (Il. α, 529.), the epithet means nothing more than the general sense of the divine celestial locks of a deity. And in short the ointment of the gods is called (Il. ψ, 187.) ἔλαιον ἀμβρόσιον, in the same way as at Od. θ, 365. it is called ἄμβροτον; and in the same way as the fodder of the immortal steeds of Mars (Il. ε, 369.) is called εἶδαρ ἀμβρόσιον, their mangers (θ, 434.) have the same epithet; and as in general all things which tend to nourish or support immortality, whether as food, as drink (Steph. Thes. in v.), as ointment (Il. π, 670.), or as a cosmetic wash (Il. ξ, 170.), are also called as substantives ἀμβροσίη.

4. It cannot be said of this last-mentioned word that ἐδωδή is understood, because ἀμβροσίη is used, as we have just seen, in such various senses, where ἐδωδή could not be admitted; ἀμβροσία, therefore, must without doubt have been originally a substantive from ἄμβροτος, like ἀθανασία from ἀθάνατος, meaning *immortality*. Thus, for instance, as the deities wash themselves with beauty (Od. σ, 192.), so they eat and drink *immortality*. An idea this which was still familiar to the later Greeks, as we may see by the use of ἀθανασία in Lucian's Dial. Deor. 4. extr. νῦν δὲ ἄπαγε αὐτὸν (Ganymede), ὦ Ἑρμῆ, καὶ πιόντα τῆς ἀθανασίας ἄγε οἰνοχοήσοντα ἡμῖν.

5. All these passages, however, do not at all help us to understand how ἀμβρόσιος, which is the epithet of the *sleep* of Agamemnon Il. β, 19. and used in the sense generally supposed to be derived from ambrosia, can be translated by *sweet*. The vast number of passages in which sleep has an epithet like γλυκύς, νήδυμος, νήγρετος, &c., and the whole picture as represented in this passage, περὶ δ' ἀμβρόσιος κέχυθ' ὕπνος, show plainly that here the word must contain some idea expressive of the nature of sleep; and therefore this appears to me to be the only passage where it is used in a poetical and not in its common sense. To express the strengthening heal-

ing nature of sleep, the poet selects an epithet used to point out that *strengthening eternizing power* which exists in heavenly objects. It is therefore an epithet somewhat improper, as is νήγρετος, yet not without truth; since sleep is not the work of man, nor does it contain in itself that which is perishable, but it is the great gift of the gods (Il. η, 482. ὕπνου δῶρον ἕλοντο), is altogether like a supersensible supernatural influence, and thence is in itself a celestial existence.

6. But is the night also called ἀμβροσίη νύξ (Il. β, 57.) because this epithet is given to sleep, as is generally supposed to be the case? I think not. But the thing is somewhat perplexed by the epithets ἄμβροτος and ἀβρότη being both given to the night. This last word is most generally explained to mean *without men,* and in confirmation of it is quoted from Æschylus ἐρημία ἄβροτος. But this form appears to be akin to ἀβροτάζειν (Il. κ, 65. μήπως ἀβροτάξομεν ἀλλήλοιϊν, "lest we miss each other,"), while on the other side it is evidently connected with ἤμβροτον, the Epic sister-form of ἥμαρτον, ἁμαρτεῖν.

7. To put all this in a clear light, we must first join together those words which beyond all question belong to each other. No critical grammarian will separate ἤμβροτον from ἥμαρτον; and from this aorist ἀμβροτεῖν came (lengthened quite according to analogy) ἀβροτάζειν, agreeing exactly with it in meaning: the shortening of the first syllable is metrical necessity. These words and forms then belong to each other. As certainly similar are ἀμβρόσιος and ἄμβροτος, at least in both being derived from ἀ and βροτός, and again ἀβρότη stands for ἄμβροτος on account of the metre, as Νὺξ ἀβρότη begins the hexameter. Least of all can the difference of the termination ος and η be any ground for supposing a difference, since it is well known that the language of Epic poetry can form compounds with ἀ and others in the fem. in η. In these two verses, Od. λ, 330.

Πρὶν γάρ κεν καὶ νὺξ φθῖτ' ἄμβροτος· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥρη,

and Il. ξ, 78.

Νὺξ ἀβρότη· ἣν καὶ τῇ ἀπόσχωνται πολέμοιο,

the former might have ἀμβρότη as well as ἄμβροτος, and the latter might, if necessary, have ἄβροτος. But here there is no necessity; and in each passage the form which is used is the best for the verse. That the feminine in η of this word never occurs elsewhere proves nothing, since these are the only two verses where the word appears in a feminine construction. On the contrary, ἀμφίβροτος, which is subject to the same laws as ἄβροτος, occurs four times, ἀσπίδος ἀμφιβρότης, or -α, -ην, in all which cases the common form was equally admissible. It is therefore quite certain that whatever νὺξ ἄμβροτος is, νὺξ ἀβρότη is the same. The next question then is, whether νὺξ ἄμβροτος is the same as νὺξ ἀμβροσίη. But can any one doubt of that who has read in Homer ἐλαίῳ ἀμβρότῳ and ἀμβροσίῳ ἐλαίῳ, ἄμβροτα εἵματα and ἀμβροσίου διὰ πέπλου?

8. And thus then the last question, as to the meaning of this word in its threefold form, is answered by itself; for no one will think of interpreting ἀμβρόσιος and ἄμβροτος here differently from what they mean in all the other passages; nor can ἀβρότη mean *without men* because ἀμβροσίη cannot have that meaning. In all three forms, then, the sense is, *the divine, sacred night*; an epithet which, it appears to me, needs an explanation much less than many of the uses of θεῖος, ἱερός, &c., in Homer[1]. Our explanation has also as great a claim to antiquity as the others. Apollon. Lex. in v. ..... οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀθάνατον, ἐξ οὗ ἡ θεία νοεῖται. Schol. min. Νὺξ ἀβρότη· ἀμβροσία, θεία. Schol. Ven. ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι ἤτοι κατὰ παράλειψιν τοῦ μ, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀμβρότη, οἷον ἀθάνατος, ἢ ἀβρότη, καθ' ἣν βροτοὶ μὴ φοιτῶσιν[2]. The use of this word in Æschylus need not lead us astray; not that he understood ἀβρότη to mean in Homer *without men* (though it is just possible he

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[1] According to the lexicons ἀβρότη alone means the *night*. It is possible that a later poet may have used the Homeric word so. But as I can nowhere find any proof of it, I conjecture that it rests only on the unmeaning observation of Eustathius on Il. ξ, 78. ὅτε γὰρ ἀβρότη μόνον ῥηθείη, λείπει τὸ νύξ.

[2] Our explanation lies hidden also in the corrupted gloss of Hesychius, Ἀβροτῆ. ἀβροτηθεία: for this, according to Schow, is the exact reading of the MS. which Musurus unskilfully changed into the present reading, Ἀβροτῆ. ἀβροτησία. The true reading is indisputably Ἀβρότη, ἀμβρότη, θεία.

might), but because ἄβροτος is in this sense a perfectly analogical word, which Æschylus himself might have formed without any precedent, and have used in this sense without at all looking back to Homer. But here again this must be left to a critique on Æschylus, for after all ἀβρότη is but a various reading in Prometh. 2[3].

9. As to the formation of ἄμβροτος, it might be very well explained, if it were the only word of its family, by the ν which is originally attached to the α privative, like ἀμφασίη. But φθισίμβροτος, τερψίμβροτος, &c., present the same appearance. To say that μ was inserted *euphoniæ gratiâ*, might be a satisfactory reason in many similar compounds which are *unique* (whereas this form is the most common one), but even there only until a better explanation could be given. And in this case we have offered us an undeniable derivation in μόρος, *fate, death*. Hence came μορτός, which as a sister-form of βροτός was in some of the dialects; for certainly Callimachus did not introduce it into his poems on merely etymological speculation; Fragm. 271. ἐδείμαμεν ἄστεα μορτοί*. And the Lat. *mors, morior, mortuus, mortalis*, confirms this. The metathesis, so natural in the older period of the Greek language, changed this μορτός into βροτός, like μολεῖν, βλώσκω· μέλι, βλίττω· μαλακός, βλάξ. See βλίττειν. But the radical μ remained before the β, whenever it was immediately preceded by a vowel (ἄμβροτος, &c.), as in μολεῖν, μέμβλωκα, βλώσκω, and in ἥμαρτον, ἤμβροτον; but at the same time it might be omitted when the verse required it; thence ἄβροτος, ἀμφιβρότη, and ἀβροτάζειν from ἀμβροτεῖν.

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[3] That is to say, Eustathius on Il. ξ, 78. quotes merely ἄβροτος ἐρημία from Æschylus; others, and amongst them a Scholium in Villoison, mention more fully ἄβροτον εἰς ἐρημίαν. Heyne on Il. κ, 65. says that it stands at the beginning of the Prometheus: but there we read now ἄβατον εἰς ἐρημίαν, which is indisputably quite as good. On this various reading, to which the gloss in Hesychius ἄβροτον, ἀπάνθρωπον, clearly belongs, we may gain some information from Hermann.

* [Buttmann here refers his reader to Schneider's Lexicon, from which I give the following extract: "Μορτὸς, ὁ, ἡ, (from μόρος) the same as its derivative βροτὸς, mortal, Callim. Fr. 271. Thence μορτόβατος, ὁ, ἡ; ναῦς μορτοβάτη, the bark of Charon, which carries mortals after death over the Styx, Hesych.; Lat. *mortuus*."—Ed.]

10. Here then must fall to the ground every attempt to bring the verb *ἀβροτάζειν* into immediate etymological connexion with *ἄβροτος*, a mistake easily caused by the similarity of the principal syllable; for some derived the verb from *ἀ* and *βροτός*, supposing it properly to mean *aberrare ab homine*; and they connected with it *ἤμβροτον* also, but did not venture to add *ἁμαρτεῖν*. Others began with *ἀβρότη*, *night*, and supposed both verbal forms (still omitting *ἁμαρτεῖν*) to mean, "I wander about in the night, and lose my way, miss my object." But every one must feel that all these and such like attempts are anything but natural modes to trace the origin of a verb which was in common and familiar use. I think, then, we cannot do better than admit the separation of *ἀβροτάζειν* and *ἄβροτος*, recommended as it is by all analogy, and include the former among the forms of *ἁμαρτάνω*, whose etymological connexions, as long as we are ignorant of them, we can easily do without[4].

Ἀμέγαρτος; vid. μεγαίρω.

Ἄμεναι; vid. ἀδῆσαι.

16. Ἀμολγῷ.

1. Whoever sees the expression *ἀμολγῷ*, without knowing anything of the context of those passages in which it occurs, would at once decide that it must come from *ἀμέλγειν*; and this decision would influence him in his explanation of those passages, as he would look upon the idea of *to milk* as the

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[4] According to my conjecture *ἁμαρτάνω* belongs to the root *μέρος*, *part*, *μείρειν*, *to impart* or *give a share of*. From this was formed, by an analogy which is no further visible in the common formation of the Greek language, but in this case is undoubted, a negative verb *ἀμέρδειν*, *to give no share to*, i. e. *to deprive* or *rob*. A similar verb was *ἁμαρτεῖν* (aorist; compare art. 106. note 5.), with an intransitive meaning, *to be without one's share*, i. e. *not to obtain*, *to miss*. The other changes follow from the above; and of the difference of the aspirate this is not the first proof, particularly of such cases where the etymology had escaped the observation of persons in general. The similarity of *ἅμα* with *ἁμαρτάνω* satisfied them.

acknowledged meaning. It is well known that this has actually been the case in explaining ἀμολγῷ. We, however, regular as this decision may appear, will endeavour to treat of the collective passages of Homer, where it occurs, without the assistance of ἀμέλγειν. In Il. λ, 173. the Trojans are described as "flying over the field, like oxen":

> Ἄστε λέων ἐφόβησε μολὼν ἐν νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ.

In ο, 324. is the same metaphor:

> . . . . ὥστ' ἠὲ βοῶν ἀγέλην ἢ πῶϋ μέγ' οἰῶν
> Θῆρε δύο κλονέωσι μελαίνης νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ
> Ἐλθόντ' ἐξαπίνης, σημάντορος οὐ παρεόντος.

In χ, 28. Achilles shines like the dog-star, whose bright rays

> Φαίνονται πολλοῖσι μετ' ἀστράσι νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ,

and at 317. the same hero is compared to the evening star:

> Οἷος δ' ἀστὴρ εἶσι μετ' ἀστράσι νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ
> Ἕσπερος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν οὐρανῷ ἵσταται ἀστήρ.

In Od. δ, 841. Penelope awakes after the disappearance of the vision with delighted feelings:

> Ὥς οἱ ἐναργὲς ὄνειρον ἐπέσσυτο νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ.

2. If the student of Homer had once become accustomed to that somewhat strange association of ideas contained in the phrase "*the milking-time of the night*", (and the ear easily becomes accustomed to anything,) he must, as we see, have proceeded some very considerable way in his Homer, supposing him to have begun with the Iliad, before he would have had any doubts as to what precise time this might be; and when such a doubt came across his mind, it is easily to be conceived that, considering the idea of *to milk* in ἀμολγῷ as an acknowledged thing, he would merely look upon it as one of those problematic questions, of which there are so many in Homer. In the first two passages, guided by the idea of *milking*, he would understand it to mean *the milking-time*, or *twilight*, in whose deceitful gloom a wild beast might approach very near his prey. In the third and fourth passages the shining of the other stars with the dog- and evening-star would indeed point out to him that it must mean actually the night; but still the "*milking-time*" stands once for all so clearly before his eyes,

that he imputes the doubt not to the word but to the thing, and tries, by inquiring into the customs of the times or the nature of the thing, either to bring the time of milking into the night, or the appearances mentioned by the poet into the twilight.

3. Those who carry the idea of twilight through all the passages, suppose, as far as I know, a late and an early hour of milking, in order to take in both twilights*. The passage of the vision then becomes very easy; and as to that of Sirius, there is a strong proof in favour of this meaning. For it is there expressly said, ὅς ῥά τ' ὀπώρης εἶσιν, to which is afterwards added, "that it is a sign of ill and brings fevers to mortals." All this fixes the season to be the middle of summer or the dog-days. But at that time Sirius does not appear at all in the night, but has just begun to show himself a little *before sun-rise*, and so continues rising earlier and earlier, until, after a considerable lapse of time, he makes his first appearance at midnight. Here, then, the morning twilight, as Eustathius has also made it appear, seems as certainly meant, as in the other passage the evening twilight is marked by the mention of the evening star. In order to have the other stars visible, as the poet has mentioned them, that precise period of the twilight must be selected, in which the stars in general shed a faint light, while those two bright stars are in full splendour.

4. But after all, I would ask, whether this last representation can be satisfactory for the expression (χ, 28.) ἀρίζηλοι δέ οἱ αὐγαὶ Φαίνονται πολλοῖσι μετ' ἀστράσι; whether it can be satisfactory as a comparison of Achilles among the other combatants before Troy? Is it not clear that whoever pictures to himself this object, *must*, in order to form the comparison properly, imagine to himself Sirius in the night in full splendour outshining all the other stars, however brilliant? Is it not clear that this is the meaning of πολλοῖσι μετ' ἀστράσιν, and also of the other passage μετ' ἀστράσιν, where the number of the stars is not defined, and consequently unlimited? And how came

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* [Göttling, in his edition of Hesiod, seems rather surprised that Buttmann has not compared with ἀμολγός the Hesiodic epithet ἀκροκνέφαιος, (Op. 565.) translated in Passow's Lexicon, "at the beginning of the morning or evening twilight."—Ed.]

the poet to spoil his picture by expressly mentioning, of all things in the world, the twilight? Νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ can, therefore, be only, what every one's sense and feelings tell him it must be, the depth of the night. As to the meaning of ὅς ῥά τ' ὀπώρης εἶσι, it was not intended to mark the *time* which the poet had in his mind, but to define the particular *star* exactly like the Ἀστέρ' ὀπωρίνῳ ἐναλίγκιος in ε, 5., in which, as in the passage before us, the star is represented in its highest brilliancy, consequently in the night; ὅστε μάλιστα Λαμπρὸν παμφαίνῃσι λελουμένος ὠκεανοῖο. And in the same way in the passage before us what is added of its being portentous of ill and of fevers is merely the poet's amplification of the properties of the star, which he here introduces with particular propriety as symbolical of Achilles threatening destruction to the Trojans. For no poet of nature would confine himself so strictly to facts as to think himself bound to suppress these properties because Sirius is thus portentous of ill only when he appears in the morning, consequently not in his greatest brilliancy; but he carelessly joins two truths which are in themselves unconnected:

Λαμπρότατος μὲν ὅδ' ἐστὶ, κακὸν δέ τε σῆμα τέτυκται.

5. There can be no doubt then, that, supposing the derivation of ἀμολγῷ to be perfectly unknown, the only meaning which we can adopt as suited to all the five passages where it occurs, can be no other than "*the depth of night.*" And accordingly we find in all the old explanations of the word, besides "*the time of milking and the evening,*" this also, "*according to others midnight.*" I will not trouble myself nor my readers with inquiring whether the ancients milked in the night; for it is sufficient to say that, even if they did, it would have been ridiculous in them to *mark* the depth of night by an action which takes place in the day and in the evening also; this would in fact be saying, "*in the night, when it is as dark as it is when people milk in the dark.*"

6. But I have a great aversion, particularly as regards language and logic, to throw away words on a thing on which poetic feeling alone can decide, and indeed has long since decided. In fact, under the name of simple and ancient, many a burden is laid on poor Homer which ought rather to be called

silly and childish. The idea of marking time in general and in great natural phænomena by the hour of milking is not to be borne for a moment. Βουλυτός must not be cited as a similar case. That is in truth a great and beautiful idea, full of spirit and meaning; the moment at which it may be supposed, that in the whole agricultural world the wearied steer is loosed from his daily labour. On the other hand, what is the hour of milking? a time perfectly arbitrary, generally regulated by particular arrangement, and occurring many times in the day. It is impossible, therefore, that ἀμολγός, like βουλυτός, should have been a general and familiar term for fixing a certain point of time in common life, whether it be supposed to have expressed the twilight or the darkness; still more impossible is it that the poet should have selected this particular expression to give his reader a lively picture of the precise time which he intended to mark.

7. Νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ means, then, nothing more than (what an unprejudiced comparison of the different passages would teach us,) *in the depth of night*. And this explanation we find also (as has been said above) in all the old grammarians, and in the scholia to the two passages of the oxen attacked by wild beasts; nay, in one of them (ο, 324.) this explanation stands regularly drawn out, and the *moonless midnight* adopted as an acknowledged meaning, while the other explanation of the *milking* is not once mentioned; at most of the other passages, however, as well as in Hesychius, in the Etym. M., &c., this last is found. But what is of more value than the explanation of a grammarian, is the use of the word in Euripides as quoted by Hesychius: Ἀμολγὸν νύκτα Εὐριπίδης Ἀλκμήνῃ ζοφερὰν καὶ σκοτεινήν. Here, then, ἀμολγός is used as an adjective, which may be either that Euripides took the liberty of making this trifling change, or that he adopted the adjective as so handed down to him from ancient tradition. Quite as certain, if well considered, is the still higher authority of Æschylus in the fragment quoted by Athenæus 11, p. 469. extr. where the departing sun is mentioned as προφυγὼν ἱερᾶς νυκτὸς ἀμολγόν[1].

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[1] The whole fragment is indeed by no means as yet cleared of corruptions; but the word προφυγών leaves no doubt of the correctness of

I do not suppose any one will say that here the sun is represented as flying before the twilight, as that again gives way to the night. Νυκτὸς ἀμολγόν can here mean nothing but *the darkness of the night*. And to this we may add another authority, far inferior, it is true, but sufficient to show that at no period did the poets understand this expression of Homer to have any other meaning. Orph. Hymn. 33, 12. to Apoll. ὕπερθέ τε καὶ δι' ἀμολγοῦ Νυκτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίῃσιν . . . . Ῥίζας νέρθε δέδορκας, where ἀμολγός stands alone in the sense of *the deepest darkness*, for νυκτός certainly belongs to ἐν ἡσυχίῃσιν*.

8. But what now is the proper meaning of the word? The reader need not fear that I am going to imitate those grammatical chamelions, and to explain ἀμολγός now (by means of μέλγω, *mulgeo, I milk*,) to mean *the time when they do not milk*. Such an attempt as this I leave with many others much worse (see Etym. M.) to those who choose to examine them; and I will first bring forward what has grown up on historic ground. Eustathius on Il. ο, says that, according to the glossographers, the Achæans call ἀμολγὸν τὴν ἀκμήν. These Achæans, we know, are no imaginary people; and a gloss of Hesychius, although an unauthenticated one, which stands in the same place, Ἀμολγάζει, μεσημβρίζει, gives very considerable weight to that explanation; for mid-day is the ἀκμή of the day, and some older poet perhaps had said ἦμαρ ἀμολγάζει. So much the more certain is now, therefore, the explanation of the μᾶζα ἀμολγαίη of Hesiod ε, 588. as given by Proclus on the passage, and in the Etym. M. v. Μάζα[2], that it means the same as ἀκμαία· τὸ γὰρ ἀμολγὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκμαίου τίθεται. In this, too, some of the grammarians thought they saw *a milk-cake*, and understood by that a cream-cheese or milky cake, to which the explanation of Eratosthenes ποιμενικήν

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the passage as far as it has been found necessary to quote it above, whatever may be the opinion of the words which precede (οὐδ' εἰς), and which certainly, as they stand, are very puzzling.

* [I find νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ also in Homer's Hymn to Merc. 7. which Buttmann has not mentioned, but where it can only mean "*in the darkness of the night*," or "*in the depth of the night*." Perhaps the latter sense suits the context better than the former.—Ed.]

[2] Compare Athen. 3. p. 115. a. and Bernhardy Eratosthenica, p. 209.

refers. This would not satisfy me. But these grammarians again make a sad business of their *ἀκμαία*, considering it to be only synonymous with *κρατίστη*. Doubtless the older interpreters thought something more definite was meant by this word; and what can that be but a cake which by the well-known usual means was brought to rise and ferment? The same form *ἀμολγαῖος* comes to us now in another passage under a new point of view. In the 98th Epigram of Leonidas of Tarentum (Brunck's Anal. 1, 246.) a shepherd is desired to sprinkle a grave with the milk of a sheep *ἀμολγαῖον μαστὸν ἀνασχόμενος*. If in this expression we see nothing more than an epithet (of the udder) drawn from milking, it is the poorest that can be imagined. But if we compare with this what has been said before, and particularly the passage of Hesiod, the only passage where the word as thus formed occurs*, we have immediately a more definite idea presented to our mind: an udder in its *ἀκμῇ* is a full, distended udder.

9. According to this, *νυκτὸς ἀμολγός* is the depth or dead of the night, without, however, limiting it to the exact point of midnight. About one watch before and one watch after midnight joined together would form a period of time which in all times has been called *the middle of the night, the depth* or *dead of the night*; and in the first part of this time the evening star frequently appears in full brilliancy. The Homeric use of *ἀμολγός* made it by degrees be supposed to mean only *darkness*: and so Æschylus uses *νυκτὸς ἀμολγόν* in the fragment quoted above merely for *the darkness of the night*; for the meaning of *ἀκμή* suits that passage as little as does the twilight; and in Orpheus, as we have seen, *ἀμολγός* stands alone for *darkness*.

10. And now that the principal point is brought, as I hope it is, to a certainty, I will add a few words on the etymology.

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* [I find in the Supplement to Schneider's Lexicon the following: “*ἡμερίην σκοτόεσσαν ἀμολγαίην*, Orac. Sibyll. 14, 214.” and there translated “*dark*.” In Passow's edition of Schneider “*μᾶζα ἀμολγαίη*” from Hesiod is rendered “milk-bread,” *pain au lait*; “according to others, i. q. *ἀμορβαία*, peasant's bread,” like our household or brown bread; “or again, i. q. *ἀκμαία*, light well-baked bread.”—Ed.]

Let us look again at the passage in the epigram of Leonidas, and I would ask, is it mere chance coincidence that the idea of milking, which has so constantly been thought to belong to ἀμολγός, should there occur in connexion with that of ἀκμή? Decidedly not. Leonidas lived in the most flourishing period of the Alexandrian era. He had everything, which we have quoted above, before his eyes much more vivid and more complete than we can. In his search for far-fetched expressions he might have found an epigram a very excellent opportunity to use the Hesiodic word at the same time both in its true and in its literal sense. Now the expressions of such a poet may possibly contain information, or furnish hints, worthy of notice; nor should such be suppressed, even for the chance that a play of the poet's imagination might be the accidental cause of a happy conjecture. In the present instance I should be so much the less inclined to do it, as the opinion of another, independent of such a play of words, coincides with my own. For I had imparted to Lachmannen the results of my investigation, as I have given it above, and it struck him, without knowing anything of the epigram, but guided merely by the idea of ἀμέλγειν, that perhaps the image of a full, swelling udder, might be the groundwork of this expression, signifying fullness and completeness. And if perchance here again that which is insignificantly small and not apparent, when placed in comparison with the vast phænomena of nature, should not immediately answer the comparison; yet certainly the striking points of the image, joined with the literal meaning of the word, will always present themselves more and more to the imagination. Figurative expressions pass into the language of common life, and cease to be figurative. Let us suppose that in the early simplicity of the pastoral times the expression for a distended udder was, "it is ἐν ἀμολγῷ"; nothing would then be more natural than to transfer the figure to all things that were similarly ἐν ἀκμῇ. And what could be more similar than a cake at the moment when it was swelling and rising in a state of fermentation? Then it was ἐν ἀμολγῷ. The figurative expression passed like a proverb into the language, and became familiar in common conversation, even when it would not have struck the poet as an immediate image; exactly as with us a number of such expressions are in common use; only that in our polished language many of those whose literal meaning at once strikes the ear, are limited by considerations as to whether they are elegant or common expressions, a distinction unknown to the old language of Epic poetry.

17. Ἀμφικύπελλον.

1. The word ἀμφικύπελλον is always found in Homer joined with δέπας, and is therefore an adjective, ἀμφικύπελλος, ὁ, ἡ. One explanation of it is, that κύπελλον comes from κύπτω, and means a ποτήριον ἔσω κεκυφώς, i. e. a cup with the edge curving inwards; and ἀμφικύπελλον will then mean that it curves inwards all round (Eust. ad Il. *α*, 584.). Others derived it from κυφός, *curved*, and understood ἀμφικύπελλον to express that it was curved on both sides, i. e. that its round form was made up of two curves (Schol. Villois. Apollon. Lex.). Aristarchus endeavoured to explain the curvature by two handles (Etym. M.), whilst others supposed the κύπελλον to have no handle at all (Hesych. v. κύπελλον). We see that all this is mere conjecture, and conjecture without coming to any decision.

2. To begin with κύπελλον. It is evident that this word, coming from a root which signifies a cavity, is the same appellation for a vessel to contain fluids, which we find, sometimes of a larger and sometimes of a smaller size, in all cognate languages to this day; as for example, κύμβη, whence a dialect κύββα (in Hesychius ποτήριον), Lat. *cupa*, Germ. *Kufe*, *Kübel*, French *cuve* and *coupe*, Engl. *cup*. Κύπελλον is therefore a diminutive, meaning, without any additional idea, *a cup*, and synonymous with δέπας. Ἀμφικύπελλος then is, according to the analogy of ἀμφίστομος, ἄμφωτος, &c., something which has a κύπελλον on both sides or at both opposite ends; and thus from the formation of the word we trace out the very utensil of which we find the description in the following passage of Aristotle (h. a. 9, 40., or in Schneid. 9, 27, 4.), where he is describing the cells of bees to be ἀμφίστομοι, with one opening above, and another below, and divided by a floor: περὶ μίαν γὰρ βάσιν δύο θυρίδες εἰσὶν, ὥσπερ τῶν ἀμφικυπέλ-

λων, ἡ μὲν ἐντὸς ἡ δ' ἐκτός. This passage contains not merely Aristotle's explanation of Homer's expression, for which purpose only it has been usual to quote it; but it shows that the idea of an object being ἀμφικύπελλος was common and familiar to every one in Aristotle's time; consequently either the Greeks had then such vessels, and called them by that name, or this word was still known to every one as an ancient form, of which, perhaps, there remained some old instances, and everybody understood such to be meant by the Homeric δέπασιν ἀμφικυπέλλοις.

3. We must not imagine that the cup made in this form was intended for some particular use; on the contrary, we see, that although it is not unusual for a beautiful cup of exquisite workmanship to have in Homer this epithet, yet it was a very common form; for example, in Il. ι, 656. Od. υ, 153. every one who drank had such a cup, and on every occasion of drinking to each other, or of pouring out a libation, the vessel used is called, if the verse requires something to complete it, ἀμφικύπελλον, which same vessel is again called merely κύπελλον. As nothing stands firmer than the round rim of a hollow vessel, so nothing was more natural in the early and simple times of art than to hollow out a piece of wood or any other material at one end for drinking, and at the other end to stand on, whence arose double cups, which might be used for drinking at either end. This form might, perhaps, have given occasion to some particular and pleasing manner of ornamenting, and hence as often as the poet wished to describe a cup with all the particular details belonging to it, this form was present to his imagination.

18. Ἀμφίς.

1. That ἀμφί and ἀμφίς are properly the same, like μέχρι and μέχρις, appears principally in that which is the ground of every preposition, in the adverbial meaning; for example, Il. φ, 507. ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' ἀμβρόσιος ἑανὸς τρέμε, around the body: Od. θ, 476. θαλερὴ δ' ἦν ἀμφὶς ἀλοιφή, around the flesh: Il. θ, 481. βαθὺς δέ τε Τάρταρος ἀμφίς: Od. ζ, 292. ἀμφὶ

δὲ λειμών. It appears, however, at least in Homer, to be an established rule that ἀμφίς never stands as a preposition in its common meaning and usual position. *After its case* it certainly does sometimes stand, as, Il. ξ, 274. and Hes. θ, 851. Κρόνον ἀμφὶς ἐόντες: Od. ζ, 266. Ἔνθα δέ τέ σφ' ἀγορὴ καλὸν Ποσιδήϊον ἀμφίς: ι, 400. Κύκλωπας...οἵ ῥά μιν ἀμφὶς Ὤικεον. See also Hymn. Cer. 289. Hence the language furnished no reason for altering, with some manuscripts, the old reading of Od. ω, 45. and 65. πολλὰ δέ σ' ἀμφὶς Δάκρυα θερμὰ χέον Δαναοί·—πολλὰ δέ σ' ἀμφίς Μῆλα κατεκτάνομεν, and taking away the ς from the end of the verse. It stands also after the dative at Il. ε, 723. κάμπυλα κύκλα...σιδηρέῳ ἄξονι ἀμφίς.

2. The ideas arising out of the radical meaning of the word are in the form ἀμφίς so different, that in order to select and arrange them correctly, we ought to have them all in our view at the same time. I will first, therefore, bring forward some passages in which the original meaning *around* is evident and necessary. For instance, Il. ω, 488. κεῖνον περιναιέται ἀμφὶς ἐόντες Τείρουσι. In σ, 519. in the description of the shield, the two deities that accompany the train of old men, &c. are Καλὼ καὶ μεγάλω...Ἀμφὶς ἀριζήλω, "radiant all around." At ξ, 123. πολλοὶ δὲ φυτῶν ἔσαν ὄρχατοι ἀμφίς, "in the country around." In the funeral games, ψ, 330., Nestor points out to his son the goal chosen by Achilles for the charioteers, namely, an old trunk of a tree and two stones

Ἐν ξυνοχῇσιν ὁδοῦ· λεῖος δ' ἱππόδρομος ἀμφίς.

The old interpreters explained the first part, and I think correctly, of a wide track in the open plain becoming somewhat narrower at the point where the old monument stood; but ἀμφίς they took in the opposite sense of χωρίς, or still more forced: Heyne, however, understood it quite correctly of the wide plain *around*, appropriated to the chariot-race, and within which stood Achilles when he pointed out the barriers in the distance (v. 359.). Others see in this passage the course winding round the monument; but then it must have been an old course regularly drawn out for the purpose; whereas this monument was selected by Achilles for a goal or mark quite arbitrarily and by his own choice, and Nestor, v. 332., only conjectures that it might have formerly served for a goal. And last of all, to this class of meanings belongs the idea *ἀμφὶς ἰδεῖν*, "to be circumspect, look around with care and foresight." Thus, in Hesiod ε, 699. where marriage is recommended, but it must be done with circumspection, *Πάντα μάλ' ἀμφὶς ἰδὼν, μὴ γείτοσι χάρματα γήμῃς*; and with the genitive of the thing considered or examined, Il. β, 384. *Εὖ δέ τις ἅρματος ἀμφὶς ἰδὼν πολεμοῖο μεδέσθω.* Both which passages, however, with regard to the digamma, must be mentioned again. See below, sect. 12.

3. The idea of *around* was afterwards limited to *on two sides, on both sides.* With this coincides in both languages the idea of *ἄμφω*, *ambo*, and the compounds *ἀμφίστομος*, *ἀμφιδέξιος*, *ambidexter*, *ambiguus*, &c. Beside the compounds, I know of no certain instance in Homer of the form *ἀμφί* in this more limited meaning; for when a *number* of men are described as encamped *on both sides* of the stream, *ἀμφὶ ῥοὰς ποταμοῖο*, Il. λ, 732., this differs little from the common meaning of *around.* Once, however, in Hesiod I find the form *ἀμφί* used of *two objects* lying one on each side of another object, and that, too, as an adverb, namely, at α, 172. *Ἤδη γάρ σφιν ἔκειτο μέγας λῖς, ἀμφὶ δὲ κάπροι Δοιοί.* But the form *ἀμφίς* occurs in this sense in the following passages of Homer. In Il. λ, 633. speaking of a large goblet, *οὔατα δ' αὐτοῦ Τέσσαρ' ἔσαν, δοιαὶ δὲ πελειάδες ἀμφὶς ἕκαστον·* and at 748. *Πεντήκοντα δ' ἕλον δίφρους, δύο δ' ἀμφὶς ἕκαστον Φῶτες ὀδὰξ ἕλον οὖδας.* Further as an adverb, at Il. φ, 162., of the combat between Achilles and Asteropæus,

> *ὁ δ' ἀνέσχετο δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς*
> *Πηλιάδα μελίην· ὁ δ' ἁμαρτῇ δούρασιν ἀμφὶς*
> *Ἥρως Ἀστεροπαῖος· ἐπεὶ περιδέξιος ἦεν·*
> *Καί ῥ' ἑτέρῳ μὲν δουρὶ σάκος βάλεν*, &c.

Here *ἀμφίς* plainly means *utrinque*, "on both sides," i.e. with both hands, and the dative *δούρασιν* is, according to the intervening passage, divided into *ἑτέρῳ μὲν*—*τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ*—. In this passage, however, the word *περιδέξιος* is very remarkable. The explanation of it by *περι-*, *very*, is insufferable; while all that we have hitherto said of the meaning of *utrinque*, belongs entirely to *ἀμφί* and those words akin to it. Nowhere in the whole range of the Greek language are *περί* and its derivatives to be found in this sense. Evidently, therefore, the poet, as an hexameter verse does not admit of *ἀμφιδέξιος*, had recourse to *περιδέξιος*, because in all other combinations *περί* is essentially synonymous with *ἀμφί*.

4. From the idea of *on both sides* proceeds (when the object which is between stands as the subject of the sentence) the idea of *separation*, the origin of which one sees in the mention of the *yoke*, although, properly speaking, that joins the oxen together; Il. *ν*, 706.

Τὼ μέν τε ζυγὸν οἶον ἐΰξοον ἀμφὶς ἐέργει.

Literally, the yoke keeps one steer *on each side*, and consequently *separates* them. And this idea becomes now the leading one, as in Od. *α*, 54. speaking of Atlas,

ἔχει δέ τε κίονας αὐτὸς
Μακρὰς, αἳ γαῖάν τε καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχουσιν,

"keep from each other", i. e. separate. Hence the expression *ἀμφὶς ἔχειν* in Homer varies according to the different turns which its meaning takes. For while in the example just given it means to keep *apart from each other*, it is afterwards used of the horses, which keep or carry the yoke *on both sides* of them, Od. *γ*, 486.

Οἱ δὲ πανημέριοι σεῖον ζυγὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχοντες.

A third meaning of this expression, with *ἀμφίς* in its first sense, occurs in Od. *θ*, 340., where Mercury wishes that he were bound with thrice as many chains as confined Mars and Venus:

Δεσμοὶ μὲν τρὶς τόσσοι ἀπείρονες ἀμφὶς ἔχοιεν.

"might keep me firm *all around*".

5. That which is separated *one from the other* might, however, have previously been one whole; and therefore *ἀμφίς*, like *δίχα* elsewhere (*δίχα πρῖσαι, σχίσαι*, &c.) means *in two*, as Il. *λ*, 559. of an ass,

. . . . . . ᾧ δὴ πολλὰ περὶ ῥόπαλ' ἀμφὶς ἐάγη,

"have been broken *in two*". For in this passage it cannot mean *all around it, on every side of it*, because, as the scholiast justly observes, these words do not relate to the blows of the boys described in the line following, but to the treatment which the ass had formerly received, and which had made it so insensible to beating.

6. From the idea of separation arises again a new use of ἀμφίς, exactly the opposite of its first meaning, by which it points out the relation which the *one part alone* bears to the others; in which, however, there may be one or more objects on either side; e. g. Il. θ, 444.

> Αἳ δ' οἶαι Διὸς ἀμφὶς Ἀθηναίη τε καὶ Ἥρη
> Ἥσθην, οὐδέ τί μιν προσεφώνεον, &c.,

that is, "each of the two sat *apart from* Jove[1]." And Od. ξ, 352.

> . . . . . μάλα δ' ὦκα θύρηθ' ἔα ἀμφὶς ἐκείνων,

"soon I was gone, *far away from* them." Again, in Il. ψ, 393., speaking of the horses whose yoke was broken, Ἀμφὶς ὁδοῦ δραμέτην, "*sideways from* the road." And in Od. π, 267., where Ulysses says of Jupiter and Minerva,

> Οὐ μέν τοϊ κείνω γε πολὺν χρόνον ἀμφὶς ἔσεσθον
> Φυλόπιδος κρατερῆς,

"they will not be long *absent from* the battle," i. e. will soon take part in it. And absolutely, *at a distance, away, absent*; as in Od. τ, 221.,

> Ὦ γύναι, ἀργαλέον, τόσσον χρόνον ἀμφὶς ἔοντα
> Εἰπέμεν.

and so also in Od. ω, 218. This phrase ἀμφὶς ἔοντα has two meanings; the context of each passage must decide which is to be preferred. For as we have just seen that it makes no difference in the meaning of ἀμφίς, whether it be used of one or more persons, so ἀμφὶς ἐόντας may be said of more than one in this same sense; and yet, as we see from Il. ω, 488., mentioned above in sect. 2., it may have a directly opposite meaning. This is also evident in Il. ι, 460., where Phœnix says of the friends who *surround* him, and endeavour to dissuade him from flying,

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[1] This is the interpretation of one scholiast, while another observes from this passage that Juno and Minerva sat in Olympus ἑκατέρωθεν, one on each side of Jupiter. But this sentence is evidently connected with the following one by οὐδέ; and the manner of their sitting, and their silence, are both the effects of their being offended with Jupiter.

Ἦ μὲν πολλὰ ἔται καὶ ἀνεψιοὶ ἀμφὶς ἐόντες
Αὐτοῦ λισσόμενοι κατερήτυον ἐν μεγάροισιν.

7. When *ἀμφίς* is used to point out in actions or in operations of the mind the relation which two or more persons reciprocally bear to each other, it expresses what *each person for himself* does or thinks, without its according with the other, nay sometimes when it is in *direct opposition* ; e. g. Il. ν, 345.

Τὼ δ' ἀμφὶς φρονέοντε δύω Κρόνου υἷε κραταιώ·

because Jupiter assisted the Greeks, Neptune the Trojans. And of many in number, at Il. β, 13. οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' ἀμφὶς. . . . . Ἀθάνατοι φράζονται. Therefore when in Od. χ, 57. the suitors offer Ulysses, "everything of thine which has been consumed,"

Τιμὴν ἀμφὶς ἄγοντες ἐεικοσάβοιον ἕκαστος
. . . . .ἀποδώσομεν,

the meaning of it is, "each for himself shall give thee the value of twenty oxen." And now we shall not fail to understand the meaning of Od. τ, 46.

Ἡ δέ μ' ὀδυρομένη εἰρήσεται ἀμφὶς ἕκαστα,

"will ask me everything *one after the other.*" Further, when at Il. χ, 117. Hector is considering whether it would not be better to return to the Greeks everything which Paris had taken from them,

ἅμα δ' ἀμφὶς Ἀχαιοῖς
Ἄλλ' ἀπόδασσασθαι, ὅσσα πτόλις ἥδε κέκευθεν,

it does not mean "to the Achæans around"; nor, as it is explained in one scholium, "besides"; nor "the one half"; but, to the Achæans, "*man by man.*" And lastly at Il. ο, 709., where the battle close to the ships is described ;

Τοῦπερ δὴ περὶ νηὸς Ἀχαιοί τε Τρῶές τε
Δῄουν ἀλλήλους αὐτοσχεδόν· οὐδ' ἄρα τοίγε
Τόξων ἀϊκὰς ἀμφὶς μένον, οὐδέ τ' ἀκόντων,
Ἀλλ' οἵγ' ἔγγυθεν ἱστάμενοι ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντες
Ὀξέσι δὴ πελέκεσσι καὶ ἀξίνῃσι μάχοντο, &c.

ἀμφίς here does not mean "from a distance," as some have supposed, in opposition to αὐτοσχεδόν; the antithesis lies in the verse following, and ἀμφίς is correctly explained in the scholium by χωρὶς ἀλλήλων, and in Eustathius by ἰδίᾳ.

8. From this multiplicity of meanings, proceeding from and blending with each other, a doubt may often arise as to the sense of ἀμφίς in particular passages; for instance, in Il. σ, 502., where, in the description of the litigation represented on the shield, both disputants are mentioned, and then follows,

> Λαοὶ δ' ἀμφοτέροισιν ἐπήπυον ἀμφὶς ἀρωγοί.

Here ἀμφίς may be explained by *around*; but then ἀρωγοί would look very bald after it. I understand ἀμφὶς ἀρωγοί to mean, "some helping the one, others the other." *Schol. min.* Χωρὶς ἑκατέρῳ οἱ ἴδιοι βοηθοί[2].—Again, at Il. μ, 434., speaking of the woman weighing the wool for spinning,

> Ἥτε σταθμὸν ἔχουσα καὶ εἴριον ἀμφὶς ἀνέλκει
> Ἰσάζουσα.

that ἀμφίς belongs to ἀνέλκει is plain, as the scholiast remarks, from the rhythm, which does not allow of a pause after ἀμφίς; it must therefore be "she makes *on both sides*, (i. e. both) hang equal."

9. In Il. γ, 115. the word requires a more particular examination. The preparations for the single combat of Menelaus and Paris are there described; and it is said of the leaders of both armies,

> Καί ῥ' ἵππους μὲν ἔρυξαν ἐπὶ στίχας, ἐκ δ' ἔβαν αὐτοὶ,
> Τεύχεά τ' ἐξεδύοντο, τὰ μὲν κατέθεντ' ἐπὶ γαίῃ
> Πλησίον ἀλλήλων, ὀλίγη δ' ἦν ἀμφὶς ἄρουρα.

The scholiast and Eustathius, and all the later commentators now lying before me, understand ἀμφίς here to mean *between*. It is true that this meaning may be drawn from the form of the expression, as it might have been also from that of the yoke mentioned before, Τὼ μέν τε ζυγὸν . . . ἀμφὶς ἐέργει, for the yoke which presses the oxen outwards *toward each side* is *between* both. But from this idea there is one more step to be taken before we can reach the other; and to take that step we must find an example in some other passage, or we must be driven to it in this by necessity. Such examples, however, I have not been able to discover; for in Il. η, 342., where it is said of the ditch protecting the rampart of the Grecians, Ἥ χ' ἵππους καὶ λαὸν ἐρύκακοι ἀμφὶς ἐοῦσα, no one will prefer the idea of *between*, (that is, between the rampart and the crowd that was pressing towards it,) to the common and natural explanation of the ditch drawn *round* the semicircular camp. As to the passage of Il. γ, before us, we must first observe, that those who understand the πλησίον ἀλλήλων to refer to the two armies, and the ἄρουρα to mean the μεταίχμιον, evidently mistake it altogether. It is supposed that these two points may be proved from the context; but I think I shall be able to show from the context that this view of them is a false one. At v. 77. Hector makes the Trojan ranks recede a little (Τρώων ἀνέεργε φάλαγγας), and he himself prepares to address the Grecians; on which Agamemnon restrains his troops from shooting and throwing at him. These troops, therefore, are standing at some distance from him, yet within bow-shot. Consequently there is now plenty of room between the two armies for a single combat: the horses of the foremost combatants are drawn up ἐπὶ στίχας, i. e. along the ranks of the foot-soldiers; the heroes lay their arms down close by their chariots, and place themselves near them; as is expressly said again at v. 326. after the long episode of Helen on the walls of Troy: Οἱ μὲν (the heroes on both sides) ἔπειθ' ἵζοντο κατὰ στίχας, ἧχι ἑκάστῳ Ἵπποι . . . καὶ . . . τεύχε' ἔκειτο. That the space between the two armies and the heroes, who were looking on, ought to be sufficiently large for the advancing and retreating movements of such a single combat, is self-evident; and whoever wishes to see it should read v. 378., where Menelaus, after having dragged Paris some little way, retains the helmet in his hand after the throat-strap had been broken, and throws it toward the Grecians ἐπιδινήσας. How then could the poet describe the μεταίχμιον to be ὀλίγη ἄρουρα? All this I was obliged to picture to myself, before I could get rid of the preconceived opinion, which hindered me, as it does others, from understanding the words, Τεύχεα δ' ἐξεδύοντο, τὰ μὲν κατέθεντ' ἐπὶ γαίῃ Πλησίον ἀλλήλων, in their plain and natural sense and connexion: the heroes laid their arms down, each near those of the other, and thus formed, by seating themselves near their arms, an assembly of spectators and judges of the combat. Thus the expression of there being but little space *between* the arms of each individual would be quite correct; but equally correct is it to say that there was ὀλίγη ἄρουρα "a little space", ἀμφίς "around each pile of arms."

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[2] Instead of ἀμφοτέροισιν ἐπήπυον there is a reading mentioned in Schol. Ven., ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐπίπνυον, which Heyne did not know how to explain satisfactorily. It certainly ought to be ἐποίπνυον, "the people were in a ferment on both sides, some in favour of the one, others of the other".

10. In the poets after Homer the form ἀμφίς is not of frequent occurrence; and in those cases which do occur I see no reason why I should anticipate all the possible meanings that may be drawn from those which I have laid down above, by criticism employing itself in explaining difficulties or fixing readings. Perhaps the use of the word by Parmenides in one of the Fragments in Simplicius (Fülleborn, 105.) may deserve particular notice;

> Ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα
> Ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης.

At least I know of no other passage where this form preserves so completely the meaning, construction and position of ἀμφί, *de*. I will also mention the use of this word in the oracle given to Crœsus in Herodot. 1, 85.

> Μὴ βούλευ πολύευκτον ἰὴν ἀνὰ δώματ' ἀκούειν
> Παιδὸς φθεγγομένου. τόδε σοι πολὺ λώϊον ἀμφὶς
> Ἔμμεναι. αὐδήσει γὰρ ἐν ἤματι πρῶτον ἀνόλβῳ.

The construction is best thus, τόδε σοι λώϊον (ἐστὶν) ἀμφὶς εἶναι, "it is better for thee to be *without it*", i. e. ἀμφὶς scil. αὐτοῦ, literally "far away from it", like ἀμφὶς φυλόπιδος above, at sect. 6.

11. We will now examine a passage in Pind. Pyth. 4, 450. which is explained in two different senses. Both of these are mentioned by the scholiast, and have been discussed by Böckh, but we will submit them to another examination. Pindar says that the Argonauts celebrated games at Lemnos ἐσθᾶτος ἀμ-

φίς; which, according to the scholiast, has two meanings, *πότερον τῆς ἐσθῆτος χωρὶς ἠγωνίσαντο, τουτέστι γυμνοὶ, ἢ τὸ ἀμφίς ἀντὶ τῆς περί δεκτέον· χρῶνται γὰρ τῇ λέξει καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου· ἵν' ᾖ τὸ ἔπαθλον ἐσθής.* The second explanation is there preferred, and with this Böckh agrees*. The latter grounds his interpretation on Olymp. 4, 31, &c. (where it appears that this contest consisted in running in armour,) and on an express mention of this meaning, as quoted by the scholiast from Simonides; *καὶ γὰρ καὶ παρὰ Σιμωνίδῃ ἐστὶν ἡ ἱστορία, ὅτι περὶ ἐσθῆτος ἠγωνίσαντο.* This however does not satisfy me; for in that passage of Ol. 4, 31. the running in armour is the only contest mentioned, because what occurs there relates to that alone; whereas in those funeral games in honour of Thoas (see Schol. ad Ol. 4, 31.) there were undoubtedly general gymnastic contests, as in other funeral games, in the famous ones of Pelias for instance. If now Simonides had spoken of those games somewhat more in detail, the mention of the garment there as one of the prizes was very natural. In Pindar, on the contrary, who merely touches on the stay of the Argonauts in Lemnos and on these games, in a few words,

> *Ἔν τ' ὠκεανοῦ πελάγεσσι μίγεν πόντῳ τ' ἐρύθρῳ,*
> *Λαμνίαν τ' ἔθνει γυναικῶν ἀνδροφόνων·*
> *ἔνθα καὶ γυίων ἀέθλοις ἐπεδείξαντο κρίσιν ἐσθᾶτος ἀμφίς.*

the mention of this unmeaning circumstance appears to me strange and misplaced; or, what is still stronger, if, as I suppose, there were also other contests besides the running in armour, such a mention of one prize for all of them was not possible, because each contest had its particular prize. On the contrary, the mentioning that they were *naked* contests was not indeed strictly necessary; but this expression refers so naturally and beautifully to *γυίων* and *ἐπεδείξαντο*, that I wonder how any one, who considers the context, can understand it otherwise; and if therefore Pindar had, when he wrote it, the other meaning in his mind, he would have drawn upon himself just and deserved reproach.

12. And now to go back to the different use of *ἀμφί* and

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* [Dissen, in his edition of Pindar, forming the 6th volume of Jacob's Bibliotheca Græca, agrees with Böckh, and objects to Buttmann's interpretation, but his arguments are not to me convincing.—Ed.]

ἀμφίς, we have seen in sect. 3. (with the exception of the passage from Hesiod) the meanings of *utrinque, seorsim*, &c. confined entirely to the form *ἀμφίς*; for the three passages from Homer where *ἀμφίς* stands before *ἕκαστον, ἕκαστα*, (see sect. 3. and 7.) cannot justify us in changing it there, on account of the digamma, to *ἀμφί*; since the word *ἕκαστος*, as is well known, cannot be reduced to any certainty on this point (see Heyne's Excursus on the Digamma); and I, at least, am not acquainted with any other passages where *ἀμφίς* before the digamma would cause a difficulty. As for the original meaning *around*, and that which is immediately connected with it, the form *ἀμφί* is constantly the prevailing one, and we seldom see the other for metrical reasons preferred to it; only in the adverbial meaning of *around* the use of *ἀμφίς* and *ἀμφί* seems to depend entirely on the convenience of the verse. In the two passages, then, quoted above, at sect. 2. instead of *ἀμφὶς ἰδών*, we should adopt, with Heyne on Il. *β*, 384., as the genuine reading, *ἀμφιδών*.

12. 'Ανενείκατο.

1. In the passage of Il. *τ*, 314., where Achilles laments the death of Patroclus, in this line,

> *Μνησάμενος δ' ἀδινῶς ἀνενείκατο, φώνησέν τε.*

And then follow the words of the lamentation. As the verb *ἀνενείκασθαι* does not occur again in all Homer, we must endeavour to find out its meaning, as far as is possible, from the word itself, and the context of this passage. The scholiasts, in this respect, give us no assistance. *Κάτωθεν τὴν φωνὴν ἀθρόαν ἐκ βάθους ἀνήνεγκεν.—'Αθρόως καὶ ἐλεεινῶς καὶ οἰκτρῶς ἀνέκραξεν· ἢ οἱονεὶ ἀνεστέναξε καὶ πολὺ ἤγαγε πνεῦμα.* These are their explanations. Of this the most certain, as drawn from the etymology of the verb, is the deep-drawn breath. But then are we to understand it to mean a loud cry caused by this, or a deep sigh previous to it? It appears to me, from the context of this passage, that after *Μνησάμενος*, and just at the beginning of a long speech, a loud cry is the most ill-suited thing in the world[1]. Now the commentator adduced but this one meaning of the word ἀδινός for this passage; but we have seen under the article ἀδινός, that the idea of *loud, loud-sounding* is but a subordinate meaning, in as much as the word is used of everything powerful and abundant, consequently of a violent sighing and lamentation. And this common junction of ἀδινὰ with στοναχίζειν makes therefore the same meaning probable in the passage before us, where nothing can suit the context better than a sigh or groan; which, however, by the expression ἀνενείκατο, is not described in this case as striking the ear by a loud sound, but depicted by a deep-drawn breath. We will therefore confine ourselves to that one part of the scholiast's explanation, as Apollonius has only that in his lexicon; ἀνεστέναξεν, οἶον ἀνήνεγκε τὸν στεναγμόν; and Hesychius, Ἀνενέγκατο (for so it is written there), ἐστέναξεν ἐκ βάθους.

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[1] How Heyne could from the *ἀδινῶς* and the *ἀθρόαν* of the scholiast arrive at the explanation which he has given, *continuo has voces in ore habuit*, I cannot at all conceive.

2. In Herodotus the same word occurs (and in the same form but once,) in the well-known passage of Crœsus on the burning pile; and every one will recognise at first sight the exact similarity of expression in these two Ionians. (1, 86.) Τῷ δὲ Κροίσῳ ἑστεῶτι ἐπὶ τῆς πυρῆς ἐσελθεῖν, καίπερ ἐν κακῷ ἐόντι τοσούτῳ, τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος ..... ὡς δὲ ἄρα μιν προστῆναι τοῦτο ἀνενεικάμενόν τε καὶ ἀναστενάξαντα ἐκ πολλῆς ἡσυχίης ἐς τρὶς ὀνομάσαι Σόλων. Of all things a loud cry is the least suited to this passage; for no one will for a moment think of connecting the sense of ἀνενεικάμενον (situated as it is) with ὀνομάσαι Σόλων, by carrying it over ἀναστενάξαντα. One should much rather say that it is an old usage in Greek to join ἀνενείκασθαι and ἀναστενάξαι, in order to bring before the mind of the reader the deep-drawn breath and groaning of one who is in great distress. And thus I think Ælian understood it, of whom the following fragment is preserved in Suidas; Ὁ δὲ ἀνηνέγκατο ἄρα στενάξας καὶ τρὶς ἐκάλεσε τὸν Σόλωνα, although the grammarian has explained the verb Ἀνηνέγκατο there by ἐκ βάθους ἐβόησεν. But it is quite evident that Ælian has only varied a little in this passage the exact words of Herodotus, and felt a pleasure in clothing the learned Ionic verb in his Attic dress. I am not aware that this *aoristus medii* is ever found elsewhere in this construction, either in the old prose or in the Attic dialect.

3. The *aoristus passivi*, on the contrary, does occur in He-

rodotus, but again only once, and in a passage which is calculated to unsettle our opinion of the former passage. It is spoken of Astyages, who is beginning to recognise his grandson in Cyrus, (1, 116.) Ἐκπλαγεὶς δὲ τούτοισι ἐπὶ χρόνον ἄφθογγος ἦν· μόγις δὲ δή κοτε ἀνενειχθεὶς εἶπε· and then follows a calm, cool speech of Astyages, relating to something else. A sigh or groan can have nothing to do in this passage; and the whole context with the word μόγις proves much rather that ἀνενειχθείς means here, "after he had recovered himself." And thus it agrees in everything essential with the use which the later authors (amongst whom Demosthenes is perhaps the earliest, p. 210, 15.) make of the active form of this verb, as intransitive, and sometimes also of the passive; ἀνήνεγκεν*, ἀνηνέχθη, "he came to himself again, recovered himself, came to life again." Vid. Steph. Thes. in Ind. v. ἀνενέγκω. Hesych. ἀνενεχθείς, ἀναβιώσας. The middle voice is also, as far as theory goes, capable of bearing this same meaning, and a certain similarity, which exists between the two passages of Herodotus, might very well induce us to understand ἀνενεικάμενος in the same sense as ἀνενειχθείς; particularly as in the former passage it is expressly added ἐκ πολλῆς ἡσυχίης[2]. But then again, the simplicity of the language of Herodotus will not allow us to suppose that he used the middle and passive of the same verb in precisely the same sense; and he could not possibly have spoken of Crœsus "coming to himself," unless he had *previously* mentioned his being in a speechless state, as he has in the second passage. But the words ἐκ πολλῆς ἡσυχίης are placed after ἀνενεικάμενον, instead of before, and express nothing more than a silent meditation, being placed in that part of the passage where they stand, because the meaning connects them closest with ἐς τρὶς ὀνομάσαι: as thus, "But when that came before his mind, he sighed deeply, and from having been until then perfectly silent and quiet, he cried out three times on Solon."

4. We are now certain enough of the meaning of the word

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* [Ἐκ τῶν τραυμάτων ἀνήνεγκε, Plut. M. Anton. 43.—Ed.]

[2] Or ἀψυχίης, λειποψυχίης, according to the various readings; both which, however, the context, rightly considered, rejects.

to examine, without fear of being led astray, the imitations of Apollonius. This poet evidently understood by the ἀδινῶς ἀνενείκατο of Homer, a loud cry, supplying in that passage an accusative, which in his own poem is everywhere expressed; and he has thus abandoned the part of an imitator, without gaining anything by appearing in his own person as an original: 3, 463. Ἦκα δὲ μυρομένη λιγέως ἀνενείκατο μῦθον· Τίπτε με δειλαίην... 635. ἀδινὴν δ' ἀνενείκατο φωνήν· Δειλὴ ἐγὼν... 4, 1748. (Euphemus) θεοπροπίας Ἑκάτοιο Θυμῷ πεμπάζων ἀνενείκατο φώνησέν τε, and then follows a very cheering prediction. Nor does Theocritus succeed better, 23, 18. οὕτω δ' ἀνενείκατο φωνήν· Ἄγριε παῖ καὶ στυγνὲ...

20. Ἄνεω, ἄνεῳ.

1. This word is in some respects exactly similar to ἀκέων, with which it also agrees in meaning. The form ἄνεῳ occurs seven times in the two poems of Homer, and always in the sense of *still, silent, without noise,* as is plain from its being generally opposed to speaking. In all these passages it relates to a plurality of persons, and is therefore generally considered as the plural of an adjective ἄνεως. But in one passage the same expression is used of a woman, and there it is written without the iota subscript, ἄνεω, Od. ψ, 93. Ἡ δ' ἄνεω δὴν ἧστο. One scholiast also has been careful enough to remark on Il. β, 323. ὧδε μὲν διὰ τοῦ ι· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ Ἡ δ' ἄνεω δὴν ἧστο[1], χωρὶς τοῦ ι. That is to say, as has been observed elsewhere, in this passage ἄνεω is an adverb according to the form of οὕτω, ἄφνω. And it is indeed remarkable how these grammarians and all succeeding critics have been puzzled at the omission of a little subscript line in one passage. Still more wonderful is it, that having once settled this difference, they should adopt it here only where the singular makes it necessary, and should not have seen that the same construction with the verb ἧσθαι requires the same form at Od. β, 240., οἷον

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[1] In Villoison is οἱ δ' ἄνεω δη ἤσαν, but this is evidently a corrupt reading, as the thing itself and a comparison of passages prove.

ἅπαντες Ἧσθ' ἄνεω, in which all leave the ι subscript untouched: whereas it is grammatically certain that Homer must have either spoken ἄνεω without the ι in both passages, or if he had said ἄνεῳ here, he could not have said in the other passage anything but ἄνεως; of which reading however there is no trace.

2. This consideration and the comparison of ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο ought, however, to lead further; that is to say, to the conclusion that in the other passages there is nothing to hinder our considering ἄνεω as an adverb in the phrases ἄνεω ἐγένοντο, ἄνεω ἦσαν. An observation to this purpose, quoted only by Damm, had been made long ago by Eustathius on Od. ψ, but made, it seems, in vain; Τὸ δὲ ἄνεω σημειῶδές ἐστιν ἐπίρρημα ὄν· καὶ δίδωσιν ὑπόνοιαν, καὶ τὸ, Οἱ δ' ἄνεω ἦσαν, τοιοῦτον εἶναι, καθὰ καὶ τὸ, Ἀθηνᾶ δ' ἀκέων ἦν, δοκεῖ ἐπίρρημα εἶναι διὰ τὸ, ἀκέων δαίνυσθε. Apollonius speaks more in detail, though not more clearly, to the same purpose, *De Adv.* p. 554. 577., from which it appears that the school of Aristarchus supposed the word to be always an adverb. The critics, who again differed from this, thought themselves, it seems, fettered by the actual existence of an adjective ἄνεως, with which, it is true, the junction of εἶναι and γενέσθαι would be more natural.

3. If, however, we search for this adjective, we nowhere find it. For the instance which Alberti on Hesychius quotes from Herodotus 5, 27. (28.) as an elegant expression, has been long acknowledged to be a corruption; and the undoubted and excellent correction of La Barre, ἄνεσις for ἄνεως, has at last found the place which it deserved in the text of Schweighäuser. With this all trace of the word ἄνεως has, as far as I know, disappeared; for ἀνεοί in Hesychius is for certain only a various reading from the passages of Homer. That in all those we ought to read ἄνεω without the ι subscript, according to the rule of that one passage where the ι has been always omitted, can no longer, then, be doubted; and we have here a notable instance on what accidental circumstances the explanations of the old grammarians partly depended. Ἄνεω was an obsolete word. If the passage in which it is joined with the singular had stood in the first book of the Iliad as well as in the last but one of the Odyssey, nothing is more certain than that from that

one all the other passages would have been considered correct. But as they stand in Homer, the eye mostly met with only that great majority of passages, where ἄνεῳ being joined with the verb substantive gave most naturally the idea of an adjective; and as there are plurals ending in ῳ, the ear had heard such a sound long before the grammarian meddled with it; who, thinking it a regularly established fact, employed himself in examining the deviation from it in Od. ψ[2].

4. As an adverb, then, it follows the analogy of adverbs in ω. And the nature of such a word appears always to bring with it the idea that it is formed from an adjective, of which it is some case, say the dative or genitive, slightly modified. With this idea we naturally turn to ὀπίσω, πρόσω, ἄφνω, and even to ἄνω, κάτω, &c.; so that one should be inclined to say that usage has fixed the termination ω on those adverbs, which as adjectives have become obsolete, or, perhaps, never come into use. In the case of οὕτω alone, which with οὕτως comes from οὗτος, we must suppose a form in ος as the most natural, or at least the most common of all those forms. Ἄνεω, then, as an adverb, will accord with every etymological view in which we may have regarded the adjective; it may, for instance, be akin to ἐννεός, it may be compounded of ἀν privative and a radical word signifying a voice or sound; a derivation which, where ε only remains to trace the root by, may be easily conjectured, but with difficulty fixed. But how are we to *accent* it? There is every reason to suspect that it retains the accentuation with which it has been handed down to us, ἄνεω, from its being considered as the plural of the adjective ἄνεως. The most natural mode of accenting it would be ἀνέω, like ὀπίσω; or if we suppose its adjective to have been accented like ἐννεός, ἀνεῶ would not be surprising, any more than σοφῶς, κρατερῶς. Under such circumstances, it is best to retain, with all due reservation, what is handed down to us; and the more so, as those same old grammarians, who

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[2] Apollonius Rhodius has the word three times, always in connexion with ἄναυδοι, from which however it does not necessarily follow that he considered it to be an adjective. The adverbial form, which his Codd. offer, may very well be joined with an adjective, as if one should say οἱ δὲ σῖγα καὶ ἀθόρυβοι παρῆλθον.

acknowledged it to be an adverb, did so accent it, as is clear from a passage of Apollonius *De Adv.* p. 577[3].

21. Ἀνήνοθεν, ἐνήνοθεν, ἐνίπτω, ἐνέπω, ἄνωγα, ἄωρτο, and other verbal forms.

1. The two forms, so similar to each other, ἀνήνοθεν and ἐνήνοθε occur only in the language of the Epic poets, both in but few instances, and the latter only when compounded with ἐπί and κατά. We will first mention the passages in which they are found. Ἀνήνοθε occurs in Il. λ, 266., where it is said of Agamemnon when wounded that he still went about fighting,

> Ὄφρα οἱ αἷμ' ἔτι θερμὸν ἀνήνοθεν ἐξ ὠτειλῆς.

and in Od. ρ, 270., where Ulysses, standing before his own palace, says he can tell that a feast is going on within,

> ....ἐπεὶ κνίσση μὲν ἀνήνοθεν, ἐν δέ τε φόρμιγξ
> Ἠπύει.

The word, therefore, evidently means the *rising* or *issuing forth* of the blood from the wound, or of the vapour and smell from the house.

2. Ἐνήνοθε compounded with ἐπί we find in Il. β, 219., where Thersites is described,

> Φοξὸς ἔην κεφαλὴν, ψεδνὴ δ' ἐπενήνοθε λάχνη.

In Il. κ, 134. speaking of Nestor,

> Ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρα χλαῖναν περονήσατο φοινικόεσσαν
> Διπλῆν, ἐκταδίην, οὔλη δ' ἐπενήνοθε λάχνη.

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[3] They derived the adverb ἄνεω from the adjective ἄνεως, and thence thought that they might accent it thus; a supposition in itself not incorrect, since, for instance, the genitive termination ων in τῶν ἔμπλεων and the like must also be regulated according to the nominative in ως. In truth the supposition of the existence of this adjective was always grounded on that imaginary ἄνεῳ. But that supposition offends against no rule of the Greek language: nay more, if we suppose such a word as ἄναος, *without sound*, the change to ἄνεως was almost necessary.

In Od. *θ*, 365., where the Graces anoint Venus with oil,

> *. . .οἷα θεοὺς ἐπενήνοθεν αἰὲν ἐόντας,*

which verse is repeated in the Hymn to Venus v. 62. Compounded with *κατά* it occurs in Hesiod. *α*, 269., where it is said of Ἀχλύς personified,

> *Εἱστήκει· πολλὴ δὲ κόνις κατενήνοθεν ὤμους.*

We see that in both these compounds, *ἐπί* and *κατά*, the meaning is the same; and that *κατενήνοθεν* in the last passage was preferred only on account of the metre. The dust *lying upon* and *covering* the shoulders will assist us, then, in fixing the sense in the two passages where mention is made of the wool and of the woolly hair; and the meaning of the word is therefore simply *to be, sit, or lie upon,* as spoken of one thing covering another more or less. We have therefore no reason whatever, in the Hymn to Ceres, v. 280., where speaking of her suddenly re-appearing in the divine form it is said,

> *. . .τῆλε δὲ φέγγος ἀπὸ χροὸς ἀθανάτοιο*
> *Λάμπε θεᾶς, ξανθαὶ δὲ κόμαι κατενήνοθεν ὤμους,*

to understand the verb of the waving motion of the hair; still less reason is there for supposing it to mean the sudden *waving* of the hair *downwards*: but the use of the imperfect (*λάμπε*, &c.), and a comparison with the passage in Hesiod, show that it merely means the hair *covers* the shoulders, *lies upon them.*

3. And now having clearly seen that *ἐπενήνοθεν* and *κατενήνοθε* are used in common for each other, we can better decide on the bold use which Apollonius makes of the word, when at 4, 276. he says of a thing long past, *πουλὺς γὰρ ἄδην ἐπενήνοθεν αἴων*, and again at 1, 664. he ventures to make a new compound, where Hypsipyle, after she had declared her opinion to the assembled women, adds, *Ἡμετέρη μέν νυν τοίη παρενήνοθε μῆτις.* It is, indeed, difficult to say with certainty the exact sense in which Apollonius used these forms. We can find in Homer little to elucidate their meaning in these two passages; whether, for instance, this Alexandrian, following some grammatical view of his own, might have connected them with the idea of motion. But it is not at all ne-

cessary to adopt this idea. The perfectly simple explanation of the Homeric ἐπενήνοθε, which for instance we find in Apollon. Lex., ἐπῆν, ἐπέκειτο, and which is therefore certainly very old, may have been the cause of Apollonius Rhodius using this ἐνήνοθεν as a mere variety of expression for the verb substantive, as thus, πολὺς ἔπεστι χρόνος, and πάρεστι, παράκειται μῆτις ἡμετέρη.

4. As to the time of these forms, ἀνήνοθεν in the second passage and ἐνήνοθεν in the third have plainly the meaning of the present, and both are therefore according to form *perfect*; and in this Apollonius imitated them: but in all the other passages they are joined in the context with the past, and both forms are therefore also *imperfect*. On this subject there is nothing further to be said, since also the third persons of δείδια, γέγωνα, ἄνωγα are without the least doubt imperfect or aorist, e. g. δείδιε Il. σ, 34., γέγωνεω, 703., ἄνωγε Od. ο, 97. That is to say, as these perfects had so completely the meaning of the present, they began to form also an imperfect or aorist in ον immediately from them, instead of the *plusquam-perfectum* which properly should supply their places. And hence the third person, without its proper augment, was the same in sound as the perfect form: but from ἄνωγα there occur also the forms ἄνωγον, ἀνώγετε, &c.

5. From the great similarity of these two perfects it has always been thought from the earliest times that they ought to be united etymologically also; and as some of the old grammarians explained ἀνήνοθα to be 2nd perfect* from ἀνθέω, with the Attic reduplication and ο inserted, as in ἀγήοχα (in which case the idea of *to rise* or *spring up* would be taken from the flowering or budding of plants); so others explained ἐνήνοθα to be precisely the same, in as much as wool, hair, oil, and dust lie lightly on objects, as a blossom does. In the Etym. M. this derivation is rejected, but the grounds given for rejecting it are as bad as those often given there in support of derivations. For these we must refer the reader to that work and to the other grammarians. We will mention only the best deri-

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* [With us it is called, most improperly, the *perfectum medium*. —Ed.]

vation which we find among the later grammarians. These could not resist the *appearance* of the words, according to which both forms would be one and the same verb, but compounded with two prepositions; and accordingly they supposed a perfect *ἤνοθα*, whose theme should be *ἐνόθω*. The simple *ὄθω* was thought to exist, and not without probability, 1st. in the lengthened form *ὤθω, ὠθέω*, 2nd. in the deponent *ὄθομαι*, *I concern myself about any one, attend to him, have a regard for* or *fear of him*, which has been compared with the Lat. *moveor*: again, the compound *ἐνόθω* was recognised in the first part of the epithets *ἐνοσίχθων, ἐννοσίγαιος, εἰνοσίφυλλος*, and in the poetical substantive *ἔνοσις*, *a violent agitation* or *shaking*, *an earthquake* (Hesiod). It is impossible to show the absolute untruth of separate parts of such combinations; but in investigations of that sort, the value of which depends on the union of probabilities, it is sufficient to point out that which is deceptive in each.

6. And first as to the application of all this to the Homeric passages, it appears to me, that since the proof of this derivation is made to depend on the existence of such words and ideas as *ὠθεῖν*, *to push* or *thrust*; *ἔνοσις*, *a violent agitation*, one should expect to find in the meaning of those forms as they occur in Homer, (if there be any grounds for such derivation,) the idea of a *violent* or at least of a *quick motion*. For the proper significancy of *ὠθεῖν* and *ἔνοσις* lies only in the idea of violence or impetuosity; take away that idea, and you destroy the point of the comparison. Now *ἀνήνοθε* in Homer gives exactly the idea of a most gentle motion; in Il. λ, 266. it is not the spouting of blood from a fresh wound, but its gentle trickling from the wound until it dries, and the wound becomes stiff (see v. 267.), and until which time the hero is still ranging about the field and fighting; and in the Odyssey that which makes Ulysses suppose that there is a banquet going on in his house is not smoke, *κάπνος*, which might be supposed to rise in rapid whirls, but it is the *κνῖσσα*, or the vapoury smell of the fat, which exhales gently and issues forth in every direction. Again *ἐνήνοθα* is, as we have seen above, entirely free from even the idea of motion; not that one cannot imagine to oneself (for what might not a poet's ever-active and creative

mind produce?) the woolly hair rising up on end, or moving, on the head of Thersites, or the oil shining as if in motion; nay, usage might transfer a word, originally taken from the idea of motion, to the lifeless wool of the cloak, or to the dust lying motionless: but then the certain, or at least highly probable, derivation must be already known from external appearance; here, on the contrary, the derivation is the very thing we are in search of, and that in a great measure from the meaning. We are not therefore justified in passing any hasty decision, but must merely say that both compounds of ἐνήνοθεν give, in the five passages in which they occur, as nearly as possible the idea of simply *to be upon, to lie upon,* in which a gentle motion may sometimes be supposed to exist, though it is very far from ever forcing itself on our notice. But then all similarity of meaning is gone between this word and ἔνοσις in ἐνοσίχθων and εἰνοσίφυλλος, which are Homeric words full of meaning.

7. Further, as to the verb ὄθομαι; if it be separated from the context in which the old word stands in the only two passages where it occurs, it is easy to raise the idea to that of a *care* which might be borrowed from physical *force* or *impulse,* of which however here only the motion can be used. But to prove this there is no evidence whatever. If Homer wishes to say that one person is acting without paying any regard to another's dislike of what he is doing, he says, that οὐκ ἀλεγίζει οὐδ' ὄθεται the other. Hesychius has beside this word a large number of other forms from the same root, with no stronger collateral idea than that of *shyness* or *timidity*; and whatever has been added of κινεῖν by other grammarians arises only from their wishing and endeavouring to connect ὄθομαι with ἔνοσις: (see Eustath. on Il. α, 181[1].) But if ὄθω is not proved to have this meaning, ἐνόθω falls entirely to the ground, in which theme the θ has been supposed merely on account of that connexion.

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[1] Others have endeavoured to connect ὄθομαι rather with ὄσσεσθαι, ὄττεσθαι; an idea not to be despised, on account of the meaning of *shyness.* In German one cannot but observe the similarity between *scheuen,* 'to be shy', and *schauen,* 'to look'; and as a provincialism the latter word is used instead of the former. Compare also the substantive ὄθμα for ὄμμα in Nicander and Hesychius.

When we are investigating the older Greek language we are in general much too liberal, as I shall presently show, with prepositions in composition. The *ο* in *ἔνοσις* has certainly no more meaning than the *υ* in *ἀνύω, ἄνυσις,* which however no one has explained as compounded with *ἀνά*. But if in *ἄνω, ἀνύω, ἄνυσις, ἀνυσίεργος,* I find the meaning of *to complete* in the syllable *ἀν*, of which I know nothing further, but which may possibly belong to the same family of words as *ἀνά* ; there is nothing to hinder me from tracing back *ἔνοσις, ἐνοσίχθων* to *ἔνω, ἐνόω,* and giving to the syllable *ἐν* the meaning of *to shake*[2], which, if you will, may belong to the same family of words as the preposition *ἐν*[3].

8. Nor is the analogy of conjugation by any means clear

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[2] Perhaps *ἐνύω* with the idea of *tumult* may belong to this ?

[3] I will here take the liberty of attacking an arbitrary alteration of Brunck, which he has made in a word of this same family. In Eurip. Bacch. (v. 585. *seq.*) in a chorus which announces the earth-shaking arrival of Bacchus as the avenging god, was this passage, difficult of explanation, and with no various reading : *πέδον χθονὸς ἔνοσι πότνια, ἆ, ἆ, τάχα τὰ Πενθέως μέλαθρα διατινάξεται πεσήμασιν.* Musgrave made a slight emendation to Πέδων, and joined *πότνια Ἔνοσι πέδων χθονός,* as an exclamation addressed to the shaking of the earth already felt. Brunck without more ado rejects this, and writes, *Πέδον, ὦ Χθὼν, ἔνοθι, πότνια,* explains *ἔνοθι* to be an imperative, gives the verse a name, and seems to think he had settled the question off-hand. Such an explanation as this arises from the false ideas which men formerly had of the grammar of the Greek language. It was thought not only that everything which appeared regularly formed according to any grammatical rules ought to be adopted, when it was found ; but that it was allowable even to form such as occasion might require, and introduce them into the works of the old writers. But because there is such a word as *ἴλαθι*, it does not follow that there must be such a one as *ἔνοθι*. Nowhere does there occur a form *ἔνωμι*, or anything which could come from it ; least of all ought it therefore to be introduced into the Attic drama. But to a chorus inspired with Bacchic frenzy, thirsting for vengeance, announcing an earthquake, and looking forward to it with delight, to such a chorus it would be very appropriate to address the earthquake in the vocative case, thus personifying it as divine. For one piece of information I willingly acknowledge myself indebted to Elmsley, namely, that the plural *τὰ πέδα* is inadmissible : I am therefore contented with one slight emendation, and read thus, *Πέδον χθονὸς Ἔνοσι πότνια. ἆ, ἆ.* For that an exclamation like these two sounds must necessarily *precede* such an announcement, I am by no means convinced by Hermann's note.

and satisfactory in these two forms, as soon as they are brought to a theme ΕΝΟΘΩ. In the adoption of a perfect ἤνοθα, formed from the present ἐνόθω, there is something at variance with what we find elsewhere. Scarcely ever was a perfect yet formed without some other mark of difference beside the temporal augment and the termination in *α*; for in ἦχα, from ἄγω, the perfect is announced by the change of the letter, in οἶδα by the change of vowel, and in λέληθα and such words by the reduplication. Perfect certainty, indeed, is not to be expected in the investigation of grammatical analogies; but no one could venture, without great danger of being led into error, to separate the forms ἀνήνοθα, ἐνήνοθα, from the analogies in ἐλήλυθα, ἐρήριπα, ἐνήνοχα, ἐδήδοκα, ἀγήοχα, ἐγρήγορα and others; from which one should expect to find in the first syllable of those two forms, as in these, the pure reduplication, and in the *ο* of the penultima the change of vowel. But that which seems to have been least considered is the supposed connexion of these two forms. Both verbs are to be derived from the same simple verb; if therefore ἀνήνοθα be compounded of ἀνά and ἤνοθα, it is absolutely necessary that ἐνήνοθα should also be compounded of ἐν and ἤνοθα. Then (for who would explain ἐνήνοθα to be a reduplication, but ἀνήνοθα not?) there is no instance of a verb, which in the same writer sometimes has this reduplication and sometimes not; and as a writer could not say ἐπελήλυθα and ἀνήλυθα, ἐπενήνοχα and ἀνήνοχα, as little could he say ἐπ-ενήνοθα and ἀν-ήνοθα. Now let it be remembered that ἤνοθα itself is said to be a compound. We will not stop here to consider that which the analogy of ὄλωλα, ὄρωρα, ὄδωδα almost demands, that is to say, that from ὄθω must come ὄτωθα, and consequently from ἐνόθω ἐνότωθα, like ἀπόλωλα; whereas ἤνοθα, like ἤνορα, ἤπολα, or the like, is unheard of. We will also put up with the decompound ἀνήνοθεν, although ἤνωθεν, ἄνωθεν would be quite sufficient; and ἐνήνοθεν or ἐπήνοθεν, if such stood there, might be defended in the sense of *it moved itself therein* or *thereupon*; but why use ἐπ-εν-ήν-οθε for so simple an idea as, for instance, of the wool on the cloak or the oil on the skin? Here the meaning of two prepositions most intimately connected with the sense must have been entirely lost by daily usage; a supposition in itself improbable, but in Homer absolutely impossible; for in his writings almost every preposition is still separable. But if we say that ἐνήνοθα is formed by Attic reduplication, ἀνήνοθα must necessarily be so too; and thus we arrive, according to the simplest analogy, at two grammatical and perfectly different themes, ΑΝΕΘΩ and ΕΝΕΘΩ.

9. Before I continue the examination of these two verbs, I cannot refrain from showing somewhat more in detail, that in general we are much too hasty in supposing old verbs from their appearance to be *compounded of prepositions*. We should remember that the syllables αν, απ, εν, επ, δι, κατ are some of the most common and familiar in the language, and therefore present themselves to our notice in great numbers in the general formation of words; consequently they must appear sometimes at the beginning as well as in the middle of words, without being therefore the same as the prepositions of a similar meaning; and that even where they really are so, a derivation from such a preposition, or from the common root, is just as possible as the being compounded of some verb and the same preposition. As this is acknowledged to be the case in those verbs whose latter part is too small to become easily the second part of a compound word, like ἀνύω; or in those which are plainly derived at once from another word, as ἀνιάω from ἀνία, διαιτάω from δίαιτα: so even where this is not the case, it is necessary for us to be on our guard against the possibility of being deceived.

10. Thus the following verbs are, according to all correct criticism, not compounded with prepositions:

Ἀπειλέω. If we consider that ἀπειλαί and ἀπειλεῖν are not mere threats, but generally express *vauntings*, as in Il. υ, 83., and that even of past exploits, as in θ, 150., it is clear that the idea of *to speak aloud* is here, as in εὔχεσθαι, αὐχεῖν, the ground or radical idea. Hence I connect it with ἀπελλαί, ἀπελλάζειν, the Doric names for the assembly of the people, and for the haranguing in that assembly; and from this I look for the root, as in ἠπύω, in the two first letters, which probably belong to the same family of words as ἔπος, ὄψ.

Ἀπατάω, ἀπάτη, might very possibly mislead us, from the long α being shortened in the Attic ἀτῶμαι, were it not for the evident affinity between *ἀπάτη* and *ἀπαφεῖν*. But this last is a reduplication from *ἅπτεσθαι, ἁφή*, and expresses the Lat. *palpare*. Certainly, therefore, *ἀπάτη* also comes by an Ionicism from *ἀφᾷν*.

Ἀναίνομαι. For the derivation of this word *αἶνος* and *αἰνέω* are generally brought forward, and in the preposition *ἀνά* something about *raising up* is sought for; but *to raise up* supposes something already existing, whereas *ἀναίνεσθαι* means to *deny* or *refuse*. It must therefore be compounded with the *α* privative; but this is opposed by the primitive form of the verb ending only in *-ω, -ομαι* (see Grammar, sect. 106, obs. 3.). Since however the *α* privative if complete would be *ἀν-*, nay perhaps *ἀνά-* (compare *ἀνάεδνος*), and, like every particle used in composition, must have had originally its own meaning as a separate word; further, since *-αίνω* is a common verbal ending, I look in the root *ἀν-* for the idea of *no*, and *ἀναίνω* is therefore, *I say no, I deny*, whence *ἀναίνομαι* will have the same meaning with reference to something of my own, i. e. *I refuse*[4]. According to this the first *η* in *ἠνηνάμην* is the regular augment, and the second the inflexion of the aorist.

Διακονέω I have traced back to *διώκω*: see art. 40. sect. 3. But

Διώκω also might be mistaken for a compound by casting a hasty and partial glance at *ὠκύς*. However, a comparison of the forms *ἰώκω* and *δίω* will prevent the mistake.

Ἐπείγω. We can find no probable traces of a simple of this verb. But if we suppose it to be itself a simple, and compare *θέλω, ἐθέλω*, we have *πιέζω, πίεξις, ἐπείγω*, an appearance of affinity not to be rejected; as also in German *drücken* 'to press', and *drängen* 'to squeeze', are akin.

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[4] Compare also the negative idea in *ἄνευ, without*. If now *ἀνηλέης νηλέης, ἀνήριθμος νήριθμος*, &c., be compared with *νήποινος, νηπενθής*, &c., and these again with the Latin *ne*; it is clear that the privative *ἀν-* (and consequently also the Latin *in-*, the German *ohn-, un-*, and the English *un-*,) is nothing more than the negative *ne*, which in all the languages of this family we sometimes find actually existing, and sometimes can with confidence suppose to exist. See also the question, whether *ἀναίνομαι* be a compound or not, referred to in art. 11. note 3.

Ἐναίρω, and

Καθαίρω are no more compounds of αἴρω than μεγαίρω is, which will be examined in its place. But so strong was the appearance of it, that the change of τ into θ (a change inconceivable in such a case) was admitted without hesitation, and the meaning forced in order to prove καθαίρω to be a compound[5]. But why should not καθαρός have its root in the first syllable, and καθαίρω be deduced from it, according to the same analogy as ποικίλλω from ποικίλος, μαλάσσω from μαλακός, &c.[6]? Ἐναίρω might indeed, as far as its form was concerned, suit that derivation; but then the preposition ἐν would be perfectly inexplicable, nay, it would be exactly contrary to the idea of αἴρω. Notwithstanding that, I cannot bring myself to the opinion of those who derive ἐναίρω from ἔναρα, however analogous it may be in form. For not only does ἐναίρειν never mean so much as σκυλεύειν, but (which is much more strange) this first meaning must have so completely disappeared, that one might even say χρόα καλὸν ἐναίρεσθαι of a woman who spoils or destroys her beautiful skin by mourning and lamentation. Ἐναίρειν must therefore of itself mean *to destroy, kill,* and ἔναρα must come from it[7].

11. I must here remind my readers of the twofold manner of

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[5] Although αἴρειν, *to take away,* may very well be joined with the idea of an impurity to be taken away; yet it is a most forced construction to make the same form, merely strengthened by κατά, govern the accusative of the thing from which the impurity is to be taken. Here the θ should have been welcomed, as enabling us to reject this derivation with certainty. The verb αἴρω is contracted from ἀείρω, which, according to the pure analogy of ancient Greek, is formed from ἀήρ; as in German *Luft* means 'air', and thence *lüften* (pronounced *liften,* whence English 'to lift') is 'to raise up'*. Ἀείρω and αἴρω have therefore never had the aspirate; and although such changes, as we see in the Attic ᾅδης, are possible, yet we must have stronger proof of the meaning than lies in that explanation of καθαίρω, before we can be induced to acknowledge it.

[6] As soon as we acknowledge the root of καθαρός to be in the first syllable, we have κεδνός akin to it, (like ψεδνός and ψαθαρός,) and Lat. *castus*; and if we suppose some such idea as *blank* to be the ground-idea, we have also καινός.

[7] Since ἔνεροι means *the infernal regions,* it is a conjecture not to be rejected that ἐναίρειν properly means *to send to the infernal regions,*

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* [And in Scottish *lift* means 'air' or 'sky': see Johnson's Dict.—So also in the old ballad of Sir Patrick Spens in Scott's Border Minstrelsy, "When the *lift* grew dark and the wind grew loud."—Ed.]

compounding verbs. The one which we will call the *inseparable* mode, is that where the whole when compounded takes a proper *derivative form*, so that the second part does not admit of separation as an independent word; while the first is generally a different part of speech from the second, and more frequently than any other a preposition, as in *συνεργέω, ἐγχειρέω*. The other, or the *separable* mode, consists in the mere joining together of two *unchanged* words, indeed strictly speaking of merely a verb and a preposition preceding it; which junction admits of none but the necessary euphonic changes, (*ἀπ-, ἀφ-, συμ-,* &c.,) as *ἀποβάλλω, συμπάσχω.* In common language these two modes of compounding are become almost equally inseparable; in as much as, on the one side, those compounded in the latter way do not admit of being separated in common discourse much more than the former, and, on the other side, the former take the augment in the middle of the word as well as the latter (*ἐνεχείρουν* like *συνέπασχον*). But the higher we mount up into antiquity, the more separable, or the more capable of tmesis, is this second species. Thus in the Ionic dialect of Herodotus we still find the separation made by certain particles, as *ἀπ᾽ ὧν ἔδοντο* for *ἀπέδοντο ὧν*. But in Homer these separable compounds are almost always to be considered as distinct words; because, in one respect, each part shows its separate force and meaning, as, to mention a particular instance, the preposition generally stands with the verb as an adverb, but more frequently preserving its proper force as a preposition belongs to some neighbouring noun, as *ἔκδεον ἡμιόνων;* in another respect, the preposition of every such verb, according to the convenience of the sense or verse, may be sometimes separated from the verb by other words, sometimes placed after it. The *inseparable* mode of compounding, on the contrary, is as inseparable in Homer as it is in the later writers, e. g. *ἀντιφερίζω, προμαχίζω, ἐπαιγίζω, ἐγγυάω, ἐγγυαλίζω.* There is the same difference in compounding verbs in the German language; only

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kill, destroy. According to closer analogy indeed it should be *ἐνείρω*; but the change of vowel in the aorist, *ἤναρον, ἐναρεῖν*, might have produced a retrograde effect on the present, as in *δέρω* (*ἐδάρην*) *δαίρω*, and exactly as in German the proper infinitive was *schweren*, 'to swear', indic. præter. *ich schwor*, 'I swore', whence arose the infinitive now in common use *schwören.*

that in this, from want of a variety of derivative endings, both forms differ in the infinitive in accent only. *Stellen** is the infinitive of a simple verb meaning 'to place'; compounded with *um*, a particle signifying 'around', it is either *úmstellen*, with the accent on the first syllable, or *umstéllen*, with the accent on the second. The former is the *loose* or *separable* mode of compounding, the latter the *fixed* or *inseparable*: the former may be translated 'to place around', the latter 'to surround'; thus, for instance, *Ich* stelle *die Worte* um, 'I *place* the words *around*, or about'; but *Ich* umstélle *die Stadt mit Truppen*, 'I *surround* the town with troops'. Again, in forming the past participle, the former takes the augment *ge* in the middle of the word, the latter admits of no augment; e. g. 'I have (*umgestellt*) placed the words about', 'I have (*umstellt*) surrounded the town with troops'. Here we cannot but feel the great similarity which there is between this *separable* mode of compounding in German and that of Homer, e. g. ἀπολούω, ἀπέλουσα, Πάτροκλον λούσειαν ἀπὸ βρότον; only that in German the separation, except in the infinitive, is become an established rule, while the language of Homer had the power of separating or not at its own convenience.

12. I have been obliged to premise these known points in order to make it evident that in the wide difference which is still visible in Homer between the two modes of compounding, *the taking of the augment* could not yet have become irregular in the way that it did in later times as mentioned above. The *separable* mode of compounding has never then the augment before it, and all such cases as ἐκάθευδον, ἠφίουν, ἠνειχόμην, belong entirely to the later Greek[8]. The mere mention of this

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* [The example given is Buttmann's; the Editor has merely inserted here and there an explanatory sentence to make it more intelligible to the English reader.—Ed.]

[8] I might also add ἠπίστατο, as Homer has only ἐπίστατο; but this I look upon as accidental. I am convinced, however, that the great difficulties which this verb offers as a compound are only to be removed by deciding that it is no compound, but a particular radical verb for the meaning of *to know, to understand*, the root of which begins with the π, without however therefore being connected with πίστις. The etymological unravelling of it would lead me much too far for my present object, since on account of the deceitfulness of analogies the Teutonic forms *verstehen*, understand, must necessarily be introduced.

must therefore be quite sufficient to convince every one that the common reading of Od. π, 408. Ἐλθόντες δ' ἐκάθιζον, which would be the only instance of all the acknowledged compounds of this kind in Homer, has crept into his writings from the usage of later times, and was quite unknown to him. The verb ἶζον meant *they sat themselves,* and καθ- was added to it, being properly separate, as it is in German and English, *they sat themselves down.* The true reading, therefore, according to strict rule would be, Ἐλθόντες δὲ καθῖζον; and in the numerous other passages where it is now written in Homer κάθιζον, κάθιζε, κάθιζεν, this mode of accenting arose entirely from the mistaken idea that the augment at the beginning had been omitted by the Ionic dialect: consequently, in strictness, it ought to be written everywhere καθῖζον; but since the omission of the temporal augment, without any necessity from the metre, is justified by ἔλπετο, ἄρχε, and similar cases, we may, not to deviate from an old tradition (see Schol. Il. γ, 426.) without necessity, retain also κάθιζον; and consequently in the passage above quoted we must read Ἐλθόντες δὲ κάθιζον[9].

13. No less certain is also the opposite case in the inseparable mode of compounding. The forms προεφήτευσα, ἐνεκωμίαζον, &c. belong to the language of after times; and certain as it is that Homer would not have said ἀντεφέριζε, because there is no simple φερίζω, so certainly also is ἀντεβόλησε contrary to Homeric analogy. For although there is a perfect βεβόλημαι for βέβλημαι (compare Gram. Anom. v. βάλλω, and Wolf Præf. ad Il. p. 43.), yet there was no such verb as βολέω, βολῆσαι; and ἀντιβολῆσαι is a fixed and inseparable compound. Since then ἀντεβόλησεν and ἀντιβόλησεν is an old various

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[9] I have recommended the retaining of the accentuation of κάθιζον as it has been handed down to us. See, however, the note in my Ausführl. Sprachl., sect. 84. obs. 8., where I have mentioned the uncertainty of this usage in the present, that is, the Wolfian text of Homer, in which we find indeed ὑπόεικε, but always ἶζεν, ἐφῖζε. And since in the case of καθεῦδε, Il. α, 611., this accentuation is preferred also by the grammarians, it seems perhaps better to preserve uniformity, and accordingly to write always ὑποεῖκε and καθῖζε.

reading in Homer[10], it is for us to decide between them, and our decision must depend on the above analogy.

14. If now we consider thoroughly all which has been here collected together, the result will be, with the highest probability of its being correct, that those apparently compound verbs, whose mode of being compounded, if certain, would be the *separable* mode, and which in Homer have the augment or the Attic reduplication before them, are not really compounds, unless the sense puts their being so beyond a doubt, which however is not the case with any one of them. To this question belongs then the verb ἐνίπτω or ἐνίσσω. But this verb has entangled itself, particularly in the accounts of the grammarians, so frequently with the verb ἐνέπω, that we must first endeavour to distinguish accurately the use and the forms of both.

15. The verb ἐνέπω offers itself to our notice as a sister-form of ειπεῖν, only that in Homer at least it occurs oftener with the more precise meaning of *to relate, declare, name* (ἄνδρα ἔννεπε, μνηστήρων θάνατον ἐνέπουσα, &c.). The present of the indicative is not indeed found in Homer, but it is in Pindar (ἐνέπει, Nem. 3, 131.) and in others; and the meaning of the present is evident enough in Homer in the participle as it stands in Il. λ, 643. Od. ω, 414. In undoubtedly the same meaning and construction occur also the forms ἔνισπες, ἔνισπεν, subjunct. ἐνίσπω, optat. ἐνίσποιμι, imper. ἔνισπε, infin. ἐνισπεῖν, fut. ἐνισπήσω. For these forms a present ἐνίσπω has also been fixed upon, associated with a theme ἐνισπέω. But the critical grammarian will clearly perceive, from merely seeing these in juxtaposition, joined with the observation that there is no instance of an indicative ἐνίσπω, that these forms together make out an aorist, ἤνισπον, ἔνισπον, the regular infinitive of which is consequently ἐνισπεῖν[11], and from which, as from so many other

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[10] See Heyne on Il. λ, 808. (809.) It is to be remarked that in this passage in the Venetian text stands ἀντεβόλησε, but in the Lemma of the Scholium ἀντιβόλησε.

[11] In Hesiod θ, 369. occurs the infinitive ἐνίσπειν. I think that it must be accented ἐνισπεῖν there also; for the poet having mentioned a long list of names, the idea that a man could not name them all would stand best in the aorist, which expresses an action *to be completed, to be ended.*

aorists, has been formed a future *ἐνισπήσω*. But Homer has also another future, *ἐνίψω*, which occurs in exactly the same construction in Il. *η*, 447. Od. *β*, 137. *λ*, 148. This too may be formed according to the strictest analogy from that same aorist, as we see also in *διδάσκω -άξω, ἀλύσκω -ύξω*, that the *σ* is rejected.

16. From this verb *ἐνέπω*, aor. *ἤνισπον, ἐνισπεῖν*, Homer has separated by construction and meaning the verb *ἐνίπτω*, of which there is a sister-form *ἐνίσσω*, and a twofold aorist *ἠνίπαπεν* and *ἐνένιπτεν*. These forms always have the meaning of *to reprove* or *reproach*, although not necessarily with the idea of strong invective, as sometimes even a very mild reproof is intended, and it is said of Ulysses soliloquizing, Od. *υ*, 17., *κραδίην δ' ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ· Τέτλαθι δὴ κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.* It must be confessed, indeed, that from this passage alone one could not attach to *ἠνίπαπε* more than the meaning of " he addressed." But when it is seen that this soliloquy is introduced with *Στῆθος δὲ πλήξας*, and Ulysses plainly reproaches himself for not regarding with complacency, as for the last time, the bold impudence of the women-servants ; when it is seen that these forms have in all other passages the meaning of reproof, sometimes milder, sometimes harsher, a just criticism will not allow of our separating this one passage from so many others. Since then *ἐνίπτω*, with its sister-forms, does not once occur with the simple meaning of *to say* without the idea of reproof; and the verb *ἐνέπειν* on the other hand has always the meaning of *to say, relate,* but never accompanied with the other idea ; it follows in the first place that *usage* has decidedly separated these two verbs. That *ἐνίπτω* is frequently accompanied by *ὀνείδεσι, χαλεπῷ μύθῳ*, and suchlike expressions defining its force, is caused by its having in itself a more general meaning, implying milder as well as stronger reproof; which view of it is strengthened by the passages where the verb stands alone, yet evidently meaning *to reproach*, particularly by Il. *ω*, 768. *Ἀλλ' εἴ τίς με καὶ ἄλλος ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐνίπτοι.*

17. There is no doubt, then, that criticism has been perfectly justified in rejecting the tenses of *ἐνίσπω* which appear as various readings, with the meaning of *to reproach*, in Il. *γ*,

438. χ, 497. ω, 238. 768. The more remarkable is the uncertainty still existing in our Homer between ἐνένιπτεν and ἐνένισπεν. The latter was formerly the reading in Il. ο, 546. and 552., but now in both places ἐνένιπτεν has been restored from the manuscripts. Only once is ἐνένισπεν still found, and in this verse, Il. ψ, 473.

> Τὸν δ' αἰσχρῶς ἐνένισπεν Ὀϊλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας,

where indeed I cannot find, at least in Heyne, any various reading quoted. But this circumstance would hardly have any weight against the verse in Od. σ, 321.

> Τὸν δ' αἰσχρῶς ἐνένιπτε Μελανθὼ καλλιπάρῃος.

If, however, there should still remain a doubt, it must be removed by this remark, that the forms ἐνέπειν, ἔνισπεν, ἐνίψω, always govern the accusative of the thing only, and never mean *to address* or *speak to*; while on the contrary ἐνίπτω, and all the forms belonging to it, govern the accusative of the person only, *to speak harshly to, reproach any one*, to which is sometimes added the dative of the thing, ἐνίπτειν τινὰ ὀνείδεσιν.

18. But now comes the question respecting the groundwork of the form ἐνένιπτεν. The reduplication at the beginning, and the construction, show the word to be an undoubted aorist, exactly similar to the other form ἠνίπαπε. But then the τ is only used to strengthen the present and imperfect, entering into no other tense (such lengthened forms as τυπτήσω only excepted), and least of all into the aorist. Hence the reading ἐνένιπεν, which stood in many passages of both poems in all the editions proceeding from the Florentine[12], and which is confirmed in all passages by the best manuscripts, ought long ago to have entirely driven out both those false forms. The Venetian manuscript has it in all four passages of the Iliad, ο, 546. 552. π, 626., and also ψ, 473., where Heyne, as has been already said, is silent; and the Harleian manuscript has

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[12] See Ernesti and Heyne on Il. ο, 546.

it in all the passages of the Odyssey[13]. But Heyne quotes this reading for the three first passages of the Iliad, and Alter for the Odyssey, from many other manuscripts also: the former, indeed, cites it always as a gross fault of prosody. But that the ι in this verb is radically long, is proved by the verbal substantive ἐνῑπή and the other aorist ἠνίπαπε. Hence the form ἐνένῑπον is the regular aor. 2. (by carrying it back to the simple form, or to the pure characteristic of the verb) with the reduplication, as in ἤγαγον, ἄλαλκον, &c. (see Gramm. sect. 77. obs. 11.), in the same way as ἠνίπαπε is the same aorist, according to the analogy of ἐρύκακε, (see Gramm. sect. 78. obs. 12.). Nor is the long vowel at all contrary to the nature of the aorist 2.; while the Homeric aorist πέπληγον is an exact parallel of ἐνένῑπον by the reduplication, by the long vowel, and by πλήσσω or πλήττω, which, beside being long by nature, is in the present a strengthened form; ἐνένιπτεν, on the contrary, is exactly the same barbarism as πέπλησσε would be. It is now, therefore, clear, that both false readings, ἐνένιπτον and ἐνένισπον, in all the passages and their various readings, arose from an ignorant anxiety to preserve the metre. Nor can these corruptions be of great antiquity; for none of the glossographers, as far as I know, has either of these forms, but all have the genuine one, and that only[14].

19. The various reading ἐνίπω (see Heyne on Il. γ, 438. and compare him on ω, 768.) occurs indeed also in the *present*; and this might appear to be an acceptable discovery, because the form ἐνίπτω in Pindar Pyth. 4, 358. ἀδείας ἐνίπτων ἐλπίδας, stands exactly in the sense of ἐνέπω; so that it might be considered settled that ἐνίπω means *I reprove*, ἐνέπω or ἐνίπτω *I say*. But this ἐνίπω occurs only in very solitary instances, and not once in those principal manuscripts which

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[13] See Porson on Od. σ, 77. 320. 325. τ, 65. 90. φ, 84. ψ, 96. Only at π, 417. the reading ἐνέειπεν is evidently a mistake of the pen for ἐνένιπεν or ἐνένειπεν.

[14] See Suidas v. ἐνένιπεν, and Schow on Hesych. p. 1230., where we see that Musurus instead of Ἐνένηπεν, which stands in the Cod., first made the present gloss Ἐνένιπτεν. The same ἐνένιπεν, which lies concealed also in Hesychius under the corrupted gloss ἔννεπεν, has been pointed out by Ruhnk. Ep. Cr. I. p. 40., and as he there quotes the verse of Il. ο, 546. with ἐνένιπεν, it appears that he preferred this reading.

have always in the aorists ἐνένιπον. It is evidently, therefore, a mere solitary fault. But the various reading ἔνισπε, ἐνίσποι, &c. in the sense of *to reprove*, arose entirely from the two acknowledged forms ἐνίπτω and ἐνίσσω. Between these two, then, the reading of Homer does really fluctuate, and to decide between them is very difficult, not perhaps as to where we are to read the one and where the other form, but whether and how it is conceivable that in the same poem two forms exactly the same in quantity, and almost exactly the same in sound, have been used for each other; for that one of them has a stronger meaning than the other, an accurate comparison of passages (Il. γ, 438. ο, 198. χ, 497. ω, 238. 768., Od. ω, 161. 163.) and of various readings does not allow of our supposing, and every attempt to do so is opposed by this fact, that in the historic times appear only the forms with the π, ἠνίπαπεν and ἐνένιπεν, which no one would think of dividing between ἐνίπτω and ἐνίσσω*. There remain then only two things; 1st, the possibility that the twofold form may be one among many traces of the poems which go under Homer's name having been composed by many persons; with regard to which, criticism must still be continually engaged in examining the reading of separate passages: 2dly, the possibility that in early times a less genuine form had crept into the place of the genuine one. If we retain this last supposition, everything speaks in favour of the form ἐνίσσω, because it certainly could not have been interpolated; but the form ἐνίπτω might very easily have been so, by means of ἐνιπή, ἐνένιπτεν, ἠνίπαπεν; and because ἐνίσσω is so well supported by the analogy of πέσσω; for all the tenses formed from this verb also (πέψω, πέπεπται, &c.) have the π, and the present πέπτω, which approaches nearer to those tenses, occurs first in the writers posterior to Homer[15].

20. We are now fully qualified to give a decided opinion,

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* [Passow has admitted into his lexicon, as two sister-forms, ἐνίπτω and ἐνίσσω, with the same general meaning of *to reproach*; and ἐνίσπω, as a sister-form and almost a synonym of ἐνέπω.—Ed.]

[15] Nor does the present of ὄψομαι, ὀφθῆναι, with the π ever occur; but only the present with σσ in the sister-form ὄσσομαι, which see in its place. Compare also φάψ, fem. φάσσα.

that the verbs ἐνέπω and ἐνίπτω are not only separated by usage, but that most probably they are not at all akin to each other. The appearance of their being so arose from the false supposition that ἐνέπειν means *to address* or *speak to*; this however it never does, but governs, as we have seen, always the accusative of the thing only; ἐνίπτειν, on the contrary, if we consider in it merely the idea of *to say, to speak*, has always the meaning of *to speak to*, and hence it governs regularly the accusative of the person only; the single exception to this being Il. ο, 198., where, by the intervention of another verb, the usual construction is destroyed, and the word governs two datives, one of the person, the other of the thing. The Pindaric ἐνίπτειν for ἐνέπειν is distinguished also by the same construction, governing, as we have seen, the accusative of the thing. And since ἐνίπτω, *I say*, bears exactly the same relation to ἐνέπω as τίκτω does to τέκω, we can acknowledge it in Pindar in each sense as genuine, without mixing it up etymologically with the Homeric ἐνίπτω, *I reproach*. For the improbability of the one being akin to the other is completed by the form of the word; as the ι here is radically long, whence also the verbal substantive of the one is ἐνιπή, of the other ἐνοπή. Convinced by all this, Ruhnken in his Ep. Crit. I. p. 40. has decided in favour of the two verbs being separate, but he has given his decision much too concisely; and in pronouncing it, he has fixed upon, but still with the same conciseness, another derivation, namely from ἴπτω, *I press*, the ι of which is also radically long in ἶπος, ἰπόω.

21. But then comes the great question, whether a verb compounded in the *separable* mode, as ἐνίπτω from ἴπτω would be, can be so old as to take the augment, and still more the reduplication joined to the preposition. We have already dismissed on internal evidence a number of apparent compounds, which might have been adduced as instances of it; and I think that the two forms with which this article began have been so thoroughly shaken from their foundations, that they cannot be brought in proof; so that, as far as I know, there remains only ἐνήνοχα, which might serve for that purpose, and this I shall endeavour soon to clear up. But that it may not be supposed that my opinion is thus fixed by my having taken a par-

tial view of only this side of the subject, I wish it to be considered how weak the meaning of reproof is in ἐνίπτω without any necessary idea of vexation or annoyance, as was evident from some examples mentioned above, and on the other hand, the strong feeling of it which the verb ἴπτω has even in Homer. For whoever on reading Il. β, 193., where it is said of Agamemnon τάχα δ' ἴψεται υἷας Ἀχαιῶν, should think only of reproaches and vexation, must have forgotten the passage of α, 454. of Apollo, μέγα δ' ἴψαο λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν. And is the preposition ἐν, if it does not increase the force of the word, to mean therefore nothing? For the relation to the person would be expressed by using a transitive verb, governing the accusative of the person, and not by the preposition ἐν. Or how is it possible generally to suppose that the ideas *premere, lædere*, could pass by composition into a meaning, which should then merely make some approach to the idea of *to reprove*? Still all this will only serve to show to those who do not suffer themselves to be led away merely by letters, that whatever there was in this derivation apparently clear, or only probable, falls entirely to the ground, and two letters so changeable as ε and ν should not hinder us from considering the word as a primitive. I say primitive in a practically-grammatical sense; as, for instance, ἐλέγχω is a primitive, because that affinity which it once had to some other word or words is no longer traceable; and exactly so it is with ἐνίπτω. The word does and must belong to some family of words, and in earlier times some other form must have existed, similar to this, and traceable to it. Thus, as ἐρύκω (from which comes ἐρύκακε, exactly analogous to ἠνίπαπε) and ἐρύω belong to a more simple form ῥύω, ῥύομαι; as ἐθέλω belongs to θέλω; as ἐρείπω is evidently akin to ῥίπτω, ῥιπή; so in ἐνίπτω, ἐνιπή, the root, which contains the meaning, lies only in the syllable νῑπ; and νεικέω, which corresponds so nearly with it in sense, has quite similarity enough to it in form to induce the etymologist to class both, with great probability of being correct, under the same family of words.

22. As to the word ἐνέπω[16], its being a compound would be

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[16] The old grammarians, although they supposed ἐνέπω to be a compound, yet did not on that account adopt any modification of the sense. Vid. Apollon. de Synt. 4, p. 327. Bekk.

here somewhat more conceivable, and *indicare*, which is not unfrequently a very proper translation, as well as the German *ansagen* (*sag'an*), 'to announce, declare', would appear to offer some analogy; although the analogy of the Greek, as we have hitherto seen it, does not seem to me to come quite up to it. This doubt is increased by the very common reduplication of the *ν*, making *ἔννεπε*. If now this be the preposition *ἐν*, it is singular that though we know the lengthened forms of it, *εἰν*, *ἐνί*, *εἰνί*, which are sufficient for all cases, though we know *εἰνάλιος*, *εἰνόδιος*, yet *ἔννεπε* stands alone. If, further, the idea of *to announce, declare*, expressed by *ἐν*, was so natural to the Greeks, how comes it that this is the only composition not continued through any of the other parts of the verb, so that they never said *ἐνεῖπεν*, *ἐνειπεῖν*? I well know myself, and have often enough expressed my conviction, that usage of language is not accustomed to allow itself to be asked the reason for its being so or so: but here the question is only to weigh the probabilities of a certain supposition. And so we may well wonder, why in this compound alone the digamma of the root ΕΠΩ, *ἔπος* was so passed over that it was allowable to say *ἐνέποντες* (◡◡–◡), &c.; while *πᾱρειπών*, *ἀποεῖπε*, and even *μῆνιν ἀπο̄ειπών* attest the continued perception of that aspirated sound[17]. In fine, (for I well know that an answer may be given to each of these remarks as soon as a strong probability can be drawn from some other source,) by what force will it be possible to explain ἐν as a preposition in ἐνοπή, the verbal substantive of ἐνέπω? In such sentences as τότε δ' ἀμφὶ μάχη ἐνοπή τε δεδήει the word ἐνοπή is certainly not a substantive of weaker sense drawn from the idea of *an address, a declaration, a narration.* For the verb ἐνέπω never expresses, as we have before seen, *the calling out to*, or *addressing, a person*, which might be introduced for want of a better, but which never could be made to suit αὔλων συρίγγων τ' ἐνοπή: and as little Hes. θ, 708., where it is said of a storm and thunder, φέρον δ' ἰαχήν τ' ἐνοπήν τε. In short, it is certain and acknowledged that ἐνοπή is nothing more than *a sound, voice, cry*, and therefore goes back to the simple meaning of the root ΕΠΩ, to which ὄψ and ἠπύω belong, and from which is derived the common meaning of εἰπεῖν and ἐνέπειν.

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[17] That a few instances do occur of *ἀπειπόντος*, *ἀπειπέμεν* is true; but no one, who is not ignorant of the subject, would think of mentioning them nowadays. From these very instances we can with confidence appeal to any one, who considers the passages, whether they are not the strongest proof of Homer's poems having been handed down by oral tradition. Even allowing that Homer could have said *ἀπειπεῖν*, still I think it is clear that the poet who at Il. *τ*, 35. began the verse with *Μῆνιν ἀπο̄ειπών*, would not have said at v. 75., when referring to the same circumstance, *Μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος*; and particularly as instead of *μεγαθύμου Πηλείωνος* there were plenty of synonyms to finish the verse, which would have fitted *Μῆνιν ἀποειπόντος*, as, for instance, *ἀμύμονος Αἰακίδαο*, *ἀγανοῦ Πηλείωνος*, *'Αχιλλῆος θείοιο*. For who cannot easily imagine that thousands of these forms must have been constantly varying in the mouths of the rhapsodists? And as *χείρεσσ'*, *πρυλέεσσ'* *ἐπέεσσ'* and such like were allowable, and that, too, in the principal cæsura of the verse, (as at Il. *β*, 342. *γ*, 367.,) the passage of Od. *α*, 91. might have originally had *Πᾶσιν μνηστήρεσσ' ἀποειπέμεν*, which in later recitation slid off into *Πᾶσιν μνηστήρεσσιν ἀπειπέμεν*.

23. And now, to offer my own opinion, I believe ἐνέπω to be nothing more than a lengthened form of ΕΠΩ or ΕΙΠΩ. To see that this is a very credible supposition, we have only to compare the three substantives ὄψ, ὀμφή, and ἐνοπή, which have nearly the same meaning, and whose etymological affinity to each other has never been doubted by any one. The addition or removal of a nasal in the root is a thing well known, from λάμψομαι for λήψομαι, from λέλογχα, πέπονθα, and many similar cases. The verbal substantive ὀμφή points out to us therefore a theme, which is evidently the same as ΕΠΩ, ΕΙΠΩ, and which, according to the uncertainty of the old sounds between the aspirate and tenuis, may, and indeed must be, ΕΜΠΩ. Let us look around, and we have no difficulty in finding a parallel case. If we consider the word ὄγκος, *a burden*, to be a verbal substantive, it answers to φόρτος, and leads us to a theme ΕΓΚΩ, *I bear or carry*; and this with such certainty, that I have no apprehension that any one, particularly after all I have so lately said on the subject, will suppose ἤνεγκον, ἐνεγκεῖν to be compounds. With full confidence, therefore, I now repeat my view of the subject, which I long ago offered in its proper place, viz. that ἤνεγκον is merely a reduplication like ἄλαλκον and ἤγαγον; and I refer my reader to art. 31. sect. 2. for an account of the ε *inserted* or *omitted* between two conso-

nants[18]. Ἄλαλκον then, with its substantives ἀλκτήρ, ἀλκ
belongs to the root of the verb ἀλέξω, which of itself, but st
more by its aorist ἀλέξασθαι, supposes a theme ΑΛΕΚ
ἄλγος is an old verbal substantive from ἀλέγω ; and ὀργή, a
cording to its true meaning, a verbal substantive from ὀρέγ
whence both ὀργυιά and ὀρόγυια. In the same way ὀμφή is
verbal substantive, derived immediately indeed from ΕΜΠ
but also from ἐνέπω, from which comes in another manner t
synonymous ἐνοπή ; and so then ὄγκος also comes immediate
from ΕΓΚΩ, whence ἤνεγκον, but also from ΕΝΕΚΩ, when
ἠνέχθην and ἐνήνοχα. In order to unite the χ of this la
form with the κ in ἐνεγκεῖν, I refer to the grammar (of whi
the main object is not to decide on disputed points of et
mology, but to understand similarity of formation,) for t
similar case of a perf. 1. with the change of the vowel.
the same time whoever sees in ἐνήνοχα the verb ἔχω, is
less correct in his supposition; only, as I hope it is no
clear, not by the help of the preposition (for ἔχω of itself
already φέρω), but by means of the nasal by which ἔχω lea
to ΕΓΧΩ and ΕΓΚΩ; as we see ὀμφή connected with εἶπ
and ἐνέπω. The Ionic ἤνεικα arose from ἤνεγκον, and
misusage passed over into the aor. pass. ἠνείχθην. Thi
again, throws light upon εἶπον, εἰπεῖν, the diphthong
which need not be looked for in the augment, as ὀμφή a
ἐνέπω show us the nasal sound from which the diphthong
εἶπον came; a change which has long ago been recognised
grammar before the σ in σπείσω, πείσομαι, τυπείς. After th
exposition there is only the aorist ἔνισπον, ἐνισπεῖν, which c
still create a doubt; for as its second part gives us ἔσπω, ἴσπ
a radical form or stem already strengthened, it appears diffic
not to consider the ἐν in this case as a preposition. I ha

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[18] I confine myself here to the ε on account of the more perfect an
logy. But that other vowels under other circumstances have the sa
capability follows of course, and will be shortly exemplified by t
vowel ο. And I may here mention a case with α. No one would thi
of separating κόναβος from the word of similar meaning κόμπος, and t
latter is unanimously traced back to the same root as κόπτω. Certain
then, κόπω, κόμπος, κόναβος, is a striking parallel case to ἔπω, ἔμπ
ἐνέπω.

been too much in the habit of seeing that no truth produced by induction and combination can with certainty be considered as an exclusive one, to think of rejecting, however clear it might be, every compound word of the older Greek which has the appearance of being compounded in the *separable* manner, and yet does not admit of a separation. What in one period of a language is of frequent occurrence, and supported by strong analogies, may at another period begin to appear singular and uncommon. That ἐνέπω is no compound I have proved, I hope, not by drawing conclusions from one side of the question only, but by numerous analogies coinciding with each other : at the same time it is possible that there might have existed besides a real compound ἐνίσπω, being much the same as it is actually explained to be ; nay, the similarity of the sound might have led to the confounding of the two forms, and to their being used in common. But there is nothing in the case of ἔνισπον to force us to suppose it a compound, and as such it certainly has a somewhat strange appearance. For if we could once see this whole system of the lengthening and shortening of words before us at one view, we should acknowledge that a further strengthening of ἐνέπω and ἐνίσπω is noways supported by analogy ; the form εἴσκω, from εἴκω, is a very similar case ; and the circumstance that, contrary to usual analogy, the aor. 2. ἔνισπον, ἐνισπεῖν, is by this position different from the present ἐνέπω, has a parallel case in ἕπομαι, aor. ἑσπόμην.

24. Let us now turn back to the forms ἀνήνοθεν, ἐνήνοθε, confirmed in our opinion of their not being compounds, and of the ο, as in ἐνοπή and ἐνήνοχα, being a change of vowel from ε ; and at the same time authorized in adopting not only ΑΝΕΘΩ and ΕΝΕΘΩ, but also ΑΝΘΩ and ΕΝΘΩ as the theme of both. And now the old derivation of the first form from ἀνθέω appears again in a favourable light, only that we must understand it somewhat more correctly. We have already frequently seen that what has appeared to commentators in general to be a metaphor taken from the common meaning of a word, was in fact nothing more than an old simple meaning. And so it is here. The blood in Homer does not "*blossom*" from the wound, nor does the smoke from the house ; but both *issue forth* : although the opinion which I gave in my gram-

mar that the common verb ἀνθῆσαι also in Od. λ, 320. did not mean *to bloom*, but was used in the general sense of *to spring forth*,—that opinion, upon more mature consideration, I have changed. But ἀνήνοθε, coming from the radical theme ΑΝΕΘΩ or ΑΝΘΩ, has the radical meaning of *to issue forth*: from this ΑΝΘΩ comes then very naturally ἄνθος, properly a verbal substantive, and then with the definite meaning of *a flower, a blossom*, from which comes again in a derivative form and meaning the verb ἀνθέω. The root of all these I look for in the particle ἀνά, from which they are *formed*, not *compounded*. For if the idea of ἀντί could be enlarged into a simple verb ἄντομαι, in the same way from ἀνά or ἄν might be formed ἀνέθω or ἄνθω, since θω is an old verbal ending still preserved in ἔσθω, φλεγέθω, and other verbs.

25. Surely no one will now wish to tear the verb ἐνήνοθα from this analogy, although I know of no other forms of words which would be derived from ΕΝΘΩ or ΕΝΕΘΩ retaining the ν. The derivation of the verb ΑΝΘΩ, ἀνήνοθε from ἀνά, as proposed above, may indeed induce us to derive this other verb in the same way from ἐν; and then ἔντεα might, with the trifling change of one sound, belong to it. But then again we have in ἐπενήνοθε a part of that troublesome accumulation which is so perplexing in the common explanation of the word. If ἐνήνοθε by its derivation from ἐν meant *lay upon*, of what use was the addition of ἐπί? Nor indeed is ἐν the genuine word to express this sense in old Greek; for in ἐνδῦναι ἐν does not express the covering lying *on* the body, but the pressing of the body *into* the covering. And ἔντεα may quite as well belong to the root of ἕννυμι. I am therefore the more fully convinced of the truth of the derivation which I before proposed, as bringing it into evident analogy with ἐνέπω and ἐνήνοχα. If we separate the idea of ἐπί from ἐπενήνοθε, there remains the idea of *sitting* or *being fixed somewhere*. That this is the physical ground-meaning of the verb ἔθω appears most highly probable, by the substantive ἦθος, which means *a seat* and *the customs, habits*, or *character*; and also by the striking analogy of the German words *Sitte* and *Gewohnheit*, both meaning ‘a custom or habit’, the former evidently derived from *sitzen*, ‘to sit’, and the latter from *wohnen*, ‘to dwell’. To this family of words then

belongs, as every one must see, our ΕΝΘΩ, ΕΝΕΘΩ, as in the other case ἐνέπω and ὀμφή are related to ἔπος and εἰπεῖν, and as ΕΓΚΩ, ὄγκος, ἐνέχθην, ἐνήνοχα, are to ἔχω.

26. There are still a few perfects which have some analogy with those hitherto treated of, and which we will therefore next consider. First however, we must observe here that some verbs have, instead of the ε, either (as mentioned in art. 52. sect. 2.) an ει or an η between two consonants, which in reality belong as little to the root as the ε does in the cases above mentioned. Thus we have (in art. 52. sect. 2.) ἐρείδω, ὀφείλω, ἀγείρω, ἐγείρω, and (in art. 106. sect. 4.) ἀρήγω akin to ἀρκέω. The change of vowel in this case then is usually into a long vowel, and in fact into ω; for as the change from ῥήγνυμι is ἔῤῥωγα, ῥώξ, ῥωγαλέος, so we see the same change from ἀρήγω in the subst. ἀρωγή. We know, however, from grammar that the Attic reduplication prefers in the third syllable the short vowel; therefore from ἐγείρω comes ἐγρήγορα. Now the old Epic perfect ἄνωγα is undoubtedly to be judged according to this analogy. The nearest theme of it would, therefore, be ΑΝΗΓΩ. To this form there is nothing to be objected. I suppose, therefore, the η, as it is in ἀρήγω, and as the ε is in ἐνέπω and ἠνέχθην, to be not essential to the word; and so following strictly the before-mentioned analogy, I come to a theme ΑΓΓΩ. Now since ἄνωγα has never any other meaning than that of the Lat. *jubere*,—which implies, it is true, the command of the master, but may also be used of a servant, child, friend, or such like, telling another what he is to do,—I cannot but retain the conjecture which I formerly hazarded, that it belongs to the same family of words as ἄγγελος, ἀγγέλλω. At the same time I feel how uncertain this conjecture is, and shall therefore be satisfied if the above-mentioned analogies prevent its being considered as a compound or as the perfect of a present ἀνώγω; see above sect 8. Perfectly analogical, however, is the supposition, that from a defective perfect, with the meaning of a present, fresh tenses are formed, as from a present; and, to mention one instance, an imperfect ἤνωγον; compare sect. 4. of this article.

27. One half of what the grammarians have said on the Epic form ἄωρτο has always been pure conjecture. Some

derived it from ἄἴρω by epenthesis, others from αἰωρέω by syncope; truth, as is frequently the case, lies between the two. In the verb ἀείρω the ει is radical, since it is indisputably derived from ἀήρ; see above, note 5. The common meaning of ἀείρειν, *tollere*, 'to raise up', is the causative meaning of 'to hang or be suspended', which αἰωρέω expresses more definitely. The substantive αἰώρα, *suspension*, is considered as the verbal substantive of αἰωρέω; but it is much more natural to suppose it the root of αἰωρέω and the verbal substantive of ἀείρω, with the common change of α into αι and ει into ω. The simple perfect of ἀείρω must therefore be ἤωρα; and as the rules for the change of the vowel are so little fixed, we may very fairly suppose that the same change was continued in the perf. pass. (of which we shall by-and-by see other instances), which would consequently be ἤωρμαι, from which the 3rd pers. of the pluperf. without augment is ἄωρτο. Since, however, quantity is of no consequence in the change of the vowel, as we see in κτείνω ἔκτονα, ἀγείρω subst. ἀγορά; we can from the subst. ἀορτήρ infer a perf. ἤορα, ἤορμαι; and then from ἤορτο may come ἄωρτο by means of the same change of position in the augment which we see in ἑώρταζον, ἐώργειν for ἠόρταζον, ἠόργειν. And this explanation appears to me at least to be more analogical than any other, as in Homer the substantive ἀορτήρ corresponds exactly in meaning with ἄωρτο. Nor should the various reading ἄορτο on any account induce us to doubt the truth of the common reading with the ω; for as the former sounds so natural, we may be sure that the latter, which has given the grammarians so much trouble, would never have been retained in the pronunciation if there had not been some very decisive tradition in its favour.

28. The perfect εἴωθα appears to be explicable only by the analogy of ἔοικα, ἔολπα (see Heyn. Exc. 3. ad Il. 19. p. 739.). But it is worthy of notice that the first syllable has not in Homer the digamma, as the other perfects above quoted have; which, consequently, is an objection to the explanation that from ϜΕΘΩ comes ϜΕϜΩΘΑ, as from ϜΕΙΚΩ ϜΕϜΟΙΚΑ; added to which, the ει in εἴωθα, which besides is a common form, cannot by this mode of derivation be supported on any correct grounds. For instance, δείδοικα may be a very good

analogy for ϜΕΙϜΟΙΚΑ (εἴοικα), if there were such a word, because in both verbs (δείω, εἴκω) the ει is in the root, but not for ϜΕΙϜΩΘΑ (εἴωθα), as the only known root is ἐθ or ἠθ. On the contrary, I am perfectly satisfied with the common explanation, which from ἔθω arrives quite regularly by means of the augment at the perfect εἶθα, and supposes ω to be inserted; and I support it on the following grounds. The wish and endeavour so evident in the Greek language to give great weight to the perfect, and the ο or ω occurring in the perfects and in the substantives akin to them more than any other vowel, as in ἄνωγα, ἄωρτο, αἰώρα, ἐδωδή, ἐνήνοχα, &c., all this created an obscurely-felt analogy, according to which εἶθα was lengthened to εἴωθα, or in other words was traced back to a supposed theme ΕΕΘΩ. According to this supposition, then, ἔωθα is a common Ionicism. In another way, this analogy includes ἔθωκα, used by the Dorians for εἴωθα, the explanation of which must be joined with that of ἐδήδοκα.

29. The verb ἔδω, on account of the confusion which would arise from its being conjugated regularly, has wound its way, as every one knows from grammar, through a multifarious anomaly. Of this description, among others, is the aor. pass., which instead of ἤσθην is ἠδέσθην; from ἐδέω it is said; but that comes to the same, unless we are to understand that such a present really existed. The truth is, that as in the old Greek it was allowable to inflect both with and without the ε, for instance μάχομαι μαχέσομαι and τεύχομαι τεύξομαι, so the ε was admitted into the form ἠδέσθην in order to preserve and make audible the radical δ, which would otherwise have disappeared before the termination. See Grammar, sect. 86. obs. 15. This is the case in ἐδήδεσμαι, and consequently also in ἐδήδεκα; but the perf. act. is never found written thus; the obscure analogy mentioned above threw the change of vowel, which elsewhere appears only in the radical syllable, in this case on the vowel belonging to the termination, making ἐδήδοκα; and this change went on in the Epic language to the passive also, ἐδήδοται. We see an exactly analogous case in the perf. πέπτωκα. According to the analogy of many verbs, particularly of δέμω δέδμηκα, the perf. of ΠΕΤΩ (πίπτω) would be πέπτηκα; but the endeavour to make the forms of the different

verbs coming from the root ΠΕΤΩ plainly distinguishable from each other, was the cause, in this perfect belonging to *πίπτω*, of the change of vowel *ω* instead of *η* being admitted into the inflexion, and also into the derivatives *πτῶσις*, *πτῶμα* ; for which, therefore, it is quite unnecessary to suppose a present ΠΤΟΩ. In the same way we have no need whatever of a theme ΕΔΟΩ; nay, unless we do it from a love of uniformity, we need not have recourse to that *ε* (*ἐδήδεκα*) in order to arrive at *ἐδήδοκα*. For it is clear that, as in the other forms the *ε* was admitted for the use before mentioned, so also in the perfect, the *ο*, which is more familiar in this form, might have been admitted in the same way, perfectly independent of the *ε* in *ἠδέσθην* : but this will be seen more fully in the next section, where *ἐδήδοκα* is again mentioned in conjunction with *ἀγήοχα*. We have an instance of the same in the before-mentioned *ἔθωκα*[19]. In this verb there is no trace remaining in any other tense of an auxiliary vowel, *ε*, *η*, *ο*, or *ω*. It would therefore be astonishing that we should try to get to it through *ἐθόω* or through *ἐθήσω*, *εἴθηκα*, *εἴθωκα*, *ἔθωκα*, when we can suppose quite regularly that the root *ἐθ* was separated from the termination *κα* by the vowel familiar to the perfect. If this case had occurred in the aor. 1. it would have been *εἴθεσα* ; if it had been the Attic reduplication, it would have been *ἐθήθοκα* ; but being neither of these, the more weighty-sounding vowel *ω* was preferred ; *ἔθωκα*. A very similar case is that of the Biblical word *ἀφέωνται*, which must not be thrown aside as a later barbarism, since not only is *ἀφέωκα* mentioned as Doric by Suidas, but this very *ἀφέωκα* is explained by Herodian in Etym. M., and still more circumstantially in Lex. Seguer. p. 470, 14. 15. It existed, therefore, indisputably in some pretty common dialects*, and from them was transferred into the so-called Alexandrine. Herodian derived it very well from the Ionic ἕηκα with the change of vowel. Since, however, this ἕηκα itself came from the formation ἥσω, &c. only through an Ionic pleonasm (for in ἵημι there is no old digamma as in ἔοικα), so here also no fault can be found with the opinion, that the short perfect form εἷκα was lengthened by the insertion of the ω so common in the perfect. And the continuation of this change of vowel in the passive (ἀφέωνται) may be classed with the Homeric forms ἐδήδοται and ἄωρτο.

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[19] Hesych. *ἐθώκατι* (very properly corrected to *ἐθώκαντι*), *εἰώθασιν*. Hence Koen has judiciously amended, in Gregor. Cor. in Dor. 160., *ἡθῶ* followed by *καί* to *ἔθωκα*. But perhaps he ought to have left the *η*; for *ἤθωκα* may very well be the Doric perfect for *εἴθωκα*. The other Hesychian gloss is also very remarkable, *Εὐέθωκεν*, *εἴωθεν*. The *εὖ* here seems redundant and useless, and we may therefore turn our thoughts to the digamma (although, on the grounds mentioned above, *εἴωθα* does not seem calculated for that purpose) ; for since *ἦθος* and *ἔθνος* plainly have the digamma in Homer, there is no doubt that originally, although not in Homer, it belonged to the family of *ἔθω*. For the digamma of *ἔθω* see the end of art. 96.

30. The last verb belonging to this question is the perfect ἀγήοχα, a form found fault with indeed by the Atticists, but still a very good and old Greek form occurring as early as Lysias. In this word the endeavour to satisfy an analogy but obscurely felt is very evident. For according to the common rule the perfect is ἦχα, which the Attics also use. With the Attic reduplication it would be ἄγηχα. For the ο therefore we see no good ground whatever, as there exists no trace of a lengthened form of ἄγω as there is of αἴρω and ᾄδω. Here, then, is again a lengthening by which the perfect is made similar to the cases of ἐδήδοκα, ἐνήνοχα, ἀνήνοθα; and hence we have only to follow the grammatical method, by which single tenses are ranged under the presents of separate verbs, and to say that the verb ἄγω, in order to form this perfect, was lengthened to ΑΕΓΩ, of which the ο is the change of vowel. But historical information has placed the thing in a different light, although still remote from its proper analogy. In the Etym. M. is an explanation which proceeds by means of the form ἀγήγοχα. This form is not a mere grammatical supposition, but really existed in the language, and is still found in inscriptions†. The grammarian in the Etym. appears to me in

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* In my Ausführl. Sprachl., in a note to sect. 108, 4., I have attributed the corresponding form ἀνέωνται to Herodotus. The text has (2, 165.) ἀνέονται ἐς τὸ μάχιμον. Stephanus conjectured ἀνέωνται, and his conjecture is confirmed by this being actually the reading in the valuable Florentine Codex.

† See Chish. Ant. As. p. 50. (Decr. Sigeensium, v. 15.) τημ βασιλειαν εις μειζω—διαθεσιν αγηγοχε: Dor. Testam. ap. Gruter. p. ccvi. col. I. v. 26. II. v. 9. ccxvii. col. I. v. 12. αγαγοχα, συναγαγοχα, συναγαγοχεια Pluperf. for -η, commonly -ειν.

this instance to have stated the true grounds of the insertion of the syllable γο, which is, that there might be the same consonant in the second and third syllable. That is to say, the ear, accustomed to hear the same consonant twice in the Attic reduplication, missed it in the regularly inflected perfect ἄγηχα. The same remark will hold good of ἐδήδοκα. From ἔδω came regularly ἦκα; the reduplication ἔδηκα would not have been a true one; the second δ therefore, which otherwise must have been lost before the termination, was separated from the κ by the ο; and as κα is a pure termination, this was following a true analogy. But in the ἄγηχα, which it was wished to avoid, χα was not a pure termination, since the characteristic of the verb is represented by the letter χ: therefore an obscurely-felt and incorrect analogy was followed by inserting γο and retaining the χ; so that in this singular instance the characteristic of the verb is *repeated three times*. It is true that ἀγήγοκα, as formed from ἀγέσω, would be more strictly analogous; but such a form as that could be produced only by a grammatical confidence of the grounds on which it proceeded, such as we cannot suppose in the primitive framers of a language. The Etym. M. quotes besides a Bœotian form ἀγείοχα; most persons will be, perhaps, inclined to consider it with him as a corruption of ἀγήοχα; I prefer, as more natural, to trace it thus, ἀγήγοχα, (γ into ι) ἀγείοχα, ἀγήοχα.

31. If we now briefly recapitulate the principal points of this article, we shall see the more plainly, that the representation of the grammarians, which explained the ο or ω in many of the above-mentioned forms by merely saying that it was *inserted*, was by no means erroneous, although it was susceptible of being developed on better grounds. We have seen that the vocal sounds ε, ει, η, in the verbs ὀρέγω, ὀφείλω, ἀρήγω, may be explained at least quite as well, with relation to ὀργή, ὀφλεῖν, ἀρκέω, by saying that they are inserted in the former, as that they are omitted in the latter forms. We have remarked, that it by no means follows, that whatever peculiarity there is in a tense, considered according to the system of grammar as derivative, must have existed also in some corresponding present; and hence if, induced by ἀλκή and ἄλαλκον, we suppose a theme ΑΛΚΩ, and from ἔχω and ὄγκος fix on a

verbal form ΕΓΚΩ, still it does not follow that for ἀλέξασθαι and ἐνεχθῆναι there must have existed also a present ΑΛΕΚΩ, ΕΝΕΚΩ, but the ε may quite as well have been admitted at once into the aorist. Further, we have seen the change of vowel from ε, ει, and η into ο and ω in the perfect and the substantive, as in ἐνοπή, ὀρόγυια from ἐνέπω, ὀρέγω; in ἐγρήγορα, ἀγορά from ἐγείρω, ἀγείρω; in ἤορτο or ἄωρτο from ἀείρω; in ἀρωγή from ἀρήγω. But from the first acknowledged principle it follows, that if there be no ε, ει or η in the present or other tenses, the vowel may first be admitted in the perfect, and consequently, according to the analogy of the perfect, that vowel would be ο or ω; and so then we have not only explained the form ἀνήνοθα, according to the analogy of ΕΓΚΩ ἐνεχθῆναι ... ἐνήνοχα, to come from the theme ΑΝΘΩ, which we recognised in ἄνθος and ἀνθεῖν, but we have also supposed the themes ΕΝΘΩ and ΑΓΓΩ for ἐνήνοθα and ἄνωγα. In these, therefore, the ο or ω is correctly said to be inserted, and that according to a perfectly regular analogy; and so it appears very conceivable, that according to an analogy only half or very obscurely understood, in the same way as ἄωρτο appeared to be formed from αἴρω, so also an ω was inserted in εἶθα to form εἴωθα, and an ο, with or without the consonant of the reduplication, to form ἀγήγοχα, ἀγήοχα, and ἐδήδοκα. I am very far, however, from considering this whole account as sure and indisputable truth obtained from historical facts; I shall be satisfied, if it be thought that I have attempted with success to unite the separate historical data in one probable and intelligible analogy. Nor have I the least doubt that, partly by the help of historical facts new data on some of these forms being brought to light, and partly by careful examination, the phænomena of the language being judiciously combined, many a point now detached and isolated may be made more probable and brought nearer to certainty.

22. Ἀντιᾷν.

1. The verb ἀντιᾷν in the Epic poets is thus inflected: ἀντιόω (for ἀντιάω), ἀντιάᾳν, fut. ἀντιάσω, aor. ἀντιάσαι; in which last forms the α in the inflexion is short, contrary to the

analogy of such derivatives in -άω. But since in general from adjectives in -ιος no verbs in -ιάω are usually formed, we see at once that the forms ἀντιάσαι, &c., come from the present ἀντιάζω (Pind.), which cannot enter into the composition of an hexameter; whence the Epic poets introduced from necessity the cognate form in -ιάω. The deponent form too ἀντιάασθε, the only one which occurs, arose out of the necessity of the metre. That is to say, the resolution of ᾱ into αᾱ does not take place in the language of Homer before the τ; in other words, the terminations ᾶτε, ᾶται are not capable of being lengthened to άᾱτε, άᾱται[1], and the metre would not admit of ἀντιᾶτε; hence recourse was had to the passive form ἀντιᾶσθε, in which the lengthening of the α is customary. And, lastly, it must be observed that the form ἀντιᾷν (ἀντιόω, &c.) is sometimes a decided present, as in Il. α, 31. ψ, 643., sometimes the so-called Attic future for ἀντιάσω, &c., as in ν, 752. Od. α, 25.

2. As to the meaning and construction of this verb, its radical meaning is *to come* or *go towards*, and the context shows whether the meeting be a hostile or an amicable one. When it relates to persons, it expresses with the dative a *casual* coming towards, a *chance* meeting, with which is mostly joined a sense of harm or misfortune, as ἐμῷ μένει ἀντιόωσιν,...μηδ' ἀντιάσειας ἐκείνῳ, Il. ζ, 127. φ, 151. 431. Od. σ, 146. In other relations the case is not expressed, as Il. κ, 551. ο, 297. Od. μ, 88. ν, 292. ρ, 442. But with the genitive it means an *intentional* coming towards or meeting, sometimes in the sense of a hostile meeting or attack, as Il. η, 231. Ἡμεῖς

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[1] With γεγάᾱτε (Batrach. 143.), which is no word of Homer, it is quite otherwise: for this is a regular perfect (γεγάᾰτε), only with the anomalous quantity caused by the influence of the frequently occurring word γεγάᾱσι. On the contrary, the form ἄαται (⏑⏑–) Scut. Herc. 101. for ἆται from ἄω, *to satiate*, may be adduced as a real resolution of the α before the τ; for the supposition that the double α is original here, as it is in ἀάω, *to injure*, is refuted by the other forms (see art. 1. sect. 3.). It is true that this also is not an Homeric form, and might possibly be defended on distinct and separate grounds of its own, particularly as its radical part is so small as to consist of a mere α; but then, again, the reading does not appear to me quite certain. For in the verse Ἦ μὴν καὶ κρατερός περ ἐὼν ἄαται πολέμοιο there is no metrical necessity for the resolution, and Hesychius has, perhaps, taken from hence the gloss ἆται, πληροῦται.

δ' εἰμὲν τοῖοι οἳ ἂν σέθεν ἀντιάσαιμεν; sometimes in an amicable sense, as Od. *ω*, 56. of Thetis, who comes to assist in the funeral rites of her son,

> *Ερχεται οὗ παιδὸς τεθνηότος ἀντιόωσα,*

where this participle is a future.

3. From this first and principal meaning arises another, of a person going toward a thing in order to *take a part in it, undertake it,* therefore properly implying an *intentional* going toward; hence in such sentences the verb has invariably the genitive only, although the idea of its being intentional is again lost in various ways. To this belong such expressions as *ἀντιάσαι πόνου, πολέμου, ἔργων, ἀέθλων*, Il. *μ*, 356. 368. *ν*, 215. *ψ*, 643. Od. *χ*, 28. Among these the instance of *ἀέθλων* is that of a much-desired, agreeable participation, an idea still stronger as applied to a banquet, Il. *ω*, 62. *Πάντες δ' ἀντιάασθε θεοὶ γάμου.* In the same sense it is used of the gods who *receive, enjoy* a sacrifice, Od. *α*, 25. *ἀντιόων ἑκατόμβης.* *γ*, 436. *ἦλθε δ' Ἀθήνη ἱρῶν ἀντιόωσα.* Il. *α*, 67. *ἀντιάσας αἰγῶν κνίσσης.* And so in a general sense *to receive, partake of*, Od. *ζ*, 193.

> *Οὔτ' οὖν ἐσθῆτος δευήσεαι, οὔτε τευ ἄλλου,*
> *Ὧν ἐπέοιχ' ἱκέτην ταλαπείριον ἀντιάσαντα.*

φ, 402.

> *Αἲ γὰρ δὴ τοσουτον ὀνήσιος ἀντιάσειεν*
> *Ὡς . . . . δυνήσεται.*

where *τοσοῦτον*, as a mere adverb, answers to *ὡς*, and consequently *ὀνήσιος*, according to the above constant analogy, belongs to *ἀντιάσειε*[2].

4. This verb governs an accusative in only one instance, viz. in the well-known passage of Il. *α*, 31.

> *. . . . . πρίν μιν καὶ γῆρας ἔπεισιν*
> *Ἱστὸν ἐποιχομένην καὶ ἐμὸν λέχος ἀντιόωσαν.*

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[2] There is a German provincialism exactly similar to these latter meanings of *ἀντιᾷν*; viz. *entgegen nehmen*, for *empfangen*. [In English also *to meet with* is frequently used in the sense of *to receive*, but in so far different from the Greek that it is always *to receive unintentionally and unwillingly*, as "he will meet with the punishment which he deserves." —Ed.]

In this passage we must not for one moment think of translating ἀντιᾷν by *to share* or *partake of*, a translation which would make the Greek imply something wished for and desired, whereas the participation here spoken of we know from the context to be exactly the contrary. There is no doubt, therefore, that the explanation preferred by the old grammarians, εὐτρεπίζουσαν, is the correct one. The grounds of this meaning may be seen in the use of this verb with the genitive, as quoted above from Od. ω, 56., where ἀντιᾷν signifies *to come to for the purpose of attending upon, of taking care of* the funeral rites of a dead person : and in the passage before us, where the predicate of the proposition is not a person but a thing, this meaning becomes more obvious by the use of the accusative case ; for λέχεος ἀντιᾷν would undoubtedly mean *to partake of* or *share my bed*. Here, therefore, ἀντιᾷν is the same as πορσύνειν in Il. γ, 411. and Od. γ, 403., where the expression λέχος πορσύνειν is, like λέχος ἀντιᾷν, an old euphemismus for sexual intercourse ; which idea has been thence adopted by succeeding writers. Compare Eurip. Suppl. 56. φίλα ποιησαμένα λέκτρα πόσει σῷ. Hel. 59. λέκτρ' ὑποστρώσω τινι. Theocr. 6, 33. where Polyphemus wishes that Galatea may στορέσειν καλὰ δέμνια τᾶσδ' ἐπὶ νάσω. Apoll. Rh. 3, 40. of Venus, who ἐντύνεσκε λέχος Ἡφαίστοιο*.

5. A deviation from the above use of ἀντιᾷν occurs in the later poets with the genitive in the sense of *to entreat, importune*, Apoll. Rh. 1, 703. 3, 694. See Scholia.

Ἄνωγα ; vid. ἀνήνοθεν.

Ἀπάρχομαι ; vid. ἄρχομαι.

23. Ἀπαυρᾷν, ἀπούρας, ἐπαυρεῖν.

1. Of the verb ἀπαυράω in this form there occur in Homer, and indeed in all the ancient writers, only three forms which we can speak to with certainty : ἀπηύρων 1. pers. sing. and 3. plur.

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* [This sense will not apply in Hymn. Cer. 144.—Ed.]

ἀπηύρας, ἀπηύρα. These, according to form, are imperfect, but they are always used in the general narrative as aorists. To these the common editions of Homer would add from Od. δ, 646. ἀπηύρατο. But Wolf has adopted the various reading ἀπηύρα, which is found in Eustathius (in his Commentary, not in the adjoining text,) and in the Cod. Harl., where it is written ἀπηῦρα; for it certainly is not clear whence ἀπηύρατο, a form deviating entirely from the others, could have crept into this single passage (Ἤ σε βίῃ ἀέκοντος ἀπηύρα νῆα μέλαιναν), without any necessity from the metre. On the other hand, however, it must be confessed, one does not see how the corruption of the common reading took place; and hence we must always look on ἀπηύρατο as an old form, carrying with it quite as much certainty as many in Homer which have been admitted from remote antiquity. If we would consider this also as an imperfect, we must suppose a present in -αμαι from a verb in -μι. But it is more natural to consider it at once as an aorist from the simplest verbal form ΑΥΡΩ.

2. It has been acknowledged as long ago as the times of the old commentators that the participles ἀπούρας, ἀπουράμενος[1] correspond exactly with the above forms both in meaning and usage. The latter of these two occurs only in the shield of Hercules (173.), and that in a passive sense. Nor have the greater part of the grammarians from very remote times been deterred by the unusual change of αυ—ου from considering these participles as the aor. 1. of the simple radical verb. Indisputably such isolated cases as this, of an uncertain radical vowel or change of vowel, are perfectly consistent with the nature of an ancient language before the invention of writing and the knowledge of grammar, when analogies were indeed formed, but did not offer themselves to the mind in such masses as they have since. On the other hand, a syncope like that supposed by some of the old grammarians, viz. ἀπουρίσας from ἀφορίζω, was quite unnatural even in such a language, to say nothing of the force done to the meaning; for we need only

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[1] The inf. ἀποῦραι in the lexicons, &c. belongs merely to the grammarians, who formed it from ἀπούρας for their own grammatical use: see Steph. Thes. 2, 1476. a.

mention the Homeric *ἄλλοι γάρ οἱ ἀπουρίσσουσιν ἀρούρας*, Il. χ, 489., to make it at once evident that here the context gives the idea of bounds or limits, but in all the other passages where *ἀπούρας* stands, there is no sign of such an idea. Much more general and complete is the correspondence of *ἀποῦρας* with *ἀπηύρα*, as in Il. λ, 334. *κλυτὰ τεύχε᾽ ἀπηύρα*, and 432. *καὶ τεύχε᾽ ἀπούρας*[2], &c.

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[2] It is however remarkable, and must not be passed over in silence, that Pindar, who never has *ἀπηύρα*, &c., and only once *ἀπούρας*, uses it in exactly the same combination of words as Homer does *ἀπουρίζειν*; namely in Pyth. 4, 265. *ἄγρους...τοὺς ἀπούρας ἁμετέρων τοκέων νέμεαι.* Hence it may be supposed with great probability that Pindar derived the Homeric *ἀπούρας* from *ὅρος, ἀφορίζω*. And so it would remain merely as a remarkable proof of a very ancient misinterpretation of Homer; for *ἀπούρας* for *ἀπαύρας* was in Pindar's time as great a deviation from analogy, as if it had stood for *ἀπουρίσας*; and the scientific skill, which would decide that the former appears more possible than the latter, we cannot suppose to have existed in Pindar's time. But what if the *ἀπουρίσσουσιν* of our Homeric text owed its origin merely to a very old forced interpretation? We see that the other verb is written in Homer, wherever there is an augment, with *ηυ*; wherever there is no augment, with *ου*. Let us now suppose that from this most ancient aorist (*ἀποῦραι*, or as aor. 2. *ἀπουρεῖν, to take away*,) was formed, as is so frequently the case, a future; this would be *ἀπουρήσω*. Indeed many manuscripts, at the head of which we may place the excellent Harleian MS., do read *ἀπουρήσουσιν*; and the Venetian scholiast has the same reading in the lemma of his scholium, in which he explains the verse simply by *ἀφαιρήσονται*. It appears to me most probable, that from this various reading, which we see is an old one, arose the common reading of the text in this manner, that they fancied they saw in the passage something of boundaries and of the diminishing of an inheritance (as Voss has very beautifully rendered it), and they altered the reading to suit that idea. But, 1st, not only this verb, but generally neither *ὁρίζω* nor its compounds ever occur in any other part of Homer. 2nd, *ἀφορίζειν τινί τι*, "to take from any one something by removing his boundaries," although a very conceivable combination, is not to be found in the later use of this verb, except in a passage of Isocrates (ad Philipp. p. 252. Wolf.), where however the dative is wanting, and the general manner of expression seems to belong more to the later orator than to the old poet. 3rd, the idea of a mere diminishing the patrimony of Astyanax, and removing the boundaries, is by no means so suited to the sense of the passage as may be imagined. Andromache in her lamentation must be supposed to say to her child, "Others will take away from thee thy patrimonial

3. We may now inquire whence the old grammarians knew that the radical form of this verb was ΑΥΡΩ, ΑΥΡΑΩ; for since, beside the forms with ου, there occur only those augmented forms with ηυ, which in the oldest copies must have been written ευ, the radical diphthong may just as well be supposed to have been ευ as αυ. That the verb may have still remained extant to later times in some dialect or other is possible; but there is no trace of it in any of the grammarians, not in Hesychius, nor in the Etymologicum; and if any one should suppose from Schneider's article on this verb in his Lexicon that Hippocrates used it, he is misled by the imperfection of the quotation there given. In one of the passages there cited (De Nat. Pueri, Edit. VDL. vol. 1. p. 157.), it is said of a graft, *καὶ πρῶτον ἀπαυρίσκεται ἀπὸ τῆς ἰκμάδος τῆς ἐν τῷ δενδρέῳ ἐνεούσης*. However we may wish to consider this as a newly-formed present from *ἀπαυράω* (like *ἀμβλίσκω* from *ἀμβλόω*, and the like), still the meaning is too remote for us to allow it to be the same verb. The sense of the middle verb in this passage is *to derive profit or advantage from, draw nourishment to itself from, enjoy*. But from this very thing it is clear that it must be *ἐπαυρίσκεται*, which is the common expression of Hippocrates in this sense; e. g. De Morbis IV. (vol. 2. p. 121.) *ἐπαυρίσκεται ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τηκομένου*, and p. 134. *οὐκ ἂν ἐπαυρίσκετο ἡμῖν (τὸ σῶμα) τῆς ἰκμάδος ἐπαρκέον*: and a little after the very passage of which we are speaking, it is said of the graft now grown larger, *ἐπαυρίσκεται ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἕλκων τὴν ἰκμάδα*. It is most improbable that Hippocrates should have used sometimes *ἀπαυρ-*. sometimes *ἐπαυρ-*. in the same sense. The other passage (De Morb. IV. vol. 2. p. 156.) runs thus: *χωρέει τὸ ποτὸν ἐς τὴν κοιλίην, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς κοιλίης ἐς τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα ἀπαυρίσκεται*. Here we should have a new meaning, *it is expended, disperses itself into*; a meaning to which there is nothing in any other part of Hippocrates to

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lands." If now we read in Homer *ἀπουρήσουσιν*, there is no necessity for our supposing that Pindar misunderstood Homer, or ever thought of *ὅρος*; but the Homeric usage of words was present to his mind as it was to that of all the poets, and so he used *ἀπούρας* as the participle of the verb in the same sense and combination as Homer had used the future.

lead us. Ἀπαυρίσκεται here would be a pure passive, which necessarily supposes in actual use an active ἀπαυρίσκω, *I consume, expend,* which should approach pretty near to that ἀπαυράω, *I take away*; but then it would stand a single isolated instance in this passage, without ever occurring again in the extensive works of Hippocrates, or even in the whole range of the Greek language. But Fœsius, as early as his time (Œconom. Hippocr. in v.) corrected it thus: ἀπὸ τῆς κοιλίης τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα ἐπαυρίσκεται, and this verb is actually given in a Vienna manuscript. The insertion of the preposition ἐς arose from the termination of the word preceding it[3].

4. The grammarians then, it seems, ascribed the diphthong αυ to the verb ἀπαυρᾷν merely from comparing it with the verb ἐπαυρίσκεθαι, of which ἀπαυρίσκεθαι may have been an old various reading with a similar meaning (see below in the note the gloss of Erotian). Both verbs certainly came from the same source. We will now examine this other more accurately.

5. In post-Homeric Greek only the *middle* voice of this verb occurs, and I have shown in my grammar (Verb. Anom. v. ΑΥΡ-.) that we must place as the present ἐπαυρίσκομαι, which occurs in Homer, Hippocrates, and elsewhere; the more simple form being merely an aorist, whence the infinitive must be written ἐπαυρέσθαι, which accentuation is found also in Eurip. Iph. Taur. 529[4]. But this same aorist had also, like other similar aorists, a more Ionic sister-form with the α or the so-called aor. 1. medium. Compare, for instance, εὑρόμην and εὑράμην[5],

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[3] The gloss of Erotian which belongs to this passage, ἀπαυρίσκεται, ἀπολλύεται, Fœsius corrects to ἀπόλλυται or ἀπολύεται; but the corruption lies deeper than this. It originated in the λλ. The word as it originally stood was ΑΠΟΛΑΥΕΙ: when some one had corrupted this to ΑΠΟΛΛΥΕΙ, it was very natural that a second should turn it into a passive. Heringa on Erotian contents himself with altering it to ἀπολαύεται, which he takes without hesitation in an active sense.

[4] In Apoll. Rh. also (1, 677.) in all the old editions it is written ἐπαυρέσθαι, and the scholium expressly remarks, that as paroxyt. it is an aorist for ἀπολαῦσαι, and as proparox. a present for ἀπολαύειν. On the contrary, at v. 1275. it is invariably written, even in the Editio princeps ἐπαύρεσθαι; and the same in Andocides De Reditu, near the beginning, in the Aldine and in the Cod. Wratisl.

[5] See the instances quoted in Matthiæ's Gr. Gramm. p. 188. Obs. 7. (or p. 240. of Blomfield's Edit.).

ὠσφρόμην and ὠσφράμην (ὄσφραντο, Herod. 1, 80.). Ἐπαύρασθαι is therefore an unobjectionable form, occurring not merely in the later writers[6], but for instance in Hippocrates in the Oath, c. 3. ἐπαύρασθαι καὶ βίου καὶ τέχνης (where there is no mention of any various reading in -εσθαι), and also in the Ionic letter to Hystanes ascribed to him, Περσέων δὲ ὄλβου οὔ μοι θέμις ἐπαύρασθαι.

6. In many of the infinitives above quoted we miss the plain sense of the *aorist*; but as this is also the case in the form in -*ασθαι*, it cannot contradict the remark respecting the accent on -*έσθαι*, since the indicative ἐπαύρομαι, as we plainly see, does not exist. It is possible, however, that usage might have extended by degrees the sense of the infinitive to that of continuation also, and so the difference of accent given by the scholiast of Apollonius Rh. (see note 4.) came to be observed. But then in both the passages of Apoll. Rh.—certainly at least in the first (1, 677.)—it must be written ἐπαύρεσθαι.

7. The most common meaning of this middle voice is undoubtedly *to derive advantage or nourishment from*; in Homer however it has this meaning in one passage only, Il. *ν*, 733., where it is said of a sensible man, τοῦ δέ τε πολλοὶ ἐπαυρίσκοντ' ἄνθρωποι. Hence the custom of considering as ironical those cases where the verb is used in a bad sense, as in that of deriving *dis*advantage, &c.; for instance, Il. *α*, 410. ἵνα πάντες ἐπαύρωνται βασιλῆος; and again, ζ, 353. ο, 17. Od. σ, 106. But this view of it is erroneous. The twofold relation arose from the one original general meaning, *to draw from, have from, derive from.* This is proved by those cases where irony is not applicable, as in that most palpable instance of the well-known saying of Democritus, (Stob. Eth. 2, p. 205.) ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν τἀγαθὰ γίγνεται ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπαυρισκοίμεθα: and so also in the passage of Herodotus (7, 180.) so remote from all idea of irony, τάχα δ' ἄν τι καὶ τοῦ οὐνόματος ἐπαύροιτο. The asperity in the passages quoted from Homer lies, therefore, not in the word, but in the thought itself.

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[6] See Suid. v. ἐπαύρασθαι: Valck. ad Herod. 7. 180.

8. The *active voice* of this verb belongs entirely to the Epic poet, and to those who have copied it from them. Homer has only the aorist of the subjunct. and infin., ἐπαύρω, -ῃς, -ῃ, ἐπαυρεῖν or ἐπαυρέμεν. The present I find in the form in -ίσκω only in Theogn. 115. (Brunck. Ed., or 111. Gaisf. Ed.) Οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἐπαυρίσκουσι παθόντες. Hesiod has it in -έω, (Op. 417.) speaking of Sirius in the winter, Βαιὸν.... Ἔρχεται ἠμάτιος, πλεῖον δέ τε νυκτὸς ἐπαυρεῖ[7].

9. This active has in many passages evidently the meaning of *to enjoy*; for instance, in Il. σ, 302., Hector says to the Trojans, "Give your property to the people for them to spend it, Τῶν τινα βέλτερόν ἐστιν ἐπαυρέμεν ἤπερ Ἀχαιούς": so also in Od. ρ, 81. Hence if this same form be used of inanimate objects, the idea is supposed to be figurative, namely, that those objects are endued with feeling; particularly in the instance of the spears, Il. λ, 573. Πάρος χρόα λευκὸν ἐπαυρεῖν Ἐν γαίῃ ἵσταντο: so also λ, 391.; in which passages is supposed a metaphorical idea of *enjoying, tasting*; an idea in itself by no means bad, particularly as in the first-mentioned passage it is added, λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἆσαι; but at Il. ν, 649. where the combatant is the subject of the sentence, μή τις χρόα χαλκῷ ἐπαύρῃ, this figure cannot be admitted.

10. We see, therefore, that in every instance the general idea lies at the foundation of the word; and as its evident affinity to ἀπαυρᾷν leads us, as the simplest idea, to that of *to take*, this will be *to take to itself, get, obtain, partake, draw* or *derive from*: so many expressions must in our modern languages be collected together for want of one single comprehensive term to express the full meaning of this Greek verb. Any collateral idea must be introduced in every instance by the meaning of the context. Consequently, the spear, or he who wields it, *attains, reaches, strikes* the body; exactly as in ψ, 340. where a charioteer in the lists is warned in guiding his car round the stone which marks the course, λίθου ἀλέασθαι ἐπαυρεῖν, "to

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[7] I know of no various reading for this passage; whereas at verse 238., as we shall by and by see, we read also ἀπηῦρα, which however would not be quite suitable here in connexion with ἔρχεται. I consider therefore ἐπαυρέω as a genuine separate form.

avoid touching the stone, striking upon it." In the passage of Hesiod respecting Sirius, the figurative idea of an inanimate object being endued with feeling is more appropriate than even that of the spears, but "he enjoys more the night," is not a correct thought. The true idea therefore here also is the general one, although we can hardly translate it literally in a modern language, "he takes to himself more of the night, comes more in contact with it[8]".

11. With regard to the case which it governs, the difference originally was this; that when the relation of the verb to the object was immediate, i.e. supposed to be an immediate *taking, consuming, striking,* the accusative case followed; on the other hand, if rather the consequences or fruits of anything were enjoyed or derived, the genitive, or, when the construction was complete, ἀπὸ with the genitive. This will be found to hold good in the generality of cases, although usage, in this as in other things, has not always strictly adhered to the distinction. The middle form has in Homer that mediate relation four times, in three of which (Il. α, 410. ν, 733. ο, 17.) the genitive is used; and in the fourth (ζ, 353.) the case is not expressed. This relation appears also more natural to the middle voice. Hence in a fifth passage (Od. σ, 106.) μή πού τι κακὸν καὶ μεῖζον ἐπαύρῃ, I should prefer the old various reading ἐπαύρῃς.

12. In Homer then the two compounds ἀπαυρᾷν and ἐπαυρεῖν, ἐπαύρεσθαι, are sufficiently distinguished by difference of meaning; but in the other poets, even the oldest, we find the same various reading which we met with above in Hippocrates. In Hesiod ε, 238. the well-known sentence

> Πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπαυρεῖ

is thus written in most of the manuscripts; but another reading, backed by very old quotations and authorities (see Græv. ad loc.) is ἀπηύρα, which aoristic imperfect is so desirable in this passage, that one is very unwilling to attribute it to an error of transcription*. And when in Eurip. Androm. 1029. we read (speaking of Clytemnestra) Αὐτά τ', ἐναλλάξασα φόνον θανάτῳ, πρὸς τέκνων ἀπηύρα, where there is no appearance of any various reading; it is clear that as early as that time the verb ἀπαυρᾷν in the Epic poets was considered, at least as a various reading, to have the meaning of ἐπαυρέσθαι. Nor is there anything to hinder us from supposing that ἀπαυρᾷν had from the earliest times this meaning, something like *auferre*. In Æschyl. Prom. 28. the word is somewhat more doubtful;

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[8] This meaning of *reaching, touching,* is found more expressly in a third compound προσαυρεῖν, προσαυρίζειν, which we know only from the gloss of Hesychius, and which Seidler has now first introduced into an old text by a happy emendation of Sophocl. Antig. 619. Hermann remarks there, that also in Nicand. Ther. 763. ἐπαύρῃ is explained by ἅψηται. How the ideas of *to take, to lay hold on, to touch,* pass into each other, may be seen explained in Buttmann's notes on Sophocl. Philoct. 657. 1398.

Τοιαῦτ' ἀπηύρω τοῦ φιλανθρώπου τρόπου.

Hitherto no one but Stephens has brought forward ἐπηύρω as a various reading to this passage. There is this objection to it, that it would be from ἐπαύρασθαι, a form which can hardly be attributed to an Attic writer. On the other hand, ἀπηύρω would be that tense of the middle voice (ἀπηυράμην) which we have seen at the beginning of this article is so very doubtful in Homer. However, the middle appears to me so defensible in this passage of Æschylus, and so suited to it, having so regularly and correctly the meaning of φέρεσθαι, *auferre*, 'to derive from', that Æschylus may very well be supposed to have formed it, though he did not find it in any older poet. The form ἐπαυρεῖν is used absolutely by Pindar (Pyth. 3, 365.) in the sense of *to receive* (*harm*) *from*; καὶ γειτόνων πολλοὶ ἐπαῦρον[9].

13. The sense of these two compounds, thus playing so into each other, confirms the opinion that they both belong to one simple form; and there are quite sufficient grounds for fixing

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* [Gaisford in his edition of the 'Poetæ Minores Græci' has ἀπηύρα in the text.—Ed.]

[9] It is not correct to say that ἐπαῦρον is used in this passage by Pindar absolutely. The use of the word is not made more absolute by its having no *accusative* case of the harm, than it is in ἵνα πάντες ἐπαύρωνται βασιλῆος. The omission of the *genitive* of the person from whom the harm is received is quite usual, and to be supplied by τούτου, or in this case by αὐτῆς, with reference to the offending damsel.

on the diphthong *αυ* for the verb *ἀπαυρᾷν*. Notwithstanding this, however, I cannot but think that the simple form of these verbs is to be sought for in the verb *εὑρεῖν*, which has always remained in use, and which differs from those compounds only by the change of the aspirate, (a difference very common in the older writers, and in the Ionic dialect,) and by a third change of vowel. However, *εὑρεῖν* bears the same relation to that *αὐρᾷν* and *αὐρεῖν*, as *εὔχομαι* does to *αὐχέω*; and we thus come nearer to the change of the vowel *ου* in *ἀπούρας*; compare *σπεύδω σπουδή*, and generally the change of *ε* to *ο*. Besides, *εὑρεῖν* corresponds very much with *ἐπαυρεῖν* in the terminations of its tenses; *εὑρίσκω, εὗρον, εὑρεῖν, εὑρέσθαι, εὕρασθαι*: *ἐπαυρίσκομαι, ἐπηῦρον, ἐπαυρεῖν, ἐπαύρεσθαι, ἐπαύρασθαι*. And lastly, a still nearer correspondence in the usage of the two verbs is to be found in an epigram of Nossis, (No. 4.,) where it is said of a courtezan, *ἐπαυρομένα μάλα πολλὰν Κτῆσιν ἀπ' οἰκείου σώματος ἀγλαΐας*. Here *ἐπαυρέσθαι* with the accusative is used exactly in the simple sense of *εὑρέσθαι* or *εὕρασθαι*.—The Latin *haurire* has been already compared by others with *ἐπαυρεῖν*, and, as it appears, not without foundation. But then the Greek *ἀρύειν* should not be omitted[10]. And if I were to pursue this idea that *ἐπαυρεῖν* and *εὑρεῖν* are connected with *haurire*, and consequently with *ἀρύειν*, I should next adopt the supposition that *ἀρύω* was also ΑΡϜΩ; wherefore in *αὔρω* or ΑϜΡΩ we have the same change in the position of the Ϝ or *υ* as in *θεουδής* and *προυσελεῖν*. Nor have I any hesitation in putting down as a parallel case ἀνύω, ANϜΩ, ἄνω, ἄνομαι, since nothing is more common than that what in one case produces a diphthong, in another merely lengthens the vowel.

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[10] It is singular that so plain a contracted imperfect as *ἀπηύρων*, *ἀπηύρα*, should be in Homer so completely an aorist; and one might be tempted to substitute instead of those forms *ἀπηῦρον*, *ἀπηῦρε* (*εν*), as an old form changed in after times; particularly as Hesychius has *ἀπηῦρον*, *ἀφείλαντο*, (the addition to this gloss is most satisfactorily accounted for in the Note to Alberti's edition,) and Zonaras has *ἀπηύρων*: the latter, however, explains it as the aorist 2. of *ἀπαυρῶ*, *ἀπαυρήσω*; from which it appears necessarily to follow, that he read and was speaking of *ἀπηῦρον*. But *ἀπηύρων* cannot be displaced from Il. *α*, 430. by *ἀπηῦρον*; we must therefore go one step further, and write *ἀπηύροντ'*: while the 3rd person *ἀπηύρα* in Æschyl. Pers. 954., and in the passage of Eurip. Androm. 1029. quoted above—in both instances a pure aorist—shows that this was the reading in Homer at least as early as the time of Pisistratus.

24. Ἀπίη γαῖα.

1. It is well known that a part of the grammarians explained Ἀπίη γαῖα (Il. α, 270. and γ, 49.) as the old name of the Peloponnesus; while the two passages in the Odyssey (η, 25. and π, 18.), where nothing is said of the Peloponnesus, plainly show that ἄπιος is an old adjective from ἄπο, like ἀντίος from ἀντί, and means *distant*. It must not however be supposed that the older Greeks in the times of the tragedians were in this same error, and that hence came the use of the name Ἀπία in Æschylus, Sophocles, and others, for the Peloponnesus. An old saying as early as Æschylus, and which he introduces in his Suppl. 275., derives this old name of the Peloponnesus from a most ancient personage named Apis, of whom there exist very different mythological accounts. We may see the passages in which these accounts are given collected together in Berckel. ad Steph. in v., and in Wassenbergh. ad Paraphr. Hom. p. 42. This Apis, we see at once, is the old mythical personification of the name of the people and country, which mythology has derived from him; therefore of Ἀπία, and of the Ἀπιδόνες or Ἀπιδανῆες, the old name for the Arcadians; see Eustath. ad Dionys. Perieg. 415[1]. The explanation of Heyne on Il. α, 270.,

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[1] There is a multiplicity of traces which concur in proving that in this word *Apis, Apia,* lies the original name of a most ancient people, which inhabited the European coasts of the Mediterranean. The mythical personages *Pelops, Cecrops, Merops,* compared with the names of countries and people, as the *Peloponnesus* and the *Meropes* (in Cos),—and in the same way the names *Dryopes Dryops, Dolopes Dolops,*—show that *Ops, Opes,* corresponding with the *Opicis, Opscis,* in Italy, and meaning the same as Apis, were ancient names of people; and that the first syllable in those names served to distinguish the different families or tribes, as the *Pelopes, Cecropes, Meropes,* &c. The *Abantes* in Eubœa, the *Aones* in Bœotia, the *Ausones* and *Osci* in Italy, are but varieties of the same name. And now, from having observed these last forms,

who maintains, contrary to the express testimonies of the geographers and grammarians, nay of Æschylus himself, that the name *Apia* never existed as a geographical name, but is entirely and originally poetical, rests on old misrepresentations. Whoever considers the true nature of poetry, particularly of the poetry of the ancients, and the mythical and geographical names occurring in it, easily sees that the poetical names, particularly all the *oldest*, are purely most ancient *real* names, which poetry has preserved to us[2].

2. There is another circumstance well worthy of our notice, that the appellative ἀπίη in Homer has the α short (ἐξ ἀπίης γαίης), but in the geographical name it is always long: γῆς ὅσοιπερ Ἀπίας, Soph. O. C. 1303. Αὐτῆς δὲ χώρας Ἀπίας πέδον τόδε, Æschyl. Suppl. 275. Κατ' Ἄπιδα, (said of the country) Theocr. 25, 183.; and this is also the quantity not only of Ἀπιδανῆες, but also of the primitive name Ἆπις, according to which is regulated that of the Egyptian Apis also; and it is inconceivable how the greatest part of the editors could write this name from the earliest times with an acute accent, and that sometimes in passages where the quantity teaches otherwise. Πράξας ἀμέμπτως Ἆπις Ἀργείᾳ χθονί, Æschyl. Supp. 284. *Et comes in pompa corniger Apis erat*, Ovid, Amor. 2, 13, 14. It is however remarkable that So-

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we shall at once recognise the *Pelopes* and the *Pelasgi* as the same. The termination *asgi* contains therefore again the old name of the family or tribe (*Opes, Apes, Asgi, Aones*, like *Opici, Osci, Ausones*); and as we know the name of that people was also *Pelargi*, we have thus the old name of the Peloponnesus, *Argos*, which is again found in Thessaly and Acarnania, brought into the series. With these is connected very naturally the old name of the inhabitants of Phrygia, Lydia, &c., the *Ascanii*, and the more simple ancient name of the country itself, *Asia*. Nor can it any longer be considered as a mere visionary scheme, if in the Hebrew tradition, which so plainly calls the Ἰάονες or Ionians *Javan*, we find also these *Ascanii*, and whatever is connected with them, in *Askenas*; and it is uncertain whether the most western trace of this race is not to be sought for in the name of the *Ausci* and *Vascones*.

[2] I mean those names which occur in the old poets as real names. It is totally different with those supposed old names of countries which we find in the geographers, and which I consider to be mostly a misunderstanding of some poetical epithets, as Ἠερίη, used of Egypt, and the like: see Ἀήρ, sect. 9.

phocles, in the same piece in which he uses Ἀπία of the Peloponnesus, further on at v. 1685. has the same word, also with the long *α*, in the sense of *a distant country*, γῆ ἀπία. If we may trust to our present knowledge of the lyric stanza, Sophocles thought himself obliged to use the Homeric word in a quantity more familiar to the Attic ear. An exactly opposite instance is found in a passage of Rhianus mentioned by Steph. Byz.,

> . . . . τοῦ δὲ κλυτὸς ἐκγένετ᾽ Ἆπις,
> Ὃς ῥ᾽ Ἀπίην ἐφάτιζε καὶ ἀνέρας Ἀπιδανῆας.

Here then the proper name is short. But this is far less striking than the other. The later Epic poet regulated himself according to the Homeric prosody, even when he used the word in a different sense. And it is possible that Rhianus took ἀπίη in Homer for the name of the Peloponnesus.

25. Ἀποέρσαι.

1. Three times in the Iliad there occur forms of an aorist ἀποέρσαι; viz. in Il. ζ, 348. where Helen wishes that she had been thrown into the sea immediately after her birth; ἔνθα με κῦμ᾽ ἀπόερσε, "there the wave would have *washed me away*"; again at φ, 283., where Achilles is afraid of being overwhelmed by the flood of the Scamander, like a young swine-herd, Ὃν ῥά τ᾽ ἔναυλος ἀποέρσῃ, "whom the torrent *washes away* as he is fording it in a storm"; and lastly at φ, 329. where Juno has the same fear for Achilles, Μή μιν ἀποέρσειε μέγας ποταμὸς βαθυδίνης, "lest the flood should *wash him away*". The sense is therefore perfectly clear; but we want to know where we are to place this verb, as its simple ἔρσαι is nowhere extant in this sense, nor is there any trace to help us, except the very evident one of the old digamma. This we see in the hiatus after the preposition, particularly in the last two passages, where the ο in the *Arsis*, as if by means of this hiatus, is long; that is to say, by means of the double aspiration in ΑΠΟϜϜΕΡΣΗΙ.

2. The most generally received opinion is that these forms belong to ἔῤῥω, the old formation of which was ἔρσαι, instead of the one afterwards in use ἐῤῥῆσαι. The digamma is indeed

recognisable also in this verb in ἐνθάδε ἔῤῥων, αὐτὰρ ὁ ἔῤῥων, Il. θ, 239. σ, 421., and as it appears to come from ῥέω, we have only to suppose that it originally had this more definite meaning of *moving in a stream*, and was also used in a causative sense, *to cause to hasten, cause to flow,* and in the passages before us, *to cause to swim, cause to float, wash along*; for the destructive part of the sense lies in each case entirely in the preposition ἀπό, to wash *off* or *away*. Easy however as these suppositions are, taking each separately, we must recollect they are three, with no trace of them elsewhere, and that too in a verb otherwise in pretty general use; a consideration which may fairly make us hesitate in adopting this derivation. We may therefore be allowed to choose for ourselves, and try another.

3. The formation ἔρσαι leads still more naturally to a theme ΕΡΔΩ, and this reminds us of ἄρδω, according to the Ionic analogy of ἔρσην, ἄρσην. The verb ἄρδω has the general meaning of *to water*; but a more definite one was, *to bring into the water and move anything about in it*; as, for instance, to drive cattle into the watering-place, which was thence properly called ἀρδμός, Il. σ, 521. Ἐν ποταμῷ ὅθι τ' ἀρδμὸς ἔην πάντεσσι βοτοῖσιν. This verb also had the digamma, which, though elsewhere obliterated, is only the more evident in the compound νεοαρδής, Il. φ, 345. Compare also the word ἔρση, whose digamma is seen in the Homeric form ἐέρση, and whose affinity to ἄρδω, *I water*, shows the same change of vowel, α into ε. I suppose, therefore, that ἔρδω meant, 1st, *I water*, whence ἔρση, *dew*; 2nd, *I wash*, whence ἀρδμός, *a washing and watering place*; its compound ἀποέρδω, *I wash away*.

4. In fact this supposition is but an easy modification of the first; for as the affinity of the words ἔῤῥω, ἄρδω, ἔρση, and of their meanings to ῥέω is pretty certain, so the difference between the two views of the question is merely this, that the causative idea belonging to ῥέω, ἔῤῥω, *I run, flow*, is according to the one laid in ἔῤῥω, according to the other in a particular form ἔρδω, which has the same relation to ἔῤῥω as ἀμέρδω has to ἀμείρω. And thus we have this result as certain, that the verb ἔρσαι, for which, as for many other aorists, we cannot

fix on a present with any degree of certainty, meant *to wash*; that it comes from the radical word ῥεῖν, and belongs to the same family with all the words and forms quoted above.

26. Ἀποξύνω, ἀποξύω.

1. To my great astonishment, no question, as far as I know, has been raised on the form ἀποξῦναι from ἀποξύνω, Od. ι, 326. In that passage Ulysses gives his companions a piece cut off from the huge limb of a tree, which was intended by the Cyclops for his staff. He relates the circumstance thus:

> Καὶ παρέθηχ' ἑτάροισιν, ἀποξῦναι δ' ἐκέλευσα.
> Οἱ δ' ὁμαλὸν ποίησαν· ἐγὼ δ' ἐθόωσα παραστάς
> Ἄκρον, ἄφαρ δὲ λαβὼν ἐπυράκτεον ἐν πυρὶ κηλέῳ.

The word ἀποξύνω, according to the simplest analogy, comes only from ὀξύς, ὀξύνω, and therefore Ulysses commands his companions to *sharpen* or *point* the piece of wood, which he however immediately afterwards relates as being done by himself. No one, indeed, but Eustathius expressly explains the word thus; and he, in order to get rid of this difficulty, adds, that the companions of Ulysses had only made it *somewhat* taper, but that Ulysses had finished it by pointing the extremity (ἄκρον). But the very nature of the thing contradicts this, for every bough tapers of itself towards the end. Happily Homer is in this passage his own scholiast in the words οἱ δ' ὁμαλὸν ποίησαν: and tradition has handed it down to us; for the common Latin translation renders the word by *levigare*, and Damm places the verb ἀποξύνω quite carelessly under ξύω, ἀποξύω.

2. Now ἀποξύω is the true and proper word for *to make smooth*, by scraping or shaving off the outer rind or skin: a proof of this is the word ξυστός, which means the shaft or handle of a spear prepared in that way; and in this sense Homer uses also the verb itself, Il. ι, 446., where to the expression "if a God would make me young again" is added γῆρας ἀποξύσας, with evident reference to the rough and wrinkled skin, which must be, as it were, *scraped off* for that

purpose. Nothing would, therefore, be more natural than to read also in the passage in question *ἀποξῦσαι δ' ἐκέλευσα* : and that this was really the old recognised reading, I conclude, not only from the total silence of all the grammarians, except Eustathius, and of all the lexicographers, who never could have passed over unnoticed this sense of *ἀποξῦναι,* deviating from the common meaning of *ἀποξύνω,* and corresponding exactly with that of *ἀποξύω,* and that too in Homer ; but I draw this conclusion also from the words of Lucian, who in Dial. Marin. 2. introduces Polyphemus relating his misfortune, and saying of Ulysses, *ὁ δὲ ἀποξύσας τὸν μοχλὸν καὶ πυρώσας γε προσέτι ἐτύφλωσέ με καθεύδοντα.* The critics, indeed, would rather suppose the reading in Lucian to be false, and alter it to *ἀποξύνας* ; and certainly Lucian might have so written it ; but as the Cyclops very naturally attributed the whole proceeding to Ulysses, he might just as well have said, giving a short account of it, " he shaved the bough smooth, and put the end in the fire ", passing over unnoticed that which necessarily follows of itself, the end being *taper* or *pointed.* And in the same way Homer might very well have spoken without thought of the *shaving* or *scraping* only, in which he might have included the idea of its being pointed ; and nothing but the express distinction which is there made between *ἀποξῦναι* and *θοῶσαι* makes it absolutely necessary for the reading to be altered. And thus then I recognise in the expression of Lucian an evident trace that the reading of Homer should also be *ἀποξῦσαι.*

3. A trace of an opposite character, and which has thence been adduced to confirm the alteration of Lucian's reading, is found in Euripides. He, like Lucian, had evidently the passage of Homer in his mind, when he makes Ulysses say with reference to the bough, (Cycl. 455.)—

> *Ὃν φασγάνῳ τῷδ' ἐξαποξύνας ἄκρον*
> *Εἰς πῦρ καθήσω.*

But this is no confirmation of the common reading of Homer's text ; for it is evident that Euripides has passed over the shaving of the bough, and intended by *ἐξαποξύνας ἄκρον* to express the *ἐθόωσα ἄκρον* of Homer ; which, indeed, the scholiast of Homer does explain by ἀπώξυνα. And from the very circumstance of this word being added in Homer as the gloss of ἐθόωσα we can better understand and explain how it crept into the preceding verse, where previously stood ἀποξῦσαι, a word so like it both in sense and form.

4. That an emendation so plain and necessary, one which must undoubtedly have struck others before, should never once have been proposed, must surely have arisen from this cause, that another form of the verb, viz. the present, occurs again in the Odyssey in exactly the same situation. It is said of the Phæacians, ζ, 269.

> Ἔνθα δὲ νηῶν ὅπλα μελαινάων ἀλέγουσιν,
> Πείσματα καὶ σπεῖρα, καὶ ἀποξύνουσιν ἐρετμά.

Here, again, the moderns explain it *to make pointed* or *taper*, because, as Stephens remarks, oars do taper toward the extremity. Still, however, every one must certainly have felt the unsuitableness of the expression; and in opposition to it, tradition, which here also speaks of *shaving* or *scraping off*, is in this passage still stronger than in the former one, in as much as it embraces Eustathius also, who says, τὸ δὲ ἀποξύνουσιν δύναται ταυτὸν τῷ λεπτύνουσιν ἢ καὶ ἀποξύουσι. And the common scholiast has expressly φλοιὸν περιξέουσιν. It is impossible that any one should, contrary to this external and internal evidence, still adhere to the idea of ὀξύνω; and some, therefore, observing the reading of both passages to correspond so exactly[1], have ventured with Damm to suppose a verb ἀπο-ξύνω as another form of ἀποξύω; in which analogy does not entirely fail them, as δύω and δύνω, θύω and θύνω, ἱδρύω and ἱδρύνθην may be adduced in support of it. Notwithstanding this, however, the supposition is incredible. If there had occurred in Homer a verb ἀποξύνω, in a different sense and derivation from the common one, it is impossible but that the grammarians, who we have seen did explain it, should have remarked this peculiarity, and that it should have found its way into the lexicons. Nay, we may add without fear of contradiction, that if Homer had used such a word as ἀπο-ξύνω, he would also have said in that third passage γῆρας ἀποξύνας, since there is no metrical reason for the difference, and surely no one will say that there is a distinction between the Iliad and the Odyssey in this ξύω and ξύνω.

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[1] The reading ἀποξείνουσιν in the Cod. Harl. is not worth our notice, as ῦ, ῖ, ει, are commonly mistaken for each other.

5. The result is undoubted. The verb ἀποξύω must stand in all three passages, and therefore at Od. ζ, 269. we must read ἀποξύουσιν ἐρετμά. The length of the υ, which is perfectly regular, but was not looked upon as certain, has been the cause of the one verb being by mistake altered to another so similar to it. And thus, then, we have a double instance on which we can depend, of a reading in Homer which must be corrected; and yet there is no mention in any of the old commentators of this twofold reading, nor has it been hitherto found in any manuscript.

Ἀπούρας; vid. ἀπαυρᾷν.

27. Ἀπριάτην.

We have before spoken of the adverb ἀκήν, and in confirmation of its being an adverb we compared it with ἀπριάτην. Now this latter would never have been known to be an adverb if we had found it only in Il. α, 99., where ἀπριάτην, ἀνάποινον appear to agree with the preceding word κούρην. But in Od. ξ, 317. Ulysses speaking of himself says, Ἔνθα με.... ἐκομίσσατο Φείδων Ἥρως ἀπριάτην. Rhianus, according to a Harleian gloss, wrote ἀπριάδην; but this was evidently a grammatical correction according to the analogy of adverbs in δην. The more correct way of stating the whole appears to me to be this. Among those cases which serve for adverbs, is, as we have seen above in the article on ἀκήν, the accus. fem. as μακράν, ἀντιβίην, συναΐκτην (Scut. Herc. 189). To these belong also ἀκήν and ἀπριάτην. The adverbs thus coming from verbal adjectives in τός, consequently those ending in την, as well as also the neuter forms in τόν and τά, took a softer pronunciation (like ὄγδοος, ἕβδομος, from ὀκτώ, ἑπτά); and thus δην, δον, δα became proper adverbial forms, which were also partly modified in the accent, e. g. *κρύβδην, ἀναφανδόν, ἀναφανδά,* and having thus the force of proper adverbial terminations they attached themselves to other forms, as λογάδην, &c. Ἀπριάδην, *συναΐγδην* would certainly then be forms agreeable to the analogy which afterwards became more general; but on that very account the ἀπριάτην in the Odyssey, which at first sight seems so objectionable, cannot be an accidental mistake; and therefore at Il. *α*, 99. ἀπριάτην, ἀνάποινον must likewise be taken adverbially, with which also the meaning of ἀνάποινον agrees much better[1].

Ἀρίζηλος; vid. ἀΐδηλος.

Ἀρκεῖν; vid. χραισμεῖν.

28. Ἄρκιος.

1. It will be seen by the article on χραισμεῖν, ἀρκεῖν, that we suppose the meaning of ἄρκιος, *enough, sufficient,* to be certain, although the verb ἀρκεῖν is not found in Homer in that sense. The affinity of the ideas *to help, to be useful to, to suffice,* and so old an usage of the verb as that of Herodotus, ἀρκέομαι τούτοις, and last of all the exactly corresponding expression μισθὸς ἄρκιος, Od. σ, 358. Il. κ, 304., appeared to justify that meaning. Still, however, the opinion was precipitate, as long as the word remained unexamined in all its combinations; for there are many passages extant where that idea is of no assistance whatever.

2. To these belongs, first, the passage at Il. β, 393. where

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[1] In Herodotus 1, 5. ἐθελοντήν also is used adverbially, as in that passage it is joined with the fem. αὐτήν, and the adjective ἐθελοντής can be only masculine, and never occurs in -τή. On that very account, however, the adverbial form ἐθελοντήν cannot, like those mentioned above, be explained as from an old adjective; but the familiar use of the adverbial forms in ην was the cause of ἐθελοντήν also being used so.

Agamemnon threatens whomsoever he shall find away from the battle and skulking among the ships;

> . . . . οὔ οἱ ἔπειτα
> Ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας ἠδ' οἰωνούς.

The scholia wish to give ἄρκιον, here at least, the meaning of *ἀρκεῖν, to help*, taking the subject of ἄρκιόν ἐστι as general, and translating it in some such way as this, "there shall be nothing there to assist him in escaping death." But besides the harhness of this combination, another passage stands in opposition to it, which cannot be taken in this way, and which yet evidently belongs to the same kind of expression, Il. ο, 502. where Ajax, enraged at the Greeks, who are giving way before the Trojans storming their camp, reproaches them with these words,

> Αἰδὼς, 'Αργεῖοι. νῦν ἄρκιον ἢ ἀπολέσθαι
> 'Ηὲ σαωθῆναι καὶ ἀπώσασθαι κακὰ νηῶν.

The scholiast does mention, indeed, here also the explanation of ὠφέλιμον; but one feels at once how tame an expression it is, and particularly after "O shame!", to say "now it is good or useful either to die or to save ourselves by a brave resistance." Hence the scholiast produces another explanation ἕτοιμον, which stands in Apollonius's Lexicon for the first passage also, and which certainly does contain an idea suitable to both, "it shall not be within his reach or power to escape death,"—"now it is in our power either to die or conquer." And this explanation is particularly strengthened by one circumstance, that the idea of ἕτοιμον appears most plainly to belong to a verse of Hesiod (ε, 349.), otherwise so difficult of explanation, where the poet recommends a neighbour to return faithfully that which has been lent,

> Ὣς ἂν χρηΐζων καὶ ἐς ὕστερον ἄρκιον εὕρῃς,

where ἕτοιμον will refer equally well to the *ready* lender as to the thing *ready* to be lent. It seems to me also that from the idea of *ἀρκεῖν, to help, defend,* and thence *ἄρκιος, able* and *willing to help,* would come very naturally the more general idea *that on which* or *on whom one can rely*; and it is very conceivable that this might have been used in the language of common life without the idea of utility, consequently of bad things as well as good. "There shall be nothing on which he can rely, nothing to give him any well-grounded hope of escaping the dogs and birds"; an expression quite as strong as "he shall *certainly* not escape them".—"Now may we rely upon it that we shall either die or conquer and save ourselves"; i. e. 'one of these two is *certain*'.

3. Let us now apply this idea of *certain* to the expression *μισθὸς ἄρκιος*, and we shall find that it gives us a meaning for this expression which can scarcely be dispensed with in the following passage of Hesiod ε, 368.

> *Μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος εἴη.*

Plutarch in Theseus 3. speaking of the wisdom for which the old Pittheus was celebrated, and which showed itself in didactic apophthegms like those of Hesiod, quotes this verse as having originally been said by Pittheus. It is difficult to conceive how this verse could have gained such celebrity as a didactic maxim, if it had contained nothing more than interpreters have generally seen in it, viz. a recommendation to give sufficient wages; and why exactly *φίλῳ*? and wherefore the word *εἰρημένος*? The true sense of the verse might have been easily guessed at from the verse following; for in Hesiod the two verses succeed each other thus,

> *Μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος εἴη.*
> *Καί τε κασιγνήτῳ γελάσας ἐπὶ μάρτυρα θέσθαι.*

It is evident here that the sense, which in both verses is essentially the same, rises in intensity from the friend to the brother*; that is to say, that in agreements or contracts with a friend or even with a brother, we should make everything *firm* and *certain*, not depending on mere words. This is a sense worthy of being embodied in a maxim or proverb, and which here in the second verse is made most pointed by the word *γελάσας*. And this sense we find uniformly given, as far as the general idea goes, in the scholia of Proclus on v. 354., and Grævius also has it; but neither of them interprets the passage literally word for word. Yet Grævius, in his explanation *fac ut primum cum illo paciscaris de mercede, quam sibi deberi putat*, seems by the latter words to translate *ἄρκιον*, and to imitate almost exactly the explanation of the other scholiast Moschopulus, *μισθὸς ἔστω συμπεφωνημένος ἱκανὸς τῇ γνώμῃ αὐτοῦ.* Here, then, we have again the common explanation of *ἄρκιος*; and we see that Græevius placed the point of the maxim in the word *εἰρημένος* only, which he joined immediately with *εἴη*; by which means *ἄρκιος* becomes a mere epithet of *μισθός*, and as to the groundwork of the maxim quite superfluous. The common rules of grammar are indeed not offended against by this mode of construing; but instead of *μισθὸς ἄρκιος εἰρημένος εἴη* (i. e. the wages which are thought sufficient to be paid by one friend to another should always be specifically agreed on), to say *μισθὸς εἰρημένος ἄρκιος εἴη*, is an arrangement of the words by which the effect of the maxim is completely destroyed, since every one who hears it knows at once that *ἄρκιος εἴη* must be the predicate of the sentence, and, consequently, if it means nothing more than *ἱκανὸς*, we have only the poor tame meaning which we mentioned before. *Ἄρκιος*, then, in this passage can have no other meaning than that which we have supposed it to have in the other passages, viz. *that which can be relied on, sure, certain.*

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* [Compare Proverbs xvii. 17. 18. 24. and xxvii. 10.—Ed.]

4. And as the expression *μισθὸς ἄρκιος* has this meaning in Hesiod, we can hardly suppose that it can have a different one in Homer, Il. κ, 303.

> *Τίς κέν μοι τόδε ἔργον ὑποσχόμενος τελέσειεν*
> *Δώρῳ ἐπὶ μεγάλῳ; μισθὸς δέ οἱ ἄρκιος ἔσται.*
> *Δώσω γὰρ δίφρον τε,* &c.

Now when a *large* gift has been already promised, why add immediately after that it should be a reward large enough to satisfy the receiver? Yet this, and much more of the same sort, is frequently imputed to ancient forms of expression and old modes of thinking; and then in the translation it is changed into something a little less objectionable: whereas a more accurate examination of the sense of the expressions might give the whole a completely different turn. A comparison of this passage with those of Hesiod shows clearly that here, in addition to the magnitude of the gift, the poet intended to represent the *certainty* of the promised reward. Nor will any one, I should suppose, object to this by saying that the *γὰρ* of the following verse necessarily refers to *μισθὸς ἄρκιος*, for it may refer quite as well or better to Δώρῳ μεγάλῳ, to which ἄρκιος is immediately attached as a necessary stipulation. The same meaning may also be very well given to Od. σ, 358., where there is nothing in the context decisive of either sense. For if I offer to take any one into my service, it is of as great, or even greater, importance to him to be promised "thy wages shall be sure", than "they shall be large enough to satisfy thee", which last idea is indeed properly included in that of wages.

5. And, lastly, when Hesiod in ε, 499. reproves the needy sluggard,

Ἥμενον ἐν λέσχῃ, τῷ μὴ βίος ἄρκιος εἴη,

the poet's description will suit, it is true, perfectly well *one who has not enough to live on*: but whatever may be the meaning of ἄρκιος in the other passages, it must be the same here; and certainly the admonition is quite as good if addressed to one *whose means of providing the necessaries of life are so uncertain, that he does not know what he shall live on from one day to another*. And similar to this is the advice given at v. 575. that at harvest you should be active in housing the corn, and should rise early to labour....ἵνα τοι βίος ἄρκιος εἴη, "that you may make *sure* of providing yourself with sustenance".

6. Since, then, in all the old Epic passages, in which ἄρκιος seemed at first sight to mean *enough, sufficient*, the idea of ἕτοιμος, *that which can be relied on, sure, certain*, is at least quite as natural; I would confirm the correctness of our view of the subject by this additional proof, that in the later poets it is never so. In these the *only* admissible idea is always *able, sufficient*; as in Apoll. Rh. 2, 799. ἥντιν' ἐγὼ τῖσαι χάριν ἄρκιός εἰμι Τίσω προφρονέως. In Callim. Cer., 35., where a body of gigantic men are described as ὅλαν πόλιν ἄρκιοι ἆραι. In Theocr. 8, 13. "what shall we place as the prize", ὅ κὲν ἁμῖν ἄρκιον εἴη; and in many other similar passages quoted by Stephens.

7. Besides, it is evident how near akin to each other the ideas *able, capable, sufficient, certain*, are, and how easy it would be to trace and describe how they arise out of and blend with each other. But although we can now no longer prove from the form ἄρκιος that the idea of *sufficient* belonged to this family of words as early as Homer's time, yet it will make one

thing more certain, that the idea of the Latin *arcere* (see art. 106. sect. 4.) cannot be the foundation and primary meaning of the word ἀρκεῖν.

29. Ἄρχομαι, ἐπάρχομαι, κατάρχομαι, ἀπάρχομαι.

1. The expression ἐπάρξασθαι δεπάεσσιν (as in Il. *α*, 471. Νώμησαν δ' ἄρα πᾶσιν ἐπαρξάμενοι δεπάεσσιν) has been always interpreted by the older commentators to mean *the pouring out of a libation*; or if they have mentioned any other meaning, they have always given this the preference. The different scholia on this passage run thus: Ἐπαρξάμενοι ἤτοι τοῦ πίνειν ἀρχὴν ποιήσαντες καὶ ἀπαρξάμενοι καὶ σπείσαντες τοῖς θεοῖς.—Τὸ ἐπαρξάμενοι, ἐπιχέαντες. ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὕτως. τῇ οἰνοχόῃ ἐπιχέαντες διέδωκαν πᾶσιν· ἢ ἀπαρξάμενοι σπονδὴν τοῖς θεοῖς, πᾶσιν ἐνώμησαν. Hesych. Ἐπαρξάμενοι· σπείσαντες, ἐπιστάντες. Instead of the last word it has been proposed to read ἐπιχέαντες, which would be a very admissible correction, if it were not for Od. σ, 425., Νώμησεν δ' ἄρα πᾶσιν ἐπισταδόν. οἱ δὲ θεοῖσιν Σπείσαντες . . . πίον . . ., from which it is very probable that in the other passages some interpreters looked for the meaning of this ἐπισταδόν in the word ἐπαρξάμενοι, and not entirely without reason, as we shall see hereafter. Eustathius on Od. φ, 263. explains indeed ἐπάρξασθαι by ἐπὶ τοῖς φθάσασι πάλιν ἄρξασθαι (p. 759, 9. Basil.), but he does it merely to explain the origin of the expression; for a little before (p. 758, 44.) he says, κελεύει τὸν οἰνοχόον ἐπάρξασθαι ἐπὶ σπονδῇ. In this confusion the word σπείσαντες is not indeed used accurately, since not those who poured out, but those who were drinking the wine, performed the libation. But the expressions ἀπαρξάμενοι σπονδὴν . . . . ἐνώμησαν, and ἐπάρξασθαι ἐπὶ σπονδῇ, show plainly in what sense the superior grammarians understood the expression.

2. This interpretation, however, has not satisfied modern commentators, who generally wish to strip the word of its religious meaning. Gronovius (Obss. 1, 4.) translates it literally by '*incipientes poculis*,' and completes the sense by adding

vinum dare circum. If this explanation be put into plain language, it means that *νώμησαν ἐπαρξάμενοι* stands for *ἐπήρξαντο* or *ἤρξαντο νωμᾷν*, which will hardly be acknowledged by any one to be Homeric. Voss in his Critique on Heyne's Homer, p. 324., takes his stand on the words of Eustathius, *ἐπὶ τοῖς φθάσασι πάλιν ἄρξασθαι*, and thinks from them that he may premise as a thing already known, that the passage literally translated means, " they distributed to all around, *beginning again* with the cups." " For now," says he, " as they were to drink anew in honour of the god, the cup-bearers had to repeat their office, as at Il. ι, 174. Od. γ, 338. φ, 270., and carried the wine round again." In the same way, he supposes, the ancients must have acknowledged the idea of a repetition in *ἐπικρῆσαι*, Od. η, 164. ; and therefore because this repetition does not take place at Od. α, 147—149., the verse ought not to be inserted there. It is well known how unphilosophically and contrary to Greek rules the Greek grammarians, particularly the later ones, proceeded in their interpretation of words ; and in the instance of Eustathius before us, his explanation does not deserve the respect which has been paid to it. Whoever is not swayed by his authority will at once feel that *ἐπάρχεσθαι* cannot have this meaning, or at least that it is a very forced one ; in the same way as in *ἐπικρῆσαι*, which means nothing more than *to mix two things together by adding one to the other*, as, for instance, to mix wine with water. Schneider in his lexicon takes *ἐπαρξ.* to mean *going from left to right*, because in handing the wine they always followed this direction, as is certainly most evident from Od. φ, 141. *Ὄρνυσθ' ἑξείης, ἐπιδέξια πάντες, ἑταῖροι Ἀρξάμενοι τοῦ χώρου ὅθεν τέ περ οἰνοχοεύει.* But this explanation is false. I grant that when it is said, " the cup-bearer began to hand the wine", the idea of " from left to right", as one well known, might have naturally suggested itself to the hearer. But it does not therefore follow, that if Homer wished to say in his usual circumstantial manner, " the cup-bearers handed the wine round from left to right", he would also say, " they handed the wine round *beginning*".

3. Let us now turn again to the way in which the ancients explained it. That in every passage where the expression occurs it refers to drinking, that this drinking takes place

after the usual repast *in honour of some deity*, and in which consequently the principal thing is the *libation*, these are points acknowledged by all. At Il. *α*, 471. it is not indeed expressly mentioned that those who were drinking did (σπένδειν) pour libations, but both the context and analogy prove that they did. And, consequently, this is the cause why the verse is not found at Od. *α*, 148.; for there it is nothing more than the early commencement of the usual repast of the suitors; but at *σ*, 418. and *φ*, 263. it is a description of the cup which passes round as a religious observance after supper before they retire to rest, where, therefore, this expression is not omitted.

4. Now as to the expression itself, ἄρχεσθαι, κατάρχεσθαι is a word used in religious ceremonies, in describing which it may stand instead of other simple words (whose meaning lies in the context), in order to connect therewith the idea of the *beginning of the religious rite* or *the consecration of the victim*: as in Od. γ, 445. at the commencement of the sacrifice, Νέστωρ Χέρνιβά τ' οὐλοχύτας τε κατήρχετο, where it stands for *to initiate*, or *perform the first part of the ceremony*[1]. But it stands likewise in its proper sense for *to take away* from a whole or from a store, as to take *the first-fruits* or something for consecration. So where separate pieces of flesh are cut away for a burnt sacrifice, Od. ξ, 427., ὁ δ' ὠμοθετεῖτο συβώτης Πάντοθεν ἀρχόμενος μελέων; where the literal translation *to begin* would be perfect nonsense; for he began with only one limb, but *he took away from all some flesh for sacrifice*. Keeping, then, always in our mind the idea of consecrating the victim, we may look upon ἄρχεσθαι in connexion with each passage as the simple idea of *to take away*, *take part of*, *take from*, with the collateral idea supplied by the preposition. Ἀπάρχεσθαι is therefore exactly the same as ἄρχεσθαι, but in Homer it occurs only of the consecrating the hair of the victim: as Il. *τ*, 254. κάπρου ἀπὸ τρίχας ἀρξά-

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[1] This sense is frequent also in prose; and hence Lucian in Somn. 3. uses it in joke of the blows which he received the first day from his new master: σκυτάλην λαβὼν οὐ πρᾴως μου κατήρξατο. [It appears that both in this passage of the Odyssey and in that of Lucian the word is equivalent to our expression "he began with."—Ed.]

μενος, and elsewhere: on the other hand, in *προσάρχεσθαι* and *ἐπάρχεσθαι* there is in addition the collateral meaning of the preposition. The former compound occurs in Plato Theæt. sect. 33. (p. 168. c.), where Heindorf suspected the correctness of the reading: *Ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἑταίρῳ σου εἰς βοήθειαν προσηρξάμην κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν σμικρὰ ἀπὸ σμικρῶν*. The metaphorical expression taken from a dedication or consecration is here evident; and *πρὸς*, which properly speaking might be dispensed with, serves only to mark more clearly the relation of the verb to the person. And, consequently, in *ἐπάρξασθαι* also the simple *ἄρξασθαι* expresses the taking away or taking a part of anything to consecrate or dedicate it, and *ἐπὶ* marks the relation of it to the individuals *to* whom it is *given* or *amongst* whom it is *divided*. It did, therefore, certainly in some measure represent the idea of *ἐπισταδόν, ἐπιστάντες* (see above, sect. 1.),—the cup-bearers *went to each individual*, gave a part to each individual,—only that the idea of *ἐπάρξασθαι* is fuller and richer; although the sense arising from that idea, as contained in the whole sentence, might also be dispensed with[2].

5. It is remarkable that the word *ἐπάρξασθαι* occurs also in the bare sense of *to impart, offer, supply with,* in the Hymn to Apoll. v. 125., where Themis, who nourishes the young Apollo, *νέκταρ τε καὶ ἀμβροσίην ἐρατεινὴν Ἀθανάτῃσιν χερσὶν ἐπήρξατο*. Here then we have a very early proof of the imperfect way in which the post-Homeric poets, in their imitations of their oldest masters, seized on and used their expressions. I will, however, allow it to be possible that the author of this hymn is intentionally poetical in this instance, and selected this word in preference to a common one, because the child was one of the superior gods. But whether this were so or not, it follows indisputably from this passage, that as early as the times of the rhapsodists, to which this hymn belongs, the word *ἐπάρξασθαι*, wherever it occurred in the Epic poets, gave the idea of *to impart* or *offer to* individuals; by which therefore the explanation

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[2] Köppen on Il. α, 471. has (with the exception of the force of *ἐπὶ*) understood and explained the word in all essential points as I have done here.

here given of the Homeric expression receives the fullest confirmation, which in this respect it is possible to have.

Ἀτέων and ἄτη; vid. ἀᾶσαι.

Ἄτος; vid. ἀάατος.

30. Αὕτως, αὔτως.

1. The wavering of the old copies between the readings αὕτως and αὔτως has been so repeatedly settled, that the former is now generally acknowledged to be the only correct form; and the connexion between the different meanings has been traced. This latter was done, in all essential points, with sufficient minuteness by Damm, and also by Heyne on Il. γ, 220. But as the opinions and decisions of the grammarians are too easily rejected, particularly by the latter commentator[1], as imaginary refinements and useless subtleties, it will be perhaps not superfluous to collect together once more in one view all the points of any importance.

2. The opinion of the grammarians is given at full length in a scholium on Il. α, 133. Ἄυτως[2], μάτην. καὶ ἔστιν ἐπίῤῥημα μεσότητος, καὶ ψιλοῦται πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τοῦ ἑτέρου τοῦ σημαίνοντος τὸ οὕτως· καὶ ψιλοῦται διότι τὸ στερητικὸν α ψιλοῦται. And then follows the derivation from ἐτός, *true, real,* of which the converse would be ἄετος, and adverbially ἀέτως, whence αὔτως, as from νᾶες, γρᾶες,—ναῦς, γραῦς. The Etym. M. gives nearly the same account. Hesychius has Αὕτως· ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ ματαίου καὶ κατακένου· Αὕτως γὰρ ἐπέεσ' ἐριδαίνομεν (Il. β, 342.) ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίως, ὡσαύτως·...φαγέμεν καὶ πιέμεν αὕτως (Od. π, 143.). So stands the gloss in the printed copies; but we learn from Schow that in the MS. it stands Αὐτῶς...Αὐτὸς γὰρ..... Faulty as this is, it is evident enough that the original gloss made a distinction between

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[1] "*Grammaticum inventum*", says he, speaking of the present subject at Il. α, 133. "*quo uti licet, si placet*". A species of philological decision which we wish never to see imitated.

[2] Villoison has, in spite of the explanation which follows, both in the text and in the lemma of the scholium, αὕτως. Wassenbergh has consequently in both cases αὕτως.

αὔτως and αὕτως; and, consequently, the almost similarly-sounding gloss of Apollonius may be corrected so as to confirm the same. From this harmony of opinions it is clear, that we have here before us the decision of some high authority in the old Homeric criticism, most probably of Aristarchus himself. But beside this there existed another opinion. Eustathius found in the sources from which he drew his information nothing further than that αὔτως was an Æolic form: he says on Il. β, 120. τῶν δ' αὐτῶν (τῶν Αἰολέων), ὡς ψιλωτικῶν, καὶ τὸ αὔτως· οὐ γὰρ ἀναντιῤῥήτως δασύνεται, ὡς φανεῖται καὶ ἑτέρωθι. Compare on β, 342. γ, 220. Hence we see that in the oldest copies of Homer there was a wavering and uncertainty between αὕτως and αὔτως, which one part explained by a difference of dialect, and then disputed which of the two was the genuine Homeric form; while others had recourse to the more refined idea of forming, according to the difference of accent, a difference of meaning, and which they accounted for in the manner above mentioned. Between these two we have to make our decision. The uncertainty of the aspirate is the same as we shall see in ἐῆος; for at the time of which we are speaking αὕτως was no longer in common use, and its form brought to mind αὐτός as well as οὗτος, αὕτη. To deter us, however, from adopting the explanation of Aristarchus there is not only its internal improbability, (to prove which indeed needs no very detailed examination,) but the impossibility of separating the different passages of Homer and of placing them regularly under those two leading senses, as every observer will easily perceive from the selection of passages which I shall presently bring forwards.

3. I set out, then, by supposing with Damm and Heyne that αὕτως, without troubling myself about its origin, is a sister-form of οὕτως; for thus far we are justified in asserting, partly because the form with the aspirate is an undisputed one, as the unaspirated form is adopted only for certain cases; and partly because the demonstrative radical meaning is, at least in some of the passages, undoubted. It is, however, nowhere to be taken as purely and exactly synonymous with οὕτως, *thus*; for in the Epic language this is hardly conceivable, as οὕτως itself is of frequent occurrence in it, and there is no

metrical reason for the one being substituted for the other. Probably, therefore, usage had adopted that sister-form in those early times, when some particular stress was to be laid on *thus*. Such an instance is, first, when it forms a strong *antithesis*, as καὶ αὕτως, *even thus, even as things now are*, i. e. even without such a cause, without those circumstances, Il. α, 520. ε, 255. ι, 595*.

4. Again, αὕτως forms this antithesis, sometimes when it places *that which is original, unchanged*, in opposition to common changes, as Il. ψ, 268. of a caldron, λευκὸν ἔθ' αὕτως, still in *that* its original state completely unblackened with fire; and ω, 413. of the body of Hector, ἀλλ' ἔτι κεῖνος κεῖται.... Αὕτως ἐν κλισίῃσι, in *that* state in which he was before, still free from corruption; and sometimes also when *that which is common and of everyday occurrence* is placed in opposition to *that which is uncommon, great*, or *supernatural*; e. g. Od. ξ, 151. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐθ' αὕτως μυθήσομαι, ἀλλὰ σὺν ὅρκῳ. And again, Il. κ, 50. where it is said of Hector that he had performed great deeds, Αὕτως, οὔτε θεᾶς υἱὸς φίλος οὔτε θεοῖο. With this was mixed up very naturally the idea of *neglect*, in which sense it occurs very frequently indeed, and that too with the antithesis not expressed but understood; as at Il. σ, 338. where Achilles says to the dead body of Patroclus, Τόφρα δέ μοι παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσι κείσεαι αὕτως. Compare Od. ν, 281. 336†. And thus it is attached to all sorts of words and phrases which contain a *reproach*, a *contempt*, a *looking down upon*, as on something bad, mean, weak, &c. Thus Agamemnon reproaches Menelaus for his compassion as ill-timed, Il. ζ, 55. τίη δὲ σὺ κήδεαι αὕτως Ἀνδρῶν; and hence at φ, 106. I would defend τίη ὀλοφύρεαι αὕτως against the great majority of authorities who recommend the reading οὕτως. Again at Od. ρ, 309. where Ulysses asks whether the speed of the dog corresponds with his appearance, Ἦ αὕτως, οἷοίτε τραπεζῆες κύνες ἀνδρῶν Γίγνονται, or "is he of so worthless a quality, like?" &c. Similar to this is the ἀκλεὲς αὕτως, the νήπιος

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* [See also Il. σ, 198. where αὕτως means "just as you are, i.e. without arms."—Ed.]

† [Compare also τοῖος used in the same disparaging sense, Il. ψ, 246.—Ed.]

αὕτως spoken of children, &c. In the same way *αὕτως* is very naturally associated with all words which contain the idea of *useless, vain*, &c.; e. g. with the idea of wandering about (Il. *ν*, 104. *ψ*, 74.). And further in such expressions as *ἔργον αὕτως ἀκράαντον, αὕτως ἐτώσια, μὰψ αὕτως, ἀνεμώλιον αὕτως, αὕτως ἄχθος ἀρούρης* (Il. *β*, 138. *ρ*, 633. *υ*, 348. *φ*, 474. Od. *υ*, 379.).

5. Hence it is perfectly conceivable that a word so stamped by usage as *αὕτως* might *by itself alone* introduce into a sentence the idea of *vain* and *useless*, as soon as the context in some measure led to it; as at Il. *π*, 117. of the spear of Ajax, cut in two by Hector's sword, *τὸ μὲν Τελαμώνιος Αἴας Πῆλ' αὕτως ἐν χειρὶ κόλον δόρυ.* At *α*, 133. Agamemnon says, *Ἦ ἐθέλεις, ὄφρ' αὐτὸς ἔχῃς γέρας, αὐτὰρ ἔμ' αὕτως Ἧσθαι δευόμενον*; At *ο*, 128. Minerva approaching Mars says to him, *ἦ νύ τοι αὕτως Οὔατ' ἀκουέμεν ἐστίν.* At *β*, 342. *Αὕτως γὰρ ἐπέεσσ' ἐριδαίνομεν*, &c. As to giving an opinion on the remaining passages as they stand in Damm, or comparing this usage of *αὕτως* with similar usages in other languages, for instance, of the German *so*, and the English *so* or *thus*, we willingly leave it to individual examination. Nor will we say anything further of the mistaken explanations given by others of such passages, in which the true force of *αὕτως* must, we think, be made sufficiently evident by the review which we have taken.

6. Beside the force of the antithesis mentioned above, there is contained in the idea of *αὕτως, so* or *thus*, the force of *accordance* or *agreement*, as when we say *just so, exactly so, in the same way as*; and that *αὕτως* has this meaning also is most evident from two passages, not Homeric, but still very ancient. Hesiod in his Theogonia 702. describes the spectacle and noise of the battle of the gods with the Titans to have been *Αὕτως ὡς ὅτε γαῖα καὶ οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὕπερθεν Πίλνατο.* And Anacreon has even joined a dative with it (as he would have done with *ὁμοίως, ὡσαύτως, κατὰ ταὐτά*), as we see from a fragment in Athenæus, 12, p. 534., *καὶ σκιαδίσκην ἐλεφαντίνην φορεῖ γυναιξὶν αὕτως.* As this meaning is generally rare, it may not be surprising that I can quote but one instance of it from Homer; nor ought this circumstance to raise

a suspicion against the correctness of the explanation. It is from Il. δ, 17. where Jupiter bids the deities consider,

> . . . . ὅπως ἔσται τάδε ἔργα.
> Ἢ ῥ’ αὖτις πόλεμόν τε κακὸν καὶ φύλοπιν αἰνὴν
> Ὄρσομεν, ἢ φιλότητα μετ’ ἀμφοτέροισι βάλωμεν.
> Εἰ δ’ αὔτως τόδε πᾶσι φίλον καὶ ἡδὺ γένοιτο,
> Ἤτοι μὲν οἰκέοιτο πόλις Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος, &c.

Here αὔτως is considered to be simply οὕτως; but in addition to the reason given above why this is not probable, (a reason sufficient in itself,) we have here the cumbrous accumulation of οὕτως τόδε, an accumulation not easily to be accounted for, as natural language would admit but one of them. Either, then, τόδε refers to the latter of the two proposals of Jupiter, and πᾶσιν αὔτως means πᾶσιν ὁμοίως; or, as I am more inclined to suppose, Jupiter thinks that by the manner in which he has put the two questions for their choice, he has made it sufficiently plain that his own opinion is in favour of the second; and therefore he goes on at once to say, "If, now, this be pleasing and agreeable to all of you *in the same way* (as it is to me), then may", &c.[3] From this same meaning the grammarians, as we have seen above in the gloss of Hesychius, explained Od. π, 143., where it is said of old Laertes, lamenting the departure of Telemachus, Οὔπω μίν φασιν φαγέμεν καὶ πιέμεν αὕτως, "in the same way", &c. (i.e. as he did before). But this last appears to me too forced, and αὕτως in this passage seems evidently to be used in its most simple sense, and to refer to the *daily* and *customary* eating and drinking of men in general, as opposed to the abstinence of Laertes,—'in that same way in which men usually do'.

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[3] If, indeed, the writing αὔτως with the *lenis* stood on any better grounds than its being an Æolicism, which there appear to me intrinsic reasons for doubting, I should almost conjecture that that way of writing it did really and properly belong to this meaning. For although it is possible that the origin of the idea *in that same way* might have taken place (as supposed above) merely from laying a particular emphasis on the idea *so* or *thus*, yet there appears to me to be a more natural way of tracing it. It is well known that the simple pronoun αὐτός has sometimes in old Epic Greek the meaning of ὁ αὐτός, as, for instance, in αὐτὰ κέλευθα, and such expressions. Now in this sense it is capable of an adverbial acceptation. For as from καλός, *good*, comes καλῶς, *in a good way* or *manner*, so it appears that from the Epic αὐτός, *the same*, may come an adverb, αὐτῶς, *in the same way*. And if this form did exist, certainly the Æolians accented it αὔτως. But in the poets of other dialects there is no ground for this accentuation; and if, therefore, there be any foundation for that conjecture, the passages above quoted from Hesiod, Anacreon, Homer, and wherever any similar ones may be found elsewhere, must certainly have been written αὐτῶς; which, however, by a very easy transition passed over into the similar form αὕτως or αὔτως, and at last gave occasion to all the remarks and interpretations of the grammarians. If it were possible to reduce this conjecture to the most convincing certainty, still, however, as αὐτῶς is a form un-

7. There is another quite peculiar case of αὕτως in the expression ὡς δ' αὕτως, or, as it is supposed to be more accurately written, ὧς δ' αὕτως. This case is common to Homer, with all other writers, and is a separation of ὡσαύτος, by which the idea of *in the same way* is most fully and commonly expressed. According to this way of writing it, that form would therefore be a junction of the demonstratives ὧς and αὕτως, a thing scarcely conceivable, any more than that ὁ οὗτος or ὃς οὗτος should ever as an adjective have the sense of *idem*, 'the same'. But from this very consideration it naturally follows, that since when we want an adjective we use ὁ αὐτός, the natural adverb of it must be ὧς αὐτῶς. I think it needs only this consideration to make it certain, that this is the true origin of that compound particle, whilst the rest of the accentuation and aspiration in ὡσαύτως, ὡς δ' αὕτως, must have arisen from getting by mistake into the form αὕτως[4].

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heard of in all our authorities, we ought never to be induced to admit it into the text of Homer, from that deference so justly due to ancient authorities, which will be found strongly recommended in the following note, and which in our days is so much laid aside, to the great injury of classical literature.

[4] Whether this mistake be attributable to some real ancient usage, or merely to the decisions and arbitrary laws of the grammarians, I would not take upon myself to decide; although in cases of accent and aspirate, a great deal may be justly attributed to them. It is, however, a conceivable case, that because ὡσαύτως, although only an adverb of comparison, like παραχρῆμα and such like, still appears to be a proper compound, it underwent in the usage of common life the process properly belonging to compounds of having the natural accent thrown backward from the end of the word; and this is the more probable as the simple αὐτῶς did not exist in the current language of the day. As to the aspirate, it was scarcely possible to be heard after the δ in ὡσδαύτως, and it must

31. Ἄφενος.

1. In the word ἄφενος we have merely to be on our guard against an inaccurate etymology. The grammarians, ancient and modern, all following an inadmissible derivation, will connect it with something about a year's produce or income. But if we look through the passages where this substantive and its more frequently recurring adjective ἀφνειός are to be found, we see plainly that it means nothing more than the simple idea of the wealth and abundance in which a person is living. For instance, in the ἄφενος καὶ πλοῦτον ἀφύσσειν, which Achilles asserts that Agamemnon will never succeed in doing before Troy; in the ἀφνειὸς βιοτοῖο (Il. ζ, 14.), and ἀφνειὸς μήλοισι, (Hes. ε, 116. Loesn., and note to v. 119. Gaisford). And hence also Hesiod (θ, 112.) uses it even of the wealth which the gods once divided amongst each other; Ὥς τ' ἄφενος δάσσαντο καὶ ὡς τιμὰς διέλοντο*.

2. In order to introduce my opinion on the derivation of the word, I must first mention, that in the presence or absence of an ε in the same root, as in ἄλγος and ἀλέγω[1], in ἀλκή and ἀλέξω, in ὀργή, ὀργυιά, and ὀρέγω, and therefore also in ἄφενος, ἀφνείος, it is not at all necessary that the more complete form should be the original one, and the other an abbreviation of it, but just the reverse of this may be quite as likely. I recognise therefore, in this case, merely the root ἀφν with and without ε. And indeed there did once exist τὸ ἄφνος; for the Etym. M. in v. quotes from Pindar, οἱ δ' ἄφνει πεποίθασιν. But Hesychius has the following gloss, ἀφνύει, ἀφνύ-

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naturally, therefore, have been suggested by the opinion of some grammarian. Further than this, however, we ought not to go in such conjectural points, where all historical criteria of ancient truth fail us; and even the accenting of ὥς in ὥς δ' αὔτως appears to me not quite free from the reproach of being a half-measure, if it be not found in some manuscript or other, which I very much doubt.

* [Passow, in his Lexicon, prefers the old derivation of the grammarians to that of Buttmann; and certainly the former is confirmed by the *annona* of Tacitus. Doederlein derives it from ἀφύω, ἀφύσσω. See Il. α, 171.—Ed.]

[1] See art. 21. sect. 23.

νει[2], ὀλβίζει. This verb and the substantive presuppose a more simple adjective, which we will form in υς, ἀφνύς, εῖα, ύ, in the same way as βαρύνω, τὸ βάρος come from βάρυς, κράτος, κρατύνω from κρατύς, and the like. And of this ἀφνύς the adjective in common use, ἀφνειός, is a lengthened form. But ἀφνύς, again, I consider to be nothing more than an old abbreviation of ἄφθονος, originating in the every-day language of Greece. The meaning of this latter word was originally confined, as is plain from its ethical relation, to the possession of property. It became afterwards more general, and meant everything numerous, whilst its abbreviation ἀφνύς with its derivatives retained only the limited sense.

3. But what are we to say of Hesiod ε, 24., where the word stands as a masculine, εἰς ἄφενον σπεύδοντα? To that passage there is a various reading, ἄφενος. And at v. 635., where the text has οὐκ ἄφενος φεύγων, there is again a various reading ἄφενον. Callimachus, indeed, who in his Hymn. Jov. 96. has undoubtedly the masculine form, Οὐδ' ἀρετῆς ἀφένοιο, must have taken it from some precedent equally undoubted. But no other poet could have allowed himself such a liberty, when only two verses before he had written δίδου δ' ἀρετήν τ' ἄφενός τε. On Hesiod we must not lay the blame of having quite unnecessarily made this variation, even though it occurs in two verses separated so widely. As the neuter is recommended both by analogy and the usage of the other oldest poets, I consider the masculine to be a misuse, which was first introduced into the language in a later period, and so crept into some of the copies of Hesiod*.

32. Ἀχέειν.

1. In Homer's Hymn to Pan, v. 18. it is said of the nightingale, in all the manuscripts,

Θρῆνον ἐπιπροχέουσα χέει μελίγηρυν ἀοιδήν.

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[2] The ἀφεννύνει which stands in the printed text is a false emendation of Musurus. See Schow.

* [Passow, in his Lexicon, is of opinion that Hesiod really did use the masculine form, and that some of his successors imitated him.—Ed.]

As this reading cannot be right, Ilgen reads,

> Θρῆνον ἐπιπροχέουσ' ἀχέει μελίγηρυν ἀοιδήν.

But this also is objected to, and Ruhnken's correction ἰάχει is preferred, and admitted into the text in Hermann's and Wolf's editions. And thus the wound is hidden; which it never would have been, if that laudable custom had been once universally adopted, of looking on the text of the ancients as something too sacred to be meddled with rashly, and of admitting nothing into it which has not a certain degree of proof and philological certainty, on which point a tacit agreement would soon be formed among true critics. Ilgen's proposed reading is no alteration of the text; it has that degree of certainty which arises from ancient authority. It is true that the objections to it are not entirely unfounded. Ἀχέειν ἀοιδήν, simply for ἀείδειν ἀχέουσαν ἀοιδήν, would perhaps not be objected to; but θρῆνον ἐπιπροχέουσα ἀχέει ἀοιδήν is an expression more than surprising in so distinguished a poet. Who would not, therefore, thankfully admit, *under* the text, Ruhnken's correction? Let documentary truth, as mentioned above, always remain *in* the text before the eyes of the philological reader, and then whatever may still be concealed in such a traditionary reading will be brought to light much quicker and much oftener than it now is.

2. In the Hymn to Ceres, 479. this advantage is still left us. The mysteries are there called

> Σεμνὰ, τά τ' οὔπως ἔστι παρεξίμεν, οὔτε πυθέσθαι,
> Οὔτ' ἀχέειν· μέγα γάρ τι θεῶν ἄγος ἰσχάνει αὐδήν.

There is in the text here a correction of Valckenaer, ἄγος for the ἄχος of the manuscripts, which is so evidently an improvement, that it may claim a full right of admission; and there is in the notes a proposal of Ilgen to read οὔτε χανεῖν for the unintelligible οὔτ' ἀχέειν.

3. The excellent critics who have given their time and attention to the Hymns would surely have been struck with the word ἀχέειν thus occurring twice in these poems, had they not been shackled by a preconceived opinion that the undoubted meaning of this verb was *to groan, lament.* From the fetters of such an idea I am freed by the gloss of Hesychius, Me-

γαχήσεται· μέγα βοήσει. To this one of the commentators subjoins with great simplicity, "*Quasi* μέγ' ἀχήσεται," and again Toup adds, with the same simple brevity, "*Dorice scilicet*". I cannot, indeed, refute the opinion which supposes this to be taken from a lyric metre; but how improbable is it that, among the innumerable Doricisms of that kind which ἀχήσεται would be, just this one should have found a place in Hesychius! On the other hand, the words bear the Epic stamp of μέγ' ὀχθήσας, μέγ' ἴαχεν, μέγ' ἔξοχος, of which the two latter are also in Hesychius; and naturally so, because such compound expressions were written also as one word, and were looked upon as real compounds. It did not strike any one that ᾱ for η is indeed a Doricism, but that ᾰ for η, although of rarer occurrence, is an Ionicism[1]. Thus Hesiod, instead of ἠμύειν, used at the end of the verse ἀμύοντα χαμᾶζε, as given in Etym. M. v. ἠμύω. And in a similar way the Epic poets of the same period for ἠχέειν used ἀχέειν, the meaning of which verb exactly suits both the above-quoted verses. The other sense of the same word need not puzzle or mislead us; for first, ἀχέειν is *to sound, to emit a sound,* therefore not yet an Homeric dialect; and secondly, in the sense of *to sigh, to groan,* only the participle ἀχέων, ἀχέουσα is to be found, which however is repeatedly used. Still less should the two verbs be confounded, as coming from the same parent stem. Ἀχέων belongs to ἄχομαι, ἄχος; but ἀχέειν, *to sound,* belongs to ἠχέω, ἠχή, &c.

4. Now that we have the verb ἀχέειν three times quite distinct before us, it will be in future more easily known under any disguise; and it occurs again in the Hymns. In the

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[1] In some words and forms the Ionians also have α for η, but always short, e.g. in πάρη for πήρα (Heraclid. ap. Eust. Il. α, 24. p. 22, 14. Od. μ, 89. p. 478, 12. Basil.), in ἀμφισβατέω, ἀμφισβασίη for -ητέω, -ησία; and hence, on account of the metre, in some tenses, as μεμᾰκυῖα from μέμηκα. And so this Ionic α, even when it stands in a syllable long by position, must be pronounced short; for instance, in the following Ionic forms, μεσαμβρία for μεσημβρία, λέλασται, λελασμένος (from λήθω), λάξις for λῆξις (Dor. λᾶξις).—Greg. Cor. in Ion. 45. 52. Eust. l. c. In this way is explained the adj. ἄσμενος, which came from the perf. or aor. syncop. of ἥδομαι, and passed into the common language of the day.—*Buttmann's Ausführl. Sprach. sect.* 27. *obs.* 17.

Hymn to Venus, 253. this goddess says, that she who had so often seduced the gods into amorous connexions with mortals, durst no longer, as she had herself yielded to a similar weakness, mention the subject among the immortals:

> Νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκέτι μοι στοναχήσεται ἐξονομῆναι
> Τοῦτο μετ' ἀθανάτοισιν.

As it has been long suspected from the context that the first syllables of στοναχήσεται conceal the word στόμα, I allow that nothing was more natural than to expect to discover in the remaining syllables some word to signify the *opening* of the mouth. And thus Hermann's and Wolf's texts have admitted, to the satisfaction of many readers, the conjecture of Bernh. Martinius, στόμα χείσεται; in support of which is cited, from Od. σ, 17. Οὐδὸς δ' ἀμφοτέρους ὅδε χείσεται, "this threshold *has room* for both of us." But fully convinced as I am that the verbs χανδάνειν and χάσκειν, χανεῖν are *etymologically* the same, yet I must (and in this case the obligation is the stronger), separate *grammatically* what usage has already divided. The verbs χάσκω, ἔχανον, κέχηνα, χανοῦμαι, and χανδάνω, ἔχαδον, κέχανδα, χείσομαι, are by meaning and usage so completely separated, the one from the other, that no form of the one ever occurs in a single instance in the sense of the other; and the diphthong of χείσομαι follows as surely from the νδ in χανδάνω, κέχανδα, as πείσομαι does from πέπονθα, πένθος. If then, after the first correction has amended the word to στομαχήσεται, the remainder χήσεται be not given unchanged to χάσκω to form another future beside χανοῦμαι, this verb, well as it suits the meaning of the sentence, cannot be made of any use. But who will adopt a form otherwise unknown, when another offers itself for our acceptance? The future middle of the verb ἀχέειν lies before our eyes in the first-mentioned gloss of Hesychius. The words οὐκέτι μοι στόμ' ἀχήσεται ἐξονομῆναι τοῦτο give therefore an exactly similar meaning, "my mouth will no more utter a sound in mention of this."

5. I suppose that this ἀχέειν was the older form, whence came ἦχος and ἠχέειν; with reference to which it is worthy of remark, that among the explanations of the epithet Ἀχαία,

which Ceres bore in Attica, there stands in the Etym. M. this also, *ἢ ὅτι μετὰ κυμβάλων ἠχοῦσα τὴν Κόρην ἐζήτει.* At the same time, it appears to me very probable that this ἀχέω is indeed, properly speaking, of the same family as χάω, χάσκω, as we see the same twofold meaning in our English word, ‘to crack’, in the German *klaffen,* and in the Latin *crepare.* We can therefore very fairly connect the sense of *non hiscere,* which is so particularly natural in the last-quoted passage, with the general tenor of our representation; but in the quotation from the Hymn to Ceres, Οὔτ' ἀχέειν suits the context much better than Οὔτε χανεῖν, because ἀχέειν there governs the same accusative as πυθέσθαι.

Ἄωρτο; vid. ἀνήνοθεν, &c.

33. Ἄωτος, ἀωτεῖν.

1. The lexicons acknowledge two forms of this word, τὸ ἄωτον and ὁ ἄωτος, of which they prefer the neuter, considering the masculine as only a sister-form of less frequent occurrence. We will begin with correcting this error. The Homeric passages do not indeed furnish us with any means of deciding on the gender; Pindar, however, has frequently ἄωτος and ἄωτοι, but never the neuter. In the later poets, from the time of Apollonius (4, 176.), the neuter does occur; but this will not justify us in considering the established usage of Pindar to be a Doricism. It is possible, however, that the lexicographers Hesychius, Suidas, and the Etymologus, considering whatever was more ancient as necessarily more rare and glossarial, noted the masculine form as the special and particular one. This opinion we must reverse, giving the precedence to ἄωτος, as the old and genuine form used by Pindar, and ranking the neuter, for which we find no authority older than the Alexandrines, as a later usage.

2. With regard to the meaning of the word likewise the lexicons (even the earliest) mislead us. Does not every one suppose that ἄωτος means *a flower,* or *blossom,* being only a more poetical word for ἄνθος? And yet it is not so. Let us

lay aside for a moment the Homeric use of the word, which most readers of Homer will recollect not to have been perfectly clear, and let us turn to Pindar, who is almost too fond of it[1]. It occurs in his Odes seventeen times, always in the figurative sense of something *very fine*, or of the *best* and *most beautiful* of its kind; in short, it is used for that which in most cases, in a mere matter of opinion, may be expressed by *flos*, the flower or bloom of anything; but Pindar never uses it of a flower or a blossom in its proper and simple sense. And all the other poets, without exception, use it in a similar manner. To give an example of the utility of this negative kind of information, we may turn to an old epigram of an uncertain author, (Anthol. Cephal. 13, 28., Anthol. Jacob. 1, 73., Brunck. Anal. 1, 141., Simonid. 70. or 76.) where, speaking of being crowned with garlands, it is said ῥόδων ἀώτοις, which has been translated *rosarum floribus* in an edition of Callimachus, to whom this epigram has been by mistake attributed. (See Blomfield's Callim. Epig. 49.) It does not appear that any one has been struck with this expression, being probably satisfied with the translation *rosarum floribus*; but not so would have been the poet, who intended, by the addition of ἄωτοι, to exalt his roses above all other roses, in the same way as Pindar marks the superiority of certain heroes by the expression, ἡρώων ἄωτοι, Nem. 8, 15.

3. I doubt not that the above observations may have occurred to other philologists as well as to myself; but one thing I very much fear, that they will for the most part remain firm in the opinion that ἄωτος means the blossom *in a metaphorical sense*. If these persons mean to say that the proper sense of ἄωτος was still extant at that time as an ancient or poetical sense, but that it happens not to have been preserved in any passages now remaining, I answer, that this is a mere assertion without proof, which we can fully and more than sufficiently refute, not only by the before-mentioned ῥόδων ἀώτοις, but, that no one may accuse us of arguing in a circle, by its being joined with στεφάνων; as when Pindar, Ol. 9, 30. says,

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[1] Τὸ φιλητὸν καὶ πολύχρηστον τῷ Πινδάρῳ ἄωτον, Eustath. ad Il. ν, 599.

ὅθεν (from Delphi and Olympia) *στεφάνων ἄωτοι κλυτὰν Λοκρῶν ἐπαείροντι ματέρ' ἀγλαόδενδρον.* Though we can say, in order to express the most excellent of its kind, 'the flower of songs', 'the blossom of life', and so on, yet we cannot say, in order to express the most illustrious or excellent of victorious wreaths, 'the blossom or the flower of wreaths', because in this case both sound and sense would be offended by the proper meaning of the word being suggested to the mind by the affinity between *flower* and *wreath.* It is clear, therefore, from this single example, that in Pindar's time no one on hearing the word *ἄωτος* thought of *a blossom,* or of any meaning beyond the proper one of the word as it existed at that time in the language. But if this be the case, neither is it a metaphor taken from the idea of a blossom or flower; for an expression becomes a metaphor only when the person who makes use of it knows its proper meaning; and either from his own imagination, or from following an idea introduced by some other, he uses the word in its metaphorical sense. The common explanation of the word *ἄωτος* prevents, therefore, the correct understanding of it; for whoever, not considering that the word nowhere means *blossom* or *flower* in its proper sense, gives to it, when he finds it expressive of something the most beautiful or excellent of its kind, the metaphorical idea of *blossom* or *flower*, that person attributes to the poet a figure which he never dreamt of; a worse fault than misunderstanding a figure which he really intended*. There would be nothing, therefore, left but to suppose that the word meant in the oldest period of the language *blossom* or *flower* in its proper sense, but that this meaning became quite obsolete, and that it retained only the metaphorical one. This is certainly possible, and if it can be proved by historical facts, it would be of some value in an inquiry into language in general; if it cannot be so proved, it is of no value at all.

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* [Buttmann makes no mention of a passage in Æschylus in which *ἄωτον* occurs, Supp. 680.

Ἥβας δ' ἄνθος ἄδρεπτον
Ἔστω· μηδ' Ἀφροδίτας
Εὐνάτωρ βροτολοιγὸς Ἄ-
-ρης κέρσειεν ἄωτον.

From *ἄωτον* following here so closely on *ἄνθος*, one can hardly avoid thinking that the poet understood them as synonymous words, and intended to keep up the same figure: yet on the other hand, from the frequent use of *κείρω* with *κόμην, χαίτας* and the like, both in the Iliad and Odyssey (see also Æschyl. Choeph. 169. 186.), we might rather conclude that the poet has here drawn his metaphor from that simple idea which Buttmann supposes toward the end of this article.—Ed.]

4. We have been obliged to premise thus much, in order that we may not be influenced by any preconceived opinion in the consideration of Homer's use of *ἄωτος*. The first passage where the word occurs in that poet is at Il. *ι*, 661. where the damsels prepare a couch for Phœnix by spreading

> *Κώεά τε ῥῆγός τε λίνοιό τε λεπτὸν ἄωτον.*

Here no one hesitates for a moment to apply to Homer the usage of succeeding poets, and to understand by it the very finest linen. Again, when in the other passages of Homer, where the thing spoken of is *wool*, it is called *οἰὸς ἄωτος*, this expression is somewhat different; still it is such, that when at Od. *α*, 443. where Telemachus sleeps *κεκαλυμμένος οἰὸς ἀώτῳ*, it is understood to mean the softest wool, this also would agree very well with the common usage of the word. But at Il. *ν*, 599. and 716. *the sling* is called *ἐΰστροφος οἰὸς ἄωτος*. Now is this the place, where the poet is speaking of a compact and hard-twisted sling, to introduce the idea of the finest, the softest, and the most beautiful wool? The same doubt recurs as forcibly at Od. *ι*, 434. where Ulysses entwines his hands in the wool of the great ram:

> ....*αὐτὰρ χερσὶν ἀώτου θεσπεσίοιο*
> *Νωλεμέως στρεφθεὶς ἐχόμην τετληότι θυμῷ.*

In explaining *θεσπέσιος* (see art. 66. sect. 5.) in this passage by *divine, splendid, pre-eminently beautiful*, it ought to be remarked that that expression contains the idea of *enormously thick and compact*, as the thing itself there plainly shows; an idea totally incompatible with that of *ἄωτος*, as hitherto explained. One thing, however, is clear, that in all those passages the thing meant was *simply wool*; and though some might still persevere in endeavouring to support the before-mentioned interpretation, by saying that the wool intended by this expression was 'the best and most excellent in the sheep',—or that, supposing the existence of that reputed ancient meaning *blossom* or *flower*, it was called by way of eminence 'the blossom of the sheep[2]', but that this poetical expression was become to a certain extent so completely Epic, that the poet used it with reference to those common subjects without any poetical view,—still even that interpretation is not applicable to this last passage; for if it were admitted, ἄωτος must have its genitive case after it. Nay, even if we suppose that 'the bloom of the sheep' was an old Epic expression for wool, still Voss would hardly bring himself to translate the passage thus:

aber ich selber
Wählte den stattlichsten Bock, der weit vorragte vor allen;
Diesen fasst' ich am Rücken, und unter den wolligen Bauch hin
Lag ich gekrümmt, und darauf in der *wunderherrlichen Blüte*
Hielt ich fest die Hände gedreht, ausdaurendes Herzens*.

And it may with truth be observed that the same would hold good of every other metaphor which we might endeavour to lay down as a groundwork for explaining the word ἄωτος. In this passage, the expression, whatever it is, must necessarily be one used in its *proper sense*; and that which Voss, with genuine poetic feeling, has actually placed in his translation, is undoubtedly the true one: *im herrlichen Flockengekräusel*, 'in the superb mat of wool'. Ἄωτος must necessarily have meant in that more remote period, even in the common language, *a lock of wool*, or collectively *a fleece*[3].

5. As soon as we have admitted this, it is hardly possible to suppose that the first passage (Il. ι, 661.), λίνοιο ἄωτος, can have been used by Homer in the sense in which the succeeding

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[2] As, for example, in Apollon. Lex. in v.

* [Which may be thus literally translated:

But I myself
Chose out the stateliest goat of all the flock;
I seized him, and beneath his woolly paunch
I lay curled up, and in the *wondrous bloom*
Twining my hands, held firm with persevering heart.—Ed.]

[3] Apollonius has only once the Homeric use of the word, viz. 4, 176., speaking of the golden fleece, Τόσσον ἔην πάντῃ χρύσεον ἐφύπερθεν ἄωτον. Callimachus, Theocritus, and others use it like Pindar.

poets used it, for the finest of linen. But by a more accurate examination of it the truth now becomes self-evident. Λίνον is properly not *linen*, but the plant of which the linen was made,—the *flax* ; and although it is now very natural that the same word should be used for the *flax-plant*, for the *flax* produced from it, and for the *thread* and *linen* made of it, yet this does not prevent λίνοιο ἄωτος from being explained according to the analogy of οἰὸς ἄωτος. For as a *lock* (*floccus*) of that which comes from the body of the sheep is wool, so a *lock* of that which comes from the flax-plant is nothing more than flax ; and as the wool is often mentioned instead of the cloth made from it, so λίνοιο ἄωτος (*floccus lini*) means nothing more than simply *linen*.

6. The meaning thus drawn from a comparison of passages is confirmed by the etymology of the word which corresponds with it most naturally. Ἄωτος is the Lat. *floccus*. As this is derived from *flo*, so that comes from ἄημι ; and both mean *the light and airy locks* of the sheep or of the flax-plant.

7. But if this be the proper and simple meaning of the word, and also (as we plainly see it is) the older sense and the one in use in Homer's time ; it follows that no other but this, or one very nearly akin to it, can be the idea from which comes the metaphorical sense used by Pindar. Here, then, all hope of introducing the idea of blossom or flower must be totally lost. But the sense of *flock* or *down* (*floccus*) will, in another way, do us the same service. Without doubt ἄωτος was used to mean also the downy pile or nap of cloth, that delicate λάχνη which constitutes the fineness and beauty of cloth, and which proves its newness, as on the other hand *defloccatæ vestes* in Latin are the same with *detritæ*, clothes which by wear have lost their nap, and consequently their freshness and beauty. That from such an object of every-day life were taken figurative and proverbial expressions, is agreeable to the simplicity of those early times ; whatever moved, as it were, above or upon any body or any number of things, as the best and most beautiful, was called the *flock* or *down* of it, the *floccus* or ἄωτος of it. The proper sense of the word was meanwhile lost after Homer's time in the common language of daily life ; and then it disappeared in its figurative application, so that

Pindar used the word in many combinations which a literal comparison with the original proper meaning no longer allows.

8. Necessary as it appears to be to connect the verb ἀωτεῖν immediately with ἄωτος, still it will be a difficult task for any one to accomplish who keeps analogy always in view. The verb occurs only as spoken of sleep; but in both the passages of Homer where it is found, it has the accusative ὕπνον with it. This favoured the explanation of the grammarians, ἀπανθίζειν. But it is to be hoped that it will not give any fresh encouragement to the explaining of the word ἄωτος by ἄνθος, as that mode of explanation, refined and forced as it is in itself, is quite inadmissible in these two passages where sleep is forbidden; as, Il. κ, 159. τί πάννυχον ὕπνον ἀωτεῖς; and Od. κ, 548. Μηκέτι νῦν εὕδοντες ἀωτεῖτε γλυκὺν ὕπνον. On the contrary, some might perhaps be satisfied with my interpretation, if I were to suppose that the verb ἀωτεῖν expresses more briefly the same meaning as the passage of Od. α, 443., where Telemachus sleeps wrapped up, οἰὸς ἀώτῳ. But neither is it consistent with analogy to form a verb thus for such a meaning, nor would it, when joined with the accusative ὕπνον, give us a just and correct sense. On the other hand, it was long ago proposed to leave the word ἄωτος out of the question, and to derive the word immediately from ἄω in the sense of *to sleep*, as we find that sense in ἄεσαν and ἰαύω. But it is very much to be feared that such a repetition of the same idea in εὕδοντες ἀωτεῖτε ὕπνον might make most readers look on it as little better than our saying 'the sleep of the sleeping sleepers', or 'the singers sang a song'; at the same time it is not to be denied that such repetitions are by no means uncommon in the simple language of the ancients, particularly when the words are of different families. That is to say, man, in the simplicity of early times, hears in each differently sounding word a different collateral idea, although he is not himself conscious of it. Now in εὕδειν it must be evident to any one who compares the passages of Homer where it occurs, that the leading idea is *to lie down*. Of ἀωτεῖν, which is a form lengthened from the verb ἄειν to increase its force, I doubt not that it originally expressed by a poetical onomatopœia the idea only of *to snore*; and then *to sleep a snoring deep sleep*; in which

sense the accusative ὕπνον was added to it, according to the usual Greek idiom, merely to have a substantive for *παννύχιος* or *γλυκύς*, the epithets used for defining what kind of sleep it was.

Βέβρυχα; vid. *βρόξαι*.

34. Βλίττειν*.

1. In giving my opinion of the derivation of *ἄμβροτος* from *μόρος*, *βροτός*, *mors*, *mortalis*, I had occasion to notice that particular formation of language, according to which, especially in Greek, *βρ* and *βλ* frequently come from *μ* followed by a vowel before *ρ* or *λ*. As many cases of this kind are looked on in a different light, it is necessary to go through the principle of this formation, as completely as it can be done on historical grounds. With this view, but also with this limitation, I will here make some additions to what has been said in the article on *ἄμβροτος*, and endeavour to give a more satisfactory detail of what may have been mentioned there too briefly.

2. I must first remind my readers of the certainty of the principle itself, after which it will only remain to show to what particular cases it may be correctly applied. This certainty is evident without further proofs from the single instance (resting on firm historical grounds) of *βλώσκω*, which bears the same relation to *μολεῖν* as *θρώσκω* to *θορεῖν*, and which possesses, besides, a middle point of support (not, indeed, that such a one is wanted,) in *μέμβλωκα*. The case of *μόρος*, *ἄμβροτος*, *βροτός*, and of the forms belonging to them, would, even if its own evidence were deficient, receive support enough from the former case to produce perfect conviction.

3. Here also induction comes to our assistance by introducing cases which, taken separately, would have less meaning

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* [Originally written as a supplement to article 15, sect. 9.—Ed.]

and weight. Every linguist knows well that the ramification of such principles spreads into dialects very remote from the written language, and he therefore has recourse to glossaries, particularly to that of Hesychius. In this he finds *Βεβραμένων* explained by *εἱμαρμένων*, the connexion of which two forms is supported by the glosses *Ἔμβραται* and *Ἐμβραμένη* for *εἵμαρται, εἱμαρμένη*. These forms do not bear any mark of having been made by the grammarians, as we find thousands which do in the Etymologicum, though but few in Hesychius. Such forms were invented by the grammarians in order to explain some other form actually occurring in the written language, the analogy of which was not evident; these, on the other hand, lead to nothing of the sort, nay, they rather deviate from the usual grammatical analogy. We may therefore take it for certain, that instead of *εἵμαρται*, or, as required by the prevailing analogy, *μέμαρται*, certain dialects had also *βέβραται* and *ἔμβραται*; this last for *ἔμμαρται*, to which we are led by the analogy of *ἔμμορα*; and here then we have again the same metathesis and its consequences. At the same time, these forms support the case of *μόρος* and *βροτός* particularly and immediately, since those, as well as these, take their origin from the same idea of fate, and the same root *μείρω*. I will only mention the case of *μάρπτω* and *βράψαι* (Hesych. *Βράψαι, συλλαβεῖν*), which strikingly agrees in analogy with the others. For further particulars I refer to Schneider's Lexicon* and the notes in Hesychius.

4. To the gloss Βλεῖ Hesychius has the explanations *βλίσσει, ἀμέλγει, βαδίζει*. Of the first two we will proceed to

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* [The following is an extract from Schneider's Lexicon: *Μάρπω* and *μάρπτω*, poet. the same as *συλλαμβάνω*, &c., &c. The root is *μάπω*, whence in Hesiod. Scut. 231. and 251. *μαπέειν* and *μεμάποιεν*. Thence *βράψαι· συλλαβεῖν, ἀναλῶσαι, κρύψαι, θηρεῦσαι*, Hesych.—*Ἔβραπτεν· ἔκρυψεν, ἔσφυξεν*. Again, *ἔβραψεν· ἔκρυψεν, ἔπιεν, κατέφαγεν*; from *βράπτειν· ἐσθίειν, κρύπτειν, ἀφανίζειν. τῷ στόματι ἕλκειν, ἢ στενάζειν*, Hesych.—The last explanation appears to refer to *βράζειν*. As from *μολίσκω* has been made *βλώσκω*, and from *ἥμαρτον ἤμβροτον*, so from *μάρπτω* has been formed *βάρπτω*, by metathesis *βράπτω*. Perhaps to these belong *βρακεῖν, βρακείς, συνιέναι, συνιείς*, Hesych. (like *συλλαμβάνειν*, *comprehendere*, 'to comprehend',) from *βράκημι*, which again is derived from *βέβρακα*.—Ed.]

speak by and by. Against the last have been made sundry uncritical attacks. We must however firmly defend every word against which suspicion has been raised without any traceable grounds. A very slight acquaintance with Hesychius is sufficient to teach us, that when he is explaining a word which, as coming from different roots or from different branches of a root, has different and totally unconnected meanings, he puts them down without hesitation, one after the other. Let us then look at Βλεῖ, *βαδίζει*, as a particular Hesychian gloss. What reason can we have for rejecting the comparison of this word with *μολεῖν*? One thing we do find,—and it enables us to prove the connexion more accurately and certainly,—which is, that in the contraction of *μολεῖν* to *βλεῖ* there remains no trace of the ο; by which, therefore, the case is somewhat different from that of *βλώσκω* and the grand analogy belonging to it. But let us recollect that by the change of vowel the verbal form *μολεῖν* probably belongs to a root with *ε*; and then we are met immediately by *μέλλειν*, of which the pure idea, as it arises in the mind, must have had likewise its physical meaning. And what can this be but *to go*; as in French *je vais perdre*, in Latin *perditum ire*, &c. Nay, *μέλω*, *μέλει μοι*, can hardly be anything else, if literally translated, than *it goes to me*, or, to make the sense more complete, *it goes to my heart**. When therefore Hesychius gives us from some of the dialects *βλεῖν* in the sense of *βαδίζειν*, who would wish to separate it from such a word as this *μέλω*, *μέλλω*, to which it bears the same relation as *κλέω*, *κλείω* does to the known root *κέλω*? But this *μέλειν* corresponds quite as well in its common meaning also with the analogy previously laid down here; in as much as, beside the Homeric *μέμβλεται*, there were in the dialects also forms with a simple *β*: for instance, in Hesych. Βέβλεσθαι, *μέλλειν*, *φροντίζειν*. Βέβλειν, *μέλλειν*: in both which glosses I have no hesitation in approving of the correction *μέλειν*.

5. The principle then of this affinity of sounds is certain, so that the application of it to individual cases has at least as much probability, as in those where it lies more on the surface.

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* [Both these sentences literally rendered, the former as well as the latter, are in constant use in German, *es geht mich an*, or *es geht mir zu herzen*; in French, *cela me va au cœur*.—Ed.]

I have for instance declared myself favourable to that opinion which connects βλίττειν, *to take the honey from the hive*, with μέλι. Βλίσαι, τὸ τὰ κηρία θλῖψαι τῶν μελισσῶν, ἀπὸ τοῦ μέλι, μελίζω. Etym. M. Βλίττειν, τὸ ἀφαιρεῖν τὸ μέλι ἀπὸ τῶν κηρίων. (and) Βλίσαι, καπνίσαι μελίσσας καὶ ἐξελάσαι τῶν σμηνῶν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὸ μέλι τρυγῆσαι. Hesych. Here we see, that in whatever way the ancients took their honey from the hive, it was called βλίττειν, which might be the foundation of the opinion so decidedly given, that βλίττειν comes from μέλι. Notwithstanding this, however, I by no means despise or reject the other opinion, which may be found in Schneider's* and in Riemer's Greek and German Lexicons, that βλίττειν comes from a more simple root, with the idea of *to handle, to press or squeeze out*. Βλεῖ· βλίσσει, ἀμέλγει, Hesych. Βλίττειν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεῖν τὸ μέλι ἀπὸ τῶν κηρίων. καὶ πειράζειν, καὶ τὸ ψηλαφᾷν, καὶ τὸ ἐκπιέζειν, τὰ κηρία τῶν μελισσῶν θλίβειν. Schol. Aristoph. Equ. 794. To which we may add the verb βλιμάζειν, *to feel* or *handle*, particularly to feel hens in order to ascertain whether they have eggs in them or not; for that this verb has been used also in the same precise sense as βλίττειν (see Etym. M. and Suid. in v.) I am not yet willing to admit as certain. If then we see the word βλίττειν, with the meaning of *to milk*, thus brought to one common fundamental idea, it is worthy of remark, that here again also we are met by the root ΜΕΛ in μέλγειν, 'to milk', *mulgere*, and that in addition to this last word the more general idea offers itself to us again in *mulcere*, 'to stroke down'. This confirms me in the wisdom of adopting one general principle, to abstain as much as possible from pronouncing positively which of two or more words comes from the other; or which sound in a family of words is the primitive one, whence the others proceed chronologically and genealogically. I might probably be allowed to derive the more general ideas of *to stroke, stroke down, handle,* or *feel,* from some more particular idea such as *to milk*; in order to support the more convenient derivation of the German verb *melken,* 'to milk', from the substantive *milch,* 'milk', and consequently also βλίττειν from μέλι. But this twofold appearance induces me for the present, at least as the more natural, to place as the groundwork of my derivation that idea which is common to both. I suppose therefore a stock or root ΜΕΛΙΩ, with the idea of 'to stroke down', 'handle', *palpare, mulcere,* with which are connected the German and English adjective *mild,* and μείλιχος, with the verb μειλίσσειν, Æschyl. μελίσσειν. The physical idea of the word passed over on the one side into the form μέλγω, *melken,* 'to milk', whence the German adjective *melk,* Engl. 'milch', and the German substantive *Milch,* Engl. 'milk', the name given to the liquor obtained by milking, i. e. by *stroking down and pressing* the teat of the cow; whilst on the other side arose from the unchanged root the substantive μέλι. These two words are therefore, strictly speaking, one and the same word and thing; but they fixed themselves in the one branch of the language on the more definite idea of *honey,* in the other on that of *milk.* At the same time in the Greek the root ΜΕΛ passed over, according to the analogy more prevalent in that language, into ΒΛ; whence βλεῖν, βλίττειν, and βλιμᾷν; and so it remains undecided whether the word βλίττω comes from the root immediately, or through μέλι. The connexion of βλίτον with μέλι, arising perhaps from the idea of sweetness, is supported by a trifling analogy[1].

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* [Schneider in his Greek and German Lexicon says of βλίττω,—Some derive it from μέλι, μελίττω, as βλάξ from μαλακός, and βλώσκω from μόλω. Again Βλίω, i. q. βλίζω, and βλίσσω, another form of βλάω, βλέω, and βλύω. As βλύζω, βλύσσω is the same with φλύζω, φλύσσω, so does βλίω, βλίζω, βλίσσω differ from φλίω, φλίβω, θλίβω only by the aspirate and dialect; its original meaning therefore is *to squeeze, press, suck, milk.*—Ed.]

6. As little reason have we to be afraid of supporting the derivation of βλάξ from μαλακός; particularly as we must first presuppose the verbal stem from which βλάξ taken by itself would come; for the form Βλάζειν, μωραίνειν in Hesychius comes, according to all analogy, at once from βλάξ. As a confirmation of which we may adduce the quantity (τὸν βλᾶκα),

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[1] Βλίτον, the potherb called *arach* or *orach,* the Atriplex of Linnæus, is called in German *Melde.* Compare also Hesych. Μελίτια, τὰ βίττα, which has been already amended by others to βλίτα; for it is evident that the explanation there given must have been a word in common and familiar use.

which in the case of *βλίσαι* is done away. In the Ionic form the word would have taken an *η*, as *θρᾱσσω*, *τέτρηχα* (see art. 100. sect. 3.); and thus we may also add the word *βληχρός*, *weak*, connected with it much in the same way as *βλωθρός* is with *βλώσκω*. But the present case leads us still further by means of the Homeric *ἀβληχρός*, in which the *α* has been long since acknowledged to be not intensive, but without signification, exactly as the stem from which *μαλακός* springs has such an *α* in *ἀμαλός*, *weak*, *tender*, (*ἄρνα*, Il. χ, 310. *γέροντα*, Eurip. Heracl. 75.) a word certainly in meaning naturally connected with *ἀβληχρός*, and not less in orthography also; for *ἄμαλος*, *ἄβληχρός* may be very well compared with *ἁμαρτεῖν*, *ἁβροτάζειν*.

35. Βούλομαι, ἐθέλω.

1. Of these two verbs ἐθέλω is of far more frequent occurrence, and the most general expression for wishing; but it expresses in particular that kind of wish in which there lies a *purpose* or *design*, consequently a desire of something the execution of which is, or at least appears to be, in one's own power; on the other hand *βούλομαι* is always confined to that kind of willingness or wishing in which the *wish* and the *inclination* toward a thing are either the only thing contained in the expression, or are at least intended to be particularly marked. Hence it expresses a readiness and willingness to submit to that which does not exactly depend on oneself, as at Il. ω, 226. *εἰ δέ μοι αἶσα Τεθνάμεναι παρὰ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων*, Βούλομαι (*I am ready and willing*, &c.). In the same way it is also used of a woman who can only do as others wish, Od. ο, 21. Κείνου βούλεται οἶκον ὀφέλλειν, ὅς κεν ὀπυίοι. And of a mere wish or desire, Il. ο, 51. *καὶ εἰ μάλα βούλεται ἄλλῃ*.

2. Hence it is remarkable, that whilst the active wish, which looks forward to its accomplishment as soon as circumstances shall allow, is in all other cases expressed by ἐθέλειν (Il. η, 364. *πάντ' ἐθέλω δόμεναι. ι*, 120. *ἂψ ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι*, &c.), *βούλομαι* is used in this sense of the *Gods* only; e. g. Il. *α*, 67. Αἴ *κέν*

πως. . .Βούλεται ἀντιάσας ἡμῖν ἀπὸ λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι; and more frequently thus, *Ἕκτορι ἐβούλετο κῦδος ὀρέξαι, Τρώεσσι δὲ βούλετο νίκην*, &c. (Il. *η*, 21. *μ*, 174. *ω*, 39. Od. *δ*, 275. See also Il. *λ*, 319., where the older editions had *ἐθέλει*. See Heyne). In this expression there is evidently something of respect, as in our verb *to will*, since in speaking of those above us we particularly remark and mention the inclination, the favour, the concession, which in them connects the wish almost immediately with its accomplishment.

3. From this meaning of inclination toward a thing which is evident in *βούλομαι*, it is used, without any other word joined with it, when beside the wish there is a preference of one thing to another. In short, *βούλομαι*, but never *ἐθέλω*, stands singly in Homer for 'to prefer', *malle*, and that when speaking of an active as well as of a passive wish. The passages where it is followed by *ἤ* are frequent and well known, as Il. *α*, 117. *ψ*, 594. Od. *λ*, 488. *π*, 106. But to these belong also those passages where this sense is evident only from the antithesis in the preceding sentence, as in Il. *α*, 112. *ἐπεὶ πολὺ βούλομαι αὐτὴν Οἴκοι ἔχειν*, and in the expression *Καί κε τὸ βουλοίμην, καί κεν πολὺ κέρδιον ἦεν*. In this case sometimes *ἐθέλειν* and *βούλεσθαι* are plainly put in opposition to each other, as in Od. *ρ*, 226. *οὐκ ἐθελήσει Ἔργον ἐποίχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πτώσσων κατὰ δῆμον Βούλεται αἰτίζων βόσκειν ἣν γαστέρ' ἄναλτον*, and so also *ι*, 95. This meaning of *βούλεσθαι* is easily overlooked, if one does not observe the antithesis, as at Od. *ο*, 88. *Βούλομαι ἤδη νεῖσθαι*, where it is not a rude "*I wish*" (*ἐθέλω*), but a friendly "I would rather now return home", in answer to the option left to him by Menelaus. Compare likewise Od. *π*, 387. *ρ*, 187[1].

4. On the contrary, it is peculiar to *ἐθέλειν* to be used without any other word joined with it for *δύνασθαι*, particularly in the negation *οὐκ ἐθέλει*, as at Il. *φ*, 366. *Οὐκ ἔθελε προ-*

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[1] *Βούλεσθαι* is seldom met with in this sense in prose. Sturz has found it once in Xenophon, Anab. 2, 6, 4. (6.), where, however, it is discoverable only by the antithesis; *ἐξὸν ῥαθυμεῖν, βούλεται πονεῖν.* In Alexander's Letter in Gellius 20, 5. it is followed by *ἢ*: *ἐγὼ δὲ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῖς περὶ τὰ ἄριστα ἐμπειρίαις ἢ ταῖς δυνάμεσι διαφέρειν.*

ῥέειν, ἀλλ' ἴσχετο, and in other passages. See Damm. *Βούλεσθαι*, in which, properly speaking, is contained the mere wish or the being willing, in itself and by itself, cannot be so used; but *ἐθέλειν* may, in as much as it never expresses the wish of a person who is not convinced of the possibility of his wish being gratified.

5. As for the rest, *ἐθέλειν* is, as we have said, the more general expression, and hence it occurs also in cases where we have seen *βούλεσθαι* used; very frequently, for instance, of the Gods, or to express a mere wish, as at Il. *η*, 182. *'Εξέθορε κλῆρος κυνέης ὃν ἄρ' ἤθελον αὐτοί.* *Βούλεσθαι*, on the contrary, is limited to the cases above mentioned; to it belongs exclusively the construction with *ἤ*, and that with the *bare accusative*, as *Τρώεσσι δὲ βούλετο νίκην*, in which manner *ἐθέλω* does not occur; for in the example quoted above from Il. *η*, the preceding verb *ἐκθορεῖν* is understood again after *ἤθελον*.

6. In modern times the verb *βούλεσθαι* in its *abridged* form *βόλεται, βόλεσθε*, was first admitted into Wolf's Homer. To scholars the question is now-a-days pretty clear (see Schneider's Lexicon*, and Heyne on Il. λ, 319.); but it may be as well to put those who are not accustomed to such points on their guard against false views of the subject.

7. No language, in expressing its sounds by writing, has ever yet succeeded in keeping pace with the real diversity of those sounds as expressed in speaking. The signs by which sounds are expressed have always been produced by chance circumstances, not by pure invention. Hence in all languages many sounds, nearly allied to each other, are united under one sign. Ear and eye then mingle and confound their own decisions, and we get accustomed to consider as really different those sounds only which have different signs, and to look upon those which are united under one sign as mere modifications of the same sound. The ancient Greeks, like some of the oriental

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* [In Schneider's Lexicon we find " Βόλομαι for *βούλομαι*, Il. λ, 319. Od. *α*, 234. *νῦν δ' ἑτέρως ἐβόλοντο θεοί*, where the usual reading is *ἐβάλοντο*. Od. π, 387. *βόλεσθε*. Theocr. 28, 15. *ἐβολλόμην*.. The root is *βόλω*, the Lat. *volo*."—Ed.]

nations even now, had only one sign, the *o*, to express the sounds *o*, *u**, *ü*. For the *ü*, however, there arose in very early times a separate sign, by the use of a form of the sister-consonant V or digamma—Υ or *υ*. The *o* therefore still remained, particularly in words of Ionic origin, the sign of only the sounds *o* and *u*. In that, indeed, they were not poorer than the Germans are now in their *e*; for every one versed in the physiology of language knows well that *o* and *u* are less different than the different modifications of the German *e*†, which we, deceived by appearances, consider as essentially the same, while we look on *o* and *u* as essentially different from each other. And here it should be remarked that between the sounds of all vowels there are intermediate sounds. As long as the attention of a nation is not awakened to the sounds of its language by those who cultivate the liberal arts, its musicians, rhetoricians, grammarians, &c., it is difficult to say (as in the case of the ancient Greeks) whether they really made a clear distinction in their pronunciation of *o* and *u*, or whether they had, particularly in separate races or dialects, an obscure middle sound for their *o*. Nor until those arts have made some progress in improving a language, does this point become clearer. The Greeks, however, were brought to the earlier solution of this question by an additional necessity; they endeavoured in some sounds to express the quantity in writing. Now the difference of the sounds of *o* and *u* is naturally more easily perceived when the vowel is pronounced long. As soon therefore as the sound of long *o* was expressed by *ω*, it was necessary to find out a sign for long *u*, whilst the short *o* still remained in that respect uncertain. Now as the sound of *u* approaches on the one side to that of *o*, and on the other to that of *ü*, a sign was formed by the union of *o* and *υ* placed side by side, or the one above the other thus, *ου* or ȣ; exactly as in some of the modern languages, the German for instance, they write *œ* or $\overset{e}{o}$ to express the sound which is between *o* and *e*. From this way of writing it, and because the common dialects used it only to express a long sound, arose the idea among the grammarians of *ου* being a diphthong, an idea transferred into our grammars, and now become, as it were, an established one; in the same way as there have been given similar false accounts of the German $\overset{e}{a}$ and $\overset{e}{o}$.

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* [The German sound of *u* is like our *o* in *do*, or the *oo* in *boot*, and the *ü* or *ů* is exactly the French *u*. The reader should bear in mind that wherever in the following remarks (for instance in p. 199, note 4.) mention is made of the sound of this letter, the *German* pronunciation of it, not the English, is intended.—Ed.]

† [And we may add the English and French *e* also; for what can be more completely distinct than the sounds of *e* in (the present of the verb to) *read, bread, certain*?—Ed.]

8. The difference, then, between the sound of the short *o* and of the short *u* has come down to us without any sign or mark by which we might discover whether the ancients really had any such difference, and if so, how far it went in their pronunciation; and it is therefore a point on which we must be content to remain in ignorance. One case however has been discovered by the metre; namely, that whereas *ου* is no true diphthong, but only a long vowel, an instance occurred in the older poetry of the quantity of a certain word not being fixed; and, therefore, as we find κᾱλός and κᾰλός, ξηρός and ξερός, so we find also βούλεσθαι with the first syllable short. In the oldest manuscripts of Homer *ου*, *ω* and *ο* were all written with the *ο*, and the metre alone showed the difference of quantity. When, however, copies were made according to the later mode of writing, that verb was written, in all common cases where it occurred, βούλεσθαι. More accurate copies might have retained the reading βόλεσθαι in those passages where the metre required the first syllable to be short, but in all others it was written βούλεσθαι even then, and the other reading has never come down to us in any of our copies. In the passage of Od. π, 387. the writing with *ου*, which is so visibly contrary to the metre, has remained even to our times:

Εἰ δ' ὑμῖν ὅδε μῦθος ἀφανδάνει, ἀλλὰ βούλεσθε
Αὐτόν τε ζώειν καὶ ἔχειν πατρώϊα πάντα·
Μή οἱ χρήματ' ἔπειτα ἅλις θυμηδέ' ἔδωμεν.

I give the passage at length, to show that βούλεσθαι stands here in the sense which is so peculiar to it. That is to say, it means not merely *to wish*, but '*if you would rather*', as the antithesis plainly shows. But in the two other passages the metre, which appeared to suffer, was the means of introducing an emendation. Il. λ, 319.

> .... ἐπεὶ νεφεληγερέτα Ζεὺς
> Τρωσὶν δὴ ἐθέλει δοῦναι κράτος ἠέπερ ἡμῖν.

Here ἐθέλειν, contrary to the universal analogy of Homer, appears with ἤ in the sense of *malle*. The best manuscripts have the true reading βούλεται, and the Venetian scholiast on the passage expressly explains it so; ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι βόλεται ἀντὶ τοῦ βούλεται[2]. Here then we have another trace of the true reading in those older and more accurate copies. And, lastly, in Od. α, 234. the common reading is

> Νῦν δ' ἑτέρως ἐβάλοντο θεοὶ κακὰ μητιόωντες,

but in the manuscripts and in the scholia the various readings are ἐβόλοντο and ἐβούλοντο; and Hesychius has, evidently with reference to this passage, the following gloss: Ἐβόλοντο· ἐβούλοντο, ἐβουλεύσαντο. Wolf, however, has retained here the common reading, which, explain it as you will (see Steph. Thes.), still remains[3] without any satisfactory parallel example; whilst ἐβούλοντο, as spoken here of the gods, stands quite in its proper sense, according to what has been said above, and even the construction with the adverb may be illustrated by Il. ο, 51. καὶ εἰ μάλα βούλεται ἄλλῃ.

9. From all that has been said, I think it is now clear that in the three passages above mentioned, this verb, even if it is written with an ο, should be pronounced *bŭletai, bŭlesthe, ebŭlonto*[4]. And for this purpose I think it would be better if we were to reserve the character ȣ (which is every day less and

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[2] The observation of Macrobius in his work *De Verbo Græco et Latino* (p. 308. ed. Bip.) refers to this passage. He says that the letter *o*, "adjecta *u*, producitur, eademque retracta corripitur, βούλεται βόλεται, τετράπους τέτραπος."

[3] The explanation of it by μετέβαλον (see Schol.) is contrary to the mid. voice, which can admit of only some such explanation as βάλλεσθαι ἐς νοῦν, ἐνὶ φρεσί, &c.; an ellipsis which does not, however, occur elsewhere.

[4] This rule is naturally calculated only for us moderns. As to the ancients, we cannot possibly know whether they always had for the *o* a middle sound between our *o* and *u*, or whether they pronounced it in some words more like *o*, in others more like *u*; or, lastly, whether the sound of *ŭ* was really lost in the common language of Greece, and remained only in the Æolic dialect and in such antiquated forms.

less used as a substitute for *ου*) entirely for this and such other similar cases as we find in the more rare dialects and in writing foreign names[5].

36. Βρόξαι, *βροχῆναι*, *βέβρυχα*.

1. There are many verbal forms which, in their letters and partly also in their meaning, come very near to the verb *βρέχειν*, the vowel of which is so changeable,—*βραχῆναι*, *βροχή*, *ὑποβρύχιος*; whence it may be useful to review them all, in order to be convinced of the difference of the stems or roots from which they spring. At the same time one thing will thereby be made evident, that they cannot possibly be used for each other; in as much as each form, the derivation of which may be doubted, is fixed by usage, so that no form really similar in sound belongs to two roots of a different meaning. Thus

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[5] As, for instance, when in the later writers such names as Ῥȣ́τȣλοι occur: always however excepting those cases where constant usage has already changed the Latin *u* into the Greek *ο* or *υ*, as in *Ρώμυλος*, *Πόπλιος*, &c. For the rest, it is easy to be seen that the Æolic dialect corresponded with the Latin in this as in so many other points, in as much as that alone of all the more common dialects had a full-sounding short *u*; and that dialect wanted only a wider range of literature and more regular grammarians to have furnished us with the means of deciding with correctness on the orthography and pronunciation of many of its words and forms. Meantime we may cite one instance as indisputable, that in order to read correctly a well-known fragment of Alcæus, we must write not *ὀρανῷ* but *ȣ̓ρανῷ*; and most probably the instances of the Æolic *υ* for *ο*, which the grammarians have preserved, like *ὕμοιος*, *ὄνυμα*, are all to be understood of the short *u*; nay, it is even a question, which I will not now stop to consider, whether this dialect did not pronounce the *υ* in general (consequently the *υ* in *νῦν*, *σῦς*, *ὕπερ* also,) like the Latin *u*, and, therefore, had both *u* and *v* (Æol. Υ and F) in common with the Latins. To corroborate what has been said above of the short *ου* of the Æolians, we may add the express assertion of the grammarians; for instance, Priscian. 1, 6. "Illi enim (the Æolians) *θουγάτηρ* pro *θυγάτηρ*, *ου* corripientes, vel magis *υ* sono *u* soliti sunt pronunciare, ideoque ascribunt *ο*, non ut diphthongum faciant, sed ut sonum *υ* Æolicum ostendant." And in Schol. ad Dionysii Thracis Grammaticam, p. 779. it is expressly said of the *ο* placed before the *υ* by the Bœotians (*τὸ ο τὸ προτιθέμενον παρὰ* Βοιωτοῖς *του υ*), that it does not alter the quantity, as they pronounce *κούνες* short, as the other Greeks do *κύνες*.

the Homeric aorist *βραχεῖν* is distinguished from *βρέχειν* not only by the sense, as being a word formed from the sound of the thing signified, like our *crack*, *crash*, &c., but also as a form; for this latter verb has no aor. 2. act., but only an aor. 2. pass. *βραχῆναι*. Besides, as the *α* in *βραχεῖν* is not a changeable vowel, but rather an essential part of the word, it is certain that besides the stem or root ΒΡΕΧ-, whence *βραχῆναι*, there is a separate root ΒΡΑΧ-.

2. Ἀναβροχέν is somewhat more likely to mislead us, in as much as it is used with reference to water; as at Od. λ, 586. where the water flying from the thirsty Tantalus is thus described, Τοσσάχ' ὕδωρ ἀπολέσκετ' ἀναβροχέν: and the change of vowel from *ε* to *ο* in the aor. 2. is not without example: compare *ἔμμορε*. But a comparison of *ἀναβροχέν* with *καταβρόξειεν* and *ἀναβρόξειε* will show us where the real connexion lies. The passages where the two latter occur are these; Od. *δ*, 222. of the wondrous drug of Helen, ‘Ὃς τὸ καταβρόξειεν...’, ‘whoever swallows it down’; and *μ*, 240., of Charybdis, Ἀλλ' ὅτ' ἀναβρόξειε θαλάσσης ἁλμυρὸν ὕδωρ, where it is the same as *καταβρόξειεν*, and opposed to *ἐξεμέσειεν*, v. 237.; the meaning therefore is, "But when she has swallowed up again the salt sea-water". Consequently the sense of *ὕδωρ ἀναβροχέν* must also be "the water being swallowed up again", that is, retiring back again into the ground. But in this case we have the aor. 1., and as a change of vowel never occurs in that tense, the *ο* must be in the stem or root, ΒΡΟΧ-, and the theme must be ΒΡΟΧΩ. With this is connected the substantive *βρόχθος*, and no less the word *βροχός*, *a noose* or *slip-knot*; as in German *Schlinge* is ‘a noose’, and the verb *schlingen*, which properly means ‘to form into a noose’, means also ‘to swallow’: and there is sufficient similarity between the act of swallowing and that of drawing together a noose[1].

3. And, lastly, as to the stem or root ΒΡΥΧ-, I refer my readers (as far as relates to *βρύχω* and *βρύκω*, *to gnash the teeth*, *bite*, and *eat*,) to my note on Soph. Philoct. 745. The poetic perf. *βέβρῡχα* *may*, according to its form, belong to

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[1] Struve has quoted *καταβρόξαι* from Apollonius Rhodius and Dionysius Perieg. in the sense of swallowing up large objects. See Buttmann's irregular verbs under *βιβρώσκω*.

βρύχω; but it is strongly attracted toward βρυχάομαι, *to roar* (as a lion, see Ammon. v. φωνεῖν, Aristoph. Ran. 823. *to bellow*, as a bull, Sophocl. Aj. 322.), by the striking analogy of μυκάομαι and μηκάομαι, each of which has in the old language of poetry just such a perfect with the same meaning, μέμυκα, μέμηκα. Both verbs, βρύχω and βρυχάομαι, are words formed from the sound of the thing signified, which (though each takes its origin, as the meanings prove, from a different sound,) have formed themselves in the language on the same stem or root ΒΡΥΧ-, although grammarians and lexicographers endeavour to connect them together partially. Homer has the present tense of neither verb, only the perfect βέβρυχα, and that, like μέμυκα and μέμηκα, in the sense of the present, according to the analogy given at length in the Ausführ. Sprachl. sect. 113. obs. 13[*]. [See also Matthiæ's Greek Grammar, p. 505. obs. 3. Blomf.] Homer uses this word three times, of the *roaring of waters*, Il. ρ, 264. Od. ε, 412. μ, 242. Now it is evident that this meaning (to connect which with that of βρύχω Damm has given himself much useless trouble,) can take its rise only from the still stronger idea of the *roaring of animals*, as Schneider has proved to a certainty by the collection of cognate verbs which he has compared together under the article *ὠρύω* in his Lexicon[2]. Again, Homer uses *βεβρυχώς*, Il. *ν*, 393. *π*, 486. of

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[*] [The passage referred to is the following:

Obs. 13. Very frequently the meanings of the present and of the perfect are so similar to each other that usage confounds them. Thus, strictly speaking, μέλει means *it goes to the heart*, the Epic μέμηλε, *it lies at the heart*; hence both mean *it concerns* or *pains me*. In this way the real difference of many perfects which are used exactly as presents may be easily imagined; as pres. *to become, to do progressively, to begin to do*; perf. *to be, to do fixedly and decisively*; as πείθομαι, *I believe*, πέποιθα, *I am confident, rely on*; and so ἁνδάνω and ἕαδα, θάλλω and τέθηλα, κήδομαι and κέκηδα, &c. Although in most of them the difference cannot be made clear, at least to us and in our languages, as in λέληθα, μέμηνα, πέφηνα, ἔολπα, δέδορκα, ὄδωδα, γέγηθα, κέχρημαι, ἀλάλημαι (from ἀλάομαι), κεκοπώς; yet we can trace in many instances that the perfect has, in addition to the meaning of the present, an expression of certainty and completeness. The application, however, of all this to particular cases must be always left to private judgement, in as much as many words admit of being taken in different views. It must be observed particularly, that the following verbs, signifying a *sound* or *call*, have quite commonly in the perfect the simple meaning of the present, as κέκραγα, *I cry out*, λέλακα, κέκλαγγα, τέτριγα, βέβρυχα (βρυχάομαι), μέμυκα (μυκάομαι), μέμηκα (μηκάομαι), so that the real present of these seldom occurs.—Ed.]

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[2] Only that Schneider in his Lexicon has not been careful enough to separate expressly this word from *βρύχω*, *frendeo*. Under the word *ὠρύω* he places *βρύχω* among the forms which mean *to roar* or *bellow*, because he refers *βέβρυχα* back to that theme; and under the word *βρύχω* he derives a verb *βρύχομαι* (probably instead of *βέβρυχα*), which should mean the same as *βρυχάομαι*, from *βρύχω*, *frendeo*.

[To give the English scholar, who may not understand German, a perfect knowledge of Buttmann's meaning, it will be necessary to give at length the articles to which he refers, as they are found in Schneider's Lexicon and Supplement.

Βρύκω, *-ξω*, *to bite, bite in pieces, devour, swallow up*, poet.; *μειράκιον τὰ πάτρῳα βρύκει*, Diphilus ap. Athen. p. 292. C. *Ὅλα μέλη βρύκων ἂν καταπίοι*, Diod. Sic. lib. 16. Æl. h. a. 4, 34. 5, 3. In Nicand. Alex. 226. *βρῦκον στόμα* is the same as *μεμυκὸς*, *the mouth shut close*. It is one and the same as *βρώσκω*, *βροχθίζω*, *βιβρώσκω*, and comes from *βόρω*, Latin *voro*, 'to eat, bite, devour'; whence *βοράω*, *βορέω*, *βορύω*, thence *βοράσκω*, contr. *βρώσκω*, *βορόκω*, *βρόκω*, fut. *βρόξω*, whence *βρόχθος*; again, *βορύκω*, contr. *βρύκω*, Jos. 16., the difference between which and *βρύχω* consists merely in the *χ*, and the latter means particularly *the gnashing of the teeth* in eating or otherwise.

Βρύχω, *-ξω*, the same as *βρύκω*; but particularly, *to strike the teeth together, gnash the teeth with rage, impatience*, &c. Thence *βρύχομαι*, same as *βρυχάομαι*. In Soph. Philoct. 745. the present reading is *βρύκομαι* instead of *βρύχομαι*. See also *ὠρύομαι*.

But in the Supplement to Schneider's Lexicon *βρύχω* stands thus:

Βρύχω, *-ξω*, appears to be the same with or very near akin to *βρύκω*, *βρύχομαι*, *βρυχάομαι*. In Homer it is used of *the roar of dashing waves*, Il. *ρ*, 264. Od. *μ*, 242. But at Il. *ν*, 393. and *π*, 486. *κεῖτο τανυσθεὶς Βεβρυχὼς* is explained by *dentibus frendens*, 'gnashing the teeth'. Hesychius has from some similar passage explained *βεβρυχότες* by *θυμοφονοῦντες*. Compare Apollon. Rhod. 2, 831. In Sophocl. Trach. 1072. *ὥστε παρθένος βέβρυχα κλαίων*, the schol. explain it by *ἀναβόω*, *to cry aloud*. *Κλαίοντά με καὶ βρυχώμενον*, Alciphr. 1, 35. appears to be an imitation of the preceding. In Philoct. 745. the old reading was *βρύχομαι*, which Brunck has altered to *βρύκομαι*. *Ὤλετο βρυχθεὶς ἁλὶ*, Philippi Epig. 77. *swallowed up in the sea*, belongs to *βρύκω*. Archiæ Epig. 12. *θηκτὸν ὀδόντα βρύχων*, *dentibus frendens*. In Hippocr. p. 604, 21. *οἱ ὀδόντες βρύχουσι*, *the teeth chatter in a shivering fit*.

Ὠρύω, *ὠρύομαι*, expresses the *cry*, *howling*, or *roaring of hungry dogs*, *wolves*, or *lions*. *Ὠρῦον κῦμα*, Antipat. Sid. Epig. 8. *Ὠρύεται οἶδμα θαλάσσης*, Dionys. Per. 83. The Latin *rugire* fully expresses the meaning of the Greek word, and comes, like *rugere*, *ructare*, from *ἐρύω*, *ἐρύγω*, *ἐρεύγομαι*, which last in its aorist is used also in the sense of *to* the cry sent forth by one lying mortally wounded. The scholiast indeed, and those who follow him, explain it by *grinding the teeth,* and support this interpretation by stating that the dying actually do so. But it is only necessary to examine the passages to feel how ill this agrees with the poet's description, and how naturally a cry of pain suits it. For, besides its proper meaning of *to roar* or *bellow,* βρυχᾶσθαι expresses *to utter any violent cry* or *scream,* as βρυχηθείς in Soph. Œd. T. 1265., ἐβρυχᾶτο in Trach. 904., and βέβρυχε, 1072. By this interpretation a uniformity of usage is preserved, not merely in Homer, but in general. Βέβρυχα belongs, as far as the sense goes, exclusively to βρυχᾶσθαι: in the sense of *gnashing the teeth* only the pres. and imperf. βρύχω, ἔβρυχον were used; and this too, as it appears, not in the language of Epic poetry.

4. There now remains for our examination the very difficult form in Il. ρ, 54.

Οἶον δὲ τρέφει ἔρνος ἀνὴρ ἐριθηλὲς ἐλαίης
Χώρῳ ἐν οἰοπόλῳ, ὅθ' ἅλις ἀναβέβρυχεν ὕδωρ.

Here is neither *the roaring of waters,* nor any sound which can be compared with *the grinding of teeth*; the sense however is clear, the poet is speaking of *the bursting forth* or *springing up of water.* But the grammarian does not remain satisfied with having ascertained the meaning; he tries to satisfy himself on the formation of the word and its analogy. And thus have arisen various opinions, some explaining the word differently, others proposing to alter the reading. As I have not succeeded

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roar, Il. υ, 403. Theocr. 13, 58. For these are used also ὀρύω, ὠρύω, ὠρύομαι; again, ὀρύγω, ὀρυγάνω. Hesychius has ὀρυγάνει, ἐρεύγεται; again, ὀρύεται, ὑλακτεῖ, and ὄρυγμος for ὀρύγμενος, i. e. ὀρυγόμενος, βρυχώμενος. As from ἐρυγάω comes ἐρυγμάω, ἐρυγμαίνω, so from ὀρύγω comes ὀρυγμάω; thence ὀρύμαδος and ὀρύμαγδος, *a loud noise.* The words ὠρυγὴ, ὠρυγμὸς, and ὠρυθμὸς are evidently derived from the form ὠρύγω; and from this or from ὀρύγω is formed by contraction βρύχω, βρυχάω.

In Passow's improved edition of Schneider βρυχάομαι stands thus:

Βρυχάομαι (from βρύχω), or less frequently βρυχανάομαι, *to roar, bellow, howl,* Lat. *rugire*; as an expression of pain both in men and animals, but properly of the lion, Lobeck's Sophocl. Aj. 320. And, generally, to make any deep and hollow rumbling sound, as that heard in an earthquake. It is used of the crying of children, Nicand. Alex. 221. but here others read βραυχανάομαι or βραυκανάομαι.—Ed.]

in finding any one explanation decisively convincing, I shall give all the different views and opinions of those who have treated on it, noting particularly the least tenable, in order that they may be avoided in future.

5. And first, then, are we to suppose a third root ΒΡΥΧ-, that is, a third of those similarly-sounding onomatopœias, with the meaning of *to spout forth like water*? The similarity of the roots might possibly be no objection, as the forms which are found with each of the three distinct meanings would be different; for to βρῡχει, *he gnashes his teeth*, and βέβρῡχε, *he roars*, we should have to add βέβρῠχε, *it spouts forth.* But herein lies a new difficulty. We know from grammar that no verb which has the same consonant in the present and perfect as its characteristic (perf. 2. or perf. middle), takes in the perfect a short vowel. The exceptions to this rule,—that is to say, 1st, the ο, as in κέκοπα, τέτοκα; 2nd, the syllable after the Attic reduplication, as in ἐλήλυθα, ἀλήλιφα; and 3rd, the Epic shortening of the η into α found only in the participles σεσαρυῖα, τεθαλυῖα, &c.,—these exceptions are so defined that they make the rule appear only the more fixed, and βέβρῠχα is therefore a startling anomaly. The grammarians were not, however, struck by this. Apollon. Lex. Ἀναβέβρυχε. τῶν πεποιημένων διὰ μίμησιν, οἷον ἀναβέβηκε μετά τινος ἤχου. If this explanation be received, we must suppose that the form itself, not standing in need of any present tense in ω, was formed at once as it now stands, in imitation of the sound signified, a perfect with a short syllable; βέβρῠχεν, *it spouts forth.*

6. Schneider in his Lexicon* mentions, secondly, the reading

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* [In Schneider's Lexicon ἀναβρύχω stands thus:
Ἀναβρύχω, a word which occurs only in ἀναβέβρυχεν ὕδωρ, *the water issues forth*, Il. ρ, 54., where others read -βέβρυκε from -βρύω, the same as ἀναβλύω, *to burst* or *issue forth*, Ælian. v. h. 3, 43. Thus ρ and λ are changed in γλώσσαργος, -αλγος, and many others. Others have read -βέβροχε, and explained it by ἀναπέπωκε, but without any suitable meaning. The interpretation of Apollonius, ἀναβέβηκεν μετά τινος ἤχου, gives reason to suppose that he, with others, must have read -βέβραχε, as Apollon. Rhod. evidently did, from his imitation of the passage, ἀνέβραχε διψάδος ὕδωρ, 1, 1147. I prefer the reading ἀναβέβρυχε, and derive it from -βρύζω, the same as ἀναβλύζω. (The root is undoubtedly connected with βλύζω, βλύω, βρύω.)—Ed.]

(whether of one or of many manuscripts I know not;—Heyne had it from a Moscow one,) *βέβρυκεν*, but he prefers *βέβρυχε*, from *βρύζω*, which should be the same as *βλύζω*. If now we adopt *βέβρῠκα*, it follows that this quantity, particularly in Homer, who uses only a few perfects ending in *-κα*, and all with a long vowel in the penultima, like *δέδυκα*, *βέβληκα*, (see the Ausführliche Grammatik *, sect. 97. obs. 7.) must be very improbable. Schneider's opinion, however, contains more improbabilities than this; for, first, there is only a verb *βρύω* and a verb *βλύζω*, both in the sense of *to shoot forth luxuriantly*, and properly used only of plants, as we actually find *βρύει* used only two verses below *ἀναβέβρυχεν* in Homer; in other writers it is found in the sense of *to spout forth*, like water or any other fluid. If now we suppose, with Schneider, a present *βρύζω*, there is no ground for forming a perfect in *-χα*; for *βλύζω* at least makes *βλύσω*, &c. And, lastly, neither *βρύω* nor *βλύζω* has ever the thing *shooting* or *spouting forth* as its subject, but the expression is always *βρύειν ἄνθεσι*, *ὕδατι*, &c., or at all events with the genitive. Here then we have supposition upon supposition; and uncertainty, so far from being removed, is consequently greatly increased.

7. Schneider gives, thirdly, *ἀναβέβραχεν* as an old reading, but he forms this conjecture only from the expression *μετά τινος ἤχου* in Apollon. Lex., and from a passage of Apollon. Rhod. 1, 1147., which he considers an imitation of the passage in Homer; *τότ' ἀνέβραχε διψάδος αὔτως Ἐκ κορυφῆς ἄλληκτον* (that is to say *ὕδωρ*). But independently of the consideration that here are no grounds for the probability of there

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* [The passage referred to runs thus:

Obs. 7. In the old Epics the perf. 2. (perf. med.) is by far the prevailing form, whilst of the perf. 1. occurs only the form in *-κα* with a vowel preceding, as *δέδυκα*, *βέβληκα*, *βέβρωκα*, *τεθάρσηκα*, and these in very limited number; of the *impuris*, however, we find the perf. 2. only. Hence Homer has from *κόπτω*, *κεκοπώς*, while the Attics use *κέκοφα*. We must not, however, overlook the 3. pl. perf. pass. in *-φαται*, *-χαται*, as occurring in the Epic poets. On the other hand, many a perf. 1. may have been current in the dialects where the common language has the perf. 2., as we see *δέδοικα* and *δέδια* stand side by side in this latter. So the Dorians (Plut. Ages. 607. e.) used *ἄκουκα* for the common *ἀκήκοα*.—Ed.]

having been a perf. βέβρᾰχε, the thing itself teaches us that the grammarian meant by ἦχός τις only *a gentle issuing forth*; but the poet Apollonius Rhodius is describing a stream of water bursting suddenly by divine power from a mountain which had been until then dry. It is evident, therefore, that he chose, uninfluenced by the other passage, the word βραχεῖν as expressing *a rushing* or *bursting noise*, which is exactly contrary to our passage in Homer.

8. There is, fourthly, an actual reading of Zenodotus ἀναβέβροχεν, consequently an ancient one, which deserves our attention. At first sight we might suppose this to be the correlate of the before-mentioned καταβρόξαι belonging to the root BPOX-, and as καταβρόξαι means *to swallow down*, this would be *to throw up*. But it must be recollected that in speaking above (sect. 2. of this article) of καταβρόξαι we saw that ἀναβρόξαι and ἀναβροχέν meant just the contrary of *to throw up*, and had essentially the same sense as καταβρόξαι, differing only by the latter meaning to swallow *down*, the two former to swallow *up* or *back again*. And even if we were to suppose that the word might have such a twofold sense as *to throw up* and *to swallow up*, still the idea conveyed by that βρόξαι, which is something violent and momentary, corresponds as little as possible with the idea in the passage in question, which is that of water issuing forth continually and gently. The reading of Zenodotus points therefore undoubtedly to the verb βρέχειν. It is true, indeed, that there is no other known instance of a perfect βέβροχα; but then we must remember that we are not justified in rejecting a form found in an old authority because it does not occur elsewhere, provided it be but consistent with analogy, and still more a real reading. Now as we can say with perfect correctness τὸ ὕδωρ βρέχει τὴν γῆν, so an absolute or neuter use of the verb will appear not unnatural, by which the poet might have said ὕδωρ ἀναβέβροχεν (the perf. in the sense of the present), 'water issues forth and irrigates the land'.

9. Fifthly, a hint, though perhaps a slight one, in favour of the common reading, ἀναβέβρῠχεν, may be drawn from the Homeric expression ὑπόβρυχα, *under water*, at Od. ε, 319. Τὸν δ' ἄρ' ὑπόβρυχα θῆκε πολὺν χρόνον, "it kept Ulysses a

long time under water". Some of the grammarians considered the expression as an adverb: whence Aratus 426. said of a vessel sinking, ὑπόβρυχα ναυτίλλονται. Others separated it, ὑπὸ βρύχα: and thence Oppian did not hesitate to use βρύχα as an accusative case for the sea ἐς νεάτην φέρεται βρύχα, Halieut. 2, 588*. But the plain analogy of such expressions as τὸν μὲν ἀρίζηλον θῆκεν θεὸς and γυῖα δ' ἔθηκεν ἐλαφρά shows that ὑπόβρυχα is an adjective, for which it is not necessary for us here to form a nominative. If one were wanted, it would doubtless be by metaplasmus ὑπόβρυχος; but ὑποβρύχιος was more in use, as in Homer's Hymns, in Herodotus, and elsewhere. Now this word indisputably comes from βρέχω: for βρέχεσθαι is used of objects which are completely under water; for example, in Xenoph. Anab. 4, 5, 2. διέβαινον βρεχόμενοι πρὸς τὸν ὀμφαλόν, "they passed through, being under water up to their middle". According to the more common analogy it would therefore be ὑπόβροχος, for which we have here, by a rather unusual change of vowel, ῠ; with which may be compared ὄνομα, ἀνώνυμος, and, as a case exactly similar, ἀγείρω, ἀγορά, ἄγυρις, ἀγύρτης. But if this change of vowel were in the derivatives, we must allow the possibility of its having been also admitted into the inflexions of the verb, and that from βρέχω was formed not only βέβροχα but βέβρῠχα, the short vowel of which, on this supposition, has nothing to startle or surprise us. In those most ancient monuments of Greek literature there are constantly found single forms which do not adapt themselves to any particular analogy, but only to the more general, as εἰλήλουθα, ἑάφθη, ἐμνήμυκε, ἀπούρας, &c. The various reading of Zenodotus, ἀναβέβροχεν, comes then by this supposition into a fresh and proper point of view. Beside the anomalous βέβρῠχα, which is come down to us from the old language, there had been also formed, at least in the mouth of criticising philologists, the other form agreeable to the great and general analogy. In the same way as we have explained the ἀναβέβροχεν of Zenodotus, so we now understand ἀναβέβρῠχεν also; and the variety of the reading is therefore only a variety of the form.

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* [In Schneider's Lexicon we find these words explained in the following manner: "Ὑπόβρυχα, Od. ϵ, 319. for ὑποβρύχιον, or it may be read separately ὑπὸ βρύχα." Again, "Ὑπόβρυχος, ὁ, ἡ, *under water*; Θεσσαλίην γενέσθαι ὑπόβρυχα, Herod. 7, 130. like Od. ϵ, 319. used adverbially. It is used in the same way in Arati 425. Oppiani 1, 145. 3, 599. 4, 39. Quint. Sm. 13, 485." To this is added in the Supplement: "The nominative case, of which no example is given in the Lexicon, is found in Phil. de Animal. p. 344." Schneider has also in his Lexicon, "Βρύξ, βρυχός, ἡ, *the deep, the depths of the sea,*" and he cites as an example the passage of Oppian above mentioned.—Ed.]

10. We have found nothing, then, during our investigation so fixed on historical grounds as to be perfectly satisfactory; and we have only, therefore, to make our choice between three suppositions resting on general analogy: viz. the *fourth*, ἀναβέβροχεν, formed according to strict analogical rules, and supposed to belong to the verb ἀναβρέχω, though the connexion is not very plainly to be traced, nor is the authority of the reading very strong: the *fifth*, ἀναβέβρῠχεν, also from ἀναβρέχω, but formed anomalously; the authority of the reading very great, and with the analogy of ὑπόβρυχα: the *first*, the same reading, ἀναβέβρῠχεν, without a derivation from any verb, but supposed to be a word formed at once in the perfect from the sound of the thing signified, *it bursts* or *issues forth*.

37. Δαΐφρων.

1. The word δαΐφρων admits of a twofold derivation, one from δαΐς, *the fight*, according to which it would mean *warlike*; the other from δαῆναι, *to learn, experience*, according to which it would signify *prudent, full of knowledge and experience*. To mention at once the passage most decisive in favour of the latter sense, from the former being totally unsuitable, we may name Od. ο, 356., where it is an epithet of the wife of Laertes. We might possibly, therefore, be tempted to decide, without further inquiry, that it must have this meaning everywhere else. For, indeed, though it be indisputable that a simple word, derivable from more roots than one, can have, and actually has, in different situations quite different meanings, yet it appears scarcely conceivable, that a compound word, made as it were for the occasion, could have in the same poet *two distinct*

meanings when used *in the same situation*, that is, as the epithet of a person who is praised for some one quality which he is supposed or represented to possess. And however decisive the sense might be in some cases, as in the instance of the wife of Laertes mentioned above, still in many others where it was not so clear there would constantly remain a doubt as to the meaning of the poet.

2. But notwithstanding this it is impossible to deprive δαΐφρων in Homer of the sense of *warlike*. We are not to suppose that there can be but few instances where the epithet *prudent* or *sensible* may not be quite as applicable to the same person as *warlike*. There are plenty of such, where the genuine meaning of the poet must decide in favour of the one or of the other. We do not wish, for example, to deny that Achilles or Diomedes is sensible and intelligent; but if these heroes, placed in a situation where the context has no reference to any quality of the understanding, have a certain epithet applied regularly to themselves, every one feels that it can be no other than one which refers to their bravery. If now Ulysses, at Il. κ, 402. says to Dolon that he is aiming at a high prize, that is to say, to get possession ἵππων Αἰακίδαο δαΐφρονος, or if at ε, 181. a Trojan, recognising Diomedes, says, Τυδείδῃ μιν ἔγωγε δαΐφρονι πάντα ἐΐσκω· these passages are perfectly decisive that δαΐφρων here refers not to the understanding, but to bravery; and the same may be said of the passage in Il. λ, 427., where Socus, unknown except from what is there said of him, plays the part of a spirited though unfortunate warrior, and at v. 456. has this epithet, Σώκοιο δαΐφρονος ὄβριμον ἔγχος Ἔξω τε χροὸς ἕλκε. To these we may add also such combinations as the often recurring δαΐφρονος, ἱπποδάμοιο.

3. The twofold sense of the epithet δαΐφρων exists therefore beyond a doubt in the poems of Homer; but this circumstance is accompanied by one very striking fact, that all the passages where δαΐφρων plainly relates to the understanding occur in the Odyssey and in the last book of the Iliad, both of which have been attributed, from a very early period, and on very strong grounds, to a different author from that of the Iliad. In Il. ω, 325. in which book the word occurs but once, it is the epithet of Priam's *herald*, Idæus; and in the Odyssey it is

given to the *wife* of Laertes, to the *artificer* Polybus, *θ*, 373., and to the *unwarlike* king Alcinous, *ζ*, 256. *θ*, 8. 13. Again, when at Od. *α*, 48. Minerva says Ἀλλά μοι ἀμφ' Ὀδυσῆϊ δαΐφρονι δαίεται ἦτορ Δυσμόρῳ, or when Penelope says δ, 687. βίοτον κατακείρετε πολλὸν, Κτῆσιν Τηλεμάχοιο δαΐφρονος, it is evident at first sight that this simple fixed epithet can mean nothing but that prudence which was the characteristic of Ulysses, and so prominent a quality in the young Telemachus. And the same remark which we have made of δαΐφρονος, ἱπποδάμοιο in the Iliad, will hold good with regard to the frequently repeated δαΐφρονα, ποικιλομήτην in the Odyssey.

4. In all the first twenty-three books of the Iliad the epithet is given only to well-known acknowledged warriors, or to those who are introduced as such, and in no one instance is there any inducement to translate it by *prudent*, except perhaps where it is given to Priam (ι, 651. λ, 197. ο, 239.); but Priam is also called elsewhere ἐϋμμελίης, as well as the brave Euphorbus and his brothers (ρ, 9. 23.). In the Odyssey, on the other hand, as soon as, from the decisive instances mentioned above, we have fixed on the meaning *prudent*, there does not occur one example to oblige us to deviate from it. Those to whom this epithet is given are indeed princes and heroes, but they are unknown except from the mention there made of them, and there is nothing to prevent our calling them wise rulers and intelligent men (α, 180. ο, 518. φ, 16.); and to these we might add without hesitation the otherwise quite unknown suitor Polybus (χ, 243.) if it were not that the other meaning of *warlike*, so common in the Iliad, may seem to strike us as a more suitable epithet to one who is described as fighting to the last against Ulysses and his friends*.

5. If now we take a general view of what has been said, we find an identity of meaning in the Iliad, and another in the Odyssey, such as we might always wish to find in poems which have been handed down by the mouth of the rhapsodists, and such therefore as deserves our particular attention.

6. In the poems of Hesiod δαΐφρων appears to have the

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* [According to Passow's Lexicon the Hom. Hymn. Dem. follows the usage of the Odyssey.—Ed.]

meaning of *warlike* both in the Op. 652. as an epithet of the brave king Amphidamas, and still more decidedly in the Scut. 119., where Iolaus is exhorted to show himself in a contest as *δαΐφρων* as he had previously been. Pindar, on the other hand (Pyth. 9, 148.), gives the epithet to Alcmena. In what sense the word is used in the lyric passage in Æschyl. Theb. 920. it is difficult to say: the poet has evidently asserted his lyric rights in the use of it. The *γόος* is there called *δαΐφρων, οὐ φιλογαθής*: now if we look no further than these words, the explanation which supposes the word compounded of *δαΐζειν φρένας* appears very suitable and satisfactory enough, by which it would mean *heart-rending*. But this will not consist with *δαϊκτήρ* preceding it:

. . . . . . δαϊκτὴρ γόος
Αὐτόστονος, αὐτοπήμων,
Δαΐφρων, οὐ φιλογαθής,
Δακρυχέων ἐκ φρενός, &c.

Hence I think that Æschylus compounds the word as it is in the Iliad. And as in the expression *οὐ φιλογαθής* there is a kind of personification, so it appears to me that it may be said in the same way of *γόος*, (which *οὐ φιλεῖ τὴν γηθοσύνην*, as being contrary to it,) that it *φιλεῖ* or *φρονεῖ τὴν δαΐδα*, as supplying it with nourishment.

38. Δέαται, δοάσσατο.

1. Whenever Homer describes any one as having been in doubt, and after consideration making up his mind what course to pursue, he uses this verse,

Ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι.

For example at Il. *ν*, 458. Od. *ε*, 474. Now supposing a person not only to have had no knowledge of the verb *δοάσσασθαι* from any other quarter, (which has been every one's case from the earliest times of Homeric explanation,) but to have believed that nothing more was known about it, such a person would still have felt quite certain of the meaning of the word, and of the sense of each passage where it occurs. For it is as clear as the light, both from the connexion of the words and from the sense of each passage, that δοάσσατο means *it seemed*, ἔδοξεν. Whoever then, considering this as a well-known fact, began to examine the word, could have been only in danger of mistaking the etymology; the meaning of the poet remained uninjured. In tracing its derivation the verb δοκεῖν would naturally present itself; for a κ too much or too little can be no objection to the affinity of two words: and thus the scholiast on Il. ν, 458. produces a perfectly harmless derivation.

2. Not so however those who started from apparent etymology. Δοιή is *a doubt*; ἐν δοιῇ εἶναι, *to be in doubt*, is a Homeric expression (Il. ι, 230.), and ἐνδοιάζειν, *to doubt*, formed from it, is found in Thucydides. Now as all the passages in question imply a state of doubt, the superficial opinion seemed ready-made for the occasion; a simple verb δοιάζω was supposed, of which the Homeric word might be a metrical abbreviation. This was the idea of some of the ancients in the Etym. M. in v.; and of the moderns according to Valckenaer's learned, but nothing more than learned, discussion *ad Ammon.* 1, 16. The similarity of the letters blinded them to the dissimilarity in the sense. If the etymology were correct, δοάσσατο must mean *he doubted within himself*. But in all the passages in question the doubt lies in the former part of the description, and is generally detailed most circumstantially, as for instance at Il. ν, 458.

> . . . . Δηΐφοβος δὲ διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν,
> Ἤ τινά που Τρώων ἑταρίσσαιτο μεγαθύμων,
> Ἂψ ἀναχωρήσας· ἢ πειρήσαιτο καὶ οἶος.
> Ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι
> Βῆναι ἐπ' Αἰνείαν·

Now in this passage how is it possible to carry on the idea of the doubt to the latter part of the paragraph? The impossibility of doing this was felt; and so to help themselves out, while they approved of the explanation *it appeared*, they added this: "*Sed quæ nobis meliora videntur, talia fere sunt in quibus tuto pedem nondum liceat figere*," &c. (Valck. loc. cit.)

A most cautious and qualified expression this, by which the verse, ten times repeated in both poems, gains nothing.

3. The opinion which the moderns had thus formed of the word must have been greatly strengthened by observing how it was used in Homer's imitators. In Apollonius Rhod. (3, 819.) they found not only δοιάζεσκε βουλάς of a person still undecided, and δοιάζοντο λεύσσειν (4, 576.), *they thought they saw* (distant and indistinct objects); but also ὁππότε δοῦπον ...δοάσσαι, 3, 955., *when she perceived*, that is, *thought she heard a sound*, and lastly, 3, 770., the very plain expression ἑζομένη δοάσσατο, *she sat in doubt and indecision*. But our critical knowledge teaches us not to consider everything which we read in Greek authors as the usage of the Greek language. Δοιάζω* was certainly never in use, and ἐνδοιάζω is no legitimate compound, but a verb formed from the expression ἐν δοιῇ. Apollonius however thought, and not without reason, that as a poet he might form such a word as δοιάζω. But then came in the feeling of the grammarian. Looking on the impersonal Homeric δοάσσατο as the very same verb, he thought himself justified in abbreviating his personal verb δοιάζειν in the same manner. Still, however, one sees how much even this grammarian-poet felt himself restricted by an ear accustomed to Homer. He only uses in that way the aorist δοάσσαι; he would never have ventured upon δοάζειν. In Virgil's imitation, too, Æn. 11, 550., "*omnia secum Versanti subito, vix hæc sententia sedit*," the *vix* appears to me to be an endeavour to introduce, as well as his poetical feeling would allow, the expression δοιή, which some interpreters had supposed to exist in δοάσσατο; an attempt exactly similar to that of Voss in his translation, "This determination appeared at last to him doubting to be the best." In both expressions the doubt is carried on to the very brink of the resolution; which cannot be the meaning of δοάσσατο, if it be formed from δοιή.

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* [Both Schneider in his Lexicon, and Passow in his improved edition of it, admit δοιάζω. The former quotes no instance of its actual occurrence in any author; the latter translates it *to double*; and thence interprets the middle voice *to be doubled* or *divided*, that is, *to be in doubt*; adducing as an instance of the active voice δοιάζεσκε, Ap. Rh. 3, 819., of the middle δοιάζοντο, 4, 576.—Ed.]

4. The only passage where this aorist occurs, except in the above oft-repeated verse of Homer, should have sufficed to prove that δοιή has no connexion with δοάσσατο. Nestor advises his son in the chariot-race to keep the left horse so near to the stone which marked out the course,

> Ὡς ἄν σοι πλήμνη γε δοάσσεται ἄκρον ἱκέσθαι,

" that the nave of your wheel may appear to touch the edge of it." Δοάσσεται (for -ηται) the scholiast explains by φαντασθῇ, νομισθῇ; and correctly so. There is here an appearance; whence δόξῃ would have expressed the same thing; but of a doubt there is not the remotest idea, any more than there is in the other passage, where however there is a doubt in the preceding verse. If now that etymology is to stand, we must say that δοάσσατο originally gave the idea of a doubtful appearance, but by time and usage that part of the meaning which implied doubt was lost. In that case the poet indeed is saved; but the etymology is unsatisfactory and useless toward the discovery of the meaning.

5. With this aorist we may join an imperfect, as found in all the editions before Wolf at Od. ζ, 242., where Nausicaa says to her attendants, of Ulysses beautified by the divine aid of Minerva,

> Πρόσθεν μὲν γὰρ δή μοι ἀεικέλιος δόατ' εἶναι,
> Νῦν δὲ θεοῖσιν ἔοικε........

Here again there is a seeming or appearance of something, which however in this case did not cause even the possibility of a doubt, but expressed perfect certainty; the appearance did indeed cause a doubt in the mind of Nausicaa, as expressed in the representation which she gave of her recollecting what the former state of Ulysses was, as compared with his present; but the word δόατο refers to the time when he appeared to be, and really was, ἀεικέλιος. This verse also ought therefore to have prevented the false derivation; though we must confess that to us it appears to furnish the most intricate point of the investigation. Before Wolf, indeed, the common reading of the editions was δόατο; but the best manuscripts and the oldest editions, the Aldine for instance, have δέατο*; the Lemma of the greater and lesser scholia (in the old edition) have the same; and Eustathius explains only this latter reading. Hesychius has, Δέαται· φαίνεται, δοκεῖ. Δεάμην· ἐδοκίμαζον, ἐδόξαζον. And lastly the Etym. M. has, under δέαται, this very passage of Homer with the reading of δέατο. No old lexicographer has the form δόατο. That it was introduced as a various reading through the existence of δοάσσατο, and that, as soon as it was so introduced, δέαται was put in the background as a corrupt reading, were necessary consequences of each other. But there was another consequence as necessary, that modern criticism should again bring forward the only authenticated reading, whatever the grounds for its authenticity might be. The derivation of this δέαται, in the Etym. M. and in the scholium, from δάω δέδαμαι[1], serves only to confirm the opinion that δέατο was the reading recognised by the grammarians, and that they never once connected this word with δοάσσατο. We however, even before we proceed to their etymology, do connect them together, because the change of vowel between ε and ο is very common, and strict regularity in these changes is not to be expected in the old language.

6. I think now we must start from δέατο: and thus the

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* [Passow in his improved edition of Schneider's Greek and German Lexicon has, "Δέατο· the only remains of an old verb δέαμαι, *to appear* or *seem*: it occurs only in Od. ζ, 242. ἀεικέλιος δέατ' εἶναι, *he seemed* or *appeared*, &c. for ἐδόκει. Before Wolf, the common reading was δόατ' εἶναι." Schneider formed both δοάσσατο and δόατο from δοάζω, for δοιάζω, *to doubt*. Passow in his first edition of Schneider formed δοάσσατο in the same way; but in his fourth and last edition he has struck out δοάζω entirely, and says that there can be no doubt of the true derivation being from δοκεῖν, for which he refers to Buttmann's Lexilogus. He also follows Wolf in rejecting δόατο without hesitation.—Ed.]

[1] The evident corruption in the Milan scholium, καὶ γίνεται ἀπὸ τοῦ δέω δεύω, κάὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεύσω δέδαμαι, is, by a comparison of it with the Etym. M., doubtless to be corrected thus, κ. γ. ἀπὸ τοῦ δαίω δάω, καὶ ε. α. δάσω δέδαμαι. The Etym. explains this δαίω by καίω. As it is inconceivable how any one could get from this idea to that of δοκεῖ, I conjecture it must have been some confusion of the later grammarian. The older one, who is the source from which all the rest is drawn, had probably in his mind δαίω, δάω, δέδαα.

derivation from *δάω* I find very reasonable; which I trace thus. No doubt the verb *δέδαα, δαῆναι* begins like *εἰδέναι*, from the idea of *to see, discern, know*. This granted, it is very probable that there was an old verb *δάαται, videtur*, from which according to analogy (for example, *μνάα μνέα, ῥέα* for PAA, *θεάομαι* from *θάω*) came *δέαται*, and it was equally natural that as the word grew more into use the radical vowel should be lost by a change into *ο*. This may remind us of a similar appearance in the verb *θαάσσω*, which will be found examined in its proper place, and to which therefore I refer.

39. Δείλη, δείελος, &c.

1. The lexicons give us a very correct view of the exact meaning of *δείλη*, as used in the older period of the Greek language; that is to say, that it meant, not the evening in the usual and common acceptation of the word, but the *afternoon*; at the same time it becomes the more necessary to produce a well-grounded conviction of this truth by bringing forward the passages where it occurs, because both the old grammarians and the usage of the word by very excellent writers of a later period, have again tended to render the meaning of it uncertain. That first and proper sense of it will appear, if rightly considered, evident enough in the Homeric division of the day at Il. φ, 111. *Ἔσσεται ἢ ἠὼς ἢ δείλη ἢ μέσον ἦμαρ*, where all three parts must be portions of, and make up, the day, as Achilles is speaking of the battle in which he expects one day or other to be slain. And in the same way, though in a very much later author, in Dio Chrysostom, Or. 66., the parts of the day follow each other, and *δείλη* is placed between *μεσημβρία* and *ἑσπέρα*. See also Pollux 1, cap. 7. The most striking examples of this sense are however in Xenophon, as may be seen in Sturz. Lex., and particularly in those passages where *δείλη* is mentioned unconnectedly, and the series of events which followed shows that it must have meant *the early part of the afternoon*. Thus in Anab. 1, 8, 8. (Sturz. 5.). *Καὶ ἤδη τε ἦν μέσον ἡμέρας καὶ οὔπω καταφανεῖς ἦσαν οἱ πολέμιοι· ἡνίκα δὲ*

δείλη ἐγένετο, ἐφάνη κονιορτὸς, κ. τ. λ., where there follows a description of the gradual appearance of the enemy, of their drawing up in order of battle, and then of the great battle of Cynaxa, all of which happened in the same day. A passage if possible still more decisive is that of 7, 3, 9. and 10. (Sturz. 4, 5.), where Seuthes speaks of some villages not too far off for them to take their dinner (ἄριστον) with ease; and immediately afterwards their arrival there is described as happening τῆς δείλης, without the least idea or mention of its being later than usual. The distance therefore was nothing more than a good morning's march, which being completed immediately after noon, τῆς δείλης, they took dinner. And the same usage of the word is found also in Herodotus 9, 101., where he says that the battle of Platæa took place πρωῒ ἔτι τῆς ἡμέρης, that of Mycale περὶ δείλην.

2. Frequently however the word, standing alone as in the previous instance, is used, no less correctly, for *the more advanced part of the afternoon,* whether this meaning be apparent from the context, or there be no occasion for defining the exact sense of the word; as in Xenophon 3, 4, 34. (Sturz. 21.) 4, 2, 1. For since δείλη, as we have seen in the beginning of this article, is used so decisively for the early part of the afternoon, it follows of course that in the same writer (and, we may add, particularly in that dialect in which he has written,) it never could have been used for the evening also. Nor could Xenophon ever have expected, that when he wrote, in the Anab. 3, 3, 11. (Sturz. 8.), ὥστε τῆς ἡμέρας ὅλης διῆλθον οὐ πλέον πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι σταδίων, ἄλλα δείλης ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὰς κώμας, he should be understood to have meant by δείλη *the evening.* He may have very fairly said of an army which, after a march constantly interrupted by the enemy, reaches a certain point somewhere about four o'clock, where it intends to pass the night, that, after marching *the whole day* it had advanced only two miles and a half, and had arrived in the afternoon at a certain point; and as the context shows that the time meant was one drawing toward the evening, the word δείλη was quite sufficient to mark it. But further, as this word thus used cannot be considered as opposed to the same word when used simply as the early part of the afternoon, it

follows that it must be used, if not in opposition to, at least to mark distinctly a time different from, the evening[1].

3. In the later times of the language, however, the usage did certainly exist of employing δείλη simply, not in the sense of the afternoon generally, but only of that *later* part of it which we call *evening*; consequently, in direct opposition to the early morning; as, for instance, is plain from Apollonius Rhod. 3, 417., where Æetes thus defines the ploughing of the dreadful field and the combat with the earth-born men as a day's work, Ἠέριος ζεύγνυμι βόας, καὶ δείελον ὥρην Παύομαι ἀμητοῖο: with which we may compare the account of the actual performance of the exploit by Jason, which at v. 1407. concludes with these words, Ἦμαρ ἔδυ καὶ τῷ τετελεσμένος ἦεν ἄεθλος. Examples to the same purport, drawn from common prose, may be seen in Stephanus, as quoted from Plutarch. This use of the word, however, in Lucian appears to me particularly striking, in Lexiph. 2., where the walk after the δεῖπνον is expressed by τὸ δειλινὸν περιδινησόμεθα, and that in the mouth of a person affecting the old Attic dialect. But certainly the use of δειλινός in this passage does not belong to the old Attic language, but was a common expression of the language of Lucian's own time, as is evident from the example of the same word in Jupit. Trag. 15. ὡς περιπατήσαιμι τὸ δειλινὸν ἐν Κεραμεικῷ. It is certain however that this sense of the word δείλη was as early as Aristotle; for what is said of Zephyrus at Probl. 26, 35., πρὸς τὴν δείλην πνεῖ, πρωῒ δ' οὔ, can be understood in no other sense than that it is a wind which rises *toward sunset*. Compare Lucian. Dem. Enc. 31. θρασέως ἐξαναστάντας, εἶτα πτήξαντας οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν, δίκην τῶν δειλινῶν πνευμάτων. Nor is it at all inconceivable that this limitation of its meaning was insensibly carried on from *before sunset* to the twilight which gradually dies away *after sunset*; which last meaning must have obtained as early as the time of Theocritus, as in Idyll. 21, 39. one fisherman, relating a dream at the request of another (Λέγε μοί ποτε νυκτὸς Ὄψιν), thus begins:

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[1] Hence we may judge how unsuitable the interpretations are which Sturz has placed at the head of those passages that appear to mean the advanced part of the afternoon, viz. *tempus vespertinum*, and still worse *crepusculum*.

Δειλινὸν ὣs κατέδαρθον ἐν εἰναλίοισι πόνοισιν,
(Οὐκ ἦν μὰν πολύσιτος· ἐπεὶ δειπνεῦντες ἐν ὥρᾳ,
Εἰ μέμνῃ, τᾶs γαστρὸs ἐφειδόμεθ᾽) εἶδον ἐμαυτὸν, &c.

Compare Apollon. 1, 1160. where the Argonauts early in the morning have to contend with the winds, which ὑπὸ δείελον ἠερέθοντο, that is, evidently, *the evening before*. Hesychius says, v. δείελος: οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἑσπέρα, δειλινὴ καὶ δείλη, ὠνόμασται.

4. Among the old Attics however, and among the Ionians, δείλη was always, as we have before said, the whole of the afternoon; and consequently, if it were required to mark distinctly the earlier or later part of it, it was necessary to add πρωΐα or ὀψία. We find proofs of this both in the grammarians and in different writers. Phot. v. πρωΐα: Δείλην πρωΐαν, τὸ πρῶτον τῆς δείλης μέρος. Mœris. Δείλης πρωΐας, τὸ μετὰ ἕκτην ὥραν· δείλης ὀψίας, πρὸς ἑσπέραν[2]. Thus we find δείλη ὀψία used in Herodot. 7, 167. Thuc. 3, 74. Demosth. c. Eubulid. p. 1301. penult., in which last passage later writers

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[2] Mœris adds: κατ᾽ ἰδίαν δὲ δείλης οὐ λέγουσιν Ἀττικοί· λέγεται δὲ μόνον δείλης καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. This assertion that the Attics did not use the word δείλην by itself, but that only the Ἕλληνες or κοινοὶ did, is, as we have seen, properly speaking contrary to the truth, and, indeed, it has no meaning; for the afternoon in general must have been so called. What, however, Mœris really intended to say has been said more clearly by Thomas Mag., where, to his explanation, quoted in the following section, he adds this, τὸ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ δείλης ὀψίας δείλης μόνον λέγειν, ἁπλῶς Ἑλληνικόν. But this assertion of Thom. Mag. is again questionable, in as much as Xenophon uses δείλης of this later time of the day: but, as I have remarked above, Xenophon speaks thus only when the more precise point of time is evident from the sense of the passage; but Thom. Mag. and Mœris are speaking of the usage of the later times, in which δείλης by itself was used *only* of the hours toward sunset. On the other hand, an assertion of Phrynichus, App. Soph. v. ἀκρατίσασθαι, p. 23., is in another respect less accurate. Δείλην γὰρ, says he, καλοῦσιν οἱ Ἀττικοὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ δεκάτην ὥραν; by which, therefore, the earlier hours seem to have been excluded. But, without doubt, Phrynichus is here speaking in opposition to the later usage of the word, i. e. the using δείλη by itself, almost entirely for the evening. And in fact, according to our own customs, the afternoon might be defined either, as in the gloss of Mœris, with mathematical accuracy, the time after twelve o'clock, or, as in that of Phrynichus, the time about three or four o'clock.

would have said merely *περὶ δείλην*; for the voting is there related to have begun *δείλης ὀψίας*, so that it became dusk before they had finished. *Δείλη πρωΐα*, also, in the sense given by the grammarians, is found in Herodot. 8, 6., where it is said that the barbarians, *ἐπεί τε δὴ ἐς τὰς Ἀφέτας περὶ δείλην πρωΐην γενομένην ἀπίκατο*, were unwilling to sail straight toward the Greeks to attack them, lest they should fly, and *the night* coming on should save them from being taken.

5. I have given the last passage at length, because it is clear from thence, as it is indeed from all which has been hitherto said, that *δείλη πρωΐα* is a part of the afternoon. But in the later times of the language there arose great confusion in the meaning. The expression *δείλη ὀψία* (as well as *δείλη* alone, which now became common,) continued to retain the same meaning, particularly in those writers who affected the Attic dialect; for example in Lucian, Cronosol., 14. Ælian, N. A. 1, 14. Alciphr. 3, 5. And in course of time we find placed in opposition to this expression, under the name of *δείλη πρωΐα*, not the early part of the afternoon, but *the morning*. In the lexicon of Timæus, however, in the explanation, *Δείλης πρωΐας, τῇ πρὸ ἀρίστου ὥρᾳ. δείλης ὀψίας, τῇ πρὸ δείπνου*, there must be some error[3]. One mistake may be easily conjectured and amended from Hesychius, where we read the following gloss, agreeing with the genuine usage of the word: *Δείλη πρωΐα, ἡ μετ᾽ ἄριστον ὥρα.* But both explanations are found together in Suidas: *Δείλη ὀψία, ἡ περὶ δύσιν ἡλίου. δείλη πρωΐα, ἡ πρὸ ἀρίστου ὥρα· ἢ μετὰ τὸ ἄριστον.* And all doubt, if any remained, would be removed by the still plainer yet more startling gloss of Thom. Mag. *Δείλης ἑῴας, καὶ δείλης μεσημβρίας, καὶ δείλης ὀψίας, Ἀττικοί.* Here the word *Ἀττικοί*, as referring to all three expressions, is certainly wrong, and, I apprehend, sufficiently refuted by what has been said above; but these startling expressions do really occur in the

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[3] This gloss does not refer to Plato, but, like many others of this grammarian, to Herodotus, whose two passages, already quoted by us, are mentioned by Ruhnken in his Notes, without however his remarking that the one in which *δείλην πρωΐην* occurs is in truth, as we have shown above, contrary to the explanation given by the grammarian, and consequently was misunderstood by him.

writers of the later times; Synes. (ap. Steph. in v.) *λύσαντες ἐκ Βενδιδείου πρὸ δείλης ἑῴας, μόλις ὑπὲρ μεσοῦσαν ἡμέραν ...παρηλλάξαμεν.* Ach. Tat. 3, 2. *περὶ γὰρ μεσημβρίαν δείλην ὁ μὲν ἥλιος τελέως ἁρπάζεται* (was completely obscured). And to these may now be joined the expression *περὶ δείλην ἑσπέραν*, in Ach. Tat. 3, 5. Herodian, 2, 6, 9. 3, 12, 16. In these passages, then, we see *each part of what is properly the day* called *δείλη*, and the name which marks the particular part meant, as midday and evening, not added adjectively, as in *ὀψία*, &c., but put in apposition; at which usage, and at Thom. Mag. calling it, without further remark, Attic, I cannot but express my surprise, as indeed I do also at this *δείλη ἑσπέρα* being attributed, in another gloss by Suidas, to the *Attics*; *Δείλης πρωΐας καὶ δείλης ἑσπέρας. οὕτω λέγουσιν Ἀττικοί.* Meanwhile, until I meet with a better explanation, I shall suppose all this to have arisen from a blundering mania for speaking Attic. As the use of the word *δείλη*, in the sense of *the early part of the afternoon*, had disappeared, but the expression *δείλη ὀψία* still remained in use as an Atticism, there was formed in an erroneous manner a new antithesis to it, that is to say, the time immediately after sunset, as opposed to the time before sunset; and this misuse soon brought in others after it, which would not repay the trouble of attempting to elucidate. But that Suidas and Thomas Mag. ascribe to the Attics those expressions which we do not find in any ancient writer, proves only that they were not all in real use, but merely used in the language of the later rhetoricians (a language made up of use and misuse), to whom the writers above quoted so strictly and properly belong, and whose language,—not indeed in the opinion of Phrynichus and Mœris, but certainly in the estimation of Thomas Mag. and other quite late grammarians,—might have very well passed for pure Attic.

6. If now we go back again to the Epic use of the word, we find in Homer, beside the before-mentioned *δείλη*, the expression *δείελον ἦμαρ*, which in Od. ρ, 606. is used, exactly as the former was, of the afternoon; for the same day continues through the following book, and not until verse 304., after the account of the fight between Ulysses and Irus, and Penelope descending and receiving the presents of the different

suitors, is it said μένον δ' ἐπὶ ἕσπερον ἐλθεῖν. Again, when Hesiod (ε, 808.) says of the εἰνὰς μέσση, i. e. the nineteenth day of the moon, that it is ἐπιδείελα λώϊον ἦμαρ, this is explained by Moschopulus μετὰ τὴν μεσημβρίαν[4]; and beyond a doubt correctly, for the comparative here evidently divides the day into its two halves. But when at Il. φ, 232. we read εἰσόκεν ἔλθῃ Δείελος ὀψὲ δύων, σκιάσῃ δ' ἐρίβωλον ἄρουραν, this is not the Attic δείλη ὀψία, with which it has been compared, but by the force of δύων the actual sunset or evening. The ὀψέ is therefore, strictly speaking, redundant, and appears to me to be used with reference only to the time past, something in this way: "thou shouldst assist the Trojans until the sun sinks late in the west."

7. From the epithet εὐδείελος will arise an entirely new investigation, carrying us at once from the consideration of time to that of place. This epithet occurs in Homer only in the Odyssey, where it is one of the fixed epithets of Ithaca; once, however, it is used more generally, at ν, 234., where Ulysses, not recognising his native island, inquires,

> Ἦ πού τις νήσων εὐδείελος, ἠέ τις ἀκτὴ
> Κεῖτ' ἁλὶ κεκλιμένη ἐριβώλακος ἠπείροιο;

It is therefore an epithet of *islands* in general, or of some certain islands. Now, as the more exact sense of it is not to be obtained either by any plain derivation or by a comparison of the Homeric passages, some traditionary account of its meaning would be acceptable; but the explanations in the scholia run so confusedly into each other that no authority can be discovered in them. Those who keep to δείελος can do so only by understanding the word to mean the evening, or rather the west, remarking at the same time that islands derive the excellence of their temperature from lying toward the west: others have recourse to δῆλος, and its resolution into δέελος, and imagine that it is an epithet particularly suited to islands, as having a natural boundary; and lastly, others (see Eustath.

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[4] Tzetzes explains it even by τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ. Not that this deserves any further consideration, than as showing how established the tradition was that the δείελος of the Epics meant *some* part of *broad day*, for otherwise these late grammarians would never have thought of it.

ad ι, 21. p. 333, 5. compared with schol. ad β, 167. ι, 21.) derive it from εὖ and εἴλη, with δ inserted ; consequently, for εὔειλος, a word used by Theophrastus (see Schneider ad Hist. Plant. 6, 8, 2.) in the sense of *apricus*, ' sunny[5] '.

8. If we consult post-Homeric usage, it is a circumstance in our favour that we can call to our aid ancient poets who never used a word without having a living knowledge of it, such as Pindar and the poetical author of the Hymn to Apollo. The former has the word twice, Ol. 1, 178., as an epithet of the Cronium Hill, and Py. 4, 136. of the plain of Iolchos, at which passages the scholia give nothing new : in the Hymn to Apollo it is said at v. 438.

Ἷξον δ' ἐς Κρίσην εὐδείελον ἀμπελόεσσαν.

Both plains, that of Crisa and that of Iolchos, are similarly situated, inclining southerly toward a gulf. To these we may add Aspledon, which, with its environs, according to an old tradition recorded by Strabo, once bore the name of Εὐδείελος (compare what has been said in art. 8. sect. 9.), and which had before it a plain running, in an almost similar manner, toward the lake Copaïs. To such a situation, to most islands, and to a hill, no idea can be so suitable as that of *apricus*, ' sunny ' ; at the same time it is an idea derived from that one of all the explanations of the grammarians which has the least etymological foundation ; whence however we may perhaps conclude, that it was a meaning not of their own forming, but handed down to them ; as it is now, I believe, the meaning generally adopted. Nor would it be easy to imagine any other single meaning which suits all the passages so well.

9. But whence is εὐδείελος to get this meaning? We have nothing to do but to treat the above-mentioned derivation which the ancients have given of the word when taken in this sense, as we would any other of their etymologies that proceed from a mistaken principle. In this com-

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[5] This is also the derivation of those who explain the word by εὔκρατος ; see Etym. M. in voce. Schneider, by mistake, in his Lexicon makes them derive it from εὐδία.

pound the δ is not inserted, but the composition εὐ-δείελος shows at once that δείελος meant *the heat of the sun.* And if we refer back to the fact, now we hope sufficiently well ascertained, that δείελος and δείλη is *the afternoon,* it will lead us to the same conclusion; for the afternoon is the time when the sun's heat, beginning about midday, becomes most powerful. But δειέλη, δείλη bears the same reference to εἵλη, as διώκω does to ἰώκω, as δαήμων, δαίμων[6] (Archilochus) to αἵμων, as δᾶ (or γᾶ, γαῖα) to αἶα, and to these I subjoin, from long-settled conviction, as δή to ἦ, the identity of which particles is further confirmed in the forms ἐπειή, τίη, ὁτιή for ἐπειδή, τί δή, ὅτι δή[7].

10. To the different points of investigation in this article belongs also the verse of Od. η, 288. on account of a various reading; for deciding on which we must first examine the common reading of the text. Ulysses is briefly informing the queen Arete, how, after he had escaped from shipwreck, he had

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[6] Let me here guard myself against the imputation, that because I have set down this form of words thus, I consider δαήμων to be the original idea of δαίμων, *deity, spirit,* however certain others may deem it.

[7] What has hitherto kept in the background the really very obvious remark, that δείλη is the old form for εἵλη, is, perhaps, a dislike to the derivation, generally considered certain, of the word εἵλη, or (what is supposed, without any regular foundation for the supposition, to be the radical sound,) ἕλη, from ἥλιος. Affinities of this kind however have but little certainty, and must give way to any other which may come recommended by stronger historical traces. The word εἵλη was indeed used of *the light of the sun*; but its original and radical meaning was, as its compounds and derivatives εἱληθερής, εἵλησις, εὔειλος, &c. show, *the sun's warmth.* Hence it strikes me as a very natural derivation, to deduce the word δείελος from δαίω, by which its meaning would be something like *burning, the sun's burning heat,* an idea particularly apposite in those countries where the afternoon heat burns up every object. That there are again other forms of words with as strong a similarity as these, which yet take a very different direction, must not too easily lead us astray; for such words as δείελος, εἵλη, ἀλέα, *calor,* καίω, δαίω, αὔω (*to dry up*), furnish etymologists with probabilities only, not with certain conclusions, either positive by their similarities, or negative by their difference. The forms δείλη, δείελος, taken by themselves, appeared to offer an etymological connexion with the verb δεῖν, *to be in want of*; but this, too, we shall unhesitatingly dismiss, when we consider that *to decrease* or *be on the wane,* (the only suitable meaning to be deduced from this idea of the afternoon,) is still a very different one from that of *to be in want of* or *deficient in.*

slept in the wood, and on his awaking had met with Nausicaa. He relates it thus:

> Ἔνθα μὲν ἐν φύλλοισι φίλον τετιημένος ἦτορ
> Εὗδον παννύχιος καὶ ἐπ' ἠῶ καὶ μέσον ἦμαρ,
> Δύσετο τ' ἠέλιος καί με γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν.
> Ἀμφιπόλους δ' ἐπὶ θινὶ τεῆς ἐνόησα θυγατρός, &c.

As these words run, and according to the analogy of Δύσετο τ' ἠέλιος σκιόωντό τε πᾶσαι ἀγυιαί, they can only mean that he waked at sunset. Now we find it circumstantially detailed in the preceding book (Od. ζ.), that the princess and her damsels had already eaten and played, and were now on the point of returning home with their garments washed (v. 110.) when Ulysses came forward. It was therefore, as we should say, evening, that is, the sun was approaching its setting. But we know at the same time how many things passed after this between Ulysses and Nausicaa, viz. his bathing, eating, &c., before they set out for the town; after which (as the poet relates it, speaking in his own person), on their arrival in the grove before the town, it is again said in the same words at v. 321.

> Δύσετο τ' ἠέλιος καὶ τοὶ κλυτὸν ἄλσος ἵκοντο.

Nay, even this second point of time still falls so early in the day that Minerva finds it necessary to make Ulysses, who is going from thence into the town, invisible. Hence in both passages we are told by the scholia that we are to take δύσετο in the sense of an imperfect, πρὸς δυσμὰς ἀπέκλινεν, εἰς δύσιν ἐκλίνετο: which however is quite contrary to the usage of the Greek language, as ἐδύσετο and ἐβήσετο are always aorists; see Buttmann's Ausführ. Sprachl.* sect. 96. obs. 10., and compare amongst an infinity of other passages where δύσετο occurs, Il. π, 729. Od. ρ, 336. This, however, does not prevent the aorist, in so common a formula as δύσετο ἠέλιος for the evening, expressing a certain extension of time, and compre-

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* [The passage referred to is too long to give entire; we extract the following abridgement:

"Obs. 10. We have also the case where the aor. 2. takes the σ of the aor. 1., of which the most complete instance is the common aorist ἔπεσον, πεσεῖν, &c. To this class belong all those forms which are comhending a short period both before and after sunset; whence therefore Ulysses, as he passed from the grove to the king's palace, observing everything, had need enough to be invisible. But if from the evening, which had now (η, 188.) really set in, we reckon back to the moment of Ulysses awaking (ζ, 110.), and consider how many things had happened in that space of time, it is totally impossible that the poet—who, when speaking in his own person of the arrival of Ulysses before the town in the early part of the evening while it was still light, had said Δύσετό τ' ἠέλιος—should now make Ulysses on his arrival at the palace use in his narration the same expression to mark a point of time which had elapsed so long before.

11. I well know what shifts criticism might call to our aid in such a doubtful point; but before we have recourse to any of these, I wish to examine anew the well-known reading of Aristarchus at η, 288.

Δείλετό τ' ἠέλιος, καί με γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἀνῆκεν.

It is singular that this reading should have disappeared from

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monly considered as anomalous derivatives from the fut. 1., and which we will collect here.

ἶζον, Epic aorist from ἵκω.

ἐβήσετο, imperat. βήσεο,
ἐδύσατο, imperat. δύσεο,
Epic aorists from βαίνω and δύνω (or δύομαι) and synonymous with the act. aor. ἔβην, ἔδυν.

λέξεο, ὄρσεο, ἀείσεο, ἄξετε, οἶσε, Epic aor. imperatives.

οἰσέμεν, οἰσέμεναι, Epic aor. infin.: see Il. γ, 120. Od. γ, 429.

These imperatives are not examples of an imper. fut. but aorists; nor is ἶξον an imperfect, but an aorist formed from the future. The more natural way will be to treat all the above forms as aorists coming at once from the stem itself, and therefore with reference to the common aorists anomalous, but independently of them having their own evident analogy. That is to say, as we have before seen that the aorists in ον and α, in ετε and ατε, in όμην and άμην, differed originally from each other only as being different dialects, so it is quite conceivable that the same differences took place also in the formation of the aorist with the σ. In a word, the old language formed the aorist partly with, partly without, the σ; and with regard to the termination, partly in ον, partly in α, &c.; ἔτυπα, ἔτυπσα, ἔτυπον, ἔτυπσον. Usage established itself (except in verbs with λ, μ, ν, ρ,) in favour of the terminations σα and ον, but still retained some remains of the formations in α and σον. And if we meet with any tenses with the σ, which are neither futures nor aorists, grammatical analysis may be permitted to derive them from either the one or the other." (Buttm. Ausf. Sprach. l. c.)—Ed.]

the editions, and, if we may judge from the five Vienna manuscripts, from the manuscripts also; while it appears to have been for a long time (as it is not at all surprising that a reading of Aristarchus should have been) the prevailing reading; for Eustathius has it in the text, and sets out with it in his Commentary; and, as I have shown above, when speaking of the scholia, the scholium of Cod. E., as well as that found in the common collection of old editions, refer only to this reading; in such a way, however, that in Schol. E., as is quite evident, Aristarchus is defending his own reading against the others. The rejection of this reading was undoubtedly owing to the verb being entirely unknown except in this instance*. Now such a reason can have weight only in the case of the reading being considered as a correction made by Aristarchus. That Aristarchus did occasionally correct the text from conjecture, no one can doubt; but that he formed from conjecture a verb, of which there are no traces elsewhere, and placed it at once in the text of his Homer in so decisive a manner that it remained an established reading in the copy which emanated from his pen, seems to me much more like any other ancient critic than like him. I think myself therefore justified in considering δείλετο to be an old reading handed down from an earlier period, which Aristarchus merely defended against the others at that time established. If I am not mistaken in this point, we cannot but conclude that it is the true reading now; for it follows almost necessarily that the other must have existed in addition to this, and must have originated in this. Again, Eustathius is quite justified in recommending this reading from its resemblance to the Homeric division of the day, as above mentioned, Ἔσσεται ἢ ἠὼς ἢ δείλη ἢ μέσον ἦμαρ: and to this I have only to add, that the verb δείλετο, which there are strong reasons for considering a mere derivative of δείελος, δείλη, and which yet comes forward in the form of a primitive, may be defended by θέρμετε, θέρμετο, by ὅπλεσθαι from ὅπλον, and by the contents of note 5. art. 106.

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* [" Atqui posterior ista vox (δείλετο) Homero prorsus inusitata." Clark.—Ed.]

12. Lastly, there comes from δείελος another acknowledged *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον*, the verb δειελιῆσαι occurring at Od. ρ, 599. Eumæus takes his leave of Telemachus to return into the country, and concludes with a wish, to which the latter answers

> Ἔσσεται οὕτως, ἄττα. σὺ δ' ἔρχεο δειελιήσας.
> Ἠῶθεν δ' ἰέναι καὶ ἄγειν ἱερήϊα καλά.

Some of the commentators understand the word of an intermediate meal between the morning and evening one; others merely of passing the afternoon in any place; and the latter appear to have been the majority. These understand, for instance, that Telemachus commands the old man, by the words ἔρχεο δειελιήσας, *not to go until later in the day*, explaining it thus: "Go, but not until you have spent the afternoon here;" an antithesis which the poet certainly would not have laid on a mere participle. And it is contradicted by what immediately follows. For as soon as Telemachus had finished speaking, Eumæus eats and drinks and then departs *during* the afternoon; v. 606. ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐπήλυθε δείελον ἦμαρ: on which verse see above sect. 6. Nothing can speak more decisively than this in favour of the other meaning, which was rejected by the grammarians merely, say they, because Homer knew only three meals, and this would therefore be a fourth; see Athen. 5, p. 193. b. They might have gone further, and have said only two meals; for to this number has the intelligent reader of Homer long ago reduced the three names, ἄριστον, δεῖπνον, δόρπον, on account of the inaccurate manner in which they were used; for ἄριστον is always the early meal or breakfast, but the two other names are used of both meals and never of a third. Any deviation from this rule depended on time and circumstances. And thus then it might very well happen that in the long space which intervened between the morning and evening meal a person might take something. And such is the meaning of the fragment of Callimachus quoted by Eustathius and the scholiast, and which in a note on the latter I have thus restored:

> Δειελίην αἰτοῦσιν, ἄγουσι δὲ χεῖρας ἀπ' ἔργου,

of workmen, who impudently require an intermediate meal which was not customary. And in the instance in Homer it was very natural that Telemachus should invite Eumæus, who was going home before the usual and proper time of the evening meal, to take an afternoon's luncheon. The verse of Callimachus, as confirmatory of this explanation, proves also thus much, that the words δειελίη and δειελιῆσαι are evidently connected together; and consequently the former, even if it was made by Callimachus for his own use, shows that in his time the Homeric verb was understood in that sense; which, when corroborated by so much internal evidence, is quite sufficient.

Δεῦτε; vid. εὖτε.

40. Διάκτορος.

1. This epithet of Mercury is explained by the grammarians in different ways, as may be seen in Eustath. ad Il. *β*, 103. and Od. *α*, 84., Etym. M. in v., Hesych. in v., Zonaras in v.[1] We will, however, notice here the only derivation which is founded on correct principles, viz. that from διάγω: whence is formed the verbal adjective διάκτωρ, and from its genitive again a new nominative διάκτορος. This last only requires to be understood more philosophically, and no fault can be found

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[1] By comparing Zonaras with a quite unintelligible derivation in the Etym. M. *παρὰ τὸ κέαρ τῶν τετελευτηκότων κομίζειν*, we are enabled to correct this latter. Instead of *τὸ κέαρ* it should be *τὸ τὰ κτέρεα*, by which we see quite enough to induce us not to trouble ourselves with so miserable an etymology. But there is one a trifle better which I will bring to light, as no one else has. Eust. ad Od. *π*, 471. (p. 615. Bas.) mentions that some explained the *ἑρμαῖα* or heaps of stones thus, that Mercury first, *οἷα κήρυξ καὶ διάκτορος καθήρας τὰς ὁδοὺς*, had thrown the stones aside out of the way, and that people now did so, *τὰς ὁδοὺς τῷ Ἑρμῇ ὡς διακτόρῳ ἐκκαθαίροντες*. It is evidently intended here to connect the name *διάκτορος* with the verb *καθαίρειν*, a connexion which Eustathius has obscured by the imperfect manner in which he has given it. He ought to have said, that as some deduced the word from *διάτορος* with the *κ* redundant, so others explained it with the *τ* redundant by *διάκορος* from *κορεῖν*, *to sweep*, whence also has been derived *ζάκορος*. See below, note 4.

with the manner of its formation. For as ος is a nominative termination as well as ς alone, or any other final letter of the root, a word may be formed with the one as well as the other termination, and inflected accordingly; for example, μάρτυρ or μάρτυς and μάρτυρος, φύλαξ and φύλακος. As the analogies of the formation of words were still less fixed, a verbal adjective in τωρ might end just as well in τορος also. The former was the regular analogy, but διάκτορος kept its ground in the old metrical passages which have come down to us.

2. But the verb itself was understood by those grammarians as referring to two different things, some of them supposing Mercury to be so called ἀπὸ τοῦ διάγειν τὰς ἀγγελίας, others ἀπὸ τοῦ διάγειν τὰς ψυχάς. It is inconceivable why Hemsterhuys on Lucian. Contempl. 1. gave the preference to the former, as διάγειν in such a sense is neither usual nor suitable, nor sufficiently characteristic of Mercury; but in the general sense of *transportare*, or the more particular one of *transvehere*, and with reference to persons, it is a very proper and fitting expression. (See Stephan. Thesaur., Sturz. Lex. Xenoph., and Hemsterhuys himself on other passages.) This explanation of the name was so familiar even with the ancients, at least in the later times of Greece, that Charon calls himself in Lucian, with evident reference to that name, the ξυνδιάκτορος of Mercury. And since the office of Mercury as a ψυχοπομπός was one so nearly connected with mankind, an epithet taken from thence was a very natural one; and we may therefore rest well satisfied with this explanation.

3. Still, however, I cannot suppress my own opinion, which is this. As it appears most natural that so constant an epithet should bear a reference to the principal office of the god, and designate him as the herald of the deities, I consider διάκτορος to be of the same family with διάκονος, which latter word is found in the grammarians among the explanations of the former, but without any further etymological discussion. The common derivation of the latter word, from διά and κόνις, is not indeed favourable to the affinity of these two names: but this derivation is certainly false, however strongly it may seem to be supported by a comparison with the verb ἐγκονεῖν,

to hasten. For if διάκονος and διακονεῖν were derived from διά, it would be impossible that the α could be so decidedly *long*, that the Ionians should say διήκονος, διηκονέειν[2]. What then is διάκονος? Like διάκτορος, from διάκτωρ, it is a variety of διάκων, which was also in use in the common language of Greece (see Schow, Charta papyracea, where it occurs more than once, p. 18. 22.), and of which we may see a parallel case in κοινών, used by good writers for κοινωνός. But such substantives and names in ων very frequently come from participles, as, for example, εἰκών from εἴκω, ἀηδών from ἀείδω, αἴθων from αἴθω, &c. Διάκονος was originally therefore, in my opinion, a participle of the same verb of which διάκτωρ is the verbal substantive; consequently διάκτωρ does not come from διάγω, but from διᾱκω or διήκω. But this latter, with the same change of vowel as we have in θῶκος and θᾶκος, in τρώγω and τρήγω (ἔτραγον), in ῥήγω, ῥήγνυμι and ἔῤῥωγα, ῥωγαλέος, &c., is the same as διώκω in its intransitive sense of *to run*, a sense which has always been more rare than its transitive one; see Schneider's Lexicon* in v., Sturz. Lex. Xenoph. in v. num. 6. 7., Abresch. ad Æschyl. 1, 13. p. 80. That is to say, there is originally in δίω and δίωκω, as in so many verbs of all languages, an intransitive as well as a transitive meaning, or, to speak more accurately, an immediate and a causative meaning, but so that the former, as the more simple, is the radical one; which will be in this case *to run*. But in time other words and forms were made to express this meaning, and thus the causative sense, *to make to run, drive,* became the prevailing one[3]. Διάκονος, therefore, derived from this διώκειν, *to run,* with the change of vowel above mentioned, properly means *the runner*; whence *a messenger, a servant,* always retaining the free and honourable idea implied in the original word; which idea became still more honourable in the other antiquated form διάκτορος, and so was an epithet well suited to the messenger or herald of the gods[4].

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[2] I do not suppose that any one will adopt the opinion, in itself so improbable, that the length of this syllable was caused by its being otherwise inadmissible in the hexameter. The hexameter would have lengthened the first syllable, as in ἀθάνατος, and in διά itself (Διὰ μὲν ἀσπίδος, &c.); but prose would not have had anything to do with such a change. The form διήκονος in Ionic prose ought to have been of itself sufficient to have at once done away with that derivation.

* [From Schneider's Greek and German Lexicon under διώκω I extract the following: "Without any case, as a neuter, it means *to run swiftly*, σπουδαίως θέω, according to Eustathius; for example, δρόμῳ διώκειν, as opposed to ἕπεσθαι βάδην, Xen. Anab. 6, 5, 25. (Sturz. 15.) Ἀναπηδήσαντες ἐδίωκον, *they leaped on their horses and rode hastily away*, Anab. 7, 2, 20. (Sturz. 11.)" But Passow in his improved edition of Schneider, after having quoted many instances of its transitive meaning, adds, "It appears to be used intransitively of a charioteer for *to drive along*, Il. ψ, 344. 424.; in Xen. of a horseman, *to gallop off*; and of a footman, *to run*; but in all these instances we must understand ἵππους, ἅρμα, πόδας, as we find the expressions thus completed in other writers."—Ed.]

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[3] Exactly in the same way the German verb *jagen* unites both meanings, the intransitive *to run, gallop,* the transitive *to cause to run, drive*[*]; while the frequentative verb *jackern* has the intransitive meaning only. Nay more, these German forms [the German pronunciation is *iagen*, as a dissyllable, or *yagen*] are precisely the same as those Greek ones, which the Homeric ἰωκή, ἰωχμός seem to me to put beyond a doubt. The form δίω took the additional idea of fear, which then became the prevailing one in the forms δίομαι, δέδοικα, δεδίττομαι, properly *to run from,* causatively *to frighten away.*

[4] The same honourable meaning which διάκονος has in Greek, existed in old German in the word *Degen,* which (as every one acquainted with that language knows) has no connexion with the modern German word *Degen,* 'a sword', Ital. *daga,* Fr. *dague,* Engl. *dagger. Degen,* old Frankish *thegan,* meant in very old German, 'a servant in general', expressed in modern German by *Diener,* whence the modern German verb *dienen,* 'to serve', as διακονεῖν from διάκονος. The etymologist, who has not hitherto observed these affinities, must see in them a strong argument in favour of what I have said on διάκονος in a former note: since, if this word were really compounded of διά, the striking similarity between the Greek διάκονος, διακονεῖν, and the German *Degen, dienen,* must be merely a delusion of chance. So far however is clear, that both the German and Greek word come from the same root, in Greek διώκω, in German now only *jagen*; which, however, most probably, like the Greek ἰώκω, is a sister-form coming from an old root originally beginning when complete with a *d*.

I will here add a further conjecture, that the word ζάκορος also is the same as διάκονος and διάκτορος: nor is it any objection to this supposition to say, that the α in ζάκορος should be short; (the decision in the Etym. M. is wrong;) for the vowel of such radical syllables may be in different forms of words both long and short. If it be said that νεωκόρος, a word of similar meaning, comes from κορεῖν, *to brush,* it will require a great degree of force to twist ζάκορος to anything like this idea, and there is no trace of the existence of such a verb as διακορεῖν. If on the

[*] [And so in colloquial English, "to run a coach."—Ed.]

4. There are still two observations with reference to the accounts which the lexicons give us of this διάκτορος, which I do not think it superfluous to mention; first, that in the pure old poetry the name is never given but to Mercury, and, further than that, is not used appellatively; secondly, that the form διάκτωρ, although according to analogy it must be considered as the groundwork of the other, was not in actual use. Whatever is at variance with these two observations belongs solely and entirely to the later and more artificial poetry; yet even when found in that it deserves and requires some investigation. The gloss in Hesychius Διάκτορσι, ἡγεμόσι, βασιλεῦσιν, appears to me indeed to be taken from some poet, who, taking the common derivation of the word from διάγω, used it as an appellation of certain royal leaders or chiefs. Much more striking is the occurrence of the word in the following epigram of Bianor from the Cephalanian Anthologia, 10, 101. (Jacob's Anth. vol. 2. p. 310.) on a cow ploughing and followed by her calf:—

Ἠνίδε καὶ χέρσου τὸ γεωτόμον ὅπλον ἐρέσσει,
Καὶ τὸν ὑπουθατίαν[5] μόσχον ἄγει δάμαλις,
Βούταν μὲν τρομέουσα διάκτορα, τὸν δὲ μένουσα
Νήπιον, ἀμφοτέρων εὔστοχα φειδομένα.
Ἴσχε', ἀροτροδίαυλε πεδώρυχε, μηδὲ διώξῃς
Τὰν διπλοῖς ἔργοις διπλὰ βαρυνομέναν.

That so polished a poet as Bianor should have thus thrown away on an animal an epithet exclusively applied to a god, is

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other hand, with reference to all that has been said above, we consider the analogy of Ζεύς, Διός, Jovis; Diabolenus, Jabolenus, Zabolenus (Salm. ad Jul. Capit. in Anton. Pio c. 12.); Jadera, Diadora, Zara (Mannert, part 7. page 329.); δίαιτα, Lat. *zeta*, and such like (which may be found in Salm. l. c., et ad Trebell. Poll. in Claudio c. 17., et ad Lamprid. in Heliogabalo, c. 30., Gesn. Thes. in Di and in Diæta);—if we consider these and other similar analogies, it is difficult to look upon ζάκορος in any other light than as another form of διάκονος; in the same way as even now in the languages of the North of Europe the sacristan or sexton is called *Degn*, and in French the same change in the termination has made *diacre* from *diaconus*.—That some derived διάκτορος also from the imaginary verb διακορεῖν, we have seen above in note 1.

[5] The editors ought never to have changed this perfectly analogical form (compare μονίας, φρονηματίας, κερατίας), which the manuscript gives, into ὑπουθάτιον.

perfectly inconceivable. But the solution of the difficulty is not far off. From the verb, which is here the usual one, and actually occurs in the fifth verse, Bianor made a perfectly analogical substantive and wrote *διώκτορα*. The lexicons have already *διώκτης*. It is very different when Callimachus in the Fragment (164.) quoted in the Etym. M. uses *διάκτορος* of the owl;

ʼΑλλὰ θεῆς, ἥτις με διάκτορον ἔλλαχε Παλλάς.

This transferring of the epithet of Mercury to the sacred owl of Minerva is not unworthy of the poet, and proves that Callimachus understood the word in its essential points as we do. On the other hand, there is a very unusual meaning of it in an oracle in Lucian Pseudomant. 33., where Pythagoras and Homer are recommended to a father as tutors for his son, in the following verse:

Πυθαγόρην, πολέμων τε διάκτορον ἐσθλὸν ἀοιδόν.

These words are an oracle made by the impostor Alexander, and belong therefore to the very late times of Greece. Undoubtedly the versifier understood the word, according to a very common explanation of it, as standing for *διάτορος*, that is, *τρανός*, *σαφής*. It belongs therefore here, with *ἐσθλόν*, to *ἀοιδόν*, and *πολέμων* is merely the genitive depending on the last word[6].

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[6] The word *διακτορία* stands in the older lexicons of Rob. Constantinus and Stephanus in the sense of *service, the office of a messenger*, but without any example; then follows a passage of Theophrastus where it has no meaning, and where some read *διατορία*, *shrillness of sound*. Schneider adopts this emendation, but cites as an example of *διακτορία* a very late poet, Julianus Ægyptius (Epigr. 11.), who probably made this word himself to describe in his joking style the office of the penknife; and no doubt the article in Rob. Const. had this passage only in view, as both there and in Julian it is the Ionicism *διακτορίη*. [Passow in his last improved edition of Schneider cites both Julian and Mus. 6. as an example of *διακτορία*.] *Διακτόρως, εἰρηνικῶς*, in Hesychius has been very judiciously amended by Hemsterhuys to *διακτόρῳ, εἰρηνικῷ*. It will then refer to Il. β, 103.

Δοάσσατο ; vid. δέαται.

41. Ἑανός, ἑδανός.

1. The forms ἑανός, ἑανοῦ, ἑανῷ, ἑανόν, εἱανοῦ occur frequently in the Iliad, in the Odyssey never : in every case they are used where something is to be put on, in most cases of some kind of robe or garment. It was not, therefore, to be expected that the grammarians would think there was any reason for supposing those forms to be more than one and the same word, merely because they were used sometimes as substantive and sometimes as adjective, and the quantity of the α always varied according to that change of usage. Besides, all appeared to proceed easily and smoothly from the root ἕω, ἕννυμι. Ἑανός was something to be *thrown round the person* or *put on*, consequently a good epithet for a robe or garment, and omitting πέπλος it would even mean the garment itself.

2. I would by no means attempt to affix any one particular meaning to this or that formation or termination so firmly, as, on this ground alone, to reject or pronounce impossible any certain usage of the older language ; but in the case before us there is one observation which I think deserves a more attentive consideration than it has generally met with ; namely, that in classifying the different passages of Homer according to the use of the word as substantive or adjective, we have at once an exact separation of the quantities. Five times it is used as an adjective, and the α in each case is *long* ; five times it is a substantive, and as often the α is *short* ; an induction which nothing but the extreme of thoughtlessness can attribute to chance. For to say of ἑανῶ λιτί, Il. σ, 352. and ψ, 254., that the former word is a substantive and the latter an adjective by metaplasmus for λιτῷ, could only be the result of an imperfect and half-considering criticism, which had either neglected to compare the passages of Il. θ, 442., where λῖτα stands alone, and Od. α, 130., where it even has epithets

joined with it, or which explained this λῖτα in some other way[1]. This circumstance of the difference of quantity in the substantive and adjective, receives additional weight from the usage of some good poets of a later period who use the substantive always short; thus it is in the Hymn. Cer. 176., in Antimachus, from whom Hesychius quotes ἑανηφόρος, and in three passages of Apollon. Rhod. 4, 169. 1155. 1189. Of the adjective I cannot find any decisive passages; see one of Sappho in this article, sect. 5[2].

3. We will now collect together the passages of Homer where ἑανός means simply *a robe* or *garment*; for instance, Il. φ, 507. it is said of the robe of Diana, Ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' ἀμβρόσιος ἑανὸς τρέμε. At ξ, 178. of Juno, Ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' ἀμβρόσιον ἑανὸν ἕσαθ', ὅν οἱ Ἀθήνη Ἔξυσ' ἀσκήσασα. At γ, 385. Venus goes to Helen, Χειρὶ δὲ νεκταρέου ἑανοῦ ἐτίναξε λαβοῦσα. And at 419. Helen, Βῆ δὲ κατασχομένη ἑανῷ ἀργῆτι φαεινῷ. Lastly, at π, 9. the child holding by its mother's garment is Εἱανοῦ ἁπτομένη. These passages give with certainty a substantive, ὁ ἑανός, which is synonymous with πέπλος, only that πέπλος has a more general meaning, including that of *a carpet*, &c., whilst ἑανός by its derivation from ἕννυμι was naturally restricted to the proper meaning of *a garment*. The unanimous

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[1] No one will any longer mistake ἑᾰνός to be a various reading of ἑδᾰνός, the epithet of oil (see Heyne on Il. ξ, 172. and sect. 7. of this article), at least in the way that Heyne recommends it for that purpose.

[2] Hesychius indeed, who has for the substantive a dialectic form ἴανον (see note 3. of this article,) has also Ἰανόκροκα, λεπτά, which can only be compounded of the adjective, and, consequently, if the word be from an hexameter line, would prove the usage of the short vowel in the adjective. But one can easily perceive of how little weight such an uncertainty is, when placed in the balance against the regularity of Homer's quantity as mentioned above; for the word may be taken from a lyric measure, it may be from a still later poet than those above mentioned; and even the meaning given is no proof; for Hesychius at the same time derives ἰανοκρήδεμνος from ἴον, *a violet*. At least it is evident that Schneider's conjecture in his Lexicon (v. ἑανός,) that ἰανοκρήδεμνος, as well as ἰανόκροκος, can be explained by λεπτός, may with equal reason be exactly reversed; and ἰανόκροκος, as well as ἰανοκρήδεμνος, be derived from ἴον, *a violet*; from which the latter is indeed derived by both Hesychius and Suidas.

explanation of the grammarians, that it means a *female* robe or garment, as it really does in all the five passages of Homer, lies not in the word, but in the thing, because none but females among the Greeks wore garments (πέπλους) so large as to wrap round the whole body. See Pollux 7. c. 13.

4. Now the adjective ἑᾱνός is really the epithet of a garment; as at ε, 734. θ, 385. of the garment or robe of Minerva; beside this, it is also the epithet of a cloth or linen with which a corpse is covered (σ, 352.), or which is thrown over the urn containing the ashes of the dead; and, lastly, it is the epithet of the tin with which the greaves were made (σ, 613.), Τεῦξε δέ οἱ κνημῖδας ἑανοῦ κασσιτέροιο. If we examine these passages more accurately, the derivation of the adjective from ἕννυμι will appear far less probable than it might at first have done. There is indeed in them all something which *covers* or *wraps up*, for even the tin is intended to inclose the legs; and we may conceive it possible that as πέπλος, like the English word *garment*, is a word of general meaning, a Greek might originally have said πέπλος ἑανός, *a garment worn round the body*, i. e. *a robe*. But is this conceivable in a poetical language like that of Homer? Is it conceivable, that when it is said of Minerva, Πέπλον μὲν κατέχευεν ἑανὸν πατρὸς ἐπ' οὔδει, this ἑανός means nothing more than 'worn round her, worn as a part of her dress'? That a proper and suitable epithet is here requisite, was felt by almost all the commentators. Hence the explanations λεπτός, μαλακός, εὐδιάχυτος, λευκός, λαμπρός, εὐώδης, ποικίλος, &c. (Hesych. in four contiguous articles, Schol. Il. σ, 352. 612. and others,) by which one sees that they are partly conjectural, partly adapted to the different passages.

5. If now, without paying any regard to etymology, we seek for an epithet explanatory of this adjective which may suit the garment and the linen covering, as well as the tin, the idea of *shining, white,* would of itself be a very appropriate one; but the passage σ, 352. speaks decidedly against this. For after it has been there said that the companions of Patroclus had covered his corpse ἑανῷ λιτί, it is immediately added καθύπερθε δὲ φάρεϊ λευκῷ. One sees, therefore, that in speaking of the linen, although it may have been white too,

yet there was no intention to refer to its colour and shining; the epithet, therefore, could not have been taken from thence. There remain therefore only these two ideas, which play so easily into each other; 1st, *fine, thin*; 2nd, *flexible, soft*; and between these two I should decide in favour of the second, because *fineness* or *thinness* is not at all a property of tin as a metal, nor is it appropriate to the tin plates of which the greaves were made any more than to the other metal which composed the rest of the armour; nay, it is less suitable to the soft tin, in as much as this, if particularly thin, would be no protection. The garment of Minerva, therefore, was *soft* and *yielding*; so was the linen used for the inner covering of any object; and *flexible, soft* is the proper epithet of tin. A verbal confirmation of this meaning, drawn from that poetry which is the next in date after the Epic, is furnished us by a fragment of Sappho (see Schneider's Lexicon[*], v. ἑανός), where a beautiful woman

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[*] [In Schneider's Lexicon we find ἑανὸς thus treated:
Ἑανὸς, ὁ, or ἑανὸν, τὸ, Il. γ, 385. and 419. *a garment*, or rather *a veil*, ἑανῷ ἀργῆτι φαεινῷ. At Il. σ, 352. ἑανῷ λιτὶ κάλυψαν, it is doubtful whether it be a substantive or adjective, but at ϵ, 615. it is an adjective, meaning *white* or *thin tin*; and thus also should the adjective be explained in the remaining passages. Mention has also been made of εἰανὸς and ἰανὸς. Hesychius has εἰανοῦ, εὐδιαχύτου, which refers to Homer's ἑανοῦ κασσιτέροιο; again, ἑωμιοῦ, ἱματίου γυναικείου; and, further, ἴανον, ἱμάτιον. Another very different meaning and derivation is given by both Hesych. and Suid. in the following; ἰανόκροκος, ὁ, ἡ, (κρόκη) λεπτὸς, of fine thread, finely woven. In the same way may be explained ἰανοκρήδεμνος, which both Hesych. and Suid. derive from ἴον. Gregorius on Hermogenes, p. 914. quotes from Sappho ἱματίου ἑανοῦ μαλακωτέρα. Antimachus has said ἠὼς ἑανηφόρος, and therefore used ἑανὸς as a substantive, like Apoll. Rhod. 4, 1155. ἑανοὺς εὐώδεας, and 1189. πολυκμήτους. In Hom. Hymn. Ven. 63. ἀμβροσίῳ ἑανῷ (ἐλαίῳ) some read ἑδανῷ.

Passow in his improved edition of Schneider arranges and alters it thus:

Ἑανός, ή, όν, an old adjective, strictly speaking known from the Iliad only, and used solely of things *which are worn* or *put on*, and which recommend themselves for wearing by their beauty or lightness and convenience; hence the derivation from ἕννυμι is probably the true one: πέπλος ἑανός a clear or light veil, *worthy of being worn*, Il. ϵ, 734. θ, 385. Ἑανῷ λιτί, with fine and white linen, *beautifully made for wearing*, Il. σ, 352. ψ, 254. Ἑανός κασσίτερος, tin beat out into thin plates for greaves, therefore *made fit for wearing*, Il. σ, 613. Thence came the is said to be *ἱματίου ἑανοῦ μαλακωτέρα*. The quantity in this, as being a fragment, is not clear. In order to make it agree with the Homeric quantity, we have only to complete the verse in some such way as this,

– – | *ἱματίου* | – ᴗ *ἑᾱ|νοῦ μαλακω|τέρα.*

6. These results are sufficient for the great object of explaining Homeric words, viz. that we may understand their meaning: and should any one be determined to retain the common derivation of both words from ἕω, ἕννυμι, there can be no decisive objection to it, as the idea of *flexibly soft* may be easily connected with that of *covering* or *wrapping up*. But then again there is nothing in favour of that derivation but old prepossessions. We should say that it were much better to derive ἑᾰνός, *a garment*, at once from ἕω, exactly according to the same analogy (the accent excepted, which no one will consider as of any authority in a word purely Epic,) as στέφανος, *a wreath*, from στέφω: by which we do away with the supposed ellipsis of πέπλος, as nothing similar occurs in the use of στέφανος. And since ἑᾱνός as an adjective is so regularly and decidedly distinguished from the substantive by its quantity, there is nothing to hinder us from supposing it to be a separate word, the proper derivation of which, like that of so many other adjectives, is no longer to be found[3].

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substantive-meaning of the neuter *τὸ ἑανόν* (supply *εἷμα* or *ἱμάτιον*), a beautiful robe, worthy of being worn by goddesses or superior women, Il. γ, 385. 419. ξ, 178. φ, 507. Also *εἰανόν* is used in π, 9. The quantity of alpha is both long and short. Clarke on Il. γ, 385. and Herm. Orph. Arg. 880. suppose it to be long in the adjective and short in the substantive, a rule which only holds good in the Iliad. Later poets use it as it suits the verse.—Ed.]

[3] The length of the *α* decides me in considering this letter as a part of the root. In the same way as *τρᾱνός, δᾱνός* are acknowledged verbal adjectives from ΤΡΑΩ (*τιτρώω*), ΔΑΩ (*δαίω*), so *ἑᾱνός* would lead us to a root ΕΑΩ; and I cannot help thinking that in the meaning of the common verb *ἐάω*, if it be taken physically, as every root originally must be, there lies something which answers very well to the idea of *yielding, flexible*. On the aspirate it is hardly worth losing our time to say a word; for if we take it for granted that a garment was called from *ἕννυμι—ἑᾰνός*, it was almost a necessary consequence that *ἑᾱνός*, which was an epithet of garments, &c., should, at a time when both words were no longer in common use, assimilate itself to the former by taking

7. With the examination of ἑανός we join that of ἑδανός, on account of its similarity, and because ἑανός is in fact a various reading for ἑδανός in the only passage where the latter occurs, Il. ξ, 172. where Juno anoints herself

. . . . λίπ' ἐλαίῳ,
Ἀμβροσίῳ, ἑδανῷ, τό ῥά οἱ τεθυωμένον ἦεν.

In the manuscripts indeed, as far as I know, and in the grammarians, no various reading is given; but a few quotations of this verse by other authors (see Heyne) give ἑανῷ, and in Hymn. Ven. 63., where it is interpolated, all the editions, except the most modern, have ἑανῷ. I have no hesitation, however, in receiving ἑδανῷ as the true and established reading, not because the quantity of the other is contrary to the universal usage of Homer mentioned above, but because there is nothing to induce the critic to prefer a various reading, which has crept in by means so easily to be conceived, to the reading of the Homeric text approved of by all the grammarians. This ἑδανῷ the grammarians explain by ἡδεῖ; and in doing so they make an observation, surprising at first sight (see Schol. and Etym. Gud.), that adjectives in -ᾰνός, formed from verbs, shorten the radical vowel of the verb, as from ἵκω comes ἱκανός, from πείθω πιθανός, and, therefore, from ἥδω ἑδανός. One thing these grammarians did not observe, although they quote an instance of it in τρώγω τραγανός, that this shortening of the vowel takes place by reverting to the vowel of the root; but this vowel in the case before us is α, as the Doricism of ἥδω, ἡδύς, and the verb ἁνδάνω, ἁδεῖν, prove; by which, therefore, the evidence of this derivation falls to the ground. One might, perhaps, feel inclined to consider -δανός as a mere termination, as in πευκεδανός, ῥιγεδανός: but to a person who examines etymology in a serious historical manner, without indulging himself in fancifully playing with ideas and mean-

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the aspirate also. If now we pay no attention to what the grammarians say of accent and aspirate, it is very probable that the substantive, according to the analogy of στέφανος, was written ἕανος, but the adjective, according to the analogy of δεινός, τρανός, was ἑανός. And, with regard to the accent, the former is confirmed by the dialectic form Ἴανον, ἱμάτιον, in Hesychius.

ings, the root ε offers nothing from either ἵημι or ἕννυμι or ἧμαι, which can satisfy him as an expressive epithet for a precious ointment. To have brought such an investigation as the above even to this point of uncertainty, I consider a service; and I will therefore only suggest the possibility of ἑδανός being perhaps a stronger and higher meaning of ἐός or ἑός, *good* (see art. 43. sect. 4.), which, beside the other words mentioned above, may be compared with οὐτιδανός, μηκεδανός[4]; so that the reader may choose between this suggestion and the explanation of the grammarians. For, as to this last, I only object to the evidence by which it was attempted to be supported. But who can pretend so to limit the euphonic changes in a language, as to declare it improbable that from ἁδανός, as the word must have properly sounded, came ἕδανος?

42. Ἑάφθη.

1. The verb ἑάφθη occurs in the two following passages; viz. in Il. ν, 543. where Æneas attacking Aphareus

> Λαιμὸν τύψ', ἐπὶ οἷ τετραμμένον, ὀξέϊ δουρί,

and it is immediately said of the latter,

> 'Εκλίνθη δ' ἑτέρωσε κάρη, ἐπὶ δ' ἀσπὶς ἑάφθη
> Καὶ κόρυς, ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ θάνατος χύτο θυμοραϊστής.

and at ξ, 419. of Hector struck near the neck by Ajax with a huge stone,

> Ὣς ἔπεσ' Ἕκτορος ὦκα χαμαὶ μένος ἐν κονίῃσιν·
> Χειρὸς δ' ἔκβαλεν ἔγχος, ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ἀσπὶς ἑάφθη
> Καὶ κόρυς, ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ βράχε τεύχεα ποικίλα χαλκῷ.

None of the commentators, as far back as we can now trace them, retained any regular traditionary knowledge of ἑάφθη, and therefore they endeavoured to get at it by examining the context and seeking for some analogy of formation. Aristarchus decided in favour of the verb ἕπεσθαι: to which derivation belongs also the explanatory ἐπικατήχθη, ἐπικατηνέχθη (see Schol. Min. on the first passage and Schol. Ven. on the second); although in Apollon. Lex. the explanatory word κατηνέχθη is separated from ἐπηκολούθησε by ἔνιοι δέ. Tyrannio objected to the change of the vowel α, and preferred the passive of ἅπτω, making it ἐπὶ . . . ἑάφθη, for ἐφήφθη, *inflicta est*. In Hesychius we find ἑκάμφθη, ἐβλάβη, which we must connect with the Schol. Min. on the second passage, ἐπικατεκάμφθη δὲ αὐτῷ ἡ ἀσπίς; this, however, is hardly conceivable, unless we suppose that some earlier commentator had introduced as a grammatical or other amendment ἐάχθη, i. e. ἐάγη: but even if this were so, the breaking or bending of the shield, though it might very well be caused by the blow of the stone in the second passage, cannot hold good in the first, where the only blow is made by a spear piercing the neck.

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[4] If μηκεδανός were but a real word. But I strongly suspect that it has come into the lexicons entirely from the endeavours of the grammarians to form the word μακεδνός from μῆκος.

2. If now we examine the context, it will appear that the sense and construction of ἐπί in both passages must be decided by the second, where the description is fuller and more complete. The expression in this latter is Χειρὸς δ' ἔκβαλεν ἔγχος, ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ἀσπὶς ἑάφθη, and here αὐτῷ appears to refer to *him*, the falling combatant. How is it then in the other passage, where it is said, Ἐκλίνθη δ' ἑτέρωσε κάρη, ἐπὶ δ' ἀσπὶς ἑάφθη? In whatever sense the verb is here taken, one cannot imagine what the shield and helmet can do merely *on the head* of the dying warrior. We must therefore suppose that, as it necessarily follows that after his head was bent on one side he fell, the word ἐπί must be understood in this passage, as in the other, to refer to *him falling*. What then must become of the shield and helmet when the warrior falls? Nothing, that we can suppose to be intended by the poet in these two passages, but *to fall* likewise. Now as far as concerns the shield, this interpretation of the preposition, ‘ it fell on him’, will suit very well (as at ρ, 300. πέσε πρηνὴς ἐπὶ νεκρῷ): but what a singular circumstance it would be for the helmet, which in other cases is described as rolling away to a distance when the combatant falls, to be said in these two instances, just as if it were a necessary consequence, to fall upon

the man! We must therefore understand ἐπί in the sense of *after that, thereupon*; much the same as at π, 661. πολέες γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ κάππεσον; or at υ, 395. ὁ δ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ (immediately after him) Δημολέοντα . . . νύξεν: or at ψ, 290. τῷ δ' ἔπι Τυδείδης ὦρτο, or ὄγχνη ἐπ' ὄγχνῃ, &c. This will correspond with what is said in the scholium to ξ, 419. ἅμα γὰρ ὅλῳ συγκατηνέχθη τῷ σώματι. The sense of the passage would therefore be this; "Hector fell; he dropped the spear from his hand, and shield and helmet fell after him;" by which we must consequently suppose that the helmet fell separate from the shield: that is to say, in both passages, the warrior is struck in front of the neck, by which the fastening of the helmet under the neck is loosened, and as the man falls the helmet drops from his head. And in this same sense, as we have said above, is the ἐπί in the first passage also to be understood.

3. But in giving this explanation of the passage, what precise meaning are we to attach to the verb ἑάφθη? The most suitable one, as the idea of the falling body is already expressed, would certainly be ἐπακολουθεῖν: but then an idea so purely neuter as this* cannot be properly expressed by a passive form, as ἑάφθη for ἕσπετο: and as to the change of the vowel, even though ἐτράφθη may be conceivable in the later Ionic dialect, in which we find τράπω, yet ἑάφθη from ἕπεσθαι must in Homer always appear strange and unaccountable. If we have recourse to ἅπτειν, *to fasten*, ἅπτεσθαι, *to be fastened, to fix* or *hold firm on anything*, the passive form is very proper; but then we cannot bring out the idea without the assistance of ἐπί, and we must therefore again render ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἑάφθη, 'struck or fell upon him', *inflicta est in ipsum*; and then we cannot but wonder how the helmet could fall upon the body.

4. In addition to these difficulties, we have also the form of the augment ἑάφθη; for there is not a single instance of the syllabic augment before a vowel, without some appearance of the digamma; and both ἕπω, ἕπομαι, and ἅπτω, ἅπτομαι, be-

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* [Buttmann in the original introduces here the German verb *folgen* (to follow) as the meaning in question of ἑάφθη and ἐπακολουθεῖν; but as the English verb 'to follow' is not *purely neuter* like *folgen*, I have omitted it in the translation, and I know of no expression to supply its place.—Ed.]

long exactly to those verbs which have nowhere any trace of the digamma. If then the critical philologist cannot discover a third verb from which he may derive this ἑάφθη, there remains only the possibility, that one of the two verbs, ἕπω or ἅπτω, might have had the digamma in the earliest times of the language, and that ἑάφθη in Homer is a relic of it: and in this case the probability would be greatly in favour of ἕπεσθαι, which still has an *s* in the Latin *sequi*, in the same way as *se*, *socer*, the German *Sitte* (Gr. ἦθος), compared with the words admitting the digamma, ἕ, ἕκυρος, ἦθος.

5. If then, in a question balanced as this is between two opinions, it remains only to decide in favour of that to which there are the fewest objections, I incline toward ἑάφθη from ἕπεσθαι: and, starting with this, I will proceed to examine the construction again. There is no question but that it is Homer's general custom to refer αὐτόν, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῷ, in one member of a sentence, to the *person* mentioned in the corresponding member; but the pronoun is also sometimes referred by him to some less striking object, to a thing, and may then be rendered by *it*; for instance, in Od. ρ, 269. Γιγνώσκω δ' ὅτι πολλοὶ ἐν αὐτῷ (in it, in the house) δαῖτα τίθενται. At ι, 205. Maron gives Ulysses wine, Ἡδὺν, ἀκηράσιον, θεῖον ποτόν· οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν Ἠείδη δμώων. Let us apply this to the present case, and we see that in the verse, Χειρὸς δ' ἔκβαλεν ἔγχος, ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ἀσπὶς ἑάφθη, the most natural relation of the pronoun is to the spear. Now ἔκβαλεν means nothing more than that he dropped the spear; if then by ἐπὶ...ἑάφθη it is intended only to say, that upon the falling of the spear, shield and helmet fell *likewise*, it is not easy to discover why this should be made to refer so particularly to the falling of the man. But whatever is said here of the spear, must in the other passage (where ἐπί stands alone, instead of ἐπ' αὐτῷ) hold good of the *head*. Now when I see that at Il. ψ, 232. κλίνθη κεκμηώς is said of one who lays himself down to sleep, and at Od. τ, 470. ἂψ δ' ἑτέρωσ' ἐκλίθη is used of a kettle which is overturned, and again I find at Il. κ, 472. ἔντεα. .παρ' αὐτοῖσιν χθονὶ κέκλιτο, —I think that in Ἐκλίνθη δ' ἑτέρωσε κάρη, ἐπὶ δ' ἀσπὶς ἑάφθη Καὶ κόρυς, we may very fairly conclude that ἑάφθη is used in the sense of *to follow*. For in order to complete the sense of

ἐφέπεσθαι it is quite enough to say that, first the head sinks and then the arms; in the same way as, when speaking of persons, we read at Il. δ, 63. ταῦθ' ὑποείξομεν ἀλλήλοισιν Σοὶ μὲν ἐγὼ σὺ δ' ἐμοί· ἐπὶ δ' ἕψονται θεοὶ ἄλλοι: and again, of all the gods acting in concert, Od. μ, 349. ἐπὶ δ' ἕσπωνται θεοὶ ἄλλοι*.

Ἑδανός; vid. ἑανός.

43. Ἐῆος, ἑῆος.

1. The form ἐῆος occurs as an unequivocal genitive of the adjective ἐΰς in the three following passages; viz. Od. ο, 450.

> Παῖδα γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἐῆος ἐνὶ μεγάροις ἀτιτάλλω,

(the son of a man *of rank and substance*): Od. ξ, 505., where Ulysses says of himself in his guise as a beggar, that if he were now in youth and strength Eumæus and his companions would give him a garment,

> Ἀμφότερον φιλότητι καὶ αἰδοῖ φωτὸς ἐῆος.

And Il. τ, 342., where Jupiter says to Minerva, speaking of Achilles,

> Τέκνον ἐμὸν, δὴ πάμπαν ἀποίχεαι ἀνδρὸς ἐῆος.
> Ἦ νύ τοι οὐκέτι πάγχυ μετὰ φρεσὶ μέμβλετ' Ἀχιλλεύς;

Let us look next at the four following passages; viz. Il. ω, 422. where Mercury says to Priam,

> Ὥς τοι κήδονται μάκαρες θεοὶ υἷος ΕΗΟΣ.

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* [Schneider's Lexicon, under ἑάφθη, says: "It is generally explained by ἐπηκολούθησε, and derived from ἐφέπομαι: but this is contrary to analogy; it had much better be formed from ἐφάπτω for ἐφήφθη in the sense of ἐπηκολούθησε: for ἑάφθη was used for ἥφθη, as ἑάλη for ἥλη, ἑάγη for ἥγη, ἑάλω for ἥλω. It is written also ἐάφθη, as is ἐάγη."—Passow, in his last edition of Schneider, writes ἐάφθη, and translates ἐπὶ δ' ἀσπὶς ἑάφθη, "the shield fell over him," so that it reached the ground, adding that it is "probably from ἅπτω, ἐφάπτω, aor. pass. for ἥφθη, ἐφήφθη. Others," says he, "write ἑάφθη, and derive it (very improbably) from ἕπομαι; that is to say, ἐπὶ—ἑάφθη is for ἐφέσπετο, '*the shield followed after*'."—Ed.]

At verse 550., where Achilles says to Priam,

Οὐ γάρ τι πρήξεις ἀκαχήμενος υἷος ΕΗΟΣ.

At Il. ο, 138., where Minerva says to Mars, respecting Ascalaphus,

Τῷ σ' αὖ νῦν κέλομαι μεθέμεν χόλον υἷος ΕΗΟΣ.

And at Il. α, 393., where Achilles says to Thetis, speaking of himself,

. . . . περίσχεο παιδὸς ΕΗΟΣ.

If any one, after a comparison of the four latter passages with the three former, should still doubt whether the ΕΗΟΣ in all of them is the same word, let him only compare with the first of the latter four the following from Od. γ, 379., where Nestor says to Telemachus, of Minerva,

Ἥ τοι καὶ πατέρ' ἐσθλὸν ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἐτίμα·

and with all four these two; Il. π, 573.

. . . . ἀτὰρ τότε γ' ἐσθλὸν ἀνεψιὸν ἐξεναρίξας
Ἐς Πηλῆ' ἱκέτευσεν·

and ε, 469.

Ἀλλ' ἄγετ' ἐκ φλοίσβοιο σαώσομεν ἐσθλὸν ἑταῖρον·

and we think he will then be satisfied that in those four passages, as in the three former, it must be written ἐῆος; and that this adjective, like the more common one of φίλος elsewhere, supplies so well the place of the possessive pronoun σοῖο, (which in a relative idea like that of *son* can be very well dispensed with, and in these cases would destroy the metre,) that the sense even gains by its admission; as the same adjective in other passages is joined with the genitive of possession, for instance ἐῢς πάϊς Ἀγχίσαο, υἱὸν ἐῢν Πριάμοιο. And whoever is offended with the epithet ἐῢς in the last of those four passages as an expression of self-praise, and again in the second where Achilles gives it to his enemy whom he had slain, mistakes the nature of the fixed epithets and the language of the heroic age.

2. The old grammarians (see particularly Apollon. Lex. in v.) add προσηνοῦς to the explanation ἀγαθοῦ, and that with especial reference to the last passage, περίσχεο παιδὸς ἐῆος: partly perhaps from the wish to soften down the idea of self-praise,

but partly also as a parallel of *φίλος*, which likewise stands elsewhere instead of the possessive pronoun, and of which *προσηνής* is the correlative, (*φίλος* implying *loved by me*, *προσηνής*, *attached to* or *loving me*,) as is evident from the imitation of Apollonius Rhodius quoted at the end of this article. This explanation by *προσηνής* may be very well applied to some of the other passages, but in no one instance can it be a reason for our at all deviating from the most simple meaning of the word *ἐΰς*. Now as this particular passage is exactly one which might be most likely to make us hesitate in giving it the sense of *ἐΰς*, it shows us plainly that those who introduced *προσηνής* to define the meaning of it, derived *ἑῆος* in this and all the other passages from *ἐΰς*.

3. If now we search after the authorities for the other explanation, according to which *ἑῆος* in the four last-mentioned passages is supposed to stand for *σοῦ*, we find it in the uncritical crowd of the common scholia, of Eustathius, and of the Etym. M. ; but in all the older authorities we look for it in vain : and, what must carry great weight, we not only find no trace of it in the Venetian scholia, not even once as the rejected interpretation of another person, but in one of these very passages (*ο*, 138.), as in one of the other three (*τ*, 342.), it is expressly explained by *ἀγαθοῦ*, though in all of them, both in the text and scholia, is written *ἑῆος*, as also at *ω*, 528. *ἑάων* for *ἐάων*. Beside this, at three of the four passages, viz. *α*, 393. *ο*, 138. *ω*, 550., and even at one of the three others, (where the meaning of *ἀγαθοῦ* is certain,) viz. *τ*, 342., the reading of Zenodotus, *ἑοῖο*, is mentioned, accompanied, in two of the passages, by an *objection* that it brings a *change of person*, and that he could have used it only from ignorance of the form *ἑῆος*, *of the good*[1]. Hence, therefore, it is plain, that at the time when this grammatical question was raised no one

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[1] On *ο*, 138. *Ἡ διπλῆ ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράφει υἷος ἑοῖο· τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ περί τινος λόγῳ* (in the third person) *τίθεται, νῦν δὲ πρὸς πρόσωπόν ἐστι* (this might mean, in the second person ; but undoubtedly the reading should be *παρὰ πρ.* as in the following scholium) *καὶ δεῖ γράφειν ἑῆος. ἠγνόηκε δὲ τὴν λέξιν. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἑῆος ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ δοτῆρες ἑάων.* On *τ*, 342. *ἀνδρὸς ἑῆος] ἡ διπλῆ ὅτι Ζ. γράφει ἑοῖο· τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ τὸ πρόσωπόν ἐστιν—ἑῆος δὲ, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.*

had any notion or knowledge of an ἑῆος, which stood for ἑοῦ, and so for σοῦ. In the lexicon of Apollonius, too, there is only ἐῆος, explained by ἀγαθοῦ, προσηνοῦς; while ἑῆος with the other explanation is wholly omitted: and lastly, (which is very decisive,) the learned grammarian Apollonius of Alexandria, who in his book on the Pronoun has collected and explained all the Greek pronouns, even the most rare of the different dialects, makes no mention of this supposed Homeric ἑῆος.

4. It will be impossible for us to conceive how the judgement of those who first introduced into our Homer the difference between ἐῆος and ἑῆος, could have become so perverted, unless we try to figure to ourselves the march of Homeric criticism. The form ἐῆος, like so many other Homeric expressions, became quite unknown to the common language of Greece. Nothing, therefore, was more natural than that it should be uncertain whether it ought to be aspirated or not: nay, some darkly felt analogies induced a custom, which at last became fixed and constant, of aspirating ΕΗΟΣ as well as ΕΑΩΝ, as we see, not only in the above-mentioned quotations from the Venetian Homer, but also in the plain and express examples of the grammarians; for instance, in the *Lexicon de Spiritibus*, in Valckenaer ad Ammon. p. 214. 215: while ἐΰς, in the same work, p. 220, is as expressly directed to be written with the *lenis*. From such fixed examples as these we might very naturally be led into error in writing these words, if we did not recollect that those grammarians were speaking of words not then in common and familiar use, but *learned* words; and that in such cases we have as good right to an opinion as the critics of that time. Now there are many verses in Homer ending with υἷος ἑῆος, παιδὸς ἑῆος, and others of a very similar character with παιδὸς ἑοῖο, πατρὸς ἑοῖο, that is to say in the third person, where the possessive pronoun suits the verse very well. It would have been indeed surprising if these endings had not been confounded together, and interchanged with each other; and as a usage undeniably ancient had made the possessive pronoun of the third person in certain cases (see below note 4.) common to both the second and third, ἑοῖο, when found in connexion with the second person, was not

so striking as it otherwise would have been. We must not suppose that Zenodotus, who is accused, certainly with great injustice, of very arbitrary proceedings, invented this reading: he found it in existence, adopted it, and made it consistent, by rejecting the reading ἑῆος in every instance where it supplied the place of the possessive pronoun[2]. Such was the state of things at the period which alone, whenever we can discover it, must be the basis of all our Homeric criticism. But now came the times of the less learned and more indecisive grammarians, who were fond of playing on words and letters. These, finding in the innumerable copies of Homer then existing, sometimes ἑῆος, sometimes ἐῆος (for the latter naturally still remained), began now to refine on this difference; and while they decided correctly on ἐΰς, ἐῆος, they thought they were carrying on the idea of Zenodotus, as to the form ἑῆος, by explaining it to be the genitive of ʽΕΥΣ or ʽΕΕΥΣ, a sister-form of ἑός. The last step was taken by those grammarians who wished to introduce uniformity into all the expressions of Homer. These limited ἑῆος exclusively to the instances of the second person, and in all those of the third, without an exception, wrote ἑοῖο: so that it now appeared as if Homer had in those passages been driven by the metre from σοῖο, and had had recourse to the common third person; but that, being desirous of making some distinction, he had taken a more rare sister-form of it, and appropriated it to the cases of the second person. And thus we see how one step of false criticism naturally led to another.

5. We shall observe, at the first glance, if it be but pointed out to our notice, how contrary it is to probability and common sense, that a form which properly belonged to the third person should never have been used in that person; and how unpoetical it was in the poet, when he had once given this universality to the third person, not to have rendered it plainly perceptible, by making the form quite common[3]. As to the question

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[2] That he could have reckoned the case of Il. τ, 342. as one of these, and understood ἀνδρὸς ἑοῖο to refer to Achilles as the favourite of Minerva, is indeed surprising, but nothing more.

[3] True uniformity would have been, if ἑῆος were a genuine form, to have placed it always at the end of the verse, and wherever in the middle a consonant was required; but in all other cases to have written ἑοῖο.

whether the change of *σός* for *ὅς* or *ἑός* should be attributed to Homer on such slight grounds, we have no occasion to discuss it here[4]. Nor need we enter any further into the doubts which may be entertained respecting the form *εΰς* or *ἑεύς*, gen. *ἑῆος*, for *ἑός*, gen. *ἑοῖο*, which stands also in Homer, and in Homer only[5]. Without examining either of these points, I think there can remain no doubt of the correctness of the reading *ἐῆος* in all the seven passages enumerated at the beginning of this article[6].

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[4] The question depends entirely, beside what has been said, on the criticism of three verses in Homer; Il. *τ*, 174. *σὺ δὲ φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἰανθῇς. γρ. φρεσὶ σῇσιν.* Od. *α*, 402. *Κτήματα δ' αὐτὸς ἔχοις καὶ δώμασιν οἷσιν ἀνάσσοις. γρ. δώμασι σοῖσιν.* Od. *ν*, 320. *φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἔχων δεδαϊγμένον ἦτορ*, for *ἐμῇσιν*. Generally speaking, the reflective form would be admissible in all these three passages, because in all of them a relation is actually thrown back on the subject of the sentence. But in a poet like Homer, and one too who has used this form (if he really has used it) so seldom, we must suppose that he chose it from some particular motive; that is to say, only where the sense *own* may be affixed to the pronoun. Wolf has therefore very judiciously restored in the first passage the reading *σῇσιν*, because there is nothing there to distinguish it from other passages where the acknowledged reading is *φρεσὶ σῇσι* (as at Il. *ξ*, 221. 264. *π*, 36., &c.); and with the same judicious unwillingness to correct unnecessarily, he has left untouched in the second passage the far better authorized reading *οἷσιν*, because this passage, from the idea of *own* being admissible in it, is visibly different from Od. *ο*, 542. where nothing but *δώμασι σοῖσιν* is or can be read. The third passage is distinguished from both the others by this, that the form *ἐμῇσιν* cannot by any means be brought into the verse, and the idea of *own*, which would be a reason for retaining *ᾗσι*, has as little business in this passage as it has in those of *φρεσὶ σῇσι*, referred to above. Hence it is remarkable that this very passage (Od. *ν*, 320. 321. see Schol. Harl.) has been from other causes declared to be spurious from very remote antiquity,—an opinion strongly confirmed by the confusion which this verse makes with the context: we must only remember to leave untouched the verses 322. 323., which another scholium includes in the same condemnation. Since then *δώμασιν οἷσιν* stands one isolated instance in all Homer, I do not believe it to be a genuine one, as the various reading *δώμασι σοῖσιν* is so trifling a difference, and the idea of *own*, though, as I have observed above, admissible, is shown by the context to be perfectly unnecessary.—I should pass the same judgement on the *φρεσὶν ᾗσιν, γρ. φρεσὶ σῇσιν* in Hesiod, *ε*, 379. as I have in Homer; although in that heterogeneous poet, whose writings afford no such inductive proof as Homer's do, such an opinion must be less certain.

[5] We must not mix up with this discussion the Doric *ἑοῦς*, which is the gen. of the pronoun substantive for *οὗ* or *εἷο*, and which those grammarians least of all looked for in Homer.

6. But as we may fairly suppose that Homer used this ἐῆος instead of the possessive pronoun, not wholly on account of the metre, but in some cases (where that did not compel him,) to suit the ἔθος of certain passages, we ought to direct our attention anew to the three following, where ἐῆος stands as a various reading of the regular ἑοῖο of the *third person*: for instance, Il. ξ, 9—11. of Nestor,

> Ὣς εἰπὼν σάκος εἷλε τετυγμένον υἷος ἑοῖο
> γρ. ἐῆος
> Κείμενον ἐν κλισίῃ, Θρασυμηδέος ἱπποδάμοιο,
> Χαλκῷ παμφαῖνον· ὁ δ' ἔχ' ἀσπίδα πατρὸς ἑοῖο.
> (no various reading.)

at Il. σ, 71. of Thetis,

> Ὀξὺ δὲ κωκύσασα κάρη λάβε παιδὸς ἑοῖο.
> γρ. ἐῆος.

and at v. 138.

> Ὣς ἄρα φωνήσασα πάλιν τράπεθ' υἷος ἑοῖο.
> γρ. ἐῆος.

I must confess that according to the first impression made on my mind by a merely superficial view of these three passages, (not thereby anticipating a more fundamental examination of them,) the reading ἐῆος appears to me very preferable; while among the other passages where ἑοῖο occurs, as Il. ξ, 11. 266. τ, 399. ψ, 360. 402., with those which have ἐμοῖο, as Od. *α*, 413. λ, 457. υ, 339., there are very few in which I should search about for the various reading ἐῆος.

7. The other Epic poets whose works have come down to us, whether earlier or later, have neither ἐῆος nor ἑῆος, except Apollonius Rhodius, in whom we find (1, 225.) ἑῆος as a various reading of ἑοῖο, and a reading of the text of the older editions, as also in the fuller scholiasts.

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[6] This is also the opinion of Heyne and other modern commentators; but they do not appear to me to have examined the question fundamentally. See Heyne's note on Il. *α*, 393. Wolf also, in his latest edition of the Iliad, reads ἐῆος in those four passages.

Οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδ' αὐτοῖο πάϊs μενέαινεν Ἄκαστος
Ἰφθίμου Πελίαο δόμοις ἔνι πατρὸς ἑοῖο
Μιμνάζειν. *γρ. ἑῆος*

Modern editors have rejected it; but surely this difficult form can scarcely have crept by an error of transcription into this single passage. I think with Heyne (on Il. *α*, 393.) that *πατρὸς ἑῆος* must there be understood to mean *of his good, loving father*; and Apollonius Rhodius followed therefore the old explanation *προσηνοῦς* (see above, sect. 2.), which suits this case perfectly well, as Pelias wished Acastus not to leave him*.

Ἐθέλω; vid. *βούλομαι*.

44. Εἰλεῖν, ἔλσαι, ἀλῆναι, εἰλίπους, &c.

1. The words and forms which proceed from the verb *εἰλεῖν*, or are connected with it, furnish a great many difficulties to

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* [In Schneider's Lexicon we find,—

" Ἑῆος, irregular genit. for *σοῦ*, in Homer, as *παιδὸς ἑῆος*: but *ἐῆος* is genit. of *ἐΰς*, q. v.

" Ἐΰς, ὁ, Ion. *ἠΰς*, like *καλὸς*, *beautiful, good, excellent, brave*; thence the genit. *ἑῆος*, Il. *α*, 393. From this is derived the *εὖ* used in prose; and some derive the neut. *δῶτορ ἐάων*, *the giver of good things*, from the genit. *ἑήων*, others from *ἑαὶ*, others from *ἑὰ*, *τά*. According to this, *ἐὸς* would be the same as the Ionic form *ἐΰς*; and *ἑὰ*, *τὰ*, the same as *τὰ ἀγαθά*."

In Passow's edition of Schneider is the following:

" Ἐῆος, gen. masc. to *ἐΰς*: occurring five times in the Il., twice in the Od. In four of these passages was formerly written *ἑῆος*, explained to be an irregular genit. of *σοῦ*: but Damm, Wolf in his last edition of the Iliad, and Buttmann in his Lexilogus, following the best of the old commentators, have changed the latter untenable form, in all passages where it occurs, into the former.

" Ἐΰς, ὁ, *good, excellent, brave, noble.* An Epic word frequent in Homer, who, besides the nom. and once the accus. *ἐΰν*, Il. *θ*, 303., uses only two irreg. genit.: viz. 1st) the genit. sing. *ἐῆος*, twice in the Il. and five times in the Od., with *ἀνδρός, φωτός, παιδός*, and *υἷος*; and 2ndly) the gen. plur. neut. *ἐάων*, as from a nomin. *τὰ* 'ΕΑ, *good things, good fortune*, Il. *ω*, 528. *Θεοὶ δωτῆρες ἐάων*, Od. *θ*, 325: compare also v. 335. and Hom. Hymn. 17, 12. 29, 8. Except this genit. the word is always masc. in Homer, but of the Ion. form *ἠΰς* he has also the neut. *ἠΰ*. On the other hand, *ἐΰ*, or as it is more frequently written, *εὖ*, and used by the Attics also, is always an adverb."—Ed.]

the critical philologist, partly by the variety of ways in which they are written and formed, as we find εἴλω and εἰλέω, εἵλω and εἱλέω, εἴλλω and εἵλλω, ἴλλω, ἕλσαι, ἀλῆναι and ἁλῆναι, all good authorized forms; and partly by the variety of meaning, as we find *to thrust, push, strike; to shut, fasten; to turn, roll up, wind up, wrap up,*—senses sometimes evident of themselves, sometimes offered by the commentators. It shall be my endeavour to bring this perplexing maze into some kind of order and certainty; but always, be it remembered, by tracing the steps of history or tradition; for as to the other method, that of fixing on some one radical meaning from which all the others may be deduced, and considering in what way they may with probability be traced from one to the other,—such a method as this, the easiest of any in its execution, which may always be brought to succeed, even when the ideas do not really correspond with each other,—I would wish, as far as my exertions can go on occasions like the present, to discourage and repress. In the case before us the principal point is, what are we to say of the meaning *to turn, roll up*? For while we always find in Homer the above-mentioned forms in the sense of *to thrust* and *shut in*, yet in the grammarians and lexicons we see the principal meanings attached to them are those of *to roll* or *wrap up*; and indeed so much so, that they are often ranked, without any visible reason for it, as the radical meaning. All this we will endeavour to unravel by tracing, as we have hitherto done, the actual usage, without suffering ourselves to be swayed by any previously formed opinion, such as the apparent or real connexion of these forms with ἑλίσσειν.

2. I set out with the forms ἕλσαι and ἔελμαι, which give us the most simple root ΕΛ, according to which we may suppose a theme ΕΛΩ or ΕΛΛΩ as the radical one. The form of the augment ἔελμαι, and the hiatus before ἕλσαι, in Il. *α*, 409. lead us at once to the digamma; consequently we have ϜΕΛΛΩ: and hence also, as in some other verbs of this kind, the redundant ε in the infinitive ἐέλσαι, Il. φ, 295. The meaning of this aorist in all the passages of the Iliad is quite plain, *to shut* or *hem in*, whether a single individual, as the Trojans did Ulysses, λ, 413. Ἔλσαν δ' ἐν μέσσοισι μετὰ σφίσι πῆμα τιθέντες, or a whole army in the space round the ships, or in the

town, α, 409. Τοὺς δὲ κατὰ πρύμνας τε καὶ ἀμφ' ἅλα ἔλσαι Ἀχαιούς. σ, 294. θαλάσσῃ τ' ἔλσαι Ἀχαιούς. φ, 225. πρὶν ἔλσαι (Τρῶας) κατὰ ἄστυ. φ, 295. Πρὶν κατὰ Ἰλιόφι κλυτὰ τείχεα λαὸν ἐέλσαι Τρωϊκὸν ὅς κε φύγῃσι. And with this agrees the perf. pass. ω, 662. Οἶσθα γὰρ ὡς κατὰ ἄστυ ἐέλμεθα. μ, 38. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ. . . Νηῦσιν ἐπὶ γλαφυρῇσιν ἐελμένοι. σ, 287. ἐελμένοι ἔνδοθι πύργων: which again is used of an individual at ν, 524.; viz. of Mars, who, Ἧστο Διὸς βουλῇσιν ἐελμένος, as he, with the other gods, was obliged to remain in Olympus.

3. Very different from the last meaning is the use of this form in the Odyssey, where however it occurs but once, that is to say, in the same verse recurring twice, ε, 132. η, 250.

> . . . . νῆα θοὴν ἀργῆτι κεραυνῷ
> Ζεὺς ἔλσας ἐκέασσε μέσῳ ἐνὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ.

Therefore ἔλσας means *striking*. Here, however, the old various reading ἐλάσας (see the scholia) deserves our serious consideration. For the fact is, that ἐλάσαι throughout Homer is the proper and usual word for *to strike*, as in the Iliad τὸν σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν,—ὁ δ' αὐχένα μέσσον ἔλασσεν,—&c., and here in the Odyssey of the blow of Neptune, so analogous to the stroke of Jove's thunderbolt, δ, 507. τρίαιναν ἑλὼν χερσὶ στιβαρῇσιν Ἤλασε Γυραίην πέτρην: and ν, 164. where he turns the ship of the Phæacians to stone, Χειρὶ καταπρηνεῖ ἐλάσας. It is difficult therefore to conceive how this ἔλσας, in a sense unknown to it elsewhere, has found its way into that one verse instead of the usual word; and why, without any metrical cause, at one time ἐλάσας is used, at another ἔλσας. This difficulty, however, is not removed by our admitting the reading ἐλάσας into the text in this passage: every genuine old various reading is of equal weight with the text; and whatever is surprising in the latter, remains surprising also if transferred to the former. Here then we will leave this point, until we have informed ourselves further on this family of words.

4. We have supposed a theme ΕΛΛΩ according to the most simple analogy, as it actually does exist in κέλλω, κέλσαι. But Homer himself furnishes us also with a tolerably simple present in the part. pass. εἰλόμενος, according to the analogy of ὀφείλω, and of κείρω ἔκερσα; with which we must also join the form-

ation in έω, evident in some of the other tenses. The agre
ment in meaning of these two forms, εἴλω and εἰλέω, wi
each other, and with ἔλσαι, ἔελμαι, is clear from one passag
Il. θ, 215. The Greeks are there forced back to their for
fications; and it is related in the imperfect tense that all t
space between the walls and fosse Πλῆθεν ὁμοῦ ἵππων τε κ
ἀνδρῶν ἀσπιστάων Εἰλομένων· εἴλει δὲ θοῷ ἀτάλαντος Ἄρ
Ἕκτωρ. Here the imperfect εἴλει stands in evident relation
the participle εἰλόμενοι, which in the sense of the present
imperfect is precisely the same as ἐελμένοι is in that of t
perfect. The Greeks were forced back in a body and shut
in that narrow space; and he who forced them back w
Hector. Thus εἰλόμενοι is principally used, not in the pa
sive but in a reflective sense, of men *collected together in*
crowd; Il. ε, 782., the two goddesses came to the Greeks, ὅ
πλεῖστοι καὶ ἄριστοι Ἕστασαν ἀμφὶ βίην Διομήδεος ἱπποδάμο
Εἰλόμενοι, λείουσιν ἐοικότες ὠμοφάγοισιν. And at ε, 20
Pandarus says, he was unwilling to take his horses with hi
to Troy lest they might be straitened for fodder, ἀνδρῶν εἰλ
μένων, that is, where so many persons had collected and crowd
together[1]. The form εἰλέω occurs further in the exact sen
of the above-mentioned ἔλσαι, at Il. σ, 447. Ἀχαιοὺς Τρῶ
ἐπὶ πρύμνῃσιν ἐείλεον (EϜEIΛEON). And at Od. μ, 21
ὅτε Κύκλωψ Εἴλει ἐνὶ σπῆϊ γλαφυρῷ, (kept us *shut up*,) &c.

5. All these forms belong therefore necessarily to each othe
and to them we may besides add, as I have shown in my Gran
mar, the form ἐάλην, ἀλῆναι: for on the uncertainty of t
aspirate we must hereafter come to some general decision. Th
form is the aor. pass. of ΕΛΛΩ or εἴλω, exactly as ἐστάλην
from στέλλω, ἐκάρην from κείρω[2]. The agreement in meanin

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[1] *Shut in together* (as it is generally translated here, as spoken
persons shut up in a besieged town,) appears to me not to have bee
Homer's idea; besides, he would have expressed it rather by ἐελμένο

[2] The supposition of a verb ἄλημι, and the deriving of all the form
belonging to this investigation (which have the α) either from ἀλέω,
avoid, or from ἀλέες, *conferti*, are clumsy contrivances of the older an
later grammarians. The most ancient grammatical tradition treate
them as we do. This is shown not only by the shorter glosses συν
στράφη, συγκλεισθέντες, &c., in the scholiasts and in Apollon. Lex., b

between this and the above forms is clear from the following passages; Il. χ, 12. (of the Trojans whom Achilles had forced back into the town), Οἳ δή τοι εἰς ἄστυ ἄλεν. σ, 76. πάντες ἐπὶ πρύμνῃσιν ἀλήμεναι υἷας Ἀχαιῶν. φ, 607. πόλις δ' ἔμπλητο ἀλέντων (exactly the same as above πλῆθεν εἰλομένων). ε, 823. Ἀργείους ἐκέλευσα ἀλήμεναι ἐνθάδε πάντας, 'to collect themselves here together'. To which belongs also ψ, 420. χειμέριον ἄλεν ὕδωρ, 'water collected together, and shut up in a narrow space'. We have now, then, the verb according to Homeric usage complete. The present is properly εἴλω, but was changed by a very easy transition to the lengthened form εἰλέω, still retaining however its more simple form in the present passive εἴλομαι; much as in common Greek στέρομαι is in use as the passive of στερέω. The remaining flexions were (ἕλσω) ἕλσαι, ἔελμαι, ἐάλην, ἀλῆναι. In all these connected forms however the digamma is announced by the usual signs.

6. In some of the examples quoted above we have already seen that this sense of *shutting* or *hemming in* is not always founded on some external force, but sometimes on the will or choice of the person so shut up; with which agrees also the idea of a body of men being drawn or collected together into one place by their leader, as in Pindar Ol. 10, 51. ἐν Πίσᾳ ἕλσαις ὅλον τε στρατὸν λείαν τε πᾶσαν, spoken of Hercules *collecting together* his army. Hence comes the well-known use in Homer of the passive ἀλῆναι of a person drawing up his body together; as we find it used in the most literal manner at Il. ν, 408. of Idomeneus crouching or concealing himself behind his large shield; Τῇ ὕπο πᾶς ἐάλη, τὸ δ' ὑπέρπτατο χάλκεον ἔγχος. And in this narrowest sense of *to conceal* the active ἕλσαι occurs, not indeed in Homer, but in that

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the proof of it may be found more at length in Eustathius, who, on Il. ν, 408., after having explained ἐάλη by συνειλήθη, συνεστράφη, adds γίνεται ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶλον, οὗ παθητικὸς ἀόριστος ἄλην, &c., where the word εἶλον cannot be intended to come from αἱρεῖν. And even supposing that Eustathius might have misunderstood the older grammarian, still we see what the meaning of this latter was by another observation in Eustathius, where not only is ἐελμένοι compared with κατὰ ἄστυ ἀλήμεναι, but there is also added, φίλαι δὲ ποιηταῖς λέξεις τὸ ἕλσαι καὶ ἀλήμεναι καὶ ἐελμένοι καὶ ἐάλη καὶ ἀλείς.

very ancient elegiac poet Callinus, v. 11. *καὶ ὑπ' ἀσπίδος ἄλκιμον ἦτορ Ἔλσας.* The drawing up the body in a crouching posture, by a person fearing immediate death, we see in Il. *π*, 403., where Thestor expecting Patroclus to kill him *ἐνὶ δίφρῳ ἧστο ἀλείς*: and *υ*, 278., where Æneas, when his shield is pierced through, holds it before him at a distance, and draws himself up together, *Αἰνείας δ' ἐάλη καὶ ἀπὸ ἕθεν ἀσπίδ' ἀνέσχεν.* Such a contracting of the body together is a particular characteristic of beasts of prey, who draw themselves up in a crouching posture before they spring on their victim; as at Il. *υ*, 168. of the lion, *ἐάλη τε χανὼν περί τ' ἀφρὸς ὀδόντας Γίγνεται*: and it is also used in the same way of a warrior, who, whilst he is preparing to rush on his enemy or expecting his attack, draws himself up together, or, as we say, puts himself in an attitude of attack or defence; as at *φ*, 571. *Ἀχιλῆα ἀλεὶς μένεν*: and thus there is a very easy and natural connexion with *any premeditated* attack, without any stress being thereby laid on the particular position in which the body previously was; Il. *χ*, 308. Od. *ω*, 537. *Οἴμησεν δὲ ἀλεὶς ὥστ' αἰετὸς ὑψιπετήεις.*

7. It is evident that in all the meanings of the passages hitherto quoted there is no appearance whatever of the idea of *to turn, roll,* or *wrap up,* or of anything akin to it. Hence, if such an idea occurs here and there in the explanations of the grammarians, it proceeds merely from their own opinions of *εἰλεῖν.* At the same time it must be confessed that in cases where the word means the collecting together a number of persons or a quantity of a thing, the meaning can be expressed perfectly well by *συστρέφεσθαι*; and consequently, if we look merely to the sense of such a passage in particular, it can be explained by that term. But that this is not the original meaning of *εἰλεῖν*, must be sufficiently plain from what has been said above. Nor is even *to shut up,* evident as this idea is in many of those passages, the primary and radical idea; as we see most clearly at Il. *φ*, 8., where a part of the combatants is driven or forced into the river, *ἡμίσεες δὲ Ἐς ποταμὸν εἰλεῦντο,* in which they swim about, are slain by Achilles, &c.; but they do not stand, as in some other passages, hemmed in between the person who is forcing them and the object which stops them. But from such passages as Od. *λ*, 573., where the poet describes

Orion Θῆρας ὁμοῦ εἰλεῦντα κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα, we see how the idea of *shutting up* arises from that of *driving on before.* The reflective idea (to crowd or collect together), as expressed by εἰλόμενοι, of those who collected round Diomede, may be cited as an additional instance, and is expressed, like so many other verbs, by the aorist passive, ἐάλην: and thus all the meanings of ἀλῆναι are brought into a regular series.

8. But this same primitive meaning of εἰλεῖν, *to force* or *drive before one*, is also the meaning of the verb ἐλᾷν, ἐλαύνειν; with this difference however, that in εἰλεῖν there is the idea of a *limit* or *boundary*, but ἐλᾶν expresses *an unlimited driving*; the additional force of this latter meaning being given to the root ΕΛ- by the ending άω[3]. The same verb has also the acknowledged sense of *to beat*, which can be connected with the other only by supposing that *to strike, push*, or *thrust*, is the primitive meaning of this verb, and consequently of the whole family of verbs which we have been examining. But in art. 87. we meet with the word ὀλή, barley *trodden out*, as a verbal substantive of this radical verb ΕΛΩ, and ἀλέω, *to tread, bruise*, or *grind*, as a more forcible derivative of this same root. And now then that various reading in the Odyssey, ἔλσας—ἐλάσας, comes before us in a new point of view: for it is impossible that a reading so unusual and startling as that is could have taken firm footing in that passage, had it not originally come from the old language of Greece. Nay more, ἐλάσας being expressly quoted as the reading of Zenodotus, shows that the other stood on much firmer historical grounds than even that; a fact which we should be concealing, if we were to adopt the reading ἐλάσας in that passage.

9. To the Homeric use of the verb εἴλω we may add the substantive εἶλαρ. The inanimate object represented by this word is described (as is very commonly the case), like a living agent, by its effects. Thus a fortress is said *to repulse* an as-

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[3] Ibycus, with the licence of a lyric poet, used ἤλσατο βοῦς for ἠλάσατο, Etym. M. p. 428, 29. But the verse of Simonides in the same Et. M. p. 634, 6., Καὶ τῆς ὄπισθεν ὀρσοθύρης ἠλσάμην, is corrupted, as the quantity of ὀρσοθύρη shows. Perhaps it should be ὀρσοθύρης ἠλευάμην, scil. αὐτόν, 'I escaped from him through the back-door'; as in Horace, "*postico falle clientem.*"

sailant. The most natural construction of the word is that in Od. ε, 257., where the well-made sides of the ship are called an εἶλαρ κύματος, as *driving off*, *repelling* the waves; and the wall in the Iliad is called εἶλαρ νηῶν τε καὶ αὐτῶν, as surrounding and defending from hostile attack the ships and the army.

10. If, then, it is quite clear that in the usage of the Epic poet there is nothing whatever which can give this family of words the idea of *to turn*, *twist*, or *roll up*, but that so far from it their only meaning is the very different one of *to beat*, *push*, or *drive*, we must have recourse next to the later and prosaic use of them, of which we can find no examples older than those in the Attic laws. We have there a very ancient grammarian in the person of Lysias, who in his Oration c. Theomn. p. 117. mentions many old law-terms no longer in common use in his time, and amongst others the following; Ὅστις δὲ ἀπείλλῃ (var. read. ἀπίλλῃ) τῇ θύρᾳ, ἔνδον τοῦ κλέπτου ὄντος. The construction is somewhat clumsy; but one sees that the thief is *shut off* from an escape, prevented from escaping; consequently the idea here is an opposite relation to that which forms the groundwork of the well-known legal term ἐξούλη. The verb from which this last substantive comes is very correctly explained by Harpocration *in v.*—whether he reads ἐξέλειν or ἐξέλλειν or ἐξείλλειν is of no consequence (see Not. in Harpocr.),—not in that strange way in which it is generally explained by *rolling out*, *turning* a person *out* of that which belongs to him, but by ἐξείργειν, ἐκβάλλειν; although even this last word is not to be understood always of *turning* a person *out* of what he is already in possession of, but of *not admitting* him, of *preventing* him from taking possession of that which was his right. And in this same sense stood the verb itself in an old Attic law quoted by Demosthenes c. Pantæn. p. 476., of a person who prevented another from working his mine; ἐάν τις ἐξείλλῃ (var. read. ἐξείλῃ) τινὰ τῆς ἐργασίας. This meaning, *the preventing a person from doing a thing, shutting or keeping him out of it*, is therefore the correlative of the other ἀπείλειν, *to prevent or hinder a person from going out, the keeping him in*, and this not only in the passage relating to the thief, as quoted above from the old law, but also in a passage of Homer, Il. β, 294. of a ship prevented from sailing;

ὅνπερ ἄελλαι Χειμέριαι εἰλέωσιν ὀρινομένη τε θάλασσα. Again we see plainly the difference between this ἐξείλειν and ἐξελαύνειν, notwithstanding that the same idea is common to them both: ἐξελαύνειν is to drive a person out of that place wherein he actually is; ἐξείλειν is at most to prevent his going in, to drive or thrust him away so that he shall not enter.

11. In Herodotus we find the most frequent recurrence of the compound κατειλεῖν, and always used of a number of persons κατειληθέντες or κατειλημένοι ἐς τὸ τεῖχος, ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ἐς τὸν Παρνησσόν, ἐν ὀλίγῳ χώρῳ, &c. In the same way at 3, 45. τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐς τοὺς νεωσοίκους συνειλήσας: consequently the meaning is invariably *to squeeze* or *crowd together* and *shut up*. And this same usage remains in the Attic writers: for instance, in Thuc. 7, 81. ἀνειληθέντες γὰρ ἔς τι χώριον ᾧ κύκλῳ τεῖχος περιῆν. Again in Xen. Hell. 7, 2, 8. οἱ δὲ ὠθούμενοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν...εἰς ἔλαττον συνειλοῦντο. Hippocrates has it in a similar sense of inanimate objects, Coac. vol. i. p. 588. κατειλούμενος εἴσω ἐρευγμός, *kept back* or *suppressed*. With this agrees exactly a passage in Plato's Timæus, p. 76. b. of the vapour which ascends from the body, but being by the external air πάλιν ἐντὸς ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα εἰλλόμενον (var. read. εἰλλ-, εἱλ-, εἰλ-, εἰλου-, and in Proclus ἰλλ-) κατερριζοῦτο.

12. After this it will be impossible for us to go from these ideas of *squeezing* or *pressing together*, *shutting up together*, in the explanation of two passages in the tragedians where this verb is compounded with ὑπό. Euripides, in a fragment of his Œdipus, (see in Valck. p. 194.) says of the Sphinx, Οὐρὰν δ' ὑπείλλουσ' (var. read. ὑπίλλ.) ὑπὸ λεοντόπουν βάσιν Ἐκαθέζετο. It is universally agreed that this is said of the Sphinx just overcome; and therefore, in order to introduce, agreeably to the preconceived meaning of the word, something of *turning* and *twisting*, the verb is either understood to mean *to wag the tail* (see Schneid.*) or it is compared with the passage in

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* [In Schneider's Lexicon we find the following article:

" Ὑπίλλω, same as ὑπειλῶ. see εἰλῶ, ἴλλω. Οὐρὰν ὑπειλεῖν, *remulcere caudam*, 'to drop the tail between the legs and wag it,' as a fawning dog does. In Eurip. ap. Æl. h. a. 12, 7. used of the Sphinx, οὐρὰν ὑπείλλασα, where Gesner reads ὑπειλοῦσα, and the Vienna MS. has

Virgil's Æneid 11, 813. of the wolf, "*caudamque* remulcens *subjecit pavitantem utero.*" The comparison is a very apt one; but as the manner in which the tail moves is self-evident, there can be nothing in ὑπείλλειν but *subjicere*, 'she sat down with her tail *thrust under her.*' And with this corresponds exactly, though in a metaphorical sense, the meaning of the same word in Soph. Antig. 509., where, after Antigone had said to Creon of the bystanders, that they would all approve of what she had done, *εἰ μὴ γλῶσσαν ἐγκλείσοι φόβος*, she applies to him the same idea in other words, *σοὶ δ' ὑπίλλουσι στόμα.* Neither the earlier usage of the verb, nor the context accurately understood, can lead us to the sense generally given to these words, *torquent os suum secundum te*; for they are not spoken of those who flatter the tyrant, but of all those present who are silent through fear, and *suppress* their feelings.

13. We come now to that expression of Plato, of which so much has been said, *γῆν εἰλλομένην* (with the usual various readings) *περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον*, Tim. p. 40. b. After all the foregoing examples it would be totally inconceivable that the verb should in this case all at once and entirely lay aside its usual meaning, and express, as some of the commentators explain it (see Ruhnk. ad Tim. p. 69.), a *rotatory* motion in its fullest sense, that is, the constant revolution of a body round its axis, and that too in the very book where, as we have so lately seen, the same word occurs in its usual sense. We at least, who have traced the word from its earliest use thus far, cannot give it in this passage a sense different from all the others; and as we have seen its meaning particularly marked sometimes by *ὑπό*, sometimes by *σύν*, &c., so here also it must mean *to press* or *be pressed round* the axis, that is, to press from all sides toward the axis. Nor let any one object to the use of the present: the powers which first formed the world and still hold it together are represented as in continual action; the earth is in a state of constant press-

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ὑπίλλασα; it must be *ὑπίλασα*. *Στόμα ὑπ.*, *subjicere, obnoxium habere os*, 'to keep the tongue in subjection to any one', Soph. Ant. 509. Timæus Ruhnk. p. 71. In Philo 3, p. 260. a MS. has *ὑπειλούσης* for *ὑπεικούσης*, *yielding.*"—Ed.]

ure toward its pole or axis, and so forms a ball round it; which use of the word answers exactly to that according to which the same verb means *to wrap round, envelope.* Here too we find, mixed up in the description, something which carries us on to a *bending, rolling,* and with that to a *turning*; but this is nothing more than a collateral idea crept in, not from the meaning of the word, but through the thing described. Let us turn now to the passage of Herodotus 4, 67. where it is said of the soothsayers who divine by means of a bundle of rods, ἐπεὰν φακέλους ῥάβδων μεγάλους ἐνείκωνται, θέντες χαμαὶ διεξελίσσουσι αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἐπὶ μίαν ἑκάστην ῥάβδον τιθέντες θεσπίζουσι· ἅμα τε λέγοντες ταῦτα συνειλέουσι τὰς ῥάβδους ὀπίσω. Here διεξελίσσειν and συνειλεῖν are certainly correlatives. But if we look at the latter by itself, there is nothing whatever in it to make us think of a *bending* and *rolling*; for the Scythian diviner takes up one rod after another, and unites all together again in one bundle; so that συνειλεῖν is, consequently, nothing more than *constringere,* which meaning is also the ground of the middle εἰλλομένην in Plato. But the undoing of this bundle may, on account of the use of διεξελίσσειν, be very well rendered an *unrolling* or *unfolding.* And hence then it comes to pass that in all similar cases, where something, by being forced or driven over and over, is either pressed together into itself, or externally wound and wrapped round, as in the ancient rolls or books, and in the binding up a wound, the most common correlatives even down to later times are κατειλῆσαι (ἐγκατειλῆσαι, ἐγκατίλλειν, Hippocr.), *to put together, bind up,* and ἀνελίττειν, *to unroll, unbind*; never κατελίττειν, for that κατειλῆσαι; but sometimes ἀνειλῆσαι, in the sense of *to undo*, as being merely the doing away that which is done by κατειλῆσαι, something like the Latin *recludere* from *claudere.* (Compare Lobeck on Phryn. pp. 29, 30.) In the same way it is used by Thucydides 2, 76. where, in the description of a blockade, clay is wrapped up in mats of plaited or twisted straw, ἐν ταρσοῖς καλάμου πηλὸν ἐνείλλοντες: here the verb is used compounded with ἐν, because the action described is that of pressing in firmly and tying up, in undoing which the most natural word would be ἐξελίττειν.

14. If then, by a course of verbal criticism, carried on re-

gularly and correctly from Homer down to Plato, including even the last-quoted passage of this writer, we have seen that εἴλειν has always essentially the same sense of *pressing* and *shutting*, and that there has been no reason in any one instance why we should understand the same verb in the sense of *to turn round*,—it must appear strikingly extraordinary (perhaps not much less so than if we had found it in Plato himself) that Aristotle, Plato's nearest follower in Grecian literature, should have understood the verb in that same passage of Plato in the sense of *to turn*; and that he did so seems beyond a doubt, as he has quoted the passage in his treatise *De Cœlo*, 2, 13. as a decided instance of this meaning. As to what may be said on this point with regard to the thing itself, how decidedly certain Plato's meaning is in this respect, and in what way we may explain Aristotle's mistaking his meaning, —on these points I refer to the old philosophers, who have expressed their astonishment at it, to Plutarch, Galen, Proclus, Simplicius, whose opinions are quoted by Ruhnken in Tim. Lex., and to Böckh in his Program *de Platonico systemate cœlestium globorum*, &c., Heidelb. 1810. 4to. I will also mention the grammatical remark added by Simplicius[4]; τὸ δὲ ἰλλομένην εἰ διὰ τοῦ ι γράφεται, τὴν προσδεδεμένην σημαίνει. καὶ οὕτω καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ ποιητὴς (1, 129.), Δεσμοῖς ἰλλόμενον, τουτέστιν ἐνδεδεμένον, μεγάλων νώτων ἐξέωσεν. καὶ Ὅμηρος (Il. ν, 572.), ἰλλάσιν, τουτέστι δεσμοῖς, οὐ βίᾳ δεσμοῦντες ἄγουσιν. εἰ δὲ διὰ τῆς ει διφθόγγου γράφεται, καὶ οὕτω τὴν κωλυομένην σημαίνει, ὡς Αἰσχύλος ἐν Βασσάραις. Hence we see that a difference did exist, whether early or late, whether well or ill-grounded, between the writing or pronunciation of εἰλ and ἰλλ, at least among those learned in grammar, according to which the latter was supposed to mean *to wrap up, bind*; and the oldest grounds for this were sought for in the Homeric substantive ἰλλάδες, *bands, chains*. Now we observe from Simplicius, that, even if there were any ground for the difference, it makes no alteration in this case, as the former mode of writing the word has a meaning essentially agreeing with that of the latter; in proof of which he could adduce of the simple verb but one passage, that from Æschylus, where *εἰλλόμενος* had the sense of *κωλυόμενος*, or, as Hesychius says of the same passage, *εἰργόμενος*[5]. We should not be able to furnish him with a more suitable passage from the collection which we have made above; but we may, perhaps, be able to produce the same result by placing together and comparing the whole usage of the word. And thus, then, Aristotle's explanation of Plato's *εἰλλομένην* becomes only the more surprising. If Aristotle really did use it in the sense of *to turn* or *revolve*, one might certainly be inclined to think that it must have had that meaning in the language of his time. This supposition is not, however, so necessary as may at first sight appear. Aristotle was an etymologist, and in pursuing his etymological inquiries the same might happen to him which does to others. The verb was evidently in his time, particularly as a simple verb, nearly or quite obsolete, and still partially used in only a few expressions. Plato, who adopted on various occasions, but always with discrimination, old and rare words, selected this for the passage in question; and Aristotle, mistaking Plato's opinion of the thing spoken of, and misled by the *περί* immediately following the word, attributed to it here the meaning of a revolving motion. At any rate the examination of it as a living word ends with Plato; and the result is, that the only meaning which this verb had throughout (if on the other hand we consider the sense of *to beat* as obsolete,) was that of *to press, to fasten*, with their derivative meanings; but the sense of *to turn, to roll*, was quite unknown to it, and only found its way into it in certain cases as a collateral idea, arising from the nature of the thing spoken of. There remain now for our consideration only some cases and passages, which we have hitherto deferred that we might not interrupt the regular course of the investigation.

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[4] In the commentary on this book of Aristotle, fol. 129. b., with the readings corrected according to Böckh. Only I have left untouched the poetical passages which are quoted incorrectly, as they cannot mislead us.

15. There is one meaning of this verb which is known to us

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[5] How little this difference also was adopted, we see, among other things, from the explanation which some grammarians gave of the word *ἔλλοψ*, that it is the same as *ἴλλοψ, διὰ τὸ εἴργεσθαι φωνῆς*: because *ἴλλεσθαι* is *εἴργεσθαι*: Ath. 7, p. 308. c.

only through a quotation from a lost lexicon of Pausanias, and one from another grammarian, both mentioned by Eustathius on Il. *ν*, 572. *Παυσανίας εἰπὼν, εἰλάειν, στρεβλοῦν, πιέζειν. μάλιστα δὲ ἐπὶ ὑγρῶν οἰκεία ἡ λέξις οἷον σταφυλῶν κατ᾽ αὐτὸν ἢ ἐλαιῶν. καὶ εἰλεῖν τὸ συνάγειν φησὶ εἰς ταυτὸ σταφυλάς. ἕτερος δὲ τεχνικός φησιν, εἰλεῖν ἐκπιέζειν ἐλαίας ἢ στέμφυλα.* Whatever inaccuracy or obscurity may have crept into these quotations, one thing is evident from them, that *εἰλεῖν*, and perhaps *εἰλάειν* also, was used in some dialect of common life in the sense of *to press, squeeze the grapes.* It is certainly very singular how such a meaning as *στρεβλοῦν* can here again enter into the explanation of *εἰλεῖν*; and when this verb is taken in conjunction with the Latin *torcular,* and another Greek verb of similar meaning, *τραπεῖν,* in Homer (Od. *η*, 125.) and Hesiod (Scut. 301.), it becomes almost impossible to avoid thinking of a *turning* wine-press. And yet I am firmly convinced that this meaning (*to turn*) does not lie at the root of either of these two Greek verbs. The verb *τραπεῖν* is understood, according to the established tradition of the grammarians, of *treading* the grapes, the only idea which can suit the description in Hesiod. And so little idea was there in that passage of a *turning* wine-press, that the grammarians derived it indeed from *τρέπω,* but only on account of the *τροπή* or *change* of the must into wine. I have not the least doubt that the Greek language preserved in this verb the family of words which pervades the modern European languages, in the German *treten,* to tread, *trappen,* to stamp*. Still less reason is there for doubting that this use of *εἰλεῖν* comes from that which we have above acknowledged to be its original meaning, *to push, thrust, stamp,* with which is connected the idea of *to grind* in *ὀλή* and *ἀλεῖν*. And undoubtedly the olive also had its Greek name *ἐλάα* from its undergoing this operation.

16. I think I can add very considerable weight to this view of the subject by the Epic epithet of oxen, *εἰλίποδες*. If the word be derived, as it properly is, from *εἰλεῖν,* and we give it the meaning of *ἑλίσσειν,* the result will be a most unnatural one; for the expression will be far more the characteristic of the

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* [We may add our verb *to trip.*—Ed.]

tread of horses than of oxen. Voss saw by his talent of observation that the characteristic of oxen was the heaviness and clumsiness of their tread; and Hippocrates (de Articulis 7.) assigned as the cause of their being εἰλίποδες more than other animals, that their joints are more *loosely set* (χαλαρά.) This property made them, therefore, peculiarly calculated for *treading* out the corn, which operation is again an analogous one to those already mentioned of the grapes and olives, and, I think, sets this epithet of εἰλίποδες[*], *stamping with their feet*, in its correct light.

17. Aristophanes (Nub. 762.) makes Socrates say, in expressions particularly select, to Strepsiades who was reflecting on a previous question,

> Μὴ νῦν περὶ σαυτὸν εἶλλε (var. ἴλλε) τὴν γνώμην ἀεὶ,
> Ἀλλ' ἀποχάλα τὴν φροντίδ' ἐς τὸν ἀέρα.

The antithesis is evidently with ἀποχαλᾷν; and εἶλλε &c. is therefore 'do not entangle thyself, do not wrap thyself up in thy thoughts'; εἴλλειν τι περί τι means therefore here, as in the passage of Plato, to bind something firm around an object, and the 'around' lies in περί. Xenophon (de Ven. 6, 15.) uses the expression ἐξίλλουσαι τὰ ἴχνη of hounds picking out a difficult scent, as where different scents cross each other. Schneider on this passage quotes others from Herodian where ἐξελίττειν has this same meaning. Both are taken metaphorically from the *unfolding* of something wrapped or covered up; as ἐξίλλειν is the doing away that which is signified by ἴλλειν, much the same as we say *to wrap* and *unwrap*, *cover* and *uncover*.

18. Very difficult, after all this discussion, is the passage in Sophocl. Antig. 341., where it is said that man Θεῶν τὰν ὑπερτάταν γᾶν ἄφθιτον ἀκαμάταν ἀποτρύεται, εἰλομένων[†]

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[*] [Both Schneider in his Lexicon, and Passow in his last edition of the same, understand εἰλίποδες in the sense of trailing heavily their feet, particularly the hinder feet, and cite Hippocrates in confirmation of it. Passow expressly objects to Buttmann's interpretation, "*stamping* with the feet."—Ed.]

[†] [Passow in his Lexicon mentions that the Ald. and one very good MS. have παλλομένων, which would appear to be the true reading.—Ed.]

(var. ἰλλομένων) ἀρότρων ἔτος εἰς ἔτος, ἱππείῳ γένει πολεύων. I cannot perceive, from all the meanings hitherto collected together, that the passive or middle sense of this verb furnishes any idea suited to this passage, unless indeed we think of the plough as being *pushed* and *driven* forward by the ploughman: but then this is opposed by the mention of the horse immediately following; as we no sooner hear of the animal which draws the plough, than we naturally think of the man not as *pushing* the plough, but guiding it. Still, however, I do not think that this explanation should on that account be rejected without further consideration. The scholiasts have been induced by the regular recurrence expressed in ἔτος εἰς ἔτος, to understand it in the sense of *revolving*. A passage of a later poet, Nicander, may give us a somewhat different view of it; he advises the flying from a huge and terrible serpent to be effected in this way; Φεῦγε δ' ἀεὶ σκολιήν τε καὶ οὐ μίαν ἀτραπὸν ἴλλων. If from this passage we determine in favour of the sense of motion *backwards and forwards* or *to and fro* for the other earlier example, this meaning certainly suits the plough particularly well; with which we may compare the words ἰλλός and ἴλλωψ, expressing a similar motion of the eyes; and this usage will then belong to that frequentative sense which still remains.

19. The passive form of this verb occurs again in another sense, which has been compared with the Latin *versari*, and that as early as Herodotus, who (2, 76.) distinguishes one species of the ibis from the common sort with this expression, τῶν ἐν ποσὶ εἰλευμένων τοῖσι ἀνθρώποισι: where ἐν ποσὶ means nothing more than *near at hand*; as at 3, 79. ἔκτεινον πάντα τινὰ τῶν μάγων τὸν ἐν ποσὶ γινόμενον, *every one who chanced to come near them, to come in their way*. I do not find a second instance of this use of the word in succeeding writers until Aristotle, who in his Hist. Anim. 10, 25. says of the bees, when they do not fly out, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ εὐδίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἀνειλοῦνται: and, lastly, in Max. Tyr. 28, 58. of persons who are always engaged in law-suits, οἱ πρὸς τὰς δίκας εἰλούμενοι. In this expression εἰλεῖσθαι answers to our phrase *to be busy about anything*. And as nothing has occurred to show that the idea of to move and turn *about* and *around* is a radical one in this word, we

must suppose that it found its way into use from the frequentative meaning of the present. That is to say, the meaning of *to be pushed* or *to push and thrust oneself* readily takes in the present, particularly in Greek, the collateral idea of *commonly, constantly*, which, when we are speaking of the space in which this is done, naturally and of itself calls up the idea of *backwards and forwards*, or the corresponding one of *around* and *about*. To this appears to belong the meaning which the word has occasionally in the later Greek, *to wind around*; for example in Theocr. 1, 31. κατ᾽ αὐτὸν (on the cup) ἕλιξ εἱλεῖται, 'the ivy winds* around.' In the above-mentioned sense of *to bustle about, be busily engaged*, the verb εἱλεῖσθαι, with its strengthened form εἱλινδεῖσθαι, is synonymous with κυλινδεῖσθαι; but we must speak of these forms more at length in a separate article.

20. As to the different ways in which the radical verb of this family is written, thus much may be said with certainty, that all the varieties which have been brought forward in the course of this investigation are genuine, that is, are drawn from and grounded in the earlier periods of the language; as is evident from this, that all the differences concerning the aspirate, the vowel, and the consonant, are mentioned in separate observations of the grammarians, and sometimes one is preferred, sometimes another. The difference of the spiritus arises from the loss of the old digamma, by which the original verb was aspirated or not. According to the nature of the dialects we may be quite certain that the aspiration, in this as in many similar doubtful cases, belonged properly to the Attics, and the other mode of pronunciation to the Ionians and the later κοινοῖς. Thus then, the forms ἐάλην and ἀλῆναι, which were elsewhere very commonly but contradictorily written ἑάλην and ἁλῆναι, are now with reason written uniformly in Homer according to the Ionic dialect, as we may suppose they were spoken by the younger rhapsodists. There is still a peculiar form of this family of verbs (if indeed it be a member of this family,) in

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* [Perhaps the word in this passage of Theocritus might have given a Greek the original Homeric idea of the ivy *clinging* and *pressing* to the cup.—Ed.]

προσελεῖν, which we shall make the subject of a separate article.

21. If we now run briefly over some certain or probable derivations from this family of verbs, we have first εἴλη or ἴλη, with its derivatives ἰλαδόν and ὅμιλος, all in the sense of *dense bodies* and *crowds* of people, and derived immediately from εἰλεῖν, as we have seen it above at sect. 4. of this article. And the Hesiodic use of ἰλαδόν in ε, 285. Τὴν μέντοι κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι, which hardly admits of a metaphor drawn from crowds of men, comes immediately from the idea of *a dense compressed mass* of anything. There is the same idea of compressing or tying up together in ἰλλάς, of which we have spoken above, as also in ἐλλεδανός (or -όν), the band with which the sheaf of corn was tied, or the sheaf itself, Il. σ, 553. Of εἰλύω we shall presently speak in a separate article, from which verb is derived not improbably the word ἰλύς, *mud*, as being a thing which passes over and covers. The sense of *volvo*, which lies in εἰλύω, we shall mention in its proper place; and while we hold the possibility of its having grown out of the frequentative sense of εἰλεῖν, we do not deny that another root ΕΛ-, having really the meaning of turning or winding, and to which the words ἑλίσσω and ἕλιξ seem to guide us, might possibly have crept into the wide store-house of the Greek language. But in either case we have this one certain result, that the verb εἴλω, εἰλέω, in this form and in the words evidently derived from it, had not in any instance the sense of winding and turning.

22. I cannot conclude this article without here referring to the word οὖλος, *curled* or *matted like wool*, which will be found (see art. 88.) derived correctly indeed from εἰλεῖν, (though agreeably to general opinion the groundwork of the meaning is supposed to be the *curled* or *winding* nature of the separate parts of an object,) and that derivation itself confirmed by οὐλαμός, as *globus virorum**. This last, however, is corrected by what has been said just above, since it comes from εἰλεῖν in the same way and with the same sense as ἴλη does, and

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* [And perhaps ὅλμος, *a round stone*, Il. λ, 147. derived by Passow from ΕΛΩ, εἴλω, εἰλύω, ἴλλο, *volvo*; but by Buttmann from ὀλαί, οὐλαί, ἀλέω, *molo*. See note, p. 451.—Ed.]

means a compressed or crowded body of men; just as the Latin *globus* by no means comes from a root signifying to turn and wind, but, with *glomus*, κλῶμαξ and *gleba*, expresses a compressed mass, *a lump* or *ball*. Nor is the above explanation of οὖλος at all satisfactory to me, because in the oldest Greek such curled or winding objects when taken separately have never this epithet, but it is given only to anything made soft and puffed out by a thick mat of hair or wool; thus in Homer it is an epithet of the woolly fleeces and coverings, and also of a head of hair, not falling down in curls, but covering the head with a thick and elastic mat, the οὖλον τρίχωμα of an οὐλοκαρήνου. From this, the only meaning found in the older Greek, it will be easily seen that all else which is brought forward in the lexicons, proceeds from some poetical continuation and metaphorical use of the original idea. For instance, as the epithet of a wreath or chaplet of violets in Stesichorus (p. 28, 5. Suchf.), ἴων τε κορωνίδας οὔλας, it expresses perfectly well the thick and cushion-like surface of a chaplet wreathed with small flowers. But all this comes very naturally from the compressing and packing together expressed by the verb εἰλεῖν. From κατειλεῖν, in the sense of *wrapping* or *covering up*, comes the epithet κατουλάς for the *dark night*, used by the post-Homeric poets. See Schneider*.

Εἰλίπους; vid. εἰλεῖν, &c. Sect. 16.

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* [From Schneider's Lexicon I extract the following:

"Κατουλὰς, άδος, ἡ, epithet of *the night*, like ὀλοὴ νύξ, *the dark night*, Apoll. Rhod. 4, 1695. and Sophocl. Nauplius in Photius. Others read κατειλάς. Hesychius has κατειλάδα, ἡμέραν χειμερινὴν, and εἰλὰς, σκοτεινὴ; also εἰλὺ, μέλαν; and, again, ἔλυστα, ἄμπελος μέλαινα; ἐλίβοτρυς, ἄμπελός τις μέλαινα."

In Passow's last edition of Schneider we have:

"Κατουλάς, ἡ, νύξ, *the dark night*, Soph. and Ap. Rh. Others write κατειλάς from εἴλω, while κατουλάς comes from οὖλος, ὅλος. The meaning is however the same, *thick darkness*, such as (according to a well-known expression) might be felt, *spissa nox*."—Ed.]

45. Εἰλύω, ἐλυσθῆναι.

1. The forms which belong to the themes εἰλύω and ἐλύω stand in evident relation, in meaning as well as orthography, to that great variety which we have seen under εἴλω. Indeed, εἰλύω, which in Homer has in its inflexions the υ long, as εἰλῡσω, εἴλῡμαι, has invariably in the same poet no other meaning than that of *to wrap, envelope,* or *cover over,* as νεφέλῃ, νυκτί, ψαμάθῳ, σάκεσιν, &c., whence εἴλῡμα in Od. ζ, 179. is any covering for the body; which meaning appears, therefore, to come originally from εἰλῆσαι, in the sense of *to envelope, wrap up.* See art. 44. sect. 13. 17.

2. The verb ἐλύω is to be considered, therefore, in this oldest Greek not as a mere contraction of εἰλύω, but as essentially different from it. It is true, that the passage of Od. ι, 433., where Ulysses is concealed under the belly of the large ram, λασίην ὑπὸ γαστέρ' ἐλυσθεὶς Κείμην, and that exactly corresponding one of Archilochus (Fr. 69. Liebel.) ἔρως ὑπὸ καρδίην ἐλυσθείς, if they were the only two passages where the word occurs, might indeed be translated in a sense drawn from the idea of *to cover over*; but the passage of Il. ω, 510. where it is said of Priam Κλαῖ' ἀδινὰ προπάροιθε ποδῶν Ἀχιλῆος ἐλυσθείς, is decisive against this interpretation; and although this last is not of itself sufficient to determine the sense, yet all three together show plainly that it means the body *compressed* or *drawn up together*; in the first passage coiled up for concealment, in the last crouching down in the attitude of a suppliant. It is evidently, therefore, only a more expressive word for ἀλείς (see art. 44. sect. 6.), the root ΕΛΩ having taken a more forcible form in ύω for that very purpose.

3. A striking deviation from these passages is found in Il. ψ, 393. where the yoke of the horses which draw the chariot of Eumelus breaks in two, the horses run aside out of the road, ῥυμὸς δ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἐλύσθη. Though the word used here were the least known in the whole Greek language, yet from the thing signified the meaning is clear and certain,—"the pole

came to the ground." This Schneider* saw in his Lexicon; but I believe this was all he saw, so completely has the word been obscured, partly by the conjectures of etymologists, and partly by the unmeaning explanations of scholiasts and commentators. If it still remain doubtful, the substantive ἔλυμα will decide it. This is that part of the plough which is nearest the ploughshare. Now exactly as this is situated in order for it to perform its duty, that is, inclining downwards and so pushed into the earth, in the same way would the pole drop in case of the yoke breaking. As this then is certainly the true sense, I think it equally certain that ἐλυσθῆναι, in this meaning as well as the others, comes originally from ΕΛΩ, ἔλσαι, through its more forcible variety ἐλύω; for we have admitted *to push, thrust, drive,* or *beat,* to be the undoubted original idea of this radical verb.

4. The examples which I have given are sufficient to show that these presumed differences are not merely casual. I mean that, even if all this really comes from ΕΛΩ, εἴλω, yet that the old language intentionally made a distinction, using the form beginning with ει for the idea of *to cover,* and the one with ε for *to compress* and *to push*†. In addition to which there is a difference in the quantity; for the σ in ἐλυσθείς indicates the shortness of the υ in its inflexions, although the substantive

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* [From Schneider's Lexicon:

" 'Ελύω, ἐλύω, from ἕλω, εἴλω, εἰλέω, also ἴλλω, *to wrap up in, cover*; whence ἔλυτρον, *a covering, case*; ῥυμὸς ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἐλύσθη, i. q. παρελύθη, ἔπεσεν, συνειλήθη, *stuck into the earth,* Il. ψ, 393. προπάροιθε ποδῶν ἐλυσθεὶς, *lying before his feet,* Il. ω, 510. κατὰ πηλοῖο ἐλυσθεὶς, Oppiani Hal. 2, 89. *concealed;* ἐνὶ κτερέεσσιν ἐλυσθεὶς νειόθι γαίης, Apollon. 1, 254. See εἰλύω. Εἰλύω, εἴλυμι, -ύσω, also εἰλύω, εἴλυμι, from ἕλω, εἴλω, *to roll, turn,* or *wind round anything, to wrap up in, envelope, cover, hide*; Il. μ, 286. π, 640. φ, 318. νεφέων εἰλυμμένον ἄλλων, Arati 413. ὀλίγη δέ μιν εἰλύσι ἀχλὺς, 432. πέριξ εἰλυμένα καπνῷ, Apollon. Rhod. 3, 1291. Midd. *to roll oneself along, drag oneself along slowly or with difficulty, crawl along like children and worms; wrap or cover oneself up, hide,* εἰλυσθεὶς, Theocr. 25, 246."

This last is evidently either a mistranslation or a misquotation of Schneider; εἰλυσθείς in Theocritus being used in a very different sense. See below at the end of sect. 4. of this article.—Ed.]

† [This will hold good in the Homeric language, but the later writers confounded both forms and meanings. Passow's Lexicon.—Ed.]

ἔλῡμα deviates again from that rule. But the succeeding poets entirely lost sight of these distinctions. Thus Apollonius Rhod. 3, 281. says of Love, αὐτῷ δ' ὕπο βαιὸς ἐλυσθεὶς Αἰσονίδῃ, and immediately after, at 296. Τοῖος ὑπὸ κραδίῃ εἰλυμένος αἴθετο λάθρη Οὖλος Ἔρως, speaking in both passages of Love hiding himself, and in the second in evident imitation of the words of Archilochus: he has therefore used εἰλυμένος and ἐλυσθείς without any distinction. Again at 3, 1291. πέριξ εἰλυμένα κάπνῳ, and soon afterwards of Jason surrounded with the flames of the fire-breathing bulls, διὰ φλογὸς εἶθαρ ἐλυσθείς: he has therefore used the two forms indifferently for the other meaning. To these we may add the passage 1, 1034. of a person slain by Jason, ὁ δ' ἐνὶ ψαμάθοισιν ἐλυσθεὶς Μοῖραν ἀνέπλησεν, consequently in the sense of 'stretched out', *provolutus*, to which meaning I cannot find any corresponding one either in Homer or elsewhere. Theocritus, 25, 246. writes εἰλυσθείς in the sense of the Homeric ἐλυσθείς, that is to say, of the lion *drawing himself up* or *crouching*, to spring on his opponent. And a writer of the middle Comedy in Athenæus, 7, p. 293. d. has εἴλυσα with the υ short, in the sense of *to wrap up in, envelope*.

5. There is another use of this verb in Sophocles, and that a most peculiar one, in two passages in Philoct. 291. and 702. in both of a *crawling* or *dragging oneself along*, or at least of such a painful and laborious pace as comes nearest to that of crawling; Εἰλυόμην δύστηνος ἐξέλκων πόδα Πρὸς τοῦτ' ἄν· and εἰλυόμενος, παῖς ἄτερ ὡς φίλας τιθήνας.

6. Whilst then the theme ἐλύω is accurately connected by meaning with the root ΕΛΩ, εἴλω,—the theme εἰλύω, as used by Homer and Sophocles, seems to have a particular identity of meaning with *volvo*; and as εἰλύω had undoubtedly the digamma (see Od. ξ, 479. ε, 403.), the Latin verb corresponds with it pretty clearly. The Epic frequentative verb εἰλυφάζω, εἰλυφάω, of the flame *rolling* or *whirling up*, proceeds probably from the same idea. At the same time, there is not in εἰλύω properly and strictly any meaning of *to turn*. Nevertheless I am too much afraid of partially mixing up many ideas in one, not to admit the possibility of a really twofold root, ϜΕΛ-, *to push* or *thrust*, and ϜΕΛ-, *to turn* or *wind*; so that to the former should belong ἔλσαι, εἴλω, ἐλάω, ἐλύω, to the latter

εἰλύω, ἑλίσσω. And thus, while I think that I have laid down with certainty the principal directions which usage has taken[1], I am at the same time willing to suppose that in this, as well as in the article on εἴλω, some things may admit of a very different decision from that which I have given.

46. Ἐΐσκειν, ἴσκειν.

1. The Epic verb ἐΐσκω has its fixed and certain meanings, *to think similar, liken, compare,* and *to make similar, assimilate.* No less fixed is the digamma before the ε, and therefore the correct way of viewing it is FEFIΣKΩ from FEIKΩ, like δεδίσκομαι (*I greet,* Od. ο, 150.) from δείκνυμι (Il. ι, 196.). But to this there arises one objection at Il. φ, 332. where Juno calls on Vulcan to attack Xanthus, and says to him, ἄντα σέθεν γὰρ Ξάνθον δινήεντα μάχῃ ἠΐσκομεν εἶναι. This form is a regular imperfect, ἐΐσκω, ἤϊσκον, or FEFIΣKΩ, EFEFIΣKON (as at Od. δ, 247. ἄλλῳ δ' αὐτὸν φωτὶ κατακρύπτων ἤϊσκεν) ; but the context is against this tense ; for there is no reason whatever for our supposing a previous consultation of the Gods to which Juno may refer in this imperfect ; and a present ἠΐσκω (FHFIΣKΩ) is contrary to all analogy. The true way is to compare it with δειδίσκομαι (Od. γ, 41.), and further with δείδοικα and δειδίσσομαι. For in this same way εἴοικα, that is, FEIFOIKA (Il. σ, 418.), was formed out of ἔοικα (FEFOIKA) from εἴκω ; and consequently FEIFIΣKΩ out of FE-

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[1] If we consider the Latin *volvo,* we recognise in it that kind of reduplication in which the end of the second part is lopped off, and the whole root is visible only in the first, as in πόρπη, *bulbus,* the German verbs *malmen, dulden,* &c. [the English words *turtle, poppy, velvet*]. To these we may add εἰλύω, in as much as from the root FEΛ- is made FEΛFΩ, of which two digammas in the Ionic the first became the aspirate, the other was changed into the υ. Now it is possible that in the simple original verb there was no other idea than that simple motion which we have seen in εἴλω, ἐλάω, &c., and that the reduplication first introduced into this family of words, as a kind of frequentative meaning, the idea of *to roll, wind,* and *turn* ; which then, being already become scarcely audible in εἰλύω, lost itself more and more in other forms, and so at last fell again into the simple root. But it may be otherwise, and the etymologist should never lose sight of all the different possibilities. See note 2, p. 352.

ϜΙΣΚΩ, that is, *εἰΐσκω* out of *ἐΐσκω*; and this present *εἰΐσκομεν* is therefore to be recognised in that *ἠΐσκομεν* handed down to us in the above passage of the Iliad. None of this, however, is the Ionic elongation of *ε* into *ει*; but *δει* and ϜΕΙ are the reduplicated radical syllables of ΔΕΙΚΩ, ΔΕΙΩ, and ϜΕΙΚΩ. See the Ausführ. Sprachl. under *δείκνυμι* and *δεῖσαι**.

2. With this verb coincides in sense the shortened form *ἴσκω*. Il. *λ*, 798. *π*, 41. *Αἴ κέ σε τῷ (Αἴ κ' ἐμὲ σοὶ) ἴσκοντες ἀπόσχωνται πολέμοιο*: as at *ε*, 181. *Τυδείδῃ μιν ἔγωγε δαΐφρονι πάντα ἐΐσκω*. Again, Od. *δ*, 279. of Helen standing near the wooden horse, *Πάντων Ἀργείων φωνὴν ἴσκουσ' ἀλόχοισιν*: therefore *φωνὴν ἴσκειν τινί* is, *to make one's voice like that of another person*, much the same as *σὲ γὰρ αὐτὴν παντὶ ἐΐσκεις*, said by Ulysses to Minerva, Od. *ν*, 313.

3. The more striking is it that *Ἴσκε* should at the same time be said to mean *he spoke*. That this sense does occur frequently in Apollonius Rhod. is perfectly undeniable; for instance, after the delivery of a speech at 2, 240. *Ἴσκεν Ἀγηνορίδης*, and again at 3, 439. *Ἴσκεν ἀπηλεγέως*. In the older Epic, however, we know of it in only these two Homeric passages; Od. *τ*, 203. of Ulysses, after his fabricated account to Penelope:

Ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὅμοια.

and *χ*, 31. of the suitors after the delivery of their speech reproaching Ulysses for having shot Antinous:

Ἴσκεν ἕκαστος ἀνὴρ, ἐπειὴ φάσαν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα
Ἄνδρα κατακτεῖναι.

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* [I extract from the above-named work of Buttmann the following: "*Δείδεγμαι, δειδέχαται, δείδεκτο*, &c. have the syllable of reduplication *δει*, because it is the radical or stem-syllable, as in *δεῖσαι*. These forms belong not to *δέχομαι*, but to *δείκνυμι*, in the sense of *to greet, welcome, drink to*, and to them we may add a word of similar meaning, *δειδίσκομαι*; whence Apoll. Rh. 1. 558. said, *δειδίσκετο πατρὶ*, in the common sense of *ἐδείκνυε*. The ground-idea is undoubtedly *the presenting the hand, cup, &c.*, with which the idea of *to show* corresponds very well.

"*Δείδοικα, δείδια, ἐδείδιμεν* were used by the Epics because, like *δείδεκτο*, the diphthong was in the radical syllable. From *δείδια* arose a present *δείδω*, of which only this person occurs."

The above will be found more at length in the translation of Buttmann's Irregular Verbs, published since the first edition of this work. —Ed.]

That these two passages of Homer read quite simply and naturally, if Ἴσκε be rendered by *he spoke*, is not to be denied; but when considered in and by themselves, it is not conceivable how a word, which in all other cases had a certain decided meaning, could in these two passages have one so totally different. And if we wish to suppose a separate but similarly sounding root *ἴσκειν, to say*, we are opposed by the unreasonableness and improbability of it, as there is no trace whatever of any relatives of such a word.

4. Hence there was a supposition in very early times that *ἴσκειν* was here misunderstood, and consequently that the imitation of Apollonius Rhod. and others was false. And first in Apollonii Lex. (in v. and under *εἴσκοντες*) the word *ἴσκεν*, which can be taken from only these two passages of Homer, is explained by *εἴκαζεν, ὡμοίου*; and the same in Hesychius. Eustathius remarks on the first passage as follows: *τὸ δὲ Ἴσκεν οἱ μὲν γλωσσογράφοι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔλεγεν ἐκδέχονται, οἱ δὲ ἀκριβέστεροι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἤϊσκεν, ὅ ἐστιν, εἴκαζεν ἀπεικονίζων πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.* The scholium on this passage is nearly the same; and on the second passage, χ, 31., the scholium, as given by Barnes, has these words, *ἄλλοι μὲν τὸ ἔλεγεν σημαίνειν βούλονται*, where it is therefore plain that there was originally another part, now lost, expressing that some understood it here also to mean *εἴκαζεν*. Eustathius explains it, indeed, in this second passage by *ἔλεγεν*, but remarks at the same time that this passage (*χωρίον*) was supposed by the ancients to be interpolated, because it seems ridiculous that all the suitors should say this at one time, like the chorus of a tragedy, and because Homer in such cases says, *ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν*: contrary to which criticism, however, he afterwards defends the disputed passage, which necessarily comprehends the verses 31, 32, 33. But the scholium in the Vienna Codex on this verse runs thus; *Οὐδέποτε Ὅμηρος ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔλεγε τὸ ἴσκε, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ὡμοίου. ἠπάτηται οὖν ὁ διασκευαστὴς ἐκ τοῦ Ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλά.* Schol. Apollon. 1, 834. *τὸ δὲ ἴσκεν ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔλεγεν, παρὰ δὲ Ὁμήρῳ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὡμοίου*[1]. Schol. Il. π. 41.

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[1] Another scholium, on 3, 396. *τὸ δὲ ἴσκεν Ὁμηρικῶς*, might be brought to accord with this of 1, 834. by supposing that the scholiast on the

ἴσκοντες. ὁμοιοῦντες. οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι ἐπὶ τοῦ λέγοντες τάττουσι τὴν λέξιν.

5. The result of all that has been said appears to amount to this, that a spurious form, ἴσκεν, *he spoke*, resting on no analogy whatever; had crept into the Epic poetry of the rhapsodists by some misunderstanding or other; that its spuriousness did not escape the notice of some of the grammarians, while others, amongst whom are the Alexandrine poets Apollonius, Theocritus (22, 167.), and Lycophron (574.), imitated it without hesitation[2]. More accurate grammarians endeavoured to account for this usage by supposing some misunderstanding of the passages in Homer. That of Od. τ. does indeed offer very good grounds for the explanation which the scholiast proposes, πολλὰ ψεύδη λέγων εἴκαζεν ὥστε ὅμοια εἶναι ἀληθέσιν: but there would be some difficulty in forcing the second passage, that of Od. χ. to bear the same explanation, although it is a coincidence singular enough, that the words immediately succeeding Ἴσκεν ἕκαστος ἀνὴρ, viz. ἐπειὴ φάσαν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα Ἄνδρα κατακτεῖναι, do imply *a conjecture, an opinion.* Still it is impossible to understand the words in question to mean 'thus each man conjectured', &c., or, 'thus spake each man dissembling', &c.; for the threat in the preceding verses was certainly not feigned, nor did the suitors feel any kindness toward the stranger (against whom they were before so exasperated for having succeeded in stringing the bow), from supposing that he had killed Antinous 'accidentally'. So convinced however were those grammarians of the impossibility of ἴσκειν meaning *to say*, that they imagined it to be the work of a διασκευαστής, and supposed the misunderstanding of τ, 203. to be the origin of the usage in the later poets.

6. For my part, I am in doubt whether to prefer this opinion or one still bolder. For instance, after repeated consideration of these passages, it has always struck me that, even in the first, the most natural mode of expression would be, 'thus

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former passage understood the flattering speech of Jason to be a feigned one; but as that scholium is wanting in the Paris Codex, it may have been added later.

[2] Simonides Epig. 59. (65.) has it in its genuine sense of *to conjecture.*

spake he'; but εἴκαζεν or ἔπλαττεν alone for ταῦτ' or ὣς ἔπλαττεν certainly could not stand in such a context. Hence I conjecture that Homer originally used here another imperfect with that same most natural meaning; nor can I think of any other so likely as ἴσπεν, a word which, it is true, does not occur in any real text, but which, as an imperfect, is supported by the strongest analogy (compare ἴσχε, Il. ο, 657.); and is connected with the aorist imperative ἔσπετε, Il. β, 484., if we suppose that this, according to the analogy of ἴσχω, ἔσχον, imperative σχές, σχέτε, stands for σπέτε, as ἑσπέσθαι for σπέσθαι. It is very conceivable that when the language of Epic poetry survived only in the mouths of the rhapsodists, two forms so similar as ἴσπε and ἴσκε became confounded in their transmission downwards, and that ἴσπε disappeared entirely.

47. Ἕκηλος, εὔκηλος.

1. That ἕκηλος and εὔκηλος are forms of one and the same adjective is universally acknowledged, and is rendered certain by a comparison of the passages in which they occur. But as the derivation of the word is obscure, and the subsequent usage of it wholly poetical, we must, from this very comparison of passages, which in Homer are numerous enough, settle also the proper meaning of the word. From this process one result is easily obtained,—that in Homer its meaning is nearly equivalent to *tranquil*, but only with the idea of a freedom from all *anxiety*, *interruption*, *danger*, or other *uncomfortable feelings*; for a person is said to be ἕκηλος or εὔκηλος, not only while he is *resting*, *sleeping*, *eating*, or *playing*, but also while he is using any kind of *active exertion*. Thus the Trojans (Il. ρ, 340.) are unwilling that the Greeks should carry off to the ships the body of Patroclus ἕκηλοι; and at ζ, 70. these latter are exhorted to leave the dead bodies of their enemies untouched, that they may plunder them ἕκηλοι after the battle; nay further at ρ, 371. it is expressly said, Εὔκηλοι πολέμιζον ὑπ' αἰθέρι, in opposition to those who were fighting in darkness, dust, and the perilous press of battle around the body of Patroclus. The idea given by the word is therefore never an absence

of motion or of labour, but expresses only that nothing unpleasant or vexatious (which interrupts labour as well as rest) is produced by trouble or care. And with this accords very well the expression used acrimoniously of one who interferes with others, that he should remain ἕκηλος in his own jurisdiction, as Neptune says (ο, 194.) of Jupiter. On the other hand, it is a faulty application of the radical idea of the word, when Theocritus, 25, 100., uses it simply for *idle, unemployed,* and that too as opposed to an occupation which is described as cheerful and exhilarating:

> Ενθα μὲν οὔτις ἕκηλος, ἀπειρεσίων περ ἐόντων,
> Εἰστήκει παρὰ βουσὶν ἀνὴρ κεχρημένος ἔργου, &c.

2. That Hesiod's use of the word could have differed essentially from this Homeric usage is not to be supposed; and yet it would appear to have been so from reading the following verses, ε, 668.:

> Τῆμος δ' εὐκρινέες αὖραι καὶ πόντος ἀπήμων,
> Εὔκηλος· τότε νῆα θοὴν ἀνέμοισι πιθήσας
> Ἑλκέμεν ἐς πόντον, φόρτον δ' εὖ πάντα τίθεσθαι.

Here εὔκηλος would seem to express mere stillness, and that of inanimate objects, of which there is no instance, either in Homer or in the oldest succeeding poets. Nor can we suppose Hesiod to use in these mere household maxims that kind of poetry which would here personify the sea, and then call it, as offering no present danger, εὔκηλος. And yet such must be its meaning if we read Hesiod's text thus. But take away the punctuation, and it is no longer so. If we place the colon after ἀπήμων, and connect εὔκηλος with ἑλκέμεν, the passage gains both in punctuation and sense. Then we have here too that tranquillity of mind opposed to anxiety and danger, which is the leading idea in the Homeric use of the word.

3. The inaccurate supposition that the general meaning of ἕκηλος was *tranquil* in the sense of *still, quiet,* was also an obstacle to the understanding of a passage, otherwise difficult, in the Hymn. Merc. 477. Of these Homeric hymns we can premise one thing, that the old Epic usage of words is still natural to them. The mental tranquillity and confidence, which we have already observed in the meaning of the word, suits

this passage also; only that here is no question of danger. Mercury has shown Apollo the lyre, and on his admiring exceedingly the newly invented art, he presents it to him with these words: "*Courage!* henceforth thou mayst bear it with perfect confidence to the festive board:" that is, "it will not fail thee." To this sense the whole context leads, and particularly the repeated expression Σοὶ δ' *αὐτάγρετόν ἐστι δαήμεναι ὅ,ττι μενοινᾷς*, i.e. "thou canst learn whatever thou choosest, and wilt therefore be able to play this lyre without trouble." I do not think this explanation will be rejected by any one who observes the striking similarity, although under quite different circumstances, between the passage of Hesiod which I have just before cleared from obscurity,

> *Εὔκηλος τότε νῆα θοὴν ἀνέμοισι πιθήσας*
> *'Ελκέμεν ἐς πόντον, φόρτον δ' εὖ πάντα τίθεσθαι,*

and this passage in the Hymn to Mercury,

> *Εὔκηλος μὲν ἔπειτα φέρειν ἐς δαῖτα θάλειαν,*
> *Καὶ χορὸν ἱμερόεντα, καὶ ἐς φιλοκυδέα κῶμον,*
> *Εὐφροσύνην νυκτός τε καὶ ἤματος*[1].

4. In Apollonius*, on the contrary, is seen at once a mistaken imitation of Homer; for he sometimes uses it, and that repeatedly, of the stillness of inanimate objects: 4, 1249. *εὐκήλῳ δὲ κατείχετο πάντα γαλήνῃ*, and (if any one should rather look upon this as an intentional metaphor,) 2, 935. *εὐκήλῃσιν πτερύγεσσιν*, and 3, 969. of trees, *Αἵ τε παρᾶσσον ἕκηλοι ἐν οὔρεσιν ἐῤῥίζωνται Νηνεμίῃ*. Sometimes he uses it of persons,

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[1] It appears unnecessary to read *μίν* in the first of these verses, as the lyre is mentioned by name in the preceding one. I understand *εὐφροσύνην* to be put in apposition with it.

* An older instance than Apollonius of the non-Homeric use of the word to express the stillness and absence of motion of inanimate things occurs in the Hymn. Cer. 451.

> *'Ες δ' ἄρα 'Ράριον ἷξε, φερέσβιον οὖθαρ ἀρούρης*
> *Τὸ πρίν· ἀτὰρ τότε γ' οὔτι φερέσβιον, ἀλλὰ ἕκηλον*
> *'Εστήκει πανάφυλλον.*

But this appears to me only an additional proof that this hymn has no claim to anything like that high antiquity which stamps the others. Buttm. Appendix.

it is true, not however to point out calmness of mind, but mere simple *silence*, and that too when joined with mental emotion; as, 3, 219. Εὔκηλοι δ' ὑπὲρ οὐδὸν ἔπειτ' ἔβαν: and 2, 861. where the Argonauts, in great distress and perplexity (ἀμηχανίῃσιν) at the loss of two of their companions, ἁλὸς προπάροιθε πεσόντες Ἔντυπας εὐκήλως εἰλυμένοι, do not think either of eating or drinking.

5. The Hesiodic phrase παίδων εὐκηλήτειρα, ε, 462., might possibly be adduced as a proof that the idea of *silence* lies in εὔκηλος. But whoever thinks thus does not consider that in that passage the children are supposed to be crying for bread, and when it is given them they become εὔκηλοι, i. e. *quiet and contented.* Still greater injustice is done to Pindar: for in Ol. 9, 87., where it is said of Jupiter, θύγατρ' ... Ὀπόεντος ἀναρπάσαις ἕκαλος μίχθη Μαιναλίοισιν ἐν δειραῖς, the scholiast actually explains it by λάθρα, and the more modern commentators follow his interpretation[2]. But secrecy, as the whole context tells us, is not at all necessary in that passage, and the true sense is that Jupiter indulged his lust high up among the mountains in *undisturbed tranquillity.*

6. It has been supposed that εὔκηλος may be the older form of the two, and derived from εὖ and κηλεῖν; without however reflecting that it would then have a much too positive sense, whereas it never occurs exactly in this positive sense; and that even in a form of more intense signification, εὐκήλητος, i.e. *highly delighted,* it must have taken a negative sense, equivalent at most to such a term as *agreeable, comfortable,* and not always even to that. But every appearance of this derivation vanishes at once by the transition of the particle εὖ into ἑ, a transition without the slightest analogy whatever[3]. Hence Schneider in

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[2] Damm however is an exception: his explanation of the word in Homer and Pindar is essentially correct.

[3] One thing which speaks strongly against this termination is the very circumstance of the old grammarians never having stumbled upon it, although it stands so manifest. The older commentators, at Il. α, 554. have merely the change from ἔκηλος to εὔκηλος, as a point well ascertained; the Etym. M. has under both forms many derivations such as his generally are, but not this, which is found, among several others, only in Eustathius on Il. α, 554. p. 112, 49. Basil.

his Lexicon supposes an old adjective κηλός, *tranquil*, from which may come, on the one hand εὔκηλος and ἕκηλος, and on the other κηλεῖν, which verb would therefore have had originally the idea of *tranquillizing*, and now for the first time that of *delight* and *pleasure*. But this supposition brings only the form εὔκηλος into any analogy. For the prefixing of an ε with the aspirate, or still more with the *digamma* (see Il. ε, 759. ζ, 70. ι, 376. λ, 75. ο, 194. ρ, 340.), in order to form ἕκηλος from κηλός, is equally without example. This last observation rather proves to me that the radical syllable is in the beginning of the word, ἑκ-, particularly as -ηλος is a well-known adjectival termination. It is true that this termination has in ἀπατηλός, ὑψηλός, &c. the accent on the final syllable, but such is the prevailing tendency of the Greek language to throw back the accent, that it is generally done whenever the derivation of a word is no longer plainly traceable[4]. To ascertain this derivation may perhaps yet be possible, perhaps not: but as this can hardly have any influence on our explanation of it in the different passages where we have found it, I leave it undecided[5].

7. As to the transition from ἕκηλος to εὔκηλος, we feel at once that the digamma of the former is at work here; and even

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[4] We have for instance the word ὅρμος, which in both its meanings is properly a verbal in μός. See ἕρμα.

[5] As far as form goes it is hardly possible not to consider the three words ἑκών, ἕκητι, ἕκηλος (all having the digamma) as verbals of one and the same root. Whether the result of the above investigation (that ἕκηλος is properly used only of persons, and generally of mental feelings,) would lead to the same point, I shall not offer an opinion. By a derivation not so sensible to the ear as the one which we rejected above, it is at least possible to form a transition from the idea of *voluntary, willing*, to those other meanings *contented, comfortable, undisturbed*. —And now I feel the more certainty in rejecting Schneider's opinion in one point, agreeing with him as I do in every other, and derive κηλέω from ἕκηλος*, as μαυροῦν (Hes. ε, 323.) comes from ἀμαυρός, κωχεύειν from ὀκωχή, &c. And this derivation is confirmed by the Hesiodic εὐκηλήτειρα, which word in fact contains a verb εὐκηλέω formed without contraction from the other form εὔκηλος, and that in the exact sense which Schneider considers the ground-meaning of κηλέω, the calming of the passions.

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* [In Schneider's third and last edition of his Lexicon he has altered that one point to an agreement with Buttmann.—Ed.]

the mere transposition from FΕΚΗΛΟΣ to ΕFΚΗΛΟΣ would perhaps be satisfactory. But we can bring forward a still plainer analogy. That many words in old Greek took an ε as a prefix, without gaining thereby any additional meaning, was first pointed out by Böckh (ad Plat. Min. p. 148.), and used for the purpose of explaining some forms. It is evident that of this kind is the Homeric ε in ἐείκοσιν, ἔεδνα, ἐέλπεται, and others. Now as all these words in their shorter form belong to those acknowledged to have the digamma (ἀνὰ εἴκοσι μέτρα, μυρία ἔδνα, ἔτι ἔλπεται, &c.), we must write the longer forms thus, ΕFΕΙΚΟΣΙΝ, ΕFΕΔΝΑ, ΕFΕΛΠΕΤΑΙ: without which supposition, it would be inconceivable how these words, already beginning with an ε, could take another ε contrary to all harmony of sound. By a similar process, for ἔκηλος we must now write FΕΚΗΛΟΣ; but as the ε here is not as in the others, long by the diphthong or by position, ΕFΕΚΗΛΟΣ became at once ΕFΚΗΛΟΣ, in the same way as by means of the augment ἐπέλετο, ἐπετόμην became ἔπλετο, ἐπτόμην. Herein it is evident that the rise and preservation of the form εὔκηλος was promoted by the apparently significative power of the syllable εὐ, exactly as from ΕFΑΔΕ came εὔαδε into Epic usage.

8. I will further confirm this view of the subject by a case exactly similar. The Argonaut Eurytus, Εὔρυτος, is called by the older writers Ἔρυτος; see Burm. Catal. Argon. It is easy to say that the latter is a poetical licence for the former; but what kind of versification must that be which would allow a name so admissible into any metre as Εὔρυτος is, to be shortened, according as circumstances might require, into Ἔρυτος? Or if (which is undoubtedly the correct supposition) the poets followed in this case a really twofold pronunciation, how can it be supposed that so significative and full-sounding a name could have been corrupted, even by the common people, into Ἔρυτος? Beyond all dispute therefore Ἔρυτος, as being the form applied to this Eurytus the Argonaut, and to no other of that name, and being found in such pure authorities as it is, is the true way in which the name is written in the tradition of the race or family to which this hero belongs; and it may now be very readily supposed, that the form Εὔρυτος is a later corruption of it, caused by the name having been borne by many

others; unless indeed, we should say that the same appearance would go still further, and point to εὐρύς as its root.

9. Among the inseparable particles that strengthen the sense of a word are two, ἀρι- and ἐρι-, which are exactly similar, at least in meaning; although it is difficult to conceive how the same dialect and the same poet could use sometimes an α, sometimes an ε with the same object. This alone is sufficient to prove with certainty that the root of each is different. And as it is certain that ἀρι- belongs to the same root as ἀρείων, ἄριστος, and consequently comes from the idea of *good*, so ἐρι- belongs to the same family as εὐρύς, and arises from the idea of *bodily size*. Hence ἀρι- is used in the old Epic and Lyric poets principally to mark out a great capability, either in an active or passive sense, for something or other; as ἀρίγνωτος, ἀριφραδής, *easy to be known*, ἀρίδακρυς, *given to crying*, ἀρισφαλής, *very deceitful*, &c., but it never properly implies size or extent, which is particularly the meaning of ἐρι-, e. g. in ἐριαύχενες, ἐρίπλευρος, ἐρικύμων, ἐριστάφυλος: and hence it makes an easy transition to the idea of *a spreading sound, an extending fame*, as in ἐριβρεμέτης, ἐρίγδουπος (which may be compared with εὐρύοπα), ἐρισμάραγος, ἐριμύκης, ἐρικυδής; or to that of luxuriant growth, as ἐριθηλής (compare εὐρυφυής). It is true that the augmentative force of this particle is carried on to some ideas which have nothing to do with size or extent, as in ἐρισθενής, ἐρίτιμος; but this is also the case in εὐρυσθενής, which in Homer indeed, where it is the epithet of Neptune, may point out the wide extent of his dominion, but in Pindar is the epithet of many inferior heroes and rulers, and in Ol. 4, 17. is even joined with the ἀρεταί; so that the Homeric epithet of Jupiter, ἐρισθενής, may very fairly be considered as the older form of εὐρυσθενής.

10. This identity of ἐρι- and εὐρυ- is seen still more decidedly marked in the name of another Argonaut, Ἐριβώτης, who was also called, for instance by Herodorus (according to Schol. Apollon. 1, 71.) Εὐρυβάτης; a circumstance which Burmann in his Catal. Argon. has very properly compared with Eurytus. He has also conjectured that this Ἐριβώτης is the same as the Εὐρυβώτας mentioned by Pausan. 5, 17. as present with Jason, Peleus, and other Argonauts at the funeral games of Pelias.

It can hardly be doubted that it is so. The hero, then, was called Ἐριβώτης or Εὐρυβώτης, and the name has thus for the first time a true meaning. The second form might have been written quite as analogically Εὐρυβότης, for the sake of the hexameter; which would have changed itself almost necessarily by an earlier or later corruption into the more glibly-running name Εὐρυβάτης[6].

11. In order now to derive εὐρύς in the above-mentioned way from that more simple form to which ἐρι- belongs, this latter must have had the digamma; of which, however, often as ἐρι- occurs in Homer, we find none of the usual traces. But it has been long an acknowledged fact, that by no means all the words and forms which ever had the digamma retain it still in Homer. Thus ἑλεῖν has it no longer, of whose digamma ἕλωρ is a proof; nor has ἀνήρ, whose digamma we ascertain from other sources; nor ὁρᾶν and αἱρεῖν, from which could not have been formed ἀόρατος and ἀποαιρεῖν without the digamma. It is no wonder then that a root, which was nothing more than a particle prefixed to some compound words, should have lost this aspirate. But fortunately there is still a trace of it, which we may discover in the same way as we have above. Ἠερίβοια is the name of a mythic woman in Il. ε, 389. That this is the same name as that borne by others, Ἐρίβοια, has been always admitted, and justly so; for the names of women with which the mythic genealogies are filled, are in a very striking manner purely poetical, consequently significative names. Whoever, therefore, is not exactly willing to allow the name Ἠερίβοια to have a jocular meaning, will not reject our observation, according to which that name becomes analogous to the masculine name Ἐριβώτης. Now the form Ἠερίβοια is evidently nothing more than the dactylic pronunciation of Ἐερίβοια; by which this name comes into the same class as the above-men-

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[6] I would not attempt to identify in the same way the questionable name Ἐρύαλος (Il. π, 411.) with Εὐρύαλος, as the long α in the former is so decidedly against it, and it is not to be supposed that the poet would have chosen for an imaginary personage a name that was not strictly analogical. I can therefore only agree with Heyne, who has adopted the reading Ἐρύλαος, which is formed quite as analogically as ἐρυσίπτολις.

tioned ἐείκοσιν, ἔεδνα, &c. For when a name was newly formed, the rule of formation was that it should have a real and poetical meaning; but when a name was changed, either in common pronunciation or for poetry, then the ear and habit inclined toward words and sounds that were known; and in this manner the form Ἡερίβοια arose and prevailed.

48. Ἐλελίζειν.

1. The verb ἑλίσσω expresses merely a simple *turning* and *rolling*. To diversify and add force to this sense recourse was very naturally had to doubling the first syllable, and giving to the derivative verb a different termination, making ἐλελίζω; for this is the only form that occurs in the present, and not ἐλελίσσω, which has been erroneously introduced as the theme of ἐλέλιξεν, &c., but which ought to be erased from the lexicons. That present is found in the Hymn to Minerva (28, 9. Wolf.) and sometimes in Pindar. The form ἐλέλικτο, which may have been regarded as the pluperfect of ἑλίσσω, is also by its meaning drawn towards this verb, and is therefore *aoristus syncopatus**.

2. The most natural meaning of this reduplicated verb is a *tortuous motion*, e.g. of the serpent and of lightning; thus at Il. β, 316. (of the serpent) Τὴν δ' ἐλελιξάμενος πτέρυγος λάβεν: and at λ, 39. of a serpent represented on a shield, ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἐλέλικτο δράκων: again of lightning, in Pind. N. 9, 45. Κρονίων ἀστεροπὰν ἐλελίξαις. It is also used for expressing other quick vibratory or brandishing motions, as at Il. ν, 558. ἔγχος σειόμενον ἐλέλικτο: again in a Lyric passage in Plut. Quæst. Conviv. 9, 15. of the foot of a dancer, ἐλελιζόμενος ποδί: and in Pind. Ol. 9, 20. Py. 1, 7. of playing on the lyre, ἐλελίζειν φόρμιγγα. Whence, in a general sense, *to cause to tremble, shake*, as to shake Olympus, Il. α, 530. θ, 199. Hymn. Minerv. l. c.; again at Il. χ, 448. τῆς δ' ἐλελίχθη γυῖα, *her limbs trembled*; and at Od. μ, 416. of the ship struck by lightning, ἡ δ' ἐλελίχθη πᾶσα.

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* See Buttmann's Gramm. sect. 99, 12, 2. e.

3. The idea of *turning round* is also expressed by this verb, as by the simple ἑλίσσω; but the additional force of meaning which the verb possesses in its reduplicated form is sensibly felt at Od. ε, 314., of the wave whirling round the raft, περὶ δὲ σχεδίην ἐλέλιξεν: and so it is used also of *a single turning round,* whenever it is wished to express a *sudden* turning to fly, or on the contrary a *sudden* turning from flight to stand firm; thus at Il. ρ, 278. μάλα γάρ σφεας ὦκ' ἐλέλιξεν Αἴας, and again ἐλελίχθησαν, ἐλελιχθέντες, Il. ζ, 106. 109. λ, 588.; while to express the same turning round without the same force of expression the simple form ἑλίσσεσθαι is used, Il. μ, 74. ἑλιχθέντων ὑπ' Ἀχαιῶν, i. e. 'if they should turn from flight'.

4. Very different from the above is the verb ἐλελίζειν, *to utter a loud cry* (ἐλελεῦ), which occurs in ordinary prose, and has the same inflexion.

Ἔλσαι; vid. εἰλεῖν.

Ἐλυσθῆναι; vid. εἰλύω.

49. Ἐνδέξια, ἐπιδέξια.

1. Whether either of the two expressions ἐνδέξια and ἐπιδέξια have in Homer the sense of *dexterous, skilful,* can be decided only by a survey of the passages in which they occur. They are these: Il. β, 353. (of Jupiter)

> Ἀστράπτων ἐπιδέξι' ἐναίσιμα σήματα φαίνων.

ι, 236.

> Ζεὺς δέ σφιν Κρονίδης ἐνδέξια σήματα φαίνων
> Ἀστράπτει.

Od. φ, 141. (The invitation to the suitors to try in turn the bow of Ulysses)

> Ὄρνυσθ' ἑξείης ἐπιδέξια πάντες ἑταῖροι,
> Ἀρξάμενοι τοῦ χώρου, ὅθεν τέ περ οἰνοχοεύει.

Il. *α*, 597. (of Vulcan),

> Αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοισι θεοῖς ἐνδέξια πᾶσιν
> Ὠινοχόει.

η, 184. (of the lot by which Ajax was elected to oppose Hector in single combat)

> ....κήρυξ δὲ φέρων ἀν' ὅμιλον ἁπάντη
> Δεῖξ' ἐνδέξια πᾶσιν ἀριστήεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν.

Od. *ρ*, 365. (of Ulysses begging of the suitors)

> Βῆ δ' ἴμεν αἰτήσων ἐνδέξια φῶτα ἕκαστον,
> Πάντοσε χεῖρ' ὀρέγων, ὡς εἰ πτωχὸς πάλαι εἴη.

Of these passages the two first show that both forms are used to express literally the right side. But since of the four others the first only (which speaks decidedly and plainly of direction,) has the expression ἐπιδέξια, and the three others without any metrical necessity have the other expression; this might seem to favour the opinion that ἐνδέξια in these three last meant *dexterous*. This meaning appears, for instance, to suit particularly well the passage of Il. *α*., and in Od. *ρ*. the context ὡς εἰ πτωχὸς πάλαι εἴη favours the idea of dexterity, which may then be very well adopted for Il. *η*. also. Since however in all four passages the sense certainly does imply *a following in rotation*, it is evident at once that ἐνδέξια, as well as ἐπιδέξια, belongs to this idea, particularly as ἐνδέξια does not occur again in all Homer where it can mean (εὖ καὶ ἐπισταμένως) *dexterous*. And this opinion is further confirmed by observing that in all these four passages the idea expressed by πάντες, πᾶσιν, φῶτα ἕκαστον is immediately preceded by the expression ἐπιδέξια or ἐνδέξια, and consequently attaches to the one as well as to the other of these, 'to all in a direction from left to right'.

2. There is no doubt therefore that the passage of Od. *φ*. must be taken as a foundation for and a guide to all the rest. At the banquet there was a certain fixed place where they began to pour out the wine. This place is pointed out with more than usual precision in that passage; for it is said of Leiodes, who first rose according to the invitation of Antinous,

> Ὅς σφι θυοσκόος ἔσκε, παρὰ κρητῆρα δὲ καλὸν
> Ἷζε μυχοίτατος αἰεί.

In the innermost part of the chamber then, where they performed their sacred ceremonies, and where he who presided over them sat, stood the goblet; there began the pouring out of the wine, and thence the cup went round in a direction from left to right. Whatever else was done in rotation on other occasions, was done, from superstitious motives, in the same direction. It is self-evident therefore that when any assembly was formed into a kind of circle, the herald, cup-bearer, &c. began with the person on his right hand, in order that it might go on in the same direction.

3. As to the form of the words ἐνδέξια and ἐπιδέξια, they are neuter adjectives used adverbially, originating from a preposition with its case, and having pretty much the meaning of one; as ὑπασπίδια προποδίζειν for ὑπ' ἀσπίδι. They stand therefore for ἐν δεξιᾷ and ἐπὶ δεξιά, which are both essentially the same, e. g. Xenoph. Anab. 6, 4, 1. ἐπὶ δεξιὰ εἰς τὸν Πόντον εἰσπλέοντι: and 5, 2, 17. οἱ ἐν δεξιᾷ οἶκοι. Consequently the two compound forms also are identical; and although the metre might not force the poet to use one in preference to the other, yet harmony might direct his choice; since it is by no means indifferent where a spondee stands and where a dactyl. Let us suppose that, of the two, ἐνδέξια was the more current term in the language of the reciter, it will be at once felt that he preferred ἐπιδέξια in two of the above passages, in order to break the chain of spondees which continue from the beginning of the line.

4. The grammarians however give this very reasonable distinction between ἐν δεξιᾷ and ἐνδέξια, that the former announces the appearance of its contrary '*on the left hand*', the latter does not; on the application of which to our editions I shall say nothing (see Hesych. v. ἐνδέξια et ibi Intpp.). The same distinction may however certainly be made between ἐπὶ δεξιὰ and ἐπιδέξια; as in Herod. 7, 39. τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ δέξια τῆς ὁδοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἐπ' ἀρίστερα: and thus we can justify the difference of expression between Il. η, 238. and the examples given above:

Οἶδ' ἐπὶ δεξιὰ, οἶδ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ νωμῆσαι βῶν.

Compare also Lobeck on Phryn. p. 259.

5. For the rest, it is very natural, that as both religion and

custom enjoined the direction from left to right, this, added to the greater readiness naturally felt to go in that direction, soon gave the person who did so the appearance of *dexterity*; and this idea, as well as the other, certainly presents itself to our minds in reading both Il. *α*, 597. and Od. *ρ*, 365. "He moved from left to right, like an experienced cup-bearer, like a practised beggar," &c. But neither of these three forms has in Homer the actual meaning of dexterity which δεξιός and ἐπιδέξιος acquired in the language of later times. As early however as the Hymn to Mercury, 454. ἐνδέξιος is so used; where Apollo, admiring the musical skill of Mercury, says that nothing has ever so much pleased him of all

Οἷα νέων θαλιῇς ἐνδέξια ἔργα πέλονται[1].

Ἐνήνοθεν, ἐνίπτω, ἐνέπω; vid. *ἀνήνοθεν*.

Ἐόλητο; vid. *αἰόλος*.

Ἐπαινή; vid. *αἶνος*.

Ἐπάρχομαι; vid. *ἄρχομαι*.

Ἐπιδέξια; vid. *ἐνδέξια*.

Ἐπίηρα, ἐπιήρανος; vid. *ἦρα*.

50. Ἐπιστέφω.

1. The Homeric expression *κρητῆρας ἐπεστέψαντο ποτοῖο* can hardly now-a-days be reckoned among the ambiguous and problematical expressions of Homer's text, nor can there be any

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[1] The form *ἐνδέξιος* never came into common use. Nor is it ever in the physical meaning of its root otherwise than poetical, e. g. in Callim. Epig. 17. *Ὧι δὲ σὺ μὴ πνεύσῃς ἐνδέξιος*: the same may be said of it when used adverbially.

longer a doubt of its meaning nothing more than *they filled the cups quite full of wine.* Heyne (on Il. α, 470.) has brought together everything which can throw light on this explanation; and if he has not been sufficiently decisive in giving his opinion, it arose solely from a habit, which had become to him a second nature, never to reject entirely any position that appeared to have one tenable point, but to leave as problematical whatever he could. The addition of the genitive ποτοῖο, and the comparison of the expression (θ, 232.) Πίνοντες κρητῆρας ἐπιστεφέας οἴνοιο, have placed that explanation beyond all doubt in the opinion of the most intelligent judges; at the head of whom stands Aristotle, in the following passage of his Symposium preserved in Athenæus (15. p. 674. extr.)...τὸ δὲ στέφειν πλήρωσίν τινα σημαίνει. Ὅμηρος· κοῦροι δὲ κρητῆρας ἐπεστέψαντο ποτοῖο....

2. But some of the grammarians, who adopt this same meaning, explain the word ἐπιστέφομαι by μέχρι στεφάνης πληρόω, with whom I cannot agree, not thinking that the root στέφω can be used to express that compound idea; and without hesitation I declare my preference of the other explanation found in the scholia, ὑπὲρ τὸ χεῖλος ἐπλήρωσαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν ἐστέφθαι τῷ ὑγρῷ· which agrees precisely with Athenæus 1, p. 13. d. If for instance a vessel be filled as full as possible, the liquor rises somewhat above the rim, and forms a kind of cover, or, if you will, a crown. Without now insisting particularly on this literal over-fulness, we can very well suppose that the expression ἐπιστέφεσθαι, arising undoubtedly from this appearance, may have passed over into a common hyperbolical expression for *complete fulness.* But still we must not forget the context in Athenæus; καὶ ταῦτα ἔπρασσον (i. e. they filled the vessel in the manner before described above the brim) πρὸς οἰωνοῦ τιθέμενοι.

3. And here it is to be observed, that the older commentators and grammarians, the whole body of scholiasts—Apollonius, Hesychius, Suidas, Eustathius—agree in this explanation; and the other idea of the literal crowning of the wine is not mentioned by one, not even by Eustathius, who on other occasions has been very successful in hunting out false interpretations. For of the four glosses of Hesychius which refer to this expres-

sion, the following—Ἐπιστεφέας οἴνῳ· ἐπιστεφανωμένους (sic: see Schow.)—need not be considered as an exception to that universal agreement, in as much as Athenæus also explains ἐπιστέφεσθαι elsewhere by the addition of ὥστε διὰ τοῦ ποτοῦ ἐπιστεφανοῦσθαι. But in our lexicons ἐπιστέφω and ἐπιστεφής ought no longer to be interpreted by *to crown*; for the verb is never found except in these passages of Homer and in some occasional literal imitations of them; and ἐπιστεφής occurs only, as far as I know, in the twenty-first fragment of Archilochus, where Thasus is said to be ὕλης ἀγρίας ἐπιστεφής. In this passage there is no reason whatever for imagining the figurative idea of a crown, for the genitive does not admit of it, nor would it at all agree with the context, which intends to lower and vilify the island, ἥδε δ' ὥστ' ὄνου ῥάχις Ἕστηκεν ὕλης ἀγρίας ἐπιστεφής. It means no more than *covered over*, and therefore explains very clearly the Homeric οἴνοιο ἐπιστεφέας, as this again does the ἐπεστέψαντο ποτοῖο.

4. Amidst this certainty which reigns over the meaning of the Homeric expression, Virgil's imitation of it is extremely startling: for who can say that "*et socii cratera coronant*," (Georg. 2, 528.) is not an imitation of κοῦροι μὲν κρητῆρας ἐπεστέψαντο? Or if this be left undecided, have we not in the following an almost literal translation of Il. *a*, 469.?

> Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἐξ ἔρον ἕντο,
> Κοῦροι μὲν κρητῆρας ἐπεστέψαντο ποτοῖο.

Æneid 1, 723.

> Postquam prima quies epulis, mensæque remotæ,
> Crateras magnos statuunt et vina coronant.

Which last verse is again given with a trifling alteration at lib. 7, 147., as Homer sometimes repeats his corresponding one. It was therefore very excusable if the old commentators, whom Servius had lying before him, expected to find the sense of the Homeric ἐπιστέψασθαι, as we have given it above, not only in this passage of the Æneid (1, 723.), but also at 3, 525. where it is said, "Tum Pater Anchises magnum cratera *corona Induit*, implevitque mero," and which must of course have a similar meaning with the former[1]. I myself had made some efforts to reconcile my mind to this forced interpretation of the two passages of Virgil; but having done so, I confess I had considerable difficulty in getting rid of the impression, so as to listen to Hottinger's fundamental exposition of them (in Mus. Turic. I. p. 266. sqq.), in which he defends the simple interpretation of the words. He has collected the following passages, viz. Soph. Œd. Col. 485—8. (472—5.), Alexis ap. Athen. 11, p. 472, a., Xenophanes Coloph. ib. p. 462. c. Theocrit. 2, 2., Tibull. 2, 5, 98., Stat. Theb. 8, 225., Silv. 3, 1, 76.; and the inference to be drawn from these is, that the custom of *crowning* and decorating their cups and vessels at banquets and religious ceremonies was so universal, even from the heroic ages, that whatever boldness of expression we may be willing to concede to Virgil's language, it is impossible to interpret those passages with *corona* and *coronare* in any other than the literal sense of the words. And should it even be allowed that an hypallage, as *vina coronare* for *crateras coronare vino*, were defensible here and elsewhere, nay, were Virgilian, yet it would be inadmissible in a case like this, in which the other meaning comes at once so naturally that we cannot mistake it; and the more so, as by altering the passage to "Crateras magnos statuunt, *vinoque coronant*," the poet would have given the desired meaning, the language would have been quite poetical enough, it would have been a truer imitation of Homer, and would have completed the verse better.

5. What then are we to think of this deviation of Virgil from Homer? The three principal persons who may be consulted on it, Hottinger, Voss, (who gives in his Georgics 2, 527. the result of Hottinger's investigation,) and Heyne, do not explain themselves clearly. But as they all consider it to be an adaptation of later customs to the heroic ages, and defend it as such, they appear to suppose that Virgil understood the true meaning of the Homeric expression, and intentionally used the

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[1] Villoison ad Apollon. Lex. v. ἐπεστέψαντο, speaking of *vina coronant*, has lately declared himself also of this opinion.

corresponding Latin one with a different meaning. But this would seem to be a poor play on words, and one which, from its giving an appearance of a want of classical knowledge (for the Greek word would then be taken in its common sense) could not have been pleasing. That a twofold interpretation of Homer's expression was common among the Greeks I cannot believe, reasoning from the unanimous opinion of all the critics from Aristotle downward being in favour of the one, and the total silence of all antiquity respecting the other, which was so striking that it could not have escaped observation. But I can very readily suppose in Virgil an actual deficiency of classical knowledge in particular instances like this. The erudition of those Roman scholars consisted in having frequently read the numerous Grecian models then extant, and heard scholastic explanations of some of them, particularly of Homer; but that the grammatical disquisitions on every particular passage were always in their mind and before their eyes is not to be supposed. The more genius a poet had, the more he felt himself raised above such trifling details; and with a mind thus enriched by Homer, Virgil was sure of producing a poem calculated to delight his countrymen, even though he might chance here and there to have understood an Homeric verse not exactly as its author meant.

51. Ἐπιτηδές.

1. The word ἐπιτηδές occurs in Homer only twice, at Il. *α*, 142. and Od. *ο*, 28., and in both passages this accentuation is the common one, or at least that adopted by the best grammarians; while the same word, when it occurs as an adverb in the later writers, has the acute accent on the antepenultima. The grounds which the grammarians give for this Homeric accentuation puts it, however, pretty much beyond a doubt that it originates with them; and at the same time it exhibits a striking proof of the unsoundness of these our teachers (for such they still continue to be,) in their grammatical judgement. For instance, in the first passage, which describes the equipping of a vessel,

Ἐς δ' ἐρέτας ἐπιτηδὲς ἀγείρομεν, ἐς δ' ἑκατόμβην
Θείομεν......

they explain it to be a contraction of the accusative plural ἐπιτηδέας; and in the other passage,

Μνηστήρων σ' ἐπιτηδὲς ἀριστῆες λοχόωσιν,

it is to be the nominative ἐπιτηδέες, the contraction taking place in both cases on account of the metre. In illustration of this they cite δυσκλέα at Il. β, 115. for δυσκλεέα, ἀκλεές at Il. η, 100. for ἀκλεέες, and παλιμπετές, which, like the word in question, is supposed to stand for -έες at Od. ε, 27. and for -έας at Il. π, 395. It requires only to make this statement, to see at once that grammatical criticism will not bear it out. In δυσκλέα for δυσκλεέα the elision is correct, and confirmed by other analogous cases, as φοβέο for φοβέεο. But every one knows that this can only take place where three vowels meet. Ἀκλεές for ἀκλεέες may therefore be justified; but παλιμπετές and ἐπιτηδές (whether as an elision for -έες, -έας, or, as some of the grammarians propose, a mere metrical abbreviation for -εῖς as the contraction of both cases,) would be forms without an example in the old Epic poetry.

2. I say in *old* Epic poetry, because I can bring from an Alexandrine Epic poet an instance of this form which is not, I think, known. In the scholia of Chœroboscos to the Γραμματικοὶ κανόνες of Theodosius (see Bibl. Coisl. Cod. 176.) from fol. 209. (Bekker. Anecd. p. 1253.) stands the following fragment of Callimachus,

.... οἵ τε βιοπλανὲς ἀγρὸν ἀπ' ἀγροῦ
Φοιτῶσιν[1].

But Callimachus, who is always on the look out for anything unusual, cannot be quoted in proof of what is really Epic language ; and the most which can be gathered from this fragment is, the probability that already in his time the Homeric forms ἐπιτηδές, παλιμπετές were understood in the manner mentioned above, and that he did not fail to imitate them. Since, however, Callimachus in particular introduced into his hexameters anything uncommon from all the dialects, I think it much more probable that the Æolic, to which belong the verbal forms in ες and εν for εις and ειν, did actually change the plurals from εῖς to ές. This probability is much increased by another fragment which the same Chœroboscus (Bekker. p. 1187.) has preserved also from Callimachus, and in which is found the nomin. sing. in ες for εις (gen. εντος).

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[1] Bekker's manuscript has φητῶσιν with φοι written over it. The fragment appears to me to be from the Hecale, from which Hesychius has quoted the word Γηφάγοι with the explanation πένητες, ἄποροι, which, if joined to the above words in some such way as this, Γηφάγοι ἀνέρες οἵ τε, &c., suits them very well, as does the whole verse in connexion with another fragment quoted also from the Hecale and thus restored by Bentley (fr. 41.); τῖον δέ ἑ πάντες ὁδῖται Ἧρα φιλοξενίης· ἔχε γὰρ τέγος ἀκλήϊστον.

> . . . . . . ὁ δ' ἀείδων
> Μαλόες ἦλθε χορός

for Μαλόεις, i. e. the Chorus of Ἀπόλλων Μαλόεις in Lesbos ; see Steph. Byz. in Μαλόεις. This Æolicism was probably supposed by the older grammarians to exist in παλιμπετές, &c., according to the well-known uncritical hypothesis that all the dialects are to be found in Homer ; and thus their explanation, though by no means admissible, would yet be more reasonable than the totally unfounded elision of ε and α in the terminations εες and εας.

3. If now the sense of the word in these Homeric passages were not at variance with this, we should have nothing more to do than to adopt the above explanation, bow to the authority of Callimachus, as one of the oldest grammarians, and suppose that these forms were rare and antiquated expressions. But a glance at the passages shows at once, to any one who is merely put in the right track, that it is in every instance a neuter in ες, attached adverbially to the verb, and supplying the same sense as its adjective would give if joined to a noun. This is so evident, that we cannot except even ἀκλεές, although that would be, as a masc. plur. (according to what was said above) quite agreeable to analogy ; for who would not prefer taking it adverbially in the following passage? (Il. η, 100.)

> Ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς μὲν πάντες ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα γένοισθε
> Ἥμενοι αὖθι ἕκαστοι ἀκήριοι ἀκλεὲς αὔτως.

The masculine in ής of παλιμπετές does not, it is true, occur anywhere; but the analogy of προπετής, περιπετής will give it, and the adverbial neuter of this suits so naturally both these passages, (Od. ε, 27.)

> Μνηστῆρες δ' ἐν νηῒ παλιμπετὲς ἀπονέωνται

and (Il. π, 395.)

> Πάτροκλος δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν πρώτας ἐπέκερσε φάλαγγας,
> Ἂψ ἐπὶ νῆας ἔεργε παλιμπετές,

that no grammarian, how ancient soever he may be, has authority enough to force upon us a form of the nom. and acc. plur. so completely at variance with all the rules of Homeric grammar.

4. In the same way, no one, looking at ἐπιτηδές in the passages quoted above, can despise, as a point of no importance, its coalescing so well with the context as an adverb. Nor is there anything in the form of the word to hinder our pronouncing it, as we have the others, to be a neuter: and if we admit the present accentuation to be a tradition existing in the olden times of the declamation of Homeric poetry, we shall then have ἐπιτηδές with its old proper accent as the neuter of the adjective ἐπιτηδής, ές; and we may compare the proparoxyton ἐπίτηδες of later times, as the grammarians do, with ἄληθες. But one thing ought to be mentioned, which I have not seen observed by any one, that the adjective ἐπιτηδής *does not occur* in any of the remains of antiquity; for the superlative ἐπιτηδέστατος, which Schneider mentions under ἐπιτήδειος as a various reading of Herodotus, scarcely deserves our notice, the reading of the text ἐπιτηδεώτατος being the usual form throughout his writings. Let us leave then the existence of the adjective undecided, as we have nothing to guide us in our inquiry, and endeavour to ascertain the meaning of the adverb ἐπιτηδές or ἐπίτηδες from itself, i. e. by a comparison of the two passages.

5. As Homer uses the word only twice, it is quite fair and allowable to call in to our aid its later usage, particularly as that was not an imitative but a real one. The general meaning of ἐπίτηδες, and its compound ἐξεπίτηδες, which became very common in the later authors, was *intentionally, premeditatedly from forethought and consideration*: see Steph. Thesau. in v.

Plat. Crito, p. 43. b. Xenoph. Cyrop. 1, 6. 2. Eurip. Iph. A. 476. It may also frequently be translated *for that very purpose*, as in Aristoph. Pac. 142. Ἐπίτηδες εἶχον πηδάλιον, ᾧ χρήσομαι. It is true that none of these translations suit exactly either of the passages in Homer, but still it is clear from comparing the two together, that the fundamental idea is, *as it ought to be in order to attain its object*, and *not as it may chance to be*. The meaning in the first passage then will be, "Let us collect rowers *as many as are proper*," and in the second, "The chiefs of the suitors are lying in wait for thee *in numbers suitable to the occasion*." More than this is not necessary for our understanding Homer's meaning.

6. But now comes the question, What is the derivation of this evidently compounded word? It is a very striking circumstance, that whilst the ἐπί is so easily seen and understood, the latter part of the word defies all our endeavours to trace a root. Now as the ἐπί here so plainly signifies *to the*, I do not think that any of the usual modes of composition will suit the case, nor do I believe in an adjective ἐπιτηδής, of which that might be the neuter; but like παραχρῆμα, ἐφεξῆς, ἐξαίφνης, καθάπερ, I look in ἐπίτηδες for a preposition with its case: and I find that such sentences as the following, 'as is necessary *for that* thing', 'for that very purpose', would be expressed most simply by ἐπί with a case of the demonstrative pronoun, ὅδε, ἥδε, τόδε; from which union of words, not discernible in the common language of the day, arose I apprehend the adverb ἐπίτηδες, whence was afterwards formed an adjective ἐπιτήδειος, which, like the verb ἐπιτηδεύω, does not occur so early as Homer[2].

Ἐριήρανος, ἐρίηρος, ἐρίηρες; vid. ἦρα.

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[2] As the old language could stray from τοῖσδε to τοῖσδεσι, it is possible that it might do the same from τάδε to τάδεσι, still keeping the first syllable unchanged. And from ἐπὶ τάδεσιν might perhaps come ἐπίτηδες by an elongation very natural in compound words, by cutting off the termination, and by a mode of accenting common to cases of apparent composition.

52. Ἕρμα.

1. On the Homeric meanings of ἕρμα Schneider has collected in his Lexicon whatever is essential. The word has two leading senses, and in each of these are other words connected with it.

1.) ἕρμα, *a prop* or *support*, particularly of vessels drawn up dry on the land; metaphorically, of young warriors, ἕρμα πόληος, *the prop of the city*. Connected with this is ἑρμίς, ῖνος, *the post* or *foot of a bed*.

2.) ἕρμα, *an earring*: connected with it is ὅρμος, *a necklace*.

2. The stem or root of this form has always been acknowledged to be, for the second meaning, in the verb εἴρειν, *serere, nectere*, '*to string*', e.g. pearls, &c. on a string, wire, or the like; and for the first meaning, in ἐρείδειν, *to fix against, support*; for a proof of which latter explanation and derivation we may cite Pindar (as the Schol. on Il. π, 549. has done), who certainly had the Homeric expression in his eye when he called Theron in Ol. 2, 12. ἔρεισμ' Ἀκράγαντος. That the spiritus is no objection to either of these derivations is shown by the analogy not only of ὄρω, ὄρνυμι—ὅρμος (the road whence vessels sail), ὁρμᾷν; ἄρω, ἀραρεῖν—ἅρμα, ἁρμόζω, ἁρμονία; but by the well-known verbal substantive of εἴρειν—εἱρμός, from which ὅρμος (a necklace, radically different from the other ὅρμος) originally differed only by the change of the vowel: compare κορμός from κείρω, στολμός from στέλλω, and ὅλμος, of which mention is made in art. 87. note 6. The derivation of ἕρμα, *an earring*, from εἴρω, is then clear and certain. But for the root of ἕρμα, *a prop*, we must neither with the ancients take exactly ἔρεισμα, nor with the moderns must we soar into the clouds in search of ΕΡΩ. What I have said under ἄφενος of ε, holds good of it also when lengthened into ει: its existence in the middle of many words may be quite as well explained to be a lengthening of the radical form, as its absence may be considered an abridgement of it in ὀφείλειν ὀφλεῖν, ἐγείρειν ἐγρέσθαι, ἀγείρειν ἀγρόμενος. We may also compare ἀμείβω

with the radical ἀμφί, Lat. *amb-*, and ἀλείφω with the German *salben*, 'to anoint'. In the same way, for ἐρείδω, a shorter form ἕρδω, or ἔρδω, through the verbal substantive ἕρμα, is all but demonstrated; in which, however, it is by no means necessary to identify with the well-known verb ἕρδειν, *to do*[1].

3. But this derivation from ἐρείδειν may also come very aptly to satisfy us of the meaning of ἕρμα in Il. δ, 117. where a sharp arrow is called μελαινέων ἕρμ' ὀδυνάων, without our troubling ourselves to examine all the ancient and modern objections which criticism has brought against it: see Apollon. Lex. v. Ἕρματα and Heyne ad loc. Against the explanation in Eustathius, ἐν ᾧ αἱ ὀδύναι οἷον ἐνοικοῦσι καὶ ἐνερείδονται, ὥστε ὅπου αὐτὸ εἰσέλθῃ ἐκεὶ καὶ θανασίμους ὀδύνας συνεισέρχεσθαι, there is only one thing to be said, that the comparison is too physical. But with the comparison of ἕρμα πόληος I am much more satisfied, although the scholium in which it is brought forward appears to make it in another sense. Exactly what brave and stout warriors are to their fellow-citizens, is the sharp arrow to the pains of a wound made by it. The species of personification which lies in this is by no means unknown to Homer, in whom for example the arrows fly about 'full of eagerness to feed on the flesh of the combatants'. The dark cruel pains place all their hopes and confidence* in so sharp an arrow[2].

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[1] A trace of connexion with this ἔρδω, ἐρείδω, may be found also in the German word *Hort*, which is exactly synonymous with ἕρμα in the expression ἕρμα πόληος. See also note 3.

* [Passow prefers the idea that "the arrow which, by pressing deep into the wound lays the foundation of pains, or presses them deep into the wounded person, is therefore *the bringer, producer of pains.*"—Ed.]

[2] To this same figurative idea of confidence belongs the expression of a later poet, Phanias, who in Epig. 3. calls a ruler for drawing lines ἕρμα πορείας σαμοθέτω. But when, in an epigram of Simonides 85. (91.) —where the general reading, even in the Anthologia of Cephalas, is (speaking of Periander) ὅς ποθ' ὑψιπύργου Σήμαινε λαοῖς ἕρμ' ἔχων Κορίνθου,—Jacobs compares it with the Homeric ἕρμα πόληος, this, in the expression ἕρμα ἔχειν, is not so clear and convincing as to justify us in giving up at once the reading of the MS. τέρμ' ἔχων, for an emendation proceeding from an unknown hand. The expression τέρμ' ἔχειν τινὸς does, we know, exist; and although it generally refers to objects which can be granted or refused to others, as for instance in Eurip.

4. Among the post-Homeric meanings of this word is that where *ἕρμα* or *ἡ ἑρμάς* means a sunken *rock* or *bank* in the sea. How bad the old derivation of this sense was from *ἐρύω, ἔρυμα,* i. e. *κώλυμα,* requires no specification. As vessels sail or rather *strike* upon such places, which idea exists also in *ἐρείδω,* nay is the ground-idea of it[3], we might be satisfied with this derivation. But no one can pronounce with certainty on such, because the relative meanings of *ἐρείδειν* in their separate applications play into each other in too many ways. It appears to me that the following view of the subject is better calculated to comprehend more under one idea. Any heavy load, as a large stone or rock, a mass or hill of sand, may from their weight, by which they *tend downward* and *press upon, ἐρείδονται,* be called *ἕρμα.* Thus the *ballast* of a ship is *ἕρμα,* although here again the idea of *holding firm,* and as it were *supporting* plays in with it; and when *ἕρμα* on the chariot-course means the *starting-place,* the original idea there, as in all boundary-marks, was that of a huge stone secure by its weight from being displaced. And now we may go on to compare in Hesychius and the other glossographers, *ἕρμακες, ἕρμαιον,* heaps of large stones placed in the public ways, which are, it is true, supposed to come from Ἑρμῆς. But here we find brought into play old confusions and circumvolutions in the ideas of the people, by which the name and ground-idea of Ἑρμῆς himself, beside the *ἑρμαῖς,* is drawn into this etymological investigation; a remark, in confirmation of which I will only add one expression in the epigram of Philoxenus (Anal. 2, p. 58.), where it is said of one who placed a figure of Mercury as the starting-post, *Ἑρμᾶν ἀφετήριον ἕρμα θῆκεν*: although if any one should say that Philoxenus intended only a play on the words, I have nothing to say to the contrary.

5. To this discussion belongs a passage of Euripides, Helen.

Orest. 1343. *ἡμῖν τέρμ' ἔχων σωτηρίας,* yet as it is also used of the gods, Eurip. Supp. 617. *ἁπάντων τέρμ' ἔχοντες,* as having the supreme will and power, there seems to be no reason why it may not be used of the power of an absolute monarch over a state.

[3] With *ἐρείδω, ἔρδω,* we may again compare the English *hurt,* French *heurter*; as well as a similar affinity between the German verbs *stossen* (to push), *stutzen* (to push violently), and *stützen* (to prop).

860., where it is said of the gods that when a brave man falls in battle they

> Κούφη καταμπίσχουσιν ἐν τύμβῳ χθονὶ,
> Κακοὺς δ' ἐφ' ἕρμα στερεὸν ἐκβάλλουσι γῆς.

It may possibly be wished to leave the second verse as it stands here, and to understand it of one lying unburied on the hard earth; but that the gods grant or refuse a grave is not a true thought. Men bury the good and the bad, but the gods regard each when in the grave (ἐν τύμβῳ) as he deserves. The true antithesis in the passage was however felt by some, and ἕρμα γῆς correctly explained to mean the *tumulus* or *mound raised over the grave.* Now as this lies like a load on the person buried under it, others preferred adopting the emendation of Scaliger; Κακοῖς δ' ἐφ' ἕρμα στερεὸν ἐμβάλλουσι γῆς. But this is too bold an alteration, and is still untrue, for it is not the gods who throw the mound upon him. They were wrong in rejecting the text of Stephens, as taken by him from the manuscripts;

> Κακοὺς δ' ὑφ' ἕρμα στερεὸν ἐκβάλλουσι γῆς.

Ἐκβάλλειν is the proper expression for throwing out a corpse or leaving it unburied, and is here used very beautifully by a kind of *oxymoron.* Him whom men have already interred, the gods leave *under his tumulus* (here for particular reasons called ἕρμα), as far as regards them uninterred, i. e. (as is clear from the first verse and the epithet στερεὸν) without making the earth lie lightly on him.

53. Ἐρύεσθαι, ἔρυσθαι, ῥύεσθαι, ῥῦσθαι.

1. Among the different modifications of meaning in this verb, the most prominent are the two following: 1. *to draw,* 2. *to save, protect.* A difference of form has followed this difference of meaning in part, but not in the way which some of the commentators suppose, who appropriate the quantity ῠς to the first and ῡς to the second meaning; and hence they write the forms of the first meaning, when the metre requires the

syllable to be long, with *υσσ*, but those of the second always with *υσ*. They have never, indeed, attempted to account for this by having recourse to a difference of derivation. Still it may not be superfluous to show here fundamentally that all these significations arise from *ἐρύειν*, *to draw*, and at the same time to point out how they do so.

2. The idea of the middle voice of *ἐρύειν* is *I draw to me, after me, I draw for myself*, &c. Thus of the flesh to be drawn from the spits, Il. *α*, 466. *ἐρύσαντό τε πάντα*; of a person whom another draws toward himself, Od. *τ*, 481. *Τῇ δ' ἑτέρῃ* (*χειρὶ*) *ἕθεν ἆσσον ἐρύσσατο, φώνησέν τε.* To this belongs also the drawing of the *bowstring*, Od. *φ*, 125. *τρὶς μέν μιν* (the bow) *πελέμιξεν, ἐρύσσεσθαι μενεαίνων*: the drawing of the *sword* from the side, Il. *δ*, 530. *ἐρύσσατο δὲ ξίφος ὀξύ*: a person drawing his own *spear* out of the wound which he had inflicted, or from any other thing which it had penetrated, Od. *κ*, 165. *δόρυ χάλκεον ἐξ ὠτειλῆς Εἰρυσάμην*: and Il. *φ*, 200. *Ἦ ῥα, καὶ ἐκ κρημνοῖο ἐρύσσατο χάλκεον ἔγχος*: the drawing their own *vessels* into the sea in order to sail home, Il. *ξ*, 79. *ἐρυσαίμεθα νῆας*, a little before which we find merely the active. In the same way a person draws a *dead body* toward himself to get it into a place of safety, and that, whether it be the body of a friend, e.g. Il. *ρ*, 104. *εἴ πως ἐρυσαίμεθα νεκρὸν* (the body of Patroclus) *Πηλείδῃ Ἀχιλῆϊ*: *σ*, 152. *Ἐκ βελέων ἐρύσαντο νέκυν* (the same body), &c.; or that of an enemy, Il. *ξ*, 422. *Οἱ δὲ μέγα ἰάχοντες ἐπέδραμον υἷες Ἀχαιῶν Ἐλπόμενοι ἐρύεσθαι* (Hector who was knocked down): at *σ*, 174. *Οἱ δὲ ἐρύσσασθαι ποτὶ Ἴλιον ἠνεμόεσσαν Τρῶες ἐπιθύουσι* (the body of Patroclus). In these two latter cases the active *ἐρύειν*, *ἕλκειν* is also frequently used. But in the middle, as used above, the idea is evidently *to bring a body into a place of safety*, whether to plunder or to save it, *for oneself*.

3. From this idea of *dragging from amidst a crowd of enemies* comes the general idea of *to save*. Thus at Il. *ε*, 344. it is said of Æneas insensible from the blow of the stone, *Καὶ τὸν μὲν μετὰ χερσὶν ἐρύσσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων Κυανέῃ νεφέλῃ*: at *λ*, 363. to Hector escaped from the spear of Diomede, *νῦν αὖτέ σ' ἐρύσσατο Φ. Α.*: at *υ*, 93. *αὐτὰρ ἐμὲ Ζεὺς Εἰρύσαθ'* (saved me from Achilles), *ὅς μοι ἐπῶρσε μένος λαιψηρά τε*

γοῦνα: at ι, 248. (to Achilles), Ἀλλ' ἄνα, εἰ μέμονάς γε.... υἷας Ἀχαιῶν Τειρομένους ἐρύεσθαι[1] ὑπὸ Τρώων ὀρυμαγδοῦ. And thus it is used as synonymous with *σαῶσαι* at Il. κ, 44. Od. χ, 372., and in the more general sense of a reception, deliverance, &c., as at Od. ξ, 279. ὁ δὲ (the king) *ἐρύσσατο καί μ' ἐλέησεν*, took me under his protection, received me a suppliant. Hence in the sense of *to ransom*, Il. χ, 351. *χρυσῷ ἐρύσασθαι ἀνώγοι*. Still in all these passages we can trace the existence of the original idea of to draw or snatch (out of danger). But the word is further used of a deliverance continued beyond the mere act by keeping in a state of safety, and therefore passes on to the idea of *to protect, defend*; as at ζ, 403. *οἷος γὰρ ἐρύετο* Ἴλιον Ἕκτωρ : at ο, 274. (of the stag or wild-goat), Τὸν *μέν τ' ἠλίβατος πέτρη καὶ δάσκιος ὕλη* Εἰρύσατο, preserved, saved it from the dogs; at δ, 186. *πάροιθεν* Εἰρύσατο *ζωστήρ*, in front my girdle protected me; and at σ, 276. *ἄστυ δὲ πύργοι*, Ὑψηλαί *τε πύλαι.... εἰρύσσονται*[2].

4. Now as the idea of *saving* is not originally in the word,

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[1] Among the examples given in this and the preceding section are two with the form *ἐρύεσθαι*, of which I have shown in the Ausführl. Sprachl. in the list of verbs*, and at sect. 95. obs. 17., that it is an old Epic future for *ἐρύσεσθαι*. In these two passages the present is not admissible, as is shown also by the aorist *ἐρύσασθαι*, which is found in all the other examples of this meaning, (the sudden snatching, drawing, or saving from a crowd of enemies,) and which would therefore have stood in these two passages also, but that after the verbs *ἔλπομαι* and *μέμονα* the future is much more common.

[2] The two examples with the aorist *εἰρύσατο* must be more accurately distinguished from the continuous sense of the imperfect *ἐρύετο* in the first example, and that of the future *εἰρύσσονται* in the fourth. It is true that both of these two, as well as the others, imply a lasting protection; but still the example of the wild-goat, Τὸν *μέν τ' ἠλίβατος πέτρη καὶ δάσκιος ὕλη* Εἰρύσατο, expresses first and foremost the momentary act of *receiving into protection*; therefore it strictly means, *took it under its protection, saved it*, &c. And so in the passage of Il. δ, 186. where Menelaus says, "The arrow has not wounded me mortally, but my girdle saved me," it certainly implies the lasting protection which such a girdle affords; but the aorist is used to express the moment when it warded off that one particular hurt.

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* [This will be found in Buttmann's Irregular Verbs, of which a translation has been lately published.—Ed.]

but any one (without reference to that idea), nay, even an enemy, may be snatched away to prevent his doing harm, (e. g. at Il. ε, 456. where Apollo is wishing Mars to remove Diomede, *Οὐκ ἂν δὴ τόνδ' ἄνδρα μάχης ἐρύσαιο μετελθών*,) it follows that the idea in this word, as in so many others, is completely twofold, i. e. the word may refer not only to the object saved or protected, but also to that against which protection is desired, e. g. at Il. ε, 538. Ἡ (the shield) *δ' οὐκ ἔγχος ἔρυτο* : consequently it means *to ward off, impede*, Il. β, 859. *Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰωνοῖσιν ἐρύσσατο κῆρα μέλαιναν*, and θ, 143. *ἀνὴρ δέ κεν οὔτι Διὸς νόον εἰρύσσαιτο* : in which sense, therefore, *ἐρύκω* is formed from it.

5. A collateral meaning is *to keep, observe, watch* ; for both of the two objects,—that which I may wish to protect, and that against which I may wish to protect myself,—must be watched, observed. Thus at Od. π, 463. Telemachus says of the suitors lying in wait for him, *ἢ ἔτι μ' αὖτ' εἰρύαται οἴκαδ' ἰόντα* ; at Od. π, 459. *μηδὲ φρεσὶν εἰρύσσαιτο*, nor keep the secret within his own breast; at ψ, 229. *ἣ νῶϊν εἴρυτο θύρας πυκινοῦ θαλάμοιο*, the female slave who then watched, i. e. was then in the constant habit of watching; at Il. α, 239. *οἵτε θέμιστας Πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύαται*, who observe justice, watch over its administration; at Il. ω, 584. *Μὴ ὁ μὲν κραδίῃ χόλον οὐκ ἐρύσαιτο*, watch over, restrain his rage : whence arises the idea, *to observe, keep, obey* ; as at Il. φ, 230. *οὐ σύγε βουλὰς Εἰρύσαο Κρονίωνος, ὅ τοι μάλα πόλλ' ἐπέτελλεν Τρωσὶ παρεστάμεναι·* and at α, 216. *Χρὴ μὲν σφωΐτερόν γε, θεὰ, ἔπος εἰρύσσασθαι.*

6. From this comparison of passages we see clearly the radical identity of all these meanings, as far as they proceed from each other. Further, it is clear that usage had not established any difference between the forms, in as much as the originally short *υ* in *ἐρύω, ἔρῠσω*, remains also short in the meanings *to save, watch*, &c. (see above, *εἰρῠσατο* from Il. δ, 186. ο, 274. υ, 93., *εἰρῠσαο* from φ, 230., *ἐρῠσασθαι* from χ, 351., *ἐρῠσαιτο* from ω, 584.); and that, consequently, according to the analogous similarity of form once observed, as soon as this syllable becomes long to suit the metre, it is now correctly written *υσσ* in all the meanings. On the quantity of the *υ* with a vowel following it no dependence can be placed, as it

is well known that the poet can in this case either shorten the long syllable or lengthen the short one[3].

7. The form without a copulative vowel, ἔρυτο, εἴρυτο, &c.[4], has, wherever it is observable, the υ long, which is singular on account of the future ἐρῠσω, &c. But this formation again does not belong to the meaning *to save* only. At Od. χ, 90. we find εἴρῡτο δὲ φάσγανον ὀξύ, which however is the only passage I know of where it means *to draw*; and therefore we may very well suppose of this form that it gave the preference to the meaning *to save, protect*. The only passage where this υ is also short, and that too in the passive meaning *to be watched, shut in*, Hes. θ, 304. ἡ δ' ἔρυτ' εἰν Ἀρίμοισιν, ought not therefore to be looked on as an interpolation, as Heyne considers it in his Exc. IV. on Il. *α*. p. 178.

8. Still more decided is the transition to the meaning *to save* in the form ῥύεσθαι, syncop. aor. ῥῦσθαι[5], which never occurs but in this second leading sense, and in the active is quite out of use; although here also the derivatives ῥυτήρ, ῥύτωρ, and ῥυτόν (see Lex.) are proofs of the ground-meaning *to draw*; and the shortness of the υ before the σ is evident in this form also from the passage of Il. ο, 29. Τὸν μὲν ἐγὼν ἔνθεν ῥυσάμην· which single instance is quite sufficient, as the passages with this form are in Homer but few. There is therefore no reason why in the Epic poets, as well as elsewhere, we should not always write, when the syllable is long, ῥύσσατο, ἐῤῥύσσατο. Indeed consistency requires it to be always so; for that the Attics afterwards use ῥῡσασθαι long is an usage which originated with them,

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[3] Heyne in his Exc. IV. on Il. *α*. thinks it necessary to fix a radical difference between ἐρῠεσθαι, ἐρῠσασθαι *to draw*, and ῥῡεσθαι, ῥῡσασθαι, ἐρῡσασθαι *to save*; and hence in all the passages in which the short syllable is against him he endeavours to find out an old mistake, since ῥῡται, ῥῡτο, εἴρῡτο may have originally stood for ῥύεται, ῥύετο,· εἰρῠσατο, —a vain attempt.

[4] Whether and where these forms are imperfect, or syncopated aorist, or pluperfect, I shall examine more at length in the Ausführl. Sprachl. under Ἐρύω in the list of verbs. [As the above work was untranslated when the first edition of the Lexilogus was printed, a translation of the account here referred to was added at the end of this article. It has been since published under the title of Buttmann's Irregular Verbs.—Ed.]

[5] Œd. Tyr. 1352. ἔῤῥῡτο κἀνέσωσεν.

as ῥῠσαμην alone with the rest of the analogy sufficiently proves[6]. The arbitrary way of writing some of these forms as adopted in Homer is particularly striking in ἐῤῥύσατο, which occurs three times, viz. Il. ο, 290. υ, 194. Od. α, 6., in precisely the same sense as the forms of ἐρύομαι, e. g. at Od. χ, 372. ἐρύσσατο καὶ ἐσάωσεν, and at Il. ο, 290. ἐῤῥύσατο, καὶ ἐσάωσεν. Here it is evident that these are forms of the same verb differing only metrically, and therefore the corresponding syllable must also be written the same; consequently ἐρύσσατο, ἐῤῥύσσατο. But for the first syllable of ἐῤῥύσατο we are also indebted to the capriciousness of the grammarians. From ΕΡΥΣΑΤΟ, of the two the older way of writing, it was as easy to form εἰρύσσατο as ἐῤῥύσατο. The preference was given to the former in the sense of *to draw*, εἰρύσσατο φάσγανον ὀξύ, Il. χ, 306., and the above comparison of passages shows that it might be written in the same way in the sense of *to save*. Nay, from the similarity of form it must have been so, and ῥύεσθαι, ῥῦσθαι, ought only to be used where the verse requires this abridged form. But this belongs to the numerous incongruities which have been made sacred in Homer by ancient criticism.

[*Extract from the Ausführliche Sprachlehre.*

Ἐρύω or εἰρύω, *to draw*, used only by the Ionics and Epics, has ῠ in the inflexion. The middle makes a transition to the meaning of *to save*, and in this sense only we find a shortened form ῥύομαι. This latter is used also in Attic prose, and in Attic poetry has the υ long in the inflexion, ἐῤῥῡσάμην. But in the Epics it is short even there, Il. ο, 29. ῥῠσάμην: hence in these, if the metre require a long syllable, this form too should be written with σσ; but the editions generally have ἐῤῥύσατο, ῥύσατο, even where the υ is required to be long.

In the passive of this verb it is sometimes difficult, particularly amidst the difference of meaning, to distinguish the tenses. The perfect passive has on account of the reduplication, even when formed from ἐρύω, the syllable εἰ as augment. According to the sense the forms εἴρυνται or εἰρύαται pluperf.

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[6] On this also I shall treat more at large in the Ausführl. Sprachl. [See the end of this article.—Ed.]

εἴρυντο, εἰρύατο, Il. ξ, 75. σ, 69. ο, 654. belong with certainty to this last description. In Od. χ, 90. it may be doubted whether εἴρῡτο is pluperf. or syncop. aor. At all events, as the radical syllable of the syncop. aor. corresponds with that of the perf. pass., it would appear, at least for the Epic language, that the 1. sing. perf. pass. was formed not with the σ but with the long υ.

In the sense of *to save, watch,* &c. we have frequently ἔρυσθαι, ἔρυτο, εἴρυτο, &c. with ῡ, but these cannot be perf. or pluperf. either according to sense, or, where the long syllable is wanting as the augment, according to form. They can only be aorists (syncop. aor.) when they mean a saving or snatching away *completed at the instant*; whereas most of the passages are decisive in favour of a *continued* action. Thus εἴρῡτο, ἔρῡτο, 2. per. ἔρῡσο, are plainly imperf. at Il. ω, 499. δ, 138. ν, 555. χ, 507., in all which passages the meaning is *was protecting,* &c. corresponding exactly with the imperfect ἐρύετο in Il. ζ, 403. In the same way εἴρυντο, ῥύατο, Il. μ, 454. σ, 515. Od. ρ, 201. are used of the *protection of bolts, walls, guards,* &c.; and a similar meaning of a *continued* action is always in the infinitives εἴρυσθαι, ἔρυσθαι, ῥῦσθαι, Od. γ, 268. ι, 194. Il. ο, 141. It is therefore clear that all these forms belong to the *syncope of the pres. and imperf.* (for which see sect. 110, 6. of this work) εἰρύετο εἴρυτο, ἐρύεσθαι ἔρυσθαι. Nay, the indicative itself, ἔρῡται *he watches,* is used not only by Apoll. Rhod. 2, 1208., but Homer has the 3. plur. εἰρύαται in Il. α, 239. Od. π, 463. in the sense of *to watch, observe,* which therefore, agreeably to the passages above quoted, is not to be explained from the idea of the perfect, and consequently can be only a present.

There remain some passages which the sense of the aorist seems to suit better than that of the imperfect, as at Il. ε, 23. 538. ἔρυτο, Soph. Œd. T. 1352. (lyric) ἔῤῥυτο: these however are sufficiently explained by the greater freedom of the older language with regard to the historical tense.

I have shown at sect. 95. obs. 17. of this work, that in the Epic language the *future* of ἐρύω is the same as the *present.* The same is to be said of the middle ἐρύεσθαι, Il. ξ, 422. ι, 248. υ, 195., as Homer, after the verbs *to hope, to intend,* when speaking of a single event, never uses these infinitives in the present, but always in the future or aorist.

There are two Hesiodic forms still to be mentioned: 1.) ε, 816. infin. εἰρύμεναι with ῠ; consequently exactly analogous to the formation in μι, as δεικνύμεναι for δεικνύναι. 2.) θ, 304. ἔρυτο also with ῠ, and in a *passive* sense, *was watched, guarded.*]

54. Ἐρωεῖν, ἐρωή.

1. The meanings of the words ἐρωεῖν and ἐρωή lead to two most opposite things, *violent motion* and *rest.* At Il. ο, 358. δουρὸς ἐρωή is the motion of the hurled spear; on the other hand, at π, 302. πολέμου δ' οὐ γίγνετ' ἐρωή must be translated "there was no rest or cessation of the war." In the same way the verb is used at α, 303. of the streaming of the blood; and, on the contrary, at β, 179. Ἀλλ' ἴθι νῦν κατὰ λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν, μηδέ τ' ἐρώει, i. e. "nor be sluggish." Hence the grammarians have given, without any qualification whatever, under ἐρωή—ὁρμή and κατάπαυσις, and under ἐρωῆσαι—ἡσυχάσαι, χωρῆσαι (see Etym. and Hesych.). A comparison however of the different passages where the word occurs will make all this consistent.

2. That the word belongs to the family of ῥέω is undoubted; the verb ῥώομαι, expressive of an *undulating wavy* motion (as of a crowd, of the hair, &c.), comes nearest to it, bearing the same relation as ῥύομαι does to ἐρύω. Its simple-ground-meaning is in the passage quoted above, Il. α, 303. Αἶψά τοι αἷμα κελαινὸν ἐρωήσει περὶ δουρί: its derivative sense is in ἐρωή in the passages where it expresses the *flight* of arrows or the *throw* of a spear (as at Il. δ, 542. λ, 357. ο, 358.), the *rushing forward* of a man (Il. ξ, 488. ὁ δ' οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν ἐρωὴν Πηνελεῶο ἄνακτος), the *swing* of the winnower and of the wood-cutter (Il. ν, 590. γ, 62.). These meanings remain unchanged in such phrases as ἐξερωῆσαι of the horses *springing on one side*, in Il. ψ, 468. Αἱ δ' ἐξηρώησαν ἐπεὶ μένος ἔλλαβε θυμόν: or when they *run back* at θ, 122. ὑπερώησαν δέ οἱ ἵπποι: with which last the passage of ψ, 433. αἱ δ' ἠρώησαν ὀπίσσω, exactly agrees. But now as the idea of *from, off from,* lies also in

the genitive, the expression ἐρωεῖν πολέμοιο, χάρμης, (Il. ν, 776. ξ, 101. ρ, 422. τ, 170.) without any adjunct, will mean literally *to withdraw from, hasten away from* the war; which is in fact as much as *to leave off, desist, cease*; which idea, without the exactly literal sense *to hasten away* being implied in it, the word has in the passages above quoted; and also in ἐρώησαν καμάτοιο, Hymn. Cer. 302. the earliest passage where the idea of going home is particularly added. But the genitive may also be omitted, when the object, from which the person or thing removes, is evident from the context, as at Od. μ, 75. of the cloud always hanging round the rock, τὸ μὲν οὔποτ' ἐρωεῖ. And thus this idea became so firmly united to ἐρωεῖν, that it stands absolutely for *to withdraw, desist,* as in the passage of Il. β, 179. above quoted, which is the only one of its kind, and where the antithesis makes the sense clear. But in the expression πολέμου δ' οὐ γίγνετ' ἐρωή, the genitive is to be taken more literally; it is, for instance, as if it were οὔτις ἠρώει πολέμου: exactly as in prose we have ἀπαλλαγὴ βίου, συμφορᾶς, &c. from ἀπαλλάττεσθαι βίου, συμφορᾶς.

3. This verb, like so many others, passed over into the transitive sense, and meant literally *to cause to retire, drive back*; as at Il. ν, 57. it is said of Hector, Τῷ κε καὶ ἐσσυμένον περ ἐρωήσαιτ' ἀπὸ νηῶν: and so also in the substantive ἐμῶν μενέων ἀπερωεύς, Il. θ, 361. *he who makes to retire, drives back*; in both which cases, however, the idea of *from* or *backwards* lies in the preposition, and ἐρωεῖν therefore remains nearer to its simple meaning.

4. In the use which later writers make of this Homeric word there are two passages which deserve our notice. The first is a remarkable one in Theocritus 13, 74. of Hercules who left the Argonauts, Οὕνεκεν ἠρώησε τριακοντάζυγον Ἀργώ: which would have come nearer to the Homeric usage, and have been agreeable to the nature of the verb, if instead of the accusative it had been the genitive, ἠρώησε τριακονταζύγου Ἀργοῦς. The other is quoted from Callimachus by the Etym. M. and Suid. in v.

Θηρὸς ἐρωήσας ὀλοὸν κέρας.

See Bentl. Fragm. 249. Suidas explains the verb here by μειώσας, κατεάξας, which would be a singular deviation of meaning. It appears to me better to begin with the gloss of the Etym. M., confused as it is. There we find as a derivation of the word ἐρωή the following: ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐράσεως· χύσις γάρ τις καὶ ἀπόκλυσίς ἐστιν· ὡς Καλλίμαχος, ἐρωήσας θηρὸς ὀλοὸν κέρας· τὸ εἰς τὴν ἔραν καταγαγών. That is to say, the grammarian derives ἐρᾷν, *to pour out,* from ἔρα, *the earth,* and supposes ἐρωεῖν to have pretty nearly the same meaning; unless perchance we have here two derivations confounded together by some mistake or other, one from ἐρᾷν *to pour out,* the other from ἔρα *the earth.* In either case the derivation is bad; but the meaning of Callimachus seems to me to be hit upon correctly. The words are spoken of the taming of the bull of Marathon in the Hecale[1], from which therefore this fragment is taken, and from the context of the same comes also the 375th of Ernesti,

> .... ὁ μὲν εἷλκεν, ὁ δ' εἵπετο νωθρὸς ὁδίτης,

which Ernesti supposed to refer to the carrying away of the Minotaur from Crete. This verse, when completed by Ὣς εἰπὼν, described the leading off the bull when tamed, by an imitation of a verse from Homer, agreeably yet not too closely parodied, Ὣς εἰπὼν ὁ μὲν ἦρχ', ὁ δ' ἅμ' ἕσπετο ἰσόθεος φώς. That my explanation is the true one is clear from Plutarch Thes. c. 14. ἐξῆλθεν ἐπὶ τὸν Μαραθώνιον ταῦρον....καὶ χειρωσάμενος ἐπεδείξατο ζῶντα διὰ τοῦ ἄστεος ἐλάσας· εἶτα τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Δελφινίῳ κατέθυσεν. These two fragments evidently mark two different points of time in this transaction. The pulling the head of the bull down to the ground by the horn is a correct picture of the commencement of the taming; the grammarian in the Etymologicum took it from the passage, which he had complete before him, but he thought he might derive ἐρωεῖν from ἔρα. The verb has, however, here only the idea of the *powerful and swinging motion* by which the head was pulled downwards, and that too in a transitive sense. That Theseus did not break off the horn, as Suidas translates it, is now self-evident; for not only would that be a poor invention of the poet, but in that case the sacrifice could not have taken place. The sacrificing of the bull was in the fable a kind of proof of the hero's exploit. An inferior personage might have destroyed the monster, but to sacrifice the bull the heroic strength of Theseus must bring him to the altar not merely alive but unmutilated.

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[1] See the epigram of Crinagoras in Bentl. Fragm. Callim. 40., or in Brunck's Anal. 2, 144.

Εὐδείελος; vid. δείλη.

Εὔκηλος; vid. ἕκηλος.

55. Εὖτε, ἠΰτε, δεῦτε.

1. If we throw aside some of the passages belonging to this investigation, the use of the particles εὖτε and ἠΰτε will be decidedly distinct; and so much so, that no one would think of considering them as originally the same, without being at the same time impelled to do that which is a check to all investigation, viz. to join together etymologically whatever is similar. If we proceed however with proper deliberation, εὖτε will be found to be a dialect from ὅτε, into the elementary causes of which latter word no one would venture to penetrate, unless invited by some certain intimations[1]. I ought rather,

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[1] Schneider's supposition, that εὖτε came from the genitive εὖ τε for οὗ τε, i.e. οὗ is not satisfactory, because there is not the least ground for using the genitive of the pronoun for this idea of time. And then ὅτε requires a similar explanation: for which purpose it would be better to take the accusative ὅ,τε for καθ' ὅ,τε, *in that* (i.e. in the time) *when*...; but, on the other hand, there is a difficulty in the syllable τε, which in the correlative τότε is not capable of any radical explanation whatever, unless we suppose this demonstrative to be formed at once *catachrestically* according to that relative. All this is possible; but if we can get nothing more than possibilities, the investigation is at an end. That all these correlatives come from the articles ὅ, τό, &c., partly from mere inflexion, partly from being joined with other words, is certain: and hence it has struck me with regard to another word more definitely expressive of time, τηνίκα, that there may have been an old word ΙΞ, FΙΞ, answering to the Latin *vice**, consequently τὴν ἵκα for *hac vice*,

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* [On this word see note in Peile's Agamemnon of Æschylus, p. 386.—Ed.]

I think, to bring forward a conjecture of my own respecting ἠΰτε, which Schneider has slightly mentioned in his Lexicon, that it comes from ᾗ εὖτε or ᾗ ὅτε (as from ὄνομα ἀνώνυμος) with the aspirate changeable, as in the correlative of τῆμος, ἧμος for ἦμος. For that ᾗ for ὡς in such derivations occurs in Homer's language, see art. 104. sect. 6. The elliptical ὡς ὅτε always brings before the mind the verb which is understood, as at Il. δ, 463. ἤριπε δ', ὡς ὅτε πύργος, "he fell, as when a tower falls;" and Od. λ, 368. Μῦθον δ', ὡς ὅτ' ἀοιδὸς, ἐπισταμένως κατέλεξας, "thou hast told thy tale skilfully, as when a poet tells anything:" and ἠΰτε, which came into the Epic language from an older dialect, was weakened down to the mere common meaning of *as*; but still the accent bears the trace of ὅτε or εὔτε lying concealed under it.

2. That ἠΰτε stands for εὖτε is therefore, according to this view of the subject, not possible, and as far as I know there is nothing like it in the language. On the other hand, we have handed down to us εὖτε for ἠΰτε twice as a various reading in Homer. In Il. γ, 10. the reading of the text is,

Εὖτ' ὄρεος κορυφῇσι νότος κατέχευεν ὀμίχλην

. . . .

Ὣs ἄρα τῶν ὑπὸ ποσσὶ κονίσαλος ὤρνυτ' ἀελλής.

We will take no notice of those (see Schol.) who propose to read εὖτε for ὅτε here also; but there is quoted in the scholia, as an old various reading, Ἠΰτ' ὄρευς. This however must be re-

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αὐτίκα for τὴν αὐτὴν ἴκα like αὐθήμερον for τὴν αὐτὴν ἡμέραν. How strongly this conjecture is corroborated by the accent is evident at first sight. To this we may add another supposition, catachrestical it is true, namely that τηνίκα, from mere similarity of termination with the adjectival forms ταῦτα, τοσαῦτα, was changed, in order to increase its force, to τηνικαῦτα, a formation which could not be made from that accusative. And this supposition is fully justified by the far more startling appearances in τημοῦτος and ἐνθεῦτεν, which can have come into the language in no other way than by a mechanical imitation of that analogy. See Gram. sect. 72. b. 5. and sect. 103, 6.—Again, τῆμος, ἧμος may be explained as compounded of the article and ἦμαρ, consequently for τῆμαρ, ἧμαρ, and answering to αὐτῆμαρ, which is evidently a correlative, though retaining only its literal meaning of *the day*.

jected, because Homer always writes ὄρεος at full length. By *writes* we mean also *pronounces*; for we never find ὄρεος in Homer's metre written as a dissyllable, any more than τείχεος, στήθεος, or any other similar genitive of this form which I can call to mind. The other passage is in Il. τ, 386. where, speaking of the arms of Achilles, the old reading is,

> Τῷ δ' ηὖτε πτερὰ γίγνετ', ἄειρε δὲ ποιμένα λαῶν,

with the various reading εὖτε. Wolf, according to a decision of Aristarchus and from the Cod. Ven. has adopted αὖτε, so that it may be said with emphasis, "they were to him as feathers, and raised him up." I will not venture an opinion on the figure; but I am not willing to purchase it with a completely idle and useless αὖτε. For there is nothing whatever in the verses preceding to which αὖτε might express opposition, or even mere difference, and δέ is only copulative: "Achilles tried on his armour to ascertain Εἴ οἱ ἐφαρμόσσειε....., Τῷ δ' ηὖτε πτερὰ γίγνετο....." I consider therefore the form of ἠΰτε contracted into a dissyllable to be the one unquestionably belonging to this verse, and I leave others to choose between the various readings in both passages ηὖτε and εὖτε, deciding for myself in favour of Ηὖτ' ὄρεος, ηὖτε πτερά.

3. A singular usage is that where ἠΰτε stands after the comparative instead of ἤ in Il. δ, 277., of the goatherd;

> Τῷ δέ τ' ἄνευθεν ἐόντι μελάντερον ἠΰτε πίσσα
> Φαίνετο (namely the cloud).

The singularity of this usage is observed in the scholia on the passage and on Apoll. Rhod. 1, 269.

> Ὡς ἔχετο κλαίουσ' ἀδινώτερον ἠΰτε κούρη.

but they explain it falsely in both passages, that the comparative is put for the positive. It is however worthy of remark that this verse of Apollonius appears much more like an imitation of Od. π, 216.

> Κλαῖον δὲ λιγέως, ἀδινώτερον ἤτ' οἰωνοί.

For this ἤτε, or ἤ τε, is quite as unexampled in the sense of ἤ *quam*, as ἠΰτε, and the τε here has no such grounds to rest on as it has where ἤ is a disjunctive copulative in Il. τ, 148.

παρασχέμεν....., *ἤ τ' ἐχέμεν*, "to offer....., or (i. e. or also) to retain." Hence in that passage attention must be paid to the various reading of one or more Vienna manuscripts *ἠΰτ' οἱ οἰωνοί*[2]; a corruption from which we may suppose the true various reading to have been *ἀδινώτερον ἠΰτ' οἰωνοί*, and which, after all that has been said above, I do not hesitate to prefer to any other. The circumstance of *ἠΰτε* appearing to stand in such a phrase may be compared with the common German expression *grösser wie du**, and the like; although there is also an old formula *ἦ ὅτε*, analogous to *ᾗ ὅτε* in the other phrase, which offers itself for our adoption.

4. By an evident corruption the word *ηὖτε* stands in some fragments of Anacreon quoted in Hephæstion, which, as far as I know, have never yet been corrected. They are these, consequently the beginnings of odes: *Μεγάλῳ δ' ηὖτε μ' Ἔρως ἔκοψεν ὥστε χαλκεύς*, Heph. p. 40. Pa. (Fisch. fr. 25.): *Παρὰ δ' ηὖτε Πυθόμανδρον*, Heph. ib. (Fisch. fr. 53.): *Ἀρθεὶς δ' ηὖτ' ἀπὸ Λευκάδος*, Heph. p. 70. (Fisch. fr. 58.). We know that Hephæstion was fond of quoting the beginnings of odes of this kind as specimens of different sorts of verse. That this was the case in the first fragment is evident from the words with which he begins his quotation: *Καὶ τῷ βραχυκαταλήκτῳ δὲ Ἀνακρέων ὅλα ᾄσματα συνέθηκε· Μεγάλῳ....* Who then can doubt that the two verses which he here quotes are the beginnings of such odes? Equally certain is this in the third fragment above quoted, which he cites as a specimen of those songs in which the short verse precedes the longer one; an arrangement which can be shown only by producing the beginning of the song. It is certain, then, that the *δέ* in these verses cannot of right belong to them. I will not therefore give myself any further trouble to show the impossibility of bringing *ηὖτε* (or, if you please, *εὖτε*,) in the first and second fragment into a regular connexion with the context; but I will at once write

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[2] This is the reading of Alter's text, given according to the Cod. 58.; from four others he mentions no various reading, and from the Cod. 133., which is particularly quoted, only the common one.

* [In German *wie* generally means *as*, but it may also mean *than*; e. g. *gross* wie *du*, 'as large *as* thou'; *grösser* wie *du* 'larger *than* thou.' In Latin also *quam* sometimes means *as*, sometimes *than*.—Ed.]

δεῦτε as the true reading; of which word I will show by a comparison of different passages, that in that older language, and particularly by Anacreon, it is used in a sense somewhat different from the common one.

5. That is to say, δεῦτε is in such passages nothing more than an animating interjection, or even merely for the purpose of calling attention; of which usage we find the groundwork as early as in Homer. At Il. η, 350. Antenor says to the chiefs assembled in council, Δεῦτ' ἄγετ' Ἀργείην Ἑλένην.... Δώομεν Ἀτρείδῃσιν ἄγειν: literally, "Come, let us give Helen to the Atridæ, &c."; and at Od. θ, 133. Laodamas says to the Phæacians assembled at the games, Δεῦτε, φίλοι, τὸν ξεῖνον ἐρώμεθα, "Come, friends, let us ask the stranger, &c.": in both which passages, as we see, there is no idea of actual motion*. Now Anacreon uses it in a similar way in a fragment quoted by Strabo 14, p. 661. (Fisch. fr. 72.), where we have two regular iambic dimeters acatalectic with pure anapæsts in the odd places, if we change the incongruous participle τιθέμεναι into the infinitive, instead of altering it with Coray into the masculine, an emendation by which some manuscripts endeavour to conceal the wound:

Διὰ δεῦτε Καριοεργέος
Ὀχάνοιο χεῖρα τιθήμεναι.

"Up! put your hand through the Carian handle" (see Schol. and Eust. on Il. θ, 193. Herod. 1, 171.); i.e. "seize the shield".

6. And now we may see how the usage of this interjection becomes extended, in the Anacreontic fragment in Heph. p. 22. (Fisch. fr. 123.)

Μνᾶται δεῦτε φαλακρὸς Ἄλεξις.

This fragment belongs to the specimens with which we set out; for Turnebus was the first who wrote δεῦτε here, without making any remark on it; the manuscripts (see Gaisford) have δηῦτε. Pauw understands this δεῦτε not incorrectly: for while he translates it *huc agite!* he appears to consider it as a comic invitation to hasten to the laughable drama. Still I would not have this expression taken too literally, as I see in it nothing more than "Listen, people!" in which I am confirmed by a comparison of the passages still remaining. Athenæus 14. p. 599. has an Anacreontic ode beginning thus:

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* [We use 'Come!' and the French make use of 'Allons!' in the same way.—Ed.]

Σφαίρῃ δεῦτέ με πορφυρέῃ
Βάλλων χρυσοκόμης Ἔρως
. . . .
Συμπαίζειν προκαλεῖται.

The similarity of the beginning of this ode to that other, of which we have the first words with the false reading δ᾽ ηὖτε, will now assist us in correcting it thus:

Μεγάλῳ δεῦτέ μ᾽ Ἔρως ἔκοψεν ὥστε χαλκεὺς
Πελέκει, χειμερίῃ δ᾽ ἔλουσεν ἐν χαράδρῃ.

We see that the word here merely supplies the place of an invitation to listen to what is intended to be said; and therefore we cannot be surprised at finding it in the two other passages given above, which when completed run thus:

Παρὰ δεῦτε Πυθόμανδρον
Κατέδυν Ἔρωτα φεύγων.

and

Ἀρθεὶς δεῦτ᾽ ἀπὸ Λευκάδος
Πέτρης ἐς πολιὸν κῦμα κολυμβῶ μεθύων ἔρωτι.

The first of these is obscure, from being suddenly broken off; and in the second the word ηὖτε might perhaps be tolerated, if it were not certain, as we stated before of this fragment, that it was the commencement of the ode. The poet therefore speaks of that, with which he is comparing his condition, as a reality. The examination of a larger fragment of the same poet in Athen. 10. p. 427. (Fisch. Od. 57.), in which, as we may conclude from the corruptions, the word δεῦτε did occur twice, I must defer to another opportunity, as it would require too much time and space; and I will only propose a conjecture that this same usage is also concealed in a fragment of Alcman in Athenæus 13. p. 600. f.

Ἔρως με δ᾽ αὖτε Κύπριδος ἕκατι
Γλυκὺς κατείβων καρδίαν ἰαίνει.

As we know nothing of the continuation of this fragment, there could not be the least objection to the word αὖτε; but the position of δὲ furnishes a trace which we would not wish to lose even by reversing the words to Ἔρως δέ μ' αὖτε. In other respects the passage is quite free from faults; for ἕκατι must have had in Alcman, as in Homer, its usual digamma. The two catalectic trimeters show then that they are the fragment of an ode, which consisted wholly of such, like the ode of the same poet from which three and two verses of the same metre are taken in Athenæus 3. p. 110. f. and 14. p. 648. b. (Welck. num. 17. and 28.). Now by comparing this with two of the Anacreontic fragments quoted above, I cannot help thinking that this also was the beginning of an ode, in which that same δεῦτε, a word quite natural it seems to this lost branch of poetry, was introduced to enliven the sentence:

> Ἔρως με δεῦτε Κύπριδος ἕκατι
> Γλυκὺς κατείβων καρδίαν ἰαίνει.

which we should translate, "See how Love at the command of Venus, sweet Love besprinkling me, softens my heart."

56. Ἐχεπευκής, πευκεδανός, πευκάλιμος.

1. That the Homeric adjectives ἐχεπευκής and πευκεδανός are connected with the word πεύκη, the *fir-* or *pine-tree*, can scarcely admit of a doubt. But in what meaning are we to look for the root? Is the idea of the tree the first, as lying most on the surface, and do those words contain that idea as a metaphorical one? or does the idea of bitterness lie originally in πεύκη, and the tree take its name from that quality, and in such a way too that those forms independently of the tree would be formed from the stem or root πεύκη, bitterness? In this investigation we must not overlook πικρός, which is used in Homer in the same sense as those words, (for instance, πικρὸς ὀϊστός,) and clearly comes from the same root; as also in the words πεύκη, πίσσα, *pix*, the sounds ευ and ι change from one to the other.

2. In the first case it is difficult to conceive that the idea of bitterness should have been taken by abstraction from the fir in

particular and its resinous gum, when that quality is far less striking in this tree than in so many other objects in which it is naturally more prominent; and equally surprising is it that so bold a metaphor could be made use of as to call a sharp arrow at once ἐχεπευκές, *fir-containing*. Besides, in that case this derivation must have come down from the olden time: for πικρός, by its deviation in form, presupposes it to have existed in an earlier age, while those others are immediate derivations and compounds, formed at different times according to the laws of analogy. On the other side, the supposition that the tree is named from its bitterness is contradicted by the general extension of this radical name for that species of tree through so many cognate languages,—for who would wish to separate πεύκη [pronounced by the Germans *poike*], *picea*, *πίτυς*, *pinus*, *Fichte*, *Föhre*, fir?—whilst there is nowhere else any appearance of a root containing the idea of *bitterness*.

3. I think I shall arrive at the truth in another way. The common radical idea is not that of *bitterness* but of *pointedness*. In the European words *pit*, *Spitze*, (a point), *pike*, *pugo* (*pungo*) lies the root. As soon as we suppose that these names of trees originally meant the *pointed*-tree or *pricking*-tree, the idea is at once so far satisfactory. And now if we look at πικρός in its oldest sense in Homer, we instantly see that the ground-meaning is *penetrating*, *sharp*, of which bitterness is only a subdivision, which did not become the prevailing sense until a later period. In Homer the sharp pungent smell* of the seals is called πικρὴ ὀδμή, a root laid on a wound is πικρή, and so are salt-water, tears, and metaphorically *pain*.

4. Every accurate examination of the older Greek language leads with full and complete evidence to roots which, in certain meanings, have *disappeared* from the common language of later times. So in the case before us the Latin *pungo* answered to a Greek form ΠΥΚΩ, ΠΕΥΚΩ, whence πικρός (like φιτρόν from φύω, φυτεύω) *sharp*, *pointed*, and πεύκη the point, which latter was lost in this sense, but left behind it those derivatives with a meaning like πικρός. With these were joined, as in the other languages, the names of that species of tree de-

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* [The French would call it 'une odeur piquante.'—Ed.]

rived from πεύκη, and corresponding with it in form; from which again came πίσσα, *pix*; very naturally, the production named after the tree.

5. The word πευκάλιμος, which never occurs but as an epithet of the understanding (φρεσὶ πευκαλίμῃσι), might be brought into the same family in the sense of *sharp, penetrating*; but I am unwilling to give the word φρήν an epithet, the physical sense of which has so little connexion with the physical sense of φρήν; and I remain therefore in favour of the usual opinion, which explains it as synonymous with πυκινός. For this also is an epithet of φρένες (Il. ξ, 294.), with which latter the verb πυκάζω is again brought into connexion, when it is said (Il. θ, 124. and elsewhere), that the mind is filled with anything. But the ευ is merely a lengthening of the υ, in itself short, which in this long word is lengthened for the same reason as the α is in ἀθάνατος: an exactly parallel case to this is in λευγαλέος, which bears precisely the same relation to λυγρός as πευκάλιμος does to πυκνός.

57. Ἐχθοδοπῆσαι.

1. The verb ἐχθοδοπῆσαι in Il. α, 518. is, as far as I know, a ἅπαξ εἰρημένον in the whole range of Greek literature. But ἐχθοδοπός (from which it is formed,) occurs sometimes in the poets, and once in prose in Plato. For we may be pretty confident that the passages brought forward by Ruhnken ad Tim. in v. are all taken from the older writers. Plato's use of the word is particularly deserving of remark, and, in an examination whether he adopted pure Epic words, might be classed with κρήγυος.

2. The first question is whether the adjective has an active sense (*hating, hostile*), or a passive one (*hated, hateful*); for the lexicons do not speak decidedly on this point. Among the poetical passages in Ruhnken are first those the context of which is decisive in favour of the former sense, Soph. Aj. 950. (932. 924.) τοῖα....ἀνεστέναζες ὠμόφρων ἐχθοδόπ' Ἀτρείδαις. Aristoph. Acharn. 227. οἶσι παρ' ἐμοῦ πόλεμος ἐχθοδοπὸς αὔξεται· and the passage of Apoll. Rhod.

quoted below. Two others,—Soph. Philoct. 1132. (1137.), where it is used of a man, and Plato Com. ap. Poll. 6, 25. where a medicine is called so,—may be very well translated in the same sense; and so also may, if I mistake not, the passage in Plato de Legg. 7. p. 810. d. The person supposed to be speaking is giving an account, which must end in the complete rejection of the Epic and other poets, and goes on to say: *κελεύεις γὰρ δή με τῆς αὐτῆς ὁδοῦ ἔχεσθαι*[1] *ἐχθοδοποῦ γεγονυίας πολλοῖς, ἴσως δ' οὐκ ἐλάττοσιν ἑτέροις προσφιλοῦς.* It seems to me that in this passage *hated* would not be so suitable a meaning as *hostile*: for the main point in the passage is, the bringing forward principles quite unusual, which will *offend* or *be objectionable* to many persons*.

3. This same meaning is also the most natural in the Homeric *ἐχθοδοπῆσαι*, which is evident by the word *ἐφήσεις*:

> Ἦ δὴ λοίγια ἔργ', ὅτε μ' ἐχθοδοπῆσαι ἐφήσεις
> Ἥρῃ, ὅταν μ' ἐρέθῃσιν ὀνειδείοις ἐπέεσσιν.

Jupiter foresees that, if he does what Thetis desires him to do, Juno will reproach him for it, and he shall then be provoked to behave toward her in word or deed in a *hostile* manner.

4. The derivation of the word is obscure, but I think the grammarians are for once in the right. They consider the δ as inserted. That is to say, when the second part of a compound word begins with a vowel, some consonant is introduced in order to separate the second part from the first, and make the separation more audible. In the Latin we have the *d* in *prodire, prodesse*; and I find it in another Greek compound, which is generally explained in a different way. To derive the forms *ἀλλοδαπός, ἡμεδαπός* from *δάπεδον* or *ἔδαφος*, is contrary

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[1] This verb, which is wanting in the text, is from a conjecture approved of by Ruhnken.

* [It is with the greatest diffidence that I venture to differ from Buttmann, but I cannot avoid thinking that the *passive* sense suits this passage better than the *active*, particularly as *ἐχθοδοποῦ* seems opposed to *προσφιλοῦς*, the former in the sense of *disliked by*, the latter of *agreeable to*. Schneider and Passow in their lexicons give both senses, and quote as authorities Sophocles and Plato, but without assigning either meaning to any particular passage.—Ed.]

to analogy. I think they arose from an old anastrophe ἄλλου ἄπο, ἡμῶν or ἡμετέρου ἄπο[2]. And so also is ἐχθοδοπός: but of the two derivations proposed by the grammarians (see Eustath.) that from ὄψ is to be rejected; for it is too restricted, and the more general one cannot be formed from it. But the derivation from ὄπτω is confirmed by the analogy of χαροπός. Ἐχθοδοπός then is properly *hostile-looking**; from which the general meaning comes very naturally. Apoll. Rhod. 4, 1670. uses it (accidentally or not?) in this which I suppose to be its original sense:

> . . . . ἐχθοδοποῖσιν
> Ὄμμασι χαλκείοιο Τάλω ἐμέγηρεν ὀπωπάς.

Ἑῶμεν; vid. ἀδῆσαι.

58. Ἠγάθεος.

The first syllable in ἠγάθεος is without doubt a mere lengthening of the word, as in ἠμαθόεις, ἠνεμόεις, ἠγερέθονται, ἠερέθονται, ἠνορέη, ἠλάσκουσιν. Both the derivations therefore, that from ἄγαμαι (according to which it would perhaps be a lengthened form of ἀγαθός), and that from ἄγαν θεῖος, would be admissible. But the latter has much clearer analogy in its favour; for the compounding with ἀγα-, dropping the ν, is found also in ἀγάκλυτος and many proper names, and the synonymous word ζάθεος is an exactly parallel case. To this we may add that ἠγάθεος in Homer and Hesiod, in Pindar ἀγάθεος, is used only of cities, countries and mountains, to which the idea of

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[2] Should this derivation be thought the true one, we may then consider the interrogative ποδαπός to be much the same as the German *wovon* [the English *wherefrom*]: but in ἐνδάπιος the δ is not inserted, the word coming from ἔνδον and ἀπό, as ἐνδόθεν does from ἔνδον with the particle θεν annexed.

* [Passow, after having mentioned in his Lexicon the different derivations of this word, adds that "probably it is no compound, but a lengthened form of ἐχθρός, like ἀλλοδαπός, ἡμεδαπός, &c., which opinion is favoured by the accent."—Ed.]

divine, sacred, belongs as a fixed epithet. Apollonius (3, 981. 4, 1131.) uses it still more generally of any divine or sacred place. Whence it is clear that the older writers understood it to mean nothing more than *θεῖος,* and the other derivation belongs therefore to the later grammarians.

Ἠέριος ; vid. ἀήρ.

59. Ἠϊόεις.

1. At Il. ε, 36. we read ἐπ' ἠϊοέντι Σκαμάνδρῳ, and the great majority of the commentators in explaining its meaning look to the word ἠϊών, ἠϊόνος, which appears both in sound and sense to be akin to it. Heyne, indeed, is satisfied with the explanation of *ripis septus,* while he rejects, and with reason, one explanation which speaks of *beautiful* banks, as not possible in an adjective so formed, and another, which renders it "on the banks of Scamander," as an expression not agreeable to Homer's general language. Eustathius looks for the origin of the epithet in the "*probability*" of the banks being *hilly.* But then this must be the proper meaning of ἠϊών, as it is in ὄχθη. Whereas in most, if not all, of the passages where Homer uses the expression ἠϊών, he is speaking of a level bank or coast of sand, as that along the sea before Troy. And in general all who derive the word from ἠϊών, touch very slightly or not at all on the circumstance that it is never used but of the sea-shore; a point which, according to my idea, ought alone to have been sufficient to cause the rejection of every explanation of this kind.

2. There is another old explanation—a very bad one it is true—from ἴον, a violet, whence ἠϊόεις is to mean *violet-covered, flowery,* and the flowery stream will be, a stream with flowery banks: now from the very circumstance of this etymology being so forced, I cannot but conjecture that those who produced it saw themselves forcibly drawn to it by some grounds or other of which they felt sure; and on which we probably can speak

with more certainty than they could, although the Venetian scholia and the lexicon of Apollonius are silent on this word. According to this my conjecture, the older grammarians were of opinion that ἠϊόεις gave the idea of a *pasture* or *meadow*; and those etymologists, as they could not derive the word from any expression signifying grass, had recourse to one meaning flowers. It is not my usual custom to find new explanations in the Epic language of Quintus; but as those grammarians are silent on this point, it is not unimportant for us to observe that the poet, speaking of geese and cranes feeding, says (5, 299.),

. . . . . . ἠϊόεν πεδίον καταβοσκομένοισιν.

We may be sure that he did not use the word in this way on account of the above unintelligible etymology, but because ἠϊόεις was handed down to him as meaning *grassy*. Let us suppose this to have been the sense in Homer's time, and we have a very suitable epithet for the Scamander, which flowed through the grassy plains of Troy. Thither Minerva led Mars, and bade him seat himself, on account of the softness and agreeableness of the situation. It was not intended by the poet that he should place himself on a hill in order to overlook and watch the battle; but if such an elevated situation had been in Homer's mind, the banks of the Simois offered him just such a one in a site both high and delightful; and where we afterwards see the gods and Mars actually seated, Il. υ, 151.

3. We now find ourselves therefore standing on the same ground with the old commentators; we have a meaning for the word ἠϊόεις, which both the thing itself and tradition render in the highest degree probable, and we may next look about us in search of a derivation. According to the analogy of other adjectives in όεις we must suppose a substantive HION or -OΣ or -A; whether such a one ever actually existed we know not. But should not the well-known Epic word εἰαμενή be derived from this very word, which we suppose must have existed in the old Epic language? Εἰαμενή is a piece of moist grass-land, a meadow or pasture such as is generally seen round a morass (hence in Homer it is always εἰαμενῇ ἕλεος), where poplars grow and innumerable herds feed; while later poets, as Apollonius 3, 1202. and Demosthenes the Bithynian, in

Steph. Byz. v. Ἡραία*, call also by this name *tracts of land* which are *flooded*; in which however we see that the ground of this latter usage is still the same idea of a low pasture-land, sometimes entirely under water, and sometimes a green meadow: hence in Apollonius 4, 316., as well as in Homer, the herds of cattle feed in the ειαμεναῖς. Of this word the most generally received etymology (see Schneider†) is that of ἧμαι, because in the common language τὰ καθήμενα was used to express *low situations*. Considered however independently of this meaning, the derivation is of a somewhat deceptive kind; for εἴαται is compared with ειαμενή, without reflecting that in the former there is a good and well-known foundation for the alpha, but in the latter there is none whatever: and when the grammarians (for instance in Schol. Il. δ, 483.) recommended the pronouncing it εἱαμενή, with the aspirate, we clearly see that they were contending on etymological grounds against the current pronunciation. Hence we are fully justified in joining this ειαμενή with that ἨΙΟΝ from which comes the adjective ἠϊόεις. If now there be any truth in the derivation of ειαμενή from ἧμαι, there is nothing to hinder us from deriving ἠϊόεις from the same. At all events we must allow that both Greek words give us the idea of a *meadow*; that we can render ἠϊόεις very well by *meadowy, surrounded by meadows*; and that it were no vain undertaking to show the accordance of the letters in the German and the Greek words[1].

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* [He says of a shallow harbour, *ειαμενὴ δὲ καὶ οὐ βάθος ἐστὶ θαλάσσης*.—Ed.]

† [The passage referred to in Schneider's Lexicon is this:

"Εἰαμενὴ, ἡ, or more correctly εἱαμενὴ, from εἱαμενὸς, from εἴαται, Ion. for ἧνται, *sitting, lying*, like καθήμενος τόπος, *a low situation*, Suid. Hesych. and Æliani v. h. 3, 1., whence Hesychius explains εἱαμενὸν by νήνεμον, κοῖλον, βοτανώδη," &c.—Ed.]

[1] The German word *Aue* [signifying a tract or district of marshy or meadow land,] belongs evidently to the simple root signifying water, which runs through all the European languages. But ειαμενή may have meant literally a *watery* tract of land, and such words as εἴβω for λείβω, εἶαρ, *moisture*, αἰονᾷν, *to sprinkle*, are very favourable to this supposition. Only we must remember that the word ΗΙΟΝ no longer struck the ear of a Greek with the mere verbal idea of water, any more than *Aue* now does the ear of a German [or *meadow* that of an Englishman], and therefore ἠϊόεις, *meadowy*, was no bad epithet for a stream.

60. Ἦκα, ἤκιστος.

1. If the adverb ἦκα agreed exactly in meaning with ἀκέων and ἀκήν, which we have examined before, the difference of the first syllable would be no objection to their being all three of the same family, as the words ἤκεστος, ἤπειρος, ἠπεδανός, ἠλέκτωρ exhibit clear proofs that in the old Ionic language the α privative was changed into η. And in fact, if we had no other passages with which to compare the Pindaric ἀκᾶ (Pind. Pyth. 4, 277. ἀκᾶ δ' ἀνταγόρευσεν καὶ Πελίας, "Pelias answered him *calmly*,") than such as Il. γ, 155. Ἦκα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔπεα πτερόεντ' ἀγόρευον, "they spoke *low* to each other," one would hardly wish to separate the two ideas. But this passage of the Iliad is the only one which comes very near to the meaning of ἀκέων and ἀκήν. Let us compare now the following passages. At Il. ψ, 336. Nestor is teaching his son that, in guiding his horses round the goal, he should incline ἦκ' ἐπ' ἀριστερά, '*a little* to the left'; and in the same way at Od. υ, 301. Ulysses avoids the ox-foot thrown at him ἦκα παρακλίνας κεφαλήν. It is plain that in both these passages the sense has nothing whatever to do with a *silent* or *tranquil* inclination, but that the person inclined in a *slight* degree, *a little*. And so it is the epithet of a *slight* blow, push, wind, the brightness of a shining body, Od. σ, 91. 93. Il. ω, 508. υ, 440. σ, 596., and of a *slow* pace, ἦκα κιόντας, Od. ρ, 254*. In all these passages there is not only no idea whatever of stillness or silence, but in all except the first the meanings cannot be deduced from the idea of stillness and calmness without considerable difficulty and force; as for instance at Od. σ, 93. the blow given was so far from being a soft or gentle one, that it smashed the bones of Irus and the blood burst from his mouth, so that ἦκα stands there only in opposition to such a blow as would have stretched him dead on the spot†. Consequently the idea given by ἦκα is not a positive one implying a negative quality as in ἀκήν, but only a relative

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* [Also of a smile, Hes. Theog. 547.—Ed.]

† [The word seems used in this passage expressly for the purpose of magnifying the strength of Ulysses, by representing what in fact was a very violent blow, to have been in his estimation quite a slight one.—Ed.]

idea implying diminution, and this is no other than *weak*. This idea will bring all those passages to an uniformity of meaning, and it is only through the context that it acquires the senseof *low, slow* ; into which it passed over completely, but very naturally, in such phrases as *ἦκα ἀγορεύειν, κίειν.*

2. According to this I suppose *ἦκα* to be the genuine positive of *ἧσσον, ἥκιστα* ; and the spiritus, if it does not belong entirely to the old etymologists, is the Ionic lenis, which was sometimes adopted without any apparent reason in single forms of a family otherwise aspirated throughout, and was perhaps used here on account of the transition from one meaning to a cognate one, from *slightly* to *softly, gently*[1]. If then, on the one side, the difference of the spiritus is no objection to my supposition, on the other it is confirmed by the digamma: for *ἦκα* has still evident traces of it in Homer,—*ἀπώσατο ἦκα, αὐτοῦ ἦκα,*—nor is there one passage to the contrary; and though *ἥσσων* has in Homer no traces of it, yet its compound *ἀήττητος* carries it continually. The positive of *ἥσσων, ἥκιστος* may have been *ἡκύς,* as that of *θάσσων, τάχιστος* is *ταχύς,* and thus *ἧκα* or *ἦκα* bears the same relation to the one as *τάχα* does to the other.

3. And for that reason I cannot follow the old grammarians in writing *ἤκιστος* at Il. ψ, 531. For they thought that because *ἦκα* in the more definite sense of *slow* was once separated from the more general meaning of *ἧσσον, ἥκιστα,* that therefore *ἥκιστος,* which occurs in that passage only, was the adjectival superlative of that adverb with the same meaning:

Βάρδιστοι μὲν γάρ οἱ ἔσαν καλλίτριχες ἵπποι,
Ἤκιστος δ' ἦν αὐτὸς ἐλαυνέμεν ἅρμ' ἐν ἀγῶνι.

And certainly if that were true, we might, amidst the general uncertainty prevailing in the oldest accentuation and aspiration, rest very well contented with the lenis here also. But if it be understood in that way, it gives a very silly meaning: "he had the slowest horses, and was himself the slowest of charioteers." As the cause of the unfortunate issue of that race is shared between the horses and the driver, it would be a false thought to ascribe the slow driving to the latter as his particular fault. Still it is evident at first sight that the charioteer was *ἥσσων ἱππηλάτης*, and that he had *βραδυτέρους ἵππους*; and so it was explained in the early times, as we find from the scholia, by those who did not go about in search of grammatical subtleties. The *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον* which we have here is therefore the adjectival superlative of *ἥσσων**, not occurring in any other passage of the older writers, though it could not have entirely disappeared from the language; for Ælian would have hardly said in his prose (N. A. 4, 31. 9, 1.) *ἥκιστος θηρᾶν, ἥκιστος κρυμὸν φέρειν*, if he had had no other precedent than this of Homer.

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[1] The Etym. M. in *ἥκιστος* has the form *ἧκα* in an obscure gloss; from which it may be inferred, either that the pronunciation was unsettled between *ἧκα* and *ἦκα,* or that my explanation of the word was not unknown to the old grammarians. Comp. Schol. B. on Il. ψ, 531.

61. Ἠλίβατος.

1. *Ἠλίβατος* in Homer is always the epithet of *πέτρη*. It is evidently a compound word, but its derivation is not clear; hence it has been generally attempted from very early times to conjecture the meaning from the passages in which the word occurs, and from that again to deduce the derivation. The leading idea, which the great majority of passages both in Homer and elsewhere has always given to the reader, is that of a steep height, difficult or impossible to be climbed. As this meaning can be made out with certainty, we will endeavour first to do so thoroughly, and then examine the peculiarities or contradictions which accompany it.

2. The passage of Il. ο, 273. is of such a kind as of itself to put the above-mentioned meaning beyond a doubt. It is there said of a stag and a wild-goat pursued by the hunters,

> *Τὸν μέν τ' ἠλίβατος πέτρη καὶ δάσκιος ὕλη*
> *Εἰρύσατ' οὐδ' ἄρα τέ σφι κιχήμεναι αἴσιμον ἦεν.*

As it is quite clear that, notwithstanding the somewhat inaccurate structure of the sentence, the rock refers to the goat, as the wood does to the stag, and as it is quite necessary that the separate epithet joined with each of those objects should express that in which the certainty of safety lies; so it is equally certain that ἠλίβατος refers to the steep height, as that δάσκιος does to the thickness of the covert. To this passage we must add those also where the same meaning offers itself as the most natural, or where it seems to be correct and beautiful. This is the case at Od. κ, 88. of the rock which runs round the harbour; where it is to be observed, that the singular πέτρη ἠλίβατος does not mean one single rock only, but expresses quite as well a lofty wall of rock, in the same way as at v. 4. the chain of rocks which runs like a wall round the island of Æolus is called λισσὴ πέτρη. Again, at Il. ο, 619. πέτρη Ἠλίβατος μεγάλη, is the huge rock on the sea-coast which braves the wind and waves; and at Hes. α, 422. ἠλίβατος, without any other epithet, is the rock struck by Jupiter's thunder. The passages also where the word is a fixed epithet, (as at Od. ν, 196. of the rocks of Ithaca, at Il. π, 35. of the rocks which Patroclus says must have been the parents of the stubborn Achilles, at Hes. θ, 786. of the rock from which the Styx springs,)—although in all of them the idea of height is not exactly a necessary one,—yet associate themselves in the same sense with those others where that meaning is more clear and decisive.

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* [Passow's article on this word is the following: “Ἥκιστος, η, ον, superl. adj. from the adv. *ἦκα*, found only at Il. ψ, 531. *ἤκιστος ἐλαυνέμεν*, the *slowest* in driving. Others read *ἥκιστος*, the common superl. of *ἥσσων*, the *worst* of drivers: but as *ἥκιστος* is otherwise unknown to the Homeric language, the other reading should be retained as a relic of the oldest verbal formation.”—Ed.]

3. That the ancients understood the word in this sense is shown also by the usage of the following classical epochs. In Theognis v. 176. a fatal leap, πετρῶν κατ' ἠλιβάτων, is joined with a leap into the deep sea. In Pindar Ol. 6, 110. the hill Cronius, which elsewhere is called the sunny, is distinguished by this epithet; ἵκοντο δ' ὑψηλοῖο πέτραν ἀλίβατον Κρονίου*. In Aristophanes Av. 1732. the Olympic throne of Jove is called ἠλίβατοι θρόνοι; a combination attributable to the ingenuity of the poet. And, lastly, in the Hymn to Venus v. 268. the connexion of this verse with the foregoing is not perhaps quite so clear, but the context in the following one makes it perfectly certain that ἠλίβατοι is there the epithet of *lofty trees*; an application of the word which does not occur elsewhere, and which appears to me to betray the industry of a later epoch in poetry

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* [It is used also in Æschyl. Supp. 350.=363.—Ed.]

than that in which we are justified in placing those poems; but this remark may perhaps belong to only these two verses, on which see Hermann's Introduction, p. 95. And in order to carry on the poetical use of the word beyond the pure age of Greek poetry, we may add to these the usage of Apollonius, with whom this word is very common as the epithet of ὄρος, or occasionally of other words signifying elevation, and always in the plain and necessary sense of a steep height; from which passages I will only select one, ἄκρη πάντοθεν ἠλίβατος, 2, 361.

4. But what appears to confirm this to be the genuine meaning is, that it occurs also in ancient prose. For when Xenophon in his Anab. 1, 4, 4., in the description of a fortified pass in Cilicia, says, ὕπερθεν δὲ ἦσαν πέτραι ἠλίβατοι, it is absurd to suppose that he selected intentionally a poetical expression for such a sentence. In the same way Polybius also uses the word, 4, 41. ἐκχαραδροῦντα καὶ διακόπτοντα τόπους ἠλιβάτους. And when we consider that this expression, without having exactly remained in constant use in the everyday language of Greece, passed by degrees from the language of poetry into that of polished prose, it supposes that this meaning of the word had been transmitted down from an earlier period, and was already become old in Xenophon's time.

5. This meaning then we must look upon as the true and genuine leading sense of the compound word ἠλίβατος, even without knowing the literal signification of its component parts; and whatever militates against this must be brought forward as a problem to be solved. The first thing of this kind which we meet with is in Homer himself, where the rock with which the Cyclops shuts up his cave (Od. ι, 243.), is called ἠλίβατος. It is true that here we need not go far in search of a reason for this use of the word. We may say that it is a fabulous exaggeration of the size of the giant and of everything around him. But this explanation is not quite satisfactory. Proportion must be preserved even in exaggerations of the imagination: the giant is a huge monster, but still there is a proportion kept up between him and the strangers, which can be comprehended, and is, if we may use the expression, tangible. He seizes two of Ulysses's companions *like puppies*; he de-

vours them, but still he is contented with two at a meal; and the draughts of wine which he takes from Ulysses's leathern bottle, though many and deep, are still enough to make him drunk; and so in other things. Thus the stone is huge, it is true, but still its size is in some measure limited by the negative sentence that two-and-twenty waggons would not have sufficed to remove it from its place. This description gives us the idea of a huge mass, not of a rock towering high in air. In spite of all, however, we must suppose some hyperbole in the passage in order to solve the problem. Neither the language nor the imagination of a poet of nature can be restrained thus by laws. As soon as poetry becomes fabulous, as soon as, in order to give pleasure by creating astonishment, it rises from surrounding nature into the monstrous, it loses proportion also, which it certainly would not be very anxious to preserve, in order to feed the listening crowd with poorer food. I have mentioned above one instance of the proportion which the giant bears to the strangers, but the poet has given another in his description of the Cyclops at the very beginning at verse 190.

Καὶ γὰρ θαῦμ' ἐτέτυκτο πελώριον, οὐδὲ ἐῴκει
'Ανδρί γε σιτοφάγῳ, ἀλλὰ ῥίῳ ὑλήεντι
Ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων, ὅτε φαίνεται οἶον ἀπ' ἄλλων.

Now, certainly, one who in size resembles a woody cliff or promontory, may very well be supposed to break off one of the precipitous rocks on the sea-coast in order to close the entrance of his cave. For that the poet wishes to represent the rocky mass to be not a mere stone, but one of the neighbouring rocks, is evident from his calling it not πέτρον but πέτρην, which latter form Homer, as well as succeeding writers, always uses of fixed rocks only, except in the passage before us, and a little further on where he makes the giant break off *the top of a large hill* and throw it into the sea, concluding the description with these words (486.),

'Εκλύσθη δὲ θάλασσα κατερχομένης ὑπὸ πέτρης.

From all that has been said we see how the disproportion is caused by the direction which the poet has chosen to take. On this point however I would remark, that here we have not only the poet before us, but that certain ideas and expressions had already been transmitted down for his adoption. And in particular I would mention, that in the descriptions handed down of the giants we find familiar and in a certain degree established representations of their seizing and hurling whole mountains, as for instance in the battle of the Titans in Hesiod (*θ*, 675.), where the hundred-handed giants are described as

> Πέτρας ἠλιβάτους στιβαρῇς ἐν χερσὶν ἔχοντες.

6. I think all this stands on grounds so sure in themselves, that I may very well now expect that no one will be misled by a passage certainly somewhat strange in Strabo, 17. p. 818. The geographer there says, that he has sometimes seen in Upper Egypt on both sides of the public roads πέτρον ἠλίβατον στρογγύλον, λεῖον ἱκανῶς, ἐγγὺς σφαιροειδοῦς, of a black and hard stone; and at the end he says the largest of these stones might be *twelve feet* in diameter, none under *six feet*. In this passage the use of the word deviates so considerably from all the older writers, unless we should think perhaps of joining with it the stone of the Cyclops, that Schneider* in his Lexicon supposes from this single passage that the word may have had a collateral meaning, a modification of the original one. But to suppose that a word contained a meaning which might have had an influence on the passages of the earlier writers, and which yet we do not observe in any one of them, is a supposition not to be entertained for a moment: and equally improbable is it that there should be a meaning peculiar to Strabo, or to this later epoch of the language; for as the roundness and smoothness, the hardness and colour, of the stone are contained in the other epithets, there remains nothing for this one but its size. And we may therefore rest very well satisfied with the alternative, that either this epithet of large rocks had become generally applicable in the

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* [Schneider explains ἠλίβατος by the mere general terms "*high, deep*, like *altus*," and adds that in the passage of Strabo "the word has *another collateral meaning*." His account is very meagre and superficial. Not so that of Passow, which is full and satisfactory, but still has nothing worth adding to Buttmann.—Ed.]

common language of the day to every huge mass of stone (for the word used here is πέτρος, not πέτρα); or that the passage in question is an isolated one, as we know that the later writers did sometimes use the expressions of the earlier authors according to their own judgement; in which case the stone at the mouth of the Cyclops' cave may very probably have served as a precedent.

7. On the other hand, more important both in itself and by its antiquity is the following deviation from Homer's usage, that the word is also an epithet of *caves* and *places not deep*. In Hesiod θ, 483. Rhea conceals the young Jupiter in Crete

> Ἄντρῳ ἐν ἠλιβάτῳ ζαθέης ὑπὸ κεύθεσι γαίης
> Αἰγαίῳ ἐν ὄρει.

In Euripides Hippol. 732. the Chorus wishes itself ἠλιβάτοις ὑπὸ κευθμῶσιν, in order that there—(I wish I could see some grounds for this locality)—they might be turned into birds, &c. And, lastly, it is mentioned in the Etym. M. that Stesichorus called Tartarus ἠλίβατος in the sense of *deep*. We might understand the passage of Hesiod, as the scholiast does (ἐν κοίλῳ καὶ ὑψηλῷ), of a cave lying in a *lofty* and trackless mountain; but then the expression ὑπὸ κεύθεσι γαίης would lead us amazingly astray. I think, therefore, that we must be satisfied in all three passages with the explanation of the Etym. M. and of the Schol. Eurip. (βαθυτάτοις), and seek for the solution of any difficulty in the analogy between *high* and *deep*, an analogy recognised by other languages. But as ἠλίβατος is evidently a compound word arising from certain definite collateral ideas, while in *high* and *deep* these are by no means the same, we must now see whether etymology will lead to any results.

8. The most common derivation, and which seems to offer itself the most readily, is that from ἥλιος; in which we need not be alarmed by the aspirate; not only because that depended on the caprice of the oldest revivers of Homer, and at Il. ο, 273. there is mentioned as an old various reading Τὸν μέν θ' ἡλίβατος (see the scholium on v. 619., where however it is said that this reading was not adopted by those to whom it was handed down); but because also in the living language of Greece the aspirate fluctuated so frequently.

Now certainly for a lofty rock on which the sun shines the whole day this is one of the most appropriate epithets; but then it is just the contrary as an epithet of caves and of Tartarus. And if we adopt it, we must at the same time suppose that the meaning of the word as applied to heights was the true and proper signification, but that its application to depth arose entirely from the imagination of the poet (Hesiod), who might not have noticed the literal sense, because it did not force itself on the ear; a supposition which in such old Epic usage as that of the Theogonia does not appear to me admissible.

9. On the other hand, if we suppose that the word according to its original sense was really an expression equally applicable to height and depth, I know of no idea suited to such an application but a synonym of ἄβατος or δύσβατος. And such a one can hardly be coined out of the syllable ἠλι by any other means than by adopting the other ancient etymology, which supposes it an abridgement of ἠλιτόβατος, according to the analogy of ἠλιτόμηνος, ἠλιτόεργος, in which words lies the idea of *missing* or *failing in*; so that ἠλίβατος would express the facility of making a false step in ascending a precipitous height or descending a steep declivity*.

Ἤμβροτον; vid. ἀμβρόσιος.

62. Ἧρα, ἐπίηρα, ἐπιήρανος, ἐρίηρος, ἐρίηρες.

1. The passages where the forms ἦρα and ἐπίηρα are found in our Homer are the following: Il. ξ, 132.

> *. . . . . οἳ τὸ πάρος περ*
> *Θυμῷ ἦρα φέροντες ἀφεστᾶσ', οὐδὲ μάχονται.*

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* [Passow in his Lexicon gives the same two derivations as Buttmann does, and agrees with him in preferring the latter. He adds from the Leips. Litt. Ztg. (Leipsic Literary Gazette) 1826. p. 2206. a third, ΑΛΩ, ἀλάομαι, *that from which the footstep slips.*—Ed.]

Od. γ, 164. of those who side with Agamemnon and wish to remain still at Troy,

> Αὖτις ἐπ' Ἀτρείδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ἦρα φέροντες.

At π, 375. one of the suitors says of the people of Ithaca,

> Λαοὶ δ' οὐκέτι πάμπαν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦρα φέρουσιν.

At σ, 56. Ulysses stipulates in his pugilistic combat with Irus,

> Μήτις ἐπ' Ἴρῳ ἦρα φέρων ἐμὲ χειρὶ παχείῃ
> Πλήξῃ.

At Il. α, 572. it is said of Vulcan, interposing between the wrangling deities and recommending concord,

> Μητρὶ φίλῃ ἐπίηρα φέρων λευκωλένῳ Ἥρῃ:

and at 578. he advises his mother

> Πατρὶ φίλῳ ἐπίηρα φέρειν Διΐ.

That all these six passages, with immaterial changes of form, give the same meaning, is clear. There is, properly speaking, no such idea in them as *to assist*; and though in the fourth passage this idea harmonizes with the sense, yet it is merely by accident. In every instance the meaning is *χαρίζεσθαι, to gratify, do* or *say something which may give pleasure to another.* Now as this is the idea in the first of those passages in the simple expression *ἦρα φέρειν*, it follows that the accusative *ἦρα* must have pretty nearly the same meaning as the accusative *χάριν*.

2. The same simple form occurs also in the well-known oracle which Hercules receives[1],

> Ἦρα γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι φέρων κλέος ἄφθιτον ἕξεις:

in which passage there are certainly more signs of the meaning *to assist*, but still some force is clearly requisite to bring it out, on account of the play on the name Ἡρακλῆς. And the *ἦρα κομίζειν, to help, to cure,* in Orph. de Lapid. 755. is a later application of the Homeric expression. The next step which has been taken, that of proceeding from the explanation of the accusative ἦρα by τὴν χάριν[2] to the use of ἦρα in the adverbial sense of χάριν, *on account of*, belongs likewise to the later poets only[3].

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[1] Tzetz. ad Lycophr. 662. Suid. in Ἡρακλῆς ξενίζεται.

3. With regard to derivation, that from ἔρος, ἐρᾷν, in which lies the idea of desiring, is far less suitable than the generally received one from ἄρω, ἀρέσκω, *to fit or suit oneself to any one, please him, be pleasing or agreeable*, with which agrees exactly the word θυμήρης[4], and the participle ἄρμενος, as used in Scut. Herc. 116. μάλα γάρ νύ οἱ ἄρμενα εἶπεν, i. e. agreeable.

4. With this corresponds exactly the word ἐρίηρος as the epithet of a friend; for when Idomeneus (Il. δ, 266.) promises Agamemnon to be to him ἐρίηρος ἑταῖρος, it can only mean *suitable, agreeable*. This too is the only way in which the same epithet can be brought to suit the *singer* (Od. α, 346. &c.) who pleases everybody. And the grammarians unanimously explain it by εὖ ἀραρώς, ἡρμοσμένος, εὐάρμοστος. The plural ἐρίηρες (we have frequently ἐρίηρες ἑταῖροι) is nothing more than a metaplasmus for ἐρίηροι; a change very conceivable in those times, when forms were not yet so regulated by analogy, and consequently that which was more agreeable to mouth and ear was frequently preferred to that which was more analogical.

5. Whether, now, ἦρα be the neuter plural of an adjective, or the accusative singular of a substantive*, is a point which might remain undecided. But the verb φέρειν appears to me to favour the substantive, particularly by the analogy of χάριν φέρειν. The supposition of a nominative ἤρ, feminine or masculine, which Herodian makes in Eustathius, is therefore grammatically quite correct, without its being necessary

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[2] Etym. M. in v. and the gloss of Hesychius quoted at sect. 7. of this article.

[3] Callim. Fr. 41. Dosiad. in Ara secunda. Hence it requires consideration before we attribute the word to Sophocles in this way; in addition to which it must have a more far-fetched meaning, and stands in a passage where the ear at once tells us it can only be ἤ ῥα. See Hermann on Soph. Aj. 177.

[4] Hence the Schol. Soph. Œd. T. 1094. explains ἐπίηρα φέρειν by τὰ θυμήρη προσέχειν.

* [Both Schneider and Passow are of opinion that ἐπίηρα is the neut. plur. of an adjective ἐπίηρος.—Ed.]

that this nominative should have actually existed; and the existence of the adjective ἐρίηρος is so far from favouring the supposition of a similar simple adjective ἦρος, that we might rather draw from it a contrary conclusion; for in none of the other words compounded with ἐρι- do we find, on separating the syllables, an adjective; but from other parts of speech, by prefixing ἐρι- and adding an adjectival form, are composed at once adjectives, as ἐρικύδης, ἐρίβρομος, ἐρίτιμος, corresponding exactly with ἐρίηρος as formed immediately from ἄρω, or if you will from ἤρ; and as there is no such simple as τίμος, &c., it is most improbable that there should have been such a one as ἦρος.

6. From the junction then of this same root with a preposition might arise an adjective, without presupposing the existence of the simple ἦρος. Thus we should have ἐπίηρος, like ἐπίκλοπος, ἐπίορκος, &c. And indeed it was an old point of dispute among the grammarians, whether in the two last of the passages quoted above we should write ἐπίηρα φέρειν or ἐπὶ ἦρά φέρειν. To decide this question we must first throw aside all later usage, and try to explain Homer by himself. Now as we have in the first passage the simple ἦρα, reasonable criticism requires that when we find ἐπίηρα (if we so write it) in an expression exactly similar, we should consider it to be a word of the same kind as ἦρα. Either, therefore, both are substantives,—but who can think a compound substantive ἐπίηρ to be probable?—or both are adjectives, which we have just seen in the case of ἦρος to be improbable. But the most convincing proof against the reading of ἐπίηρα may be drawn from the second and two following passages, on which three I might therefore fairly expect some clear explanation from those who read in the two last ἐπίηρα. Some of these commentators have quoted the above three passages without due consideration as examples in favour of the simple ἦρα. They did not consider that when the same poet says in one place

ἐπ' Ἀτρείδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ἦρα φέροντες,

and in another

Μητρὶ φίλῃ ΕΠΙ ΗΡΑ φέρων,

this, according to all reasonable judgement, is one and the same expression; so that it is impossible to join ἐπί with φέρειν in the former case, and with ἦρα (by writing ἐπίηρα) in the latter[5]. Hence we can hardly think otherwise than that all who favoured the reading of ἐπίηρα, must have supposed in the former case a *tmesis*, not of ἐπιφέροντες, but of ἐπίηρα. But this is contrary to all experience and all the philosophy of language; for every preposition which does not govern a case becomes at once an adverb, that is, attaches itself in thought to the verb or to the whole sentence, not to one of the other parts of the sentence; which is the only correct view of the tmesis.

7. A part of the old grammarians then acknowledged (and correctly) no other reading than ἦρα in any of the passages; whence arose the gloss of Hesychius, as it stands in the edition of Alberti (vol. i. p. 1648. l. 8.), and which, if we follow the manuscript (see Schow), must be written thus: Ἦρα· ἤτοι ὄντως· ἢ χάριν, βοήθειαν, ἐπικουρίαν, Πατρὶ φίλῳ ἐπὶ ἦρα φέρων Διΐ· ἢ ἔφη. That is to say, we have here placed together ἦ ῥα, *certainly*, ἦρα, *favour*, and ἦ ῥα, *he spoke*; because all these forms were written the same in the old copies. Aristarchus, on the other hand, who was anything in the world but a philosopher, declared himself in favour of ἐπίηρα; and, as is but too common, the authority of a name prevailed against reason and solid argument. Remarkable is the voice of defeat as sounded by the Schol. on Il. α, 572. καὶ ἐπεκράτησεν ἡ Ἀριστάρχου καίτοι λόγον μὴ ἔχουσα.

8. In addition to the fear of altering the text of Aristarchus on insufficient grounds, modern scholars have also been deterred from rejecting the inadmissible ἐπίηρα by other reasons, which may be found in Wolf's Prolegom. to the Iliad of 1785, in Schellenberg on Antimachus Fr. 87, and in Heyne on Il. α, 572. The particular objection of the last commentator was to the expression itself, grounded on the supposition that we cannot well say χάριν ἐπιφέρειν. I take this objection to mean that ἐπιφέρειν may be used elsewhere in a hostile sense; for instance, with χεῖρα, Ἄρηα[6]. Schneider, indeed,

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[5] This is the meaning of Brunck's brief decision on Rhian. 1, 21.

[6] Heyne was too hasty in his objection that the verb ἐπιφέρειν is not Homeric. It does occur in the tmesis (the only way in which it can

in his Lexicon draws a comparison* between this expression and a similar one, with a friendly meaning, in Thucyd. 8, 83. *ult.* ὀργὰς ἐπιφέρειν τινί. But this, beside not being Homeric, is of a different kind, and means '*to direct* all one's inclinations and exertions *toward* some person or his party.' But a shorter and more satisfactory answer to that objection may be made by recollecting that the expression, which in Il. *α*, 572. 578. is disputed, does, according to the observations made above in section 6., actually stand undisputed in the three passages in the Odyssey, and consequently can be used. If, however, there be anything startling in this expression, I hope to be able to remove it.

9. Ἧρα φέρειν was, in the sense of *to be agreeable, to gratify*, so current an expression, and the substantive was so completely forgotten as a separate word, that ἠραφέρειν seemed to the ear to be a single word, like δακρυχέουσα, αὐέρυσαν, εὐπάσχειν, and such like. Hence in those four passages the two words are not separated by any third word. And in the same way as men were led to strengthen the cognate ideas ἀρήγειν, ἀμύνειν, by joining them to a preposition and thus forming ἐπαρήγειν, ἐπαμύνειν, so they said (if we may be allowed for a moment to write it so) ἐπιηραφέρειν, and then admitted the tmesis ἐπ' Ἀγαμέμνονι ἠραφέρειν, as in ἐπὶ Τρώεσσιν ἀρῆξαι: just as the later prose writers ventured to say ἀντευπάσχειν. To compare it with the Homeric κατὰ δάκρυ χέουσα, which Wolf is correct in writing separately, would I think be unfair, as this latter is no compound in the sense of καταδακρύουσα (shedding tears), but a real transposition of the words for δάκρυ καταχέουσα, which in ἐπὶ ἦρα φέρειν is the very point in doubt[7].

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be admitted into an hexameter) at Il. θ, 516. Τρωσὶν ἐφ' ἱπποδάμοισι φέρειν πολύδακρυν Ἄρηα. Larcher in the Hist. de l'A. d. 1. to. 47. p. 179., in a note on the Etym. M. v. ἤρανον, speaks on this question much as Heyne does, but there is nothing new in what he says.

* [Schneider says that the expression of Thucydides does not exactly correspond with that of Homer.—Ed.]

[7] Still I would never at once write ἠραφέρειν, ἐπιηραφέρειν, for the sake of a theory, which, like many others, may be overturned by a single historical observation. A respect for documentary evidence within certain limits becomes no one more than him who professes to examine fundamentally.

10. Far less can the reading of Aristarchus be rendered necessary by the actual occurrence of the adjective *ἐπιήρανα* in Od. *τ*, 343. For in the first place *ἐπιήρανα* is not *ἐπίηρα*; and in the second, this would be comparing sentences of a totally dissimilar formation. The expression in that passage of the Odyssey, *Οὐδέ τί μοι ποδάνιπτρα ποδῶν ἐπιήρανα θυμῷ Γίγνεται*, cannot make it even probable that we must write *ἐπίηρα φέρειν τινί*, if there be other grounds for doubting this reading. As for that still more forced alteration of Aristarchus, by which *ἐπίηρα* is thrust into this passage also by reading *ἐπίηρ' ἀνὰ θυμῷ Γίγνεται*, it has been most justly and properly rejected. Nor ought the critic to be acquitted of want of judgement in this instance, in opposition to the plain and unequivocal account in the Lexicon of Apollonius[8].

11. Homer himself then furnishes us with all that is necessary; and it would be a most erroneous and deceptive mode of proceeding, if, in order to decide on the reading in Homer, we should think it necessary to examine the post-Homeric poets, however old, as to whether *ἐπίηρος* were a form in use or not. This however we will do, but not with that object. Brunck indeed went too far the other way, when in a note on Rhianus 1, 21. he carried on his conclusions—correct as far as they regarded Homer—to all other authors, and wished to banish the word altogether from the language. In Sophocles Œd. T. 1094., where we have in a chorus *ὡς ἐπίηρα φέροντα τοῖς ἐμοῖς τυράννοις*, and where Brunck most extraordinarily retains this reading, without retracting his former decision, the passage is so exact an imitation of the Homeric passages, that whatever can be said of them would seem to hold good of this also; and the utmost, therefore, we have to do is to acknowledge with respect the pen of the Alexandrine poets in the reading of *ἐπίηρα*. My opinion however is not

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[8] *Ἐπίηρα, τὴν μετ' ἐπικουρίας χάριν· Μητρὶ φίλῃ ἐπίηρα φέρων. ἐν δὲ τῷ, Οὐδέ τί μοι ποδάνιπτρα ποδῶν ἐπίηρ' ἀνὰ θυμῷ, τὰ ἐπικουρητικὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. οὕτως Ἀρίσταρχος.* For to read here *ἐπιήρανα* would be contrary to the plain meaning of Apollonius, as the words *τὰ ἐπικουρητικὰ* can only refer to the first word of the gloss, *Ἐπίηρα*. Compare Eustath. ad loc.

that they first introduced it, even in Homer: I feel much more persuaded that this reading, like many others, had long been unsettled; otherwise Apollonius Rhodius in his poem of the Argonauts (4, 375.) would not have written so positively Ὄφρ' *ἐπίηρα φέρωμαι ἐοικότα μαργοσύνῃσιν.* For as surely as this reading is false in Homer, so surely is Brunck wrong in reading in this passage *ἐπὶ ἦρα φέρωμαι.* Medea is here saying with bitterness to Jason, that he had better kill her "that she might *thereby receive* the thanks or reward due to her folly." Here the simple *φέρωμαι* is indispensable; and Apollonius, who thought he read in Homer *ἐπίηρα φέρειν τινί*, formed from it for his own use *ἐπίηρα φέρεσθαι.* The epigrammatic poet Phædimus, who belongs to about the same time, acted in the same way; he joins *ἐπίηρα δέχθαι* (Epigr. 1.), in order to use it as the correlative of *ἐπίηρα φέρειν.*—In Rhianus the reading is uncertain, because he has exactly the Homeric expression, and we know not how he wrote it. In such cases we can only be guided by the manuscripts. But that Antimachus used the word *ἐπίηρα* as a substantive does not follow, as Schellenberg (p. 113.) thinks, from the following gloss of Hesychius: *Ἐπίηρα·*[9] *τὴν μετ' ἐπικουρίας χάριν μεγάλην· ἢ ἐκ τῆς περιουσίας, ὡς Ἀντίμαχος.* So far from it, I cannot find any other meaning in *ἐκ περιουσίας* (for the grammarian meant this phrase in a good sense, i. e. *from excess of spirits, to gratify, give pleasure,*) than if I were to write *ἐπὶ ἦρα.*— But there occur other forms of the adjective *ἐπίηρος.* The *ἐπίηρον* in the second Triopeian Inscription, v. 19. (see Jacobs ad Anal. Brunck. 2. p. 302.) is however the most unmeaning. A poet of so late a period as he is, and one always on the look out for learned expressions, might have formed this word for himself out of the already generally received *ἐπίηρα.* But we find also two glosses of this word in Hesychius, where they now appear thus:

Ἐπίηρος· ἐπίκουρος, ἐπιθυμητής.
Ἐπίηρος· βοηθός, χάριν ἀποδιδούς.

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[9] In the MS. it is, according to Schow, *ἐπίηρος*, which however appears to have been very properly altered by Musurus to *ἐπίηρα.* In the manuscripts the *α* is frequently written with such long projecting points that it is very easily mistaken for *ος* (*ος*).

But instead of the first Ἐπίηρος the MS. has Ἐπιήραν, and instead of the second it has Ἐπιή ρος, as Musurus has erased a letter (see Schow) between *η* and *ρ*. This strengthens Pierson's conjecture proposed in the Verisim. p. 105. that instead of the first ἐπίηρος we should read Ἐπιήρανος; and the second stands on very uncertain grounds[10]: nor, if it be genuine, can we know to which of the later writers it refers.

12. On the other hand we have two instances of Ἐπίηρος in very ancient poets. In Lesches, in a fragment of the little Iliad quoted by Tzetzes ad Lycophron. 1263., the Greeks give Andromache to Neoptolemus, ἐπίηρον ἀμειβόμενοι γέρας ἀνδρί. And Empedocles, in a fragment quoted by Aristotle De Anima 1, 5. (Sturz. vers. 208.), gives this word as an epithet of the earth: Ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐστέρνοις χοάνοισιν. But in both these instances ἐπίηρος is evidently an adjective, and the epithet of a substantive standing near; and this appearance therefore is the less able to furnish any proof of the reading in Homer. So far from that, it is very natural that the effect of ἐπί should be, as it is in ἦρα ἐπιφέρειν, to cause the formation of an adjective by compounding it of ἐπὶ and ἦρα; and this might have been ἐπίηρος as well as ἐπιήρανος. At the same time we must not forget the uncertainty of readings in fragments. Now, as in the epithet of the earth we cannot in any way perceive the force of ἐπί (toward *whom* is it suitable or pleasing?), and as Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle explains this word by εὐάρμοστος, which we have seen above among the explanations of ἐρίηρος, I cannot but conjecture, and I think with reason, that this last-mentioned genuine and old Epic word should be restored to both those fragments. How particularly suited it is, though not exactly in the Homeric sense, to the philosophical ideas of Empedocles, must be at once felt; and in Lesches it expresses the same as would be expressed by ἐπιήρανος and by ἐπίηρος*, which is now not unjustly suspected.

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[10] Pierson leaves it as it stands, considering all from *ἐπίκουρος* to *ἀποδιδούς* as explanations of *Ἐπιήρανος*.—For the rest, *ἐπιθυμητής* should be *ἐπιθυμητός*.

* [Passow reads *ἐπίηρα* as one word in the two passages of Homer and in the Œd. T. of Sophocles. He adds, " Buttmann in his Lexilogus

13. The form ἐπιήρανος in post-Homeric usage has been somewhat perplexed, according to my view of it, from two roots meeting in the same form. For according to glosses which can be depended on, ἤρανος is the same as κοίρανος; and thus ἐπιήρανος fluctuates between the meanings of *agreeable, helper, ruler.* For very copious information on ἤρανος, ἠρανέω and ἐπιήρανος we may refer to Pierson, to whose quotations belongs also another verse of Empedocles (Sturz. vers. 421.), where Pythagoras is called Παντοίων τε μάλιστα σοφῶν ἐπιήρανος ἔργων. See also Schneider's* Lexicon, and the beginning of the inscription of Herodes Atticus, Πότνι' Ἀθηνάων ἐπιήρανε Τριτογένεια.

Ἠΰτε ; vid. εὖτε.

63. Θάασσειν, θοάζειν.

1. The verb θάσσειν, *to sit,* is known to us from the Attic poetry, particularly from Euripides. A substantive, ὁ θᾶκος, *the seat,* in the same writers, shows by its quantity that the α of the verb, as well as of the substantive, is not only long by position, but long also in itself, as in πράσσω, πρᾶγος. With this agrees exactly the double alpha in the Epic form of this verb, in θαασσέμεν, Od. γ, 336., θάασσεν, Il. ι, 194. And I take this opportunity of again rejecting the idea that the Epic

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rejects the word, and proposes to read both in Homer and Sophocles ἐπὶ ἦρα; but his grounds for doing so are not convincing."—Ed.]

* [From Schneider's and Passow's Lexicons I compile the following: "Ἐπιήρανος, ον, adj. *agreeable, grateful,* ἐπιήρανα θυμῷ, Od. τ, 343. —After Homer the meaning fluctuates between *agreeable, suitable*; and (by its connexion with ἤρανος, κοίρανος,) *helping, protecting, ruling, master of*; in this latter case it governs a genitive: σοφῶν ἔργων ἐπ. Empedocles. νόος παιδεύσιος καὶ ἀρετᾶς ἐπ. γενόμενος, *master* or *possessor of,* Stobæus Phys. p. 856. ἀσπὶς ἀκόντων ἐπ. *protecting against,* Anal. 2. p. 405. no. 1. νεύρων ἐπ. *strengthening,* Athen. 1, p. 5. νηυσὶν ἐπιήρανος ὅρμος, *agreeable* or *suitable to,* Dionys. Perieg. 617. Compare ἄρμενα εἶπεν, Hes. Scut. 116., and ἄρμενα παρεῖχον, 84."—Ed.]

poets lengthened the long vowel merely on account of the metre. This, I repeat, is never the case; but where it appears to be so, it is either a contraction occurring elsewhere but suspended in one particular instance, or it is a *real contraction* resolved into two vowels of similar sound, as in ὁράασθαι from ὁρᾶσθαι, which is itself contracted from ὁράεσθαι. Thus θᾶσσον, μᾶλλον, θῆρες, βῶλος, πῶλος, and a number of others are never lengthened by the Epic poets; but they are right in saying λᾶας, κράατος, which, as I have shown in note 1. of art. 1. are original forms without contraction, or in other words are already in resolution. We must therefore, on account of the Epic θαάσσω, acknowledge in θα̅́σσω a contraction; and as in this case we have no reason for resolving the *α* into two different vowels (as ἆθλος into ἄεθλος) we must look on the Homeric θαάσσω as the resolved, or, more strictly speaking, the radical, not the lengthened form.

2. With this again accords very well the form θοάζω, which in two passages in the Tragedians is explained like the Homeric θαάσσω. Æschylus in the Suppl. 610. says of Jupiter,

> Ὑπ' ἀρχὰς δ' οὔτινος θοάζων
> τὸ μεῖον κρεισσόνων κρατύνει·
> οὔτινος ἄνωθεν ἡμένου σέβει κάτω.

The old and only explanation from the time of the Scholiast is, '*sitting under no one's dominion.*' And in Sophocles Œd. T. 2. Œdipus asks the supplicating Thebans,

> Τίνας ποθ' ἕδρας τάσδε μοι θοάζετε
> Ἱκτηρίοις κλάδοισιν ἐξεστεμμένοι.

The scholium is: θοάζετε κατὰ διάλυσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ θάσσετε. ἢ θοῶς προκάθησθε. Doubtless the explanation, which in this latter scholium stands first, and in the scholium to Æschylus stands alone, was the general and traditionary one; and hence Plutarch (De Aud. Poet. p. 22. e.) introduces this very verb as one example among others of a word of twofold meaning in the poets. Θοάζειν, says he, means either a motion, as in Euripides, ἢ τὸ καθέζεσθαι καὶ θαάσσειν ὡς Σοφοκλῆς: and then he quotes the passage above. It is impossible that Plutarch could have mentioned this meaning with such confidence if he had not known that this was the general, and, as he at least must have thought, the undisputed explanation.

3. Certainly this interpretation of a word, appearing so plainly to be derived from *θοός*, must have been striking; and this alone was undoubtedly the cause which induced even Greek interpreters of Sophocles, as we see in the scholium quoted above, to try and unite the idea of quick motion with that of sitting; an explanation which has been lately supported by Erfurdt and Hermann as the only true one. According to these it must mean, "Cur hanc mihi sessionem festinatis?" Whatever can be advanced in support of such an interpretation every one may easily supply for himself. Even Hermann adduces only some general principles; and therefore I refer the reader to those two commentators, merely remarking that I am far from convinced by the notes of either of them. Everything in the passage betokens that the supplicants, who were seated in front of the palace, had been already there a considerable time, when at length the king went out to inquire the cause of their coming. Here is nothing to give the idea of a calamity suddenly breaking out, to avert which the citizens rush in haste to the king; but it is the account of a pestilence which had already lasted a long time, and had at last induced the citizens to seat themselves as suppliants before the palace: a proceeding which, I can certainly imagine, might well have been introduced by a solemn supplicatory procession, but not by anything with which the idea of haste would accord. Whoever has still doubts on this point, may read, in addition to that address to the citizens of Thebes,

Τίνας ποθ' ἕδρας τάσδε μοι θοάζετε;

this of Theseus to Hercules, who is described sitting on the ground, muffled up and in deep distress, in Eur. Herc. Fur. 1214.

. . . . σὲ τὸν θάσσοντα δυστήνους ἕδρας
Αὐδῶ.

4. With regard to the passage of Æschylus, Erfurdt declares that he does not understand it: of one thing only he seems convinced, that the common explanation "nullius sub imperio sedens" is beyond measure silly. Hermann says only that

θοάζων there does not mean *sitting*. He reserves therefore to himself the alternative of explaining it from the idea of *θοός*; an explanation which physically cannot be wrong, but which must be very striking if it is to supersede with me the thought which lies in the usual explanation. For the sentence is not a mere bald assertion, that Jupiter is not a subject; but it is said of him in opposition to all other kings and all the other gods, that he is the only ruler who has no higher ruler above him. And therefore it is said that he *κρατύνει*, with which idea *θοάζει* in the sense of the Epic *θαάσσειν* accords extremely well; and to this again the expression *ἄνωθεν ἡμένου* refers with much more meaning, as to one who is supposed to be likewise in a sitting posture. Nor is the tautology, which has offended some of the commentators, one unworthy of a lyric poet. The principal thought is divided into two ideas; first, that he is *inferior to none in power*, nor subject to any more powerful than himself (*κρατύνειν* and *κρείσσονες*, as words of the same family, standing in evident relation each to the other); secondly, that he has no one above himself *to look up to with awe or fear*. This is surely no tautology, where no idea is repeated a second time. Or if any one should think that *κάτω*, after *ὑπ' ἀρχὰς θοάζων* is superfluous, he will be assisted by Pauw, who proposes to erase this *κάτω*, as being more than the metre of the corresponding strophe will allow of; or perhaps he may be relieved by a happy conjecture of some better critic than Pauw. As it now stands the literal sense is this; "Not sitting under the dominion of any one has he less power than more powerful ones; he (below) does not look up with awe to any one sitting above." Whatever other questions may arise from the words as they there stand, I leave unnoticed: they are so trifling in comparison with the truth of the whole, that we feel at once that they may be easily removed by sensible interpretation or simple criticism.

5. This *θοάζω*, in my opinion, does not come from *θοός*, as Valckenaer supposes, who, according to his well-known unsound etymology, does not hesitate to derive *θάσσω, θαάσσω*, nay all words which mean *to sit* or *set down*, from hastening to a seat. I go no further back than to the root ΘΕ- in *τίθημι*, which, as every scholar will see, is different from the root ΘΕ- in *θέω*, whence *θοός* seems to come. Why this root is changed in *θα-*

άσσω into ΘΑ- I know not; I only see that it is so, and at the same time I perceive that in another dialect in that wide field of the ancient Greek language, from which the lyric poets and tragedians took their less usual, but to the ears of their contemporaries not unknown sounds, that in such a dialect the *α* of the radical syllable is lost before the other *α* by being changed into *ο*; just as we have seen in a former article that *δοάσσατο* belongs to a verb whose present is *δέαται*, and which we have with great probability derived from *δάω*. The termination *άζω* bears the same relation to the other form as in *σφάζω, σφάττω*; and this *θοάζω* would probably when inflected take the ξ[1]. This word then was taken by the old tragedians from that source, which they preferred to any other; from what was indeed at some one time, and in some place or other, the common language of the day; whilst the other *θοάζω*, which signifies *to rush* and *storm*, belongs without doubt to those words formed by the poet analogically for his own use. Nay, I have no hesitation in conjecturing that Euripides, or whomsoever he followed in this, transferred intentionally by a kind of play on the word the old form (which was in use in another sense, but for which there was no ostensible derivation,) to the sense of *θοός*, as this latter struck the ear the moment the verb was uttered: and it appears to me to be greatly in confirmation of my conjecture, that Euripides uses the word in this latter sense only, Æschylus and Sophocles only in the former.

6. But in order to be able to pronounce with certainty on this point, we must examine another word used by the tragedians, the compound *ἐπιθοάζειν* in the two following passages: Æschyl. Choeph. 853., where the chorus of young women, looking forward to the murder-scene between Orestes and Ægisthus, exclaim in their anxiety,—

Ζεῦ, Ζεῦ, τί λέγω; πόθεν ἄρξωμαι
Τάδ' ἐπευχομένη κἀπιθοάζουσ';
Ὑπὸ δ' εὐνοίας
Πῶς ἴσον εἰποῦσ' ἀνύσωμαι;

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[1] Perhaps this may explain the meaning of *Θόαξος* (Hesych.), one of the names of Apollo, as sufferers seated themselves in his temples in particular, supplicating relief or advice from his sanative and oracular power.

and the end of Eurip. Med., where Jason, imprecating vengeance on Medea, who was flying away with the bodies of their children whom she had murdered, says,—

> Ἀλλ' ὁπόσον γοῦν πάρα καὶ δύναμαι,
> Τάδε καὶ θρηνῶ κἀπιθοάζω
> Μαρτυρόμενος δαίμονας, ὥς μοι
> Τέκν' ἀποκτείνασ', &c.

Hermann, who quotes these two passages also, but who cannot in the compass of a note enter into a full examination of them, says only thus much, that they, like the others, have the verb in its genuine signification, that is to say, in the sense of θοός. I can only repeat here what I have said in the former case. There is no doubt whatever that ingenuity may bring the obscure verb into the sense of θοάζω from θοός; but I still doubt whether it can be done in such a way as to have that degree of clearness requisite in poetry. And with this I might rest satisfied: but Schneider in his Lexicon makes some observations on this word which deserve all our attention. He compares it with the known verb ἐπιθειάζειν or ἐπιθεάζειν, *to complain to the gods*, but still in such a way that he deduces ἐπιθοάζειν here also from the idea of *sitting and supplicating*. If he is right, the uniformity of usage in Æschylus is preserved; and that Euripides used the word θοάζω once in its old signification, will surprise and mislead no one. At all events, the meaning, as similar to that of ἐπιθεάζειν, is evident (among other examples of this verb) in the following: Pherecrates ap. Eustath.

> Ὕστερον ἀρᾶται κἀπιθεάζει τῷ πατρί.

and Plato Phædr. p. 241. b. where the boy follows the person who is leaving him

> ἀγανακτῶν καὶ ἐπιθεάζων[2].

Now to me it seems impossible to consider as two distinct verbs the forms *ἐπιθεάζειν* and *ἐπιθοάζειν*, which we see a fixed usage has joined by a *καί* to verbs signifying some powerful expression of feeling, as *ἐπεύχεσθαι, θρηνεῖν, ἀρᾶσθαί τινι, ἀγανακτεῖν*, and which give the idea of violent lamentation or complaint: but either we must read in the two tragic passages *ἐπιθεάζειν*, or this word must have received in an old dialect the change of ε into ο. There is a third supposition possible, namely, that *ἐπιθοάζειν* may be in its derivation distinct from *ἐπιθεάζειν*, but that from similarity of sound usage has confounded them; in which case I should always prefer Schneider's derivation of *θοάζειν* to the possible one from *θοός*.

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[2] There is a various reading ἐπιθειάζων in some very good MSS., as in the Clark. &c., and we find in Thucydides occasionally ἐπιθειάζειν, ἐπιθειασμός, without, as it appears, any various reading. Notwithstanding this I am inclined to consider ἐπιθεάζειν as the older form, on account of the more simple etymology τοὺς θεοὺς καλεῖν ἐπί τινι. It is true

7. With *θᾱσσω* is connected, as we have before said, *θᾶκος*; consequently we might expect to find in the Epic language *θάακος*: and it is a striking circumstance that we do find *θῶκος* and its lengthened form *θόωκος* exclusively Epic. This proves however that *θῶκος* is a contraction, either from *αο* or *οα*. But *θόακος* only is agreeable to Greek analogy (compare *θύλακος, φύλαξ* and *φύλακος, φάρμακον, μαλακός*): and this leads us to the verbal form *θοάζω*: nor ought we to be more astonished at finding *θαάσσω* in Homer with (*θόακος*) *θῶκος, θόωκος*, than we are at seeing *δοάσσατο* by the side of *δέατο*[3].

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that we might also say *τὰ θεῖα*, instead of *τοὺς θεοὺς*; but as *θειάζειν, ἐκθειάζειν*, &c. were in existence in a somewhat different etymological way, it was very natural even without that for *ἐπιθεάζειν* to pass over into the same form.

[3] We have adopted as the root of the forms treated of in this article ΘΕ-, or ΘΑ-, not with the causative meaning *to place*, (which in *τίθημι* is undoubtedly only the derivative one, as *to cause to stand* is in *ἵστημι*:) but with the meaning of *to sit*, in which sense it has given place in common usage to other forms. Hence the probability of its connexion with the old verb *θέσσασθαι, to supplicate*, arising from the posture of suppliants which we have seen in *θοάζειν*. See Schneid. Lex. To this I would add the word *θῆτες*, which I do not derive from the idea of *locare operam*, but from that of *to sit*, as the Germans say the *Sassen* [Saxons] or *Insassen* [inhabitants]; that is to say, the original *settlers* or old inhabitants of the country. This name was originally *θᾶτες*, which form Hesychius quotes expressly as Cretan; in the same way as the form *θαάσσω* gives us the root ΘΑ-. I suppose then that *θάακος, a seat*, is formed immediately from that very ancient verbal form now lost; and from this name, according to all analogy, comes at once the verb *θαάσσω*, like *φαρμάσσω, μαλάσσω*. The the double *α* in *θαάσσω* is

64. Θεοπρόπος, θεοπρόπιον, &c.

1. The derivation of the word θεοπρόπος from προέπω does not in itself deserve to be at once rejected, as such elision-like contractions are conceivable in old compounds, and are not perhaps without example. The simple analogy however, which leads to πρέπω, deserves a prior examination; but in making this we must not allow ourselves to be misled or startled by the common meaning of this word, *to become, suit*. Homer has not this meaning at all, and it is therefore clear that it was first formed from the older one, *to be distinguished, be pre-eminent*, which in Homer is the constant sense of πρέπω, μεταπρέπω, ἐκπρεπής, &c. But old meanings of words are not to be sought for in the Epic language only; in the lyric usage, and through this in the dramatic, there are many significations which we must be careful not too frequently to explain away as bold metaphors, appropriate as these are to lyric poetry. Combinations like those produced by the word before us may put us on our guard against such an error. Æschylus uses the word of everything which *forces itself forward, penetrates through*, of everything which forces itself on *any* sense. For if it were confined to the *sight*, the transferring of it to the *smell*, as in Agam. 1322. Ὅμοιος ἀτμὸς, ὥσπερ ἐκ τάφου, πρέπει, could scarcely avoid being ridiculous; and besides, at v. 331. of the same tragedy it is used of *sound*, and again Pindar N. 3, 118. says absolutely βοὴ πρέπει, "a shout comes forth." With this may be joined a new sense from a comparison of these two passages; Æsch. Agam. 30. Ἰλίου πόλις Ἑάλωκεν, ὡς ὁ φρυκτὸς ἀγγέλλων πρέπει; and Eurip. Alc. 515. Τί χρῆμα κουρᾷ τῇδε πενθίμῳ πρέπεις. I cannot think that in the second passage the usual explanation of τί χρῆμα for τί, i. e. διά τί with πρέπεις (*insignis es*) used absolutely, will be preferred before the explanation of πρέπεις by σημαίνεις, which suits so well the pas-

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fully explained: for to append -άσσω as a mere termination, like -άζω, is not according to analogy: though a word formed in -άσσω may be changed to -άζω, as σφάττω is into σφάζω.

sage of Æschylus. To this let us add the glosses of Hesychius, *Πρέπον, τέρας, Κύπριοι, Πρεπτὰ, φαντάσματα, εἰκόνες,* and it will be difficult to separate the *θεοπρόπος,* who interprets the signs given by the gods, from this family of words. Il. *μ*, 228.

> *Ὧδέ χ' ὑποκρίναιτο θεοπρόπος, ὃς σάφα θυμῷ*
> *Εἰδείη τεράων, καί οἱ πειθοίατο λαοί.*

That is to say, probably the old expression was *θεὸς πρέπει* "a god sends a sign;" the sign sent was called *θεοπρόπιον,* and the interpreter of it *θεοπρόπος*[1].

2. If we wish to go further, and give to the radical word *πρέπω* its proper etymological place, it appears to me to belong to those numerous modifications, so natural in every old language, of the form and meaning of ΠΕΡΩ, *πείρω, περάω,* &c., *to press through*; and to have taken to itself the definite meaning of *to press forward, burst forth,* consequently also *to cause to press forward, send forth,* and, after its own peculiar form, to be a reduplication, as in the same family of words *πορπή* is[2].

65. Θεουδής.

1. I consider the Homeric word *θεουδής* to be essentially distinct from those which I shall have to treat of in the next article. In general it is considered to be a contraction from *θεοειδής,* a word of exactly the same meaning as *θεοείκελος.* But as the sense of *θεουδής,* in the passages where it occurs, is at once felt to be different from the meaning of those other words (*θέσκελος,* &c.), there has been drawn from the idea of *god-like* the more general one of *godly,* and that again understood to

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[1] I lay no great stress on the gloss of Suidas, Πρόπιον, *μάντευμα· καὶ θεοπρόπιον, τὸ ἐκ θεῶν μάντευμα,* in order that I may suppose *πρόπιον* to have existed as a simple; although it does accord remarkably well with the glosses of Hesychius. Besides, the question gains nothing by it.

[2] That is to say, the second syllable of the original reduplication, which doubles the whole radical syllable, is frequently cut short, and so arose for example such words as *malmen, dulden, treten,* [German infinitives] *volvo, palpo, βλάβω* (a form of *βάλλω*), *κρέκω* (a reduplication of the same root whence come *κροαίνω, κρούω*), and others. See note, p. 275.

mean *pious, holy, upright*. Many a person must surely have felt that in this explanation is mixed up something not Greek, or, to speak more intelligibly, something un-heathenish. The higher we mount up into antiquity, the less must we look for the godlike or godly in *moral* qualities, in what *we* call *holy*, but seek it rather in the great, the beautiful, or the wonderful. Thus θεοειδής, like θεοείκελος, is throughout Homer an epithet of none but heroes as such, whatever they may be in other respects,—for instance, of the chiefs of the *ungodly* suitors.

2. Little as I rely on the verbal derivations of even the older grammarians, I still consider it a very strong preliminary objection to any etymological explanation, that although quite apparent to any observer, and thence almost universally adopted by the later grammarians, it has been entirely overlooked by the older ones. The derivation above mentioned from θεοειδής is indeed found in those commentators, who have everything good bad and indifferent, Eustathius and the common scholiast; but it is wanting even in the Etym. M., while on the contrary there and in the other glossographers and scholiasts are found far more startling derivations, as, for instance, in the second half of the word they look sometimes for ἁδεῖν (probably the oldest derivation in the lexicon of Apollonius, and which is refuted in the Etym. M.), sometimes for the ἕδη of the gods, sometimes for the verb αὐδᾷν. Now as the derivation from θεοειδής seems so easy and striking from similarity of form, and is so agreeable to analogy, it is evident at once, that from the plain meaning which the word has in Homer, *pious*, those old Greeks had more difficulty, from their ideas of things, in connecting that meaning with θεοειδής, than with any of the other supposed derivations above-mentioned

3. To this we may add from the form of the word another reason, which was unknown to those grammarians. Εἶδος belongs to those words which are so decidedly *digammaed*, that a contraction or crasis with it in the Homeric language cannot for a moment be entertained. Homer could therefore only say θεοειδής; and the case is thus completely made out, that θεουδής, which it is clearly seen must have originated in a much more ancient time, cannot come from εἶδος[1].

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[1] In apparent contradiction to what I have asserted, that the con-

4. I trust that these observations taken together will so far have an effect on the readers of Homer that they will not suffer that false derivation to have any influence, mediate or immediate, on the explanation of his meaning. The passages where *θεουδής* occurs are the following. In opposition to a savage people, regardless of right and wrong, are repeatedly placed those who are *φιλόξεινοι, καί σφιν νόος ἐστὶ θεουδής* (Od. *ζ*, 121. &c.); and at Od. *τ*, 364. the nurse speaks of Ulysses as *θεουδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντα,* and explains this immediately by the words

Οὐ γάρ πώ τις τόσσα βροτῶν Διὶ τερπικεραύνῳ
Πίονα μηρί᾽ ἔκη᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐξαίτους ἑκατόμβας.

And in the same way in the passage of Od. *τ*, 109., where after *βασιλῆος ἀμύμονος* is added, *ὅστε θεουδής Ἀνδράσιν ἐν πολλοῖσι καὶ ἰφθίμοισι ἀνάσσων Εὐδικίας ἀνέχῃσι, εὐδικία* contains the reason of the king being called *θεούδης*. The old grammarians therefore were essentially correct, although they modified the word a little to suit individual passages, in explaining it (see particularly the principal gloss of Hesychius on *θεουδής*) by *θεοσεβής, εὐσεβής, δίκαιος, εὐγνώμων,* and Plutarch (ad Princip. Inerud. c. 3.) by *θεοῦ λόγον ἔχων*.

5. The general idea contained in these epithets can hardly arise from anything else, than from that whence the thing itself proceeded in all the most ancient religions, namely, from *fear of the gods*. Thus Eumæus tells Ulysses (Od. *ξ*, 389.) that he would treat him hospitably *Δία ξένιον δείσας,* and again (*χ*, 39.) the suitors are reproached for the unjust con-

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traction of *θεοειδής* in Homer is impossible on account of the digamma, we read in Od. *ν*, 194.

Τούνεκ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀλλοειδέα φαινέσκετο πάντα ἄνακτι.

But in the Cod. Harl. stands *φαίνετο* with a better meaning than *φαινέσκετο,* which cannot possibly belong to the passage. There is no doubt therefore that this reading is not only to be defended in the way that Porson has done, but is the only one to be retained; that is to say, by supposing that it was pronounced ΑΛΛΟFFΕΙΔΕΑ *φαίνετο,* like ΕFFΑΔΕΝ. Besides, I would observe that if *θεοειδής* could be contracted, *θεουδής* would be incorrect, as the *ει* here is not a lengthened *ε*, but a lengthened *ι*. The contraction therefore could be only *θεοιδής*.

duct of which they were guilty Οὐδὲ θεοὺς δείσαντες, &c. Now as he who casts away all fear and shame is called ἀδεής (κύον ἀδδεές), so he who thinks and acts uprightly is *one who fears God*, θεοδεής, which form, it is true, does not occur, because it was changed at once into θεουδής; a change furthered by the particular nature of the δ in δεῖσαι, which in the older language lengthened the preceding syllable[2].

6. Apollonius Rhodius follows strictly the Homeric meaning of the word: as at 2, 1180. οἵ τε θεουδέες ἠδὲ δίκαιοι. At 3, 586. Æetes says of Phrixus ὃς περὶ πάντων Ξείνων μειλιχίῃ τε θεουδείῃ τ' ἐκέκαστο. And the epithet has the same meaning when it is applied at 2, 849. to the prophet Idmon, and at 4, 1123. to the upright Alcinoüs. In the Argonautica of Orpheus too the epithet is used correctly, for when among many names of plants is mentioned κυκλαμίς τε θεουδής, Pliny 25. chap. 9. gives the explanation, by saying of this very plant, "in omnibus serenda domibus, si verum est, ubi sata sit nihil nocere mala medicamenta." Here therefore it is a purely poetical epithet, which Hermann in his too great haste joined in the same condemnation with another reading θεοειδής, rejected on account of its offending against the metre, and substituted for it τ' ἰοειδής. On the other hand, in the Orphean Book of stones, where the poet calls a stone, which was not in this sense salutary, but wonderful and prophetic, θεουδέα πέτρον, I recognise only the

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[2] See ΔΕΙΩ in the list of anomalous words in my Grammar, and Dawes Misc. Crit. p. 165. 168., whose supposition, that originally a digamma was pronounced after the δ in this family of words, is most highly probable. An exactly parallel case to it will be found in the word δίς, which can have arisen only from ΔΥΙΣ, ΔϜΙΣ. See Gram. sect. 16. obs. 2. note. The form θεοδεής therefore could not *properly* come into an hexameter. It would have been *possible* indeed to have shortened the vowel before this δ, as is once done in ἀδειής, Il. η, 117.; but this would not have helped the metre. All difficulties were remedied by the elision of the ε, making θεοδής, and afterwards there remained nothing of the digamma but the quantity of the preceding syllable: it was then pronounced θεοδής with ο long, that is with ου, as ἀδεές was spoken with the long α. Thus came θεουδής and ἀδεές (α long) into Homer; the latter of which was not written ἀδδεές until a somewhat late period, as probably in the older copies the pronunciation of ἀδεές, and ἔδει-|σεν and ὑ-|ποδεί-|σασα was left to the reader's knowledge of verse.

later sense of *godly, divine*[3]. In the same way Quintus Smyrnæus in his imitation, where we meet with no critical nicety of expression, uses it exactly like θεῖος, θεσπέσιος, and the like: as when for instance (1, 64.) he applies it as an epithet of a violent rain, or (at 3, 775.) to the island intended for the residence of the deified Achilles. But when the learned Alexandrine poet Eratosthenes, in his epigram *de cubo duplicando*, Analect. 1, p. 478. gives this epithet to the mathematician Eudoxus, where it can relate only to his understanding, it does not follow that he misunderstood the word in Homer; he probably thought that he might use this same form for θεοειδής, as this last admits of being so contracted agreeably to analogy[4].

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[3] Compare Hesychius θεουδέα, θειώδη; although the author coined this gloss primarily for Od. τ, 364. But the word given as the explanation is striking; for θειώδης is used elsewhere only of sulphur (θεῖον). Perhaps the grammarian wished to compare the supposed Homeric contraction with the otherwise common form in -ώδης, which is also deduced from -οειδής. So far indeed the comparison would be an unhappy one, as it must in that case be θεώδης.

[4] In prose θεοειδής remained in constant use (as for instance in Plat. Phæd. p. 95. c. and Lucian, Imag. 11.), because it was well known that in this and some other families of words the old digamma still had an influence by preventing the elision, and therefore they said ἀλλοειδής, ὀρθοεπής, &c. But are we to believe the information of Suidas, at which Eustathius (on Il. γ, 37. p. 286. Basil.) expresses his astonishment? Θεαιδέστατος, says the former, θεοῦ ἰδέαν ἔχων. εἶπε δὲ Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ περὶ Ὁμονοίας οὕτως· Ἄνθρωπος, ὅς φησι μὲν πάντων θηρίων θεαιδέστατος γενέσθαι. That the original author of this gloss should have misunderstood a word formed from αἰδεῖσθαι θεούς, is not to be supposed; nor does the sense of the passage quoted admit of such a supposition, as ὅς φησι,—γενέσθαι is evidently a proud assertion of man, and can mean nothing else than, as Suidas here understands it, the likeness of man to God. So much therefore is clear, that Antiphon deviated from the form θεοειδής. But then he could only have ventured, in order to avoid the collision of the three vowels, on leaving out one of them, and thus have made θεειδέστατος; which form came to the later grammarian corrupted to θεαιδέστατος.

66. Θέσκελος, θέσπις, θεσπέσιος, θέσφατος, ἀθέσφατος.

1. The words *θέσκελος, θέσπις,* and *θέσφατος* explain each other in form. They are compounds of *θεός,* with only the radical syllable *θε* appearing. For the *σ* in *θέσφατος* is not the *σ* of the nominative, which properly speaking can never remain in the compound; but here, as well as in *θεόσδοτος,* the *σ* is only an euphonic sound strengthening the word, as in *σακέσπαλος,* &c. But in *θέσκελος* and *θέσπις* (the former of which is explained by the more full synonym *θεοείκελος,* a form also in use,) the *σ* belongs to the second part of the composition; since it is known that from *εἴκω* came *ἴσκω* and from *εἰπεῖν* also *ἔσπετε.* The former then stands for *θε-ίσκελος,* the latter for *θέ-εσπις.*

2. Θεοείκελος and *θέσκελος* mean properly *godlike*; and thence, *like that which is godly or divine,* i. e. supernatural, wonderful. Afterwards, by a very natural usage, the full and plain form *θεοείκελος,* which in Homer is only an epithet of superior heroes, was used to express the literal meaning of *godlike,* and *θέσκελος* retained only that of *wonderful*; *θέσκελα ἔργα, wonderful exploits, labours, things*; *ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ, he was wonderfully like him.* (Il. ψ, 107.)

3. In the same manner *θέσφατος* and *θέσπις* or *θεσπέσιος* are originally synonymous. All three mean *spoken by God, speaking* or *spoken by divine inspiration.* The first meaning is without the slightest change in *θέσφατος.* Θέσφατον, *θέσφατα,* are sometimes *oracles,* sometimes *ancient decrees of God, fata*; for example in Od. ι, 507. Il. θ, 477. But as deities work and bring to pass by their word or command, it is a very natural transition that all those words should signify also *anything caused by a god*: and in this the form *θέσφατος* remains true to the literal meaning, in as much as nothing but what proceeds really from a god is called by this word; thus at Od. η, 143. *θέσφατος ἀήρ* is the thick mist poured around Ulysses by Minerva.

4. The proper sense of *θέσπις* is that of something *inspired by a god*: it is the epithet of song and of the singer, *θέσπις*

ἀοιδή, θέσπις ἀοιδός ; and thence θεσπιῳδεῖν, θεσπίζειν. In another sense it is used of the great phenomena of nature. Θέσπις ἄελλα occurs in the Hymn. Ven. 208., and θεσπιδαές (from δαίω) is an established epithet of fire, as much as to say *divinely-blazing*, because the appearance of a blazing and spreading fire is, of all the common phenomena of nature, the most like an immediate effect or production of a deity.

5. In θεσπέσιος, which is derived from θέσπις, the sense of εἰπεῖν is quite lost, except that ἀοιδὴ θεσπεσίη (like θέσπις elsewhere) occurs in Il. β, 600., to which it appears also to belong as an epithet of the Sirens in Od. μ, 158. In general it is nothing more than θεῖος ; as Il. α, 591. βηλὸς θεσπέσιος, the abode of the gods ; Od. ν, 363. ἄντρον θεσπέσιον, the grotto of the nymphs ; whence θεσπεσίῃ is put adverbially for θείᾳ μοίρᾳ or θείᾳ βουλῇ in Il. β, 367. In its most general sense it is the epithet of any great appearance, of anything superior and excellent, whether proceeding from nature or man, as the ἠχὴ θεσπεσίη of a noisy people ; ὀδμὴ ἡδεῖα θεσπεσίη, the excessively delightful smell of wine, Od. ι, 211. ; χαλκὸς θεσπέσιος, the splendidly-dazzling brass, Il. β, 457. ; ἄωτος θεσπέσιος, the divine, superb wool, Od. ι, 434. When therefore, in addition to this greatness or superiority, anything really proceeds or may be considered to proceed from the gods, (as all that is great does proceed from them,) still the form θεσπέσιος does not in Homer give that idea : for instance in such passages as these, where the intervention of the deity is expressly mentioned ; Il. ρ, 118. Θεσπέσιον γάρ σφιν φόβον ἔμβαλε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων. and β, 670. Καί σφιν θεσπέσιον πλοῦτον κατέχευε Κρονίων. Consequently also at Il. ι, 2. the θεσπεσίη φῦζα of the Achæans is not to be explained as a supernatural flight, occasioned by the gods. It is a great and general flight, caused by Hector and the Trojans. For although this was approved of and encouraged by Jupiter, yet his was only that mediate influence of the deity without which in general nothing took place in the Homeric battles.

6. Of rare occurrence and not Homeric is the form θέσπιος, which occurs in its original sense in the fragment of Hesiod quoted by Clemens Strom. 1, p. 337. (123. 124.) [In Gaisford's Poet. Min. Gr. Frag. 54.]

> *Μουσάων, αἵ τ' ἄνδρα πολυφραδέοντα τιθεῖσι*
> *Θέσπιον, αὐδήεντα·*

where the collectors of the fragments write, I know not on what authority, *θέσκελον*. Again it stands simply for *θεῖος* as a mere address to a person—*θέσπιε κοῦρε*—in the Oracle of Bacis in Aristoph. Av. 977.

7. Θέσφατος then, as stated above, although properly synonymous with *θεσπέσιος*, has always the literal idea of that which proceeds from God, never the secondary one transferred to everything great or vast. This sense however it acquires by means of the negation. Ἀθέσφατος always means *immeasurable, endless.* This striking appearance is not to be explained by having recourse to so poor an aid as the so-called *α* intensive. The apparent contradiction of a negative form of speech is frequently explained by an *οὐδέ*; as we say for instance, when wishing to praise an object highly, 'it is *worth its weight in gold,*' or '*gold cannot pay for it.*' The ground of this is nothing more than an excessive hyperbole, which is expressed most clearly by the old grammarian in Hesychius: Ἀθέσφατον· *πολὺ, ἀπαρακολούθητον*[1], *καὶ ὅσον οὐδ' ἂν θεὸς φατίσειεν δι' ὑπερβολὴν πλήθους.* Such hyperboles took their rise in cases where they were in some measure justified by feeling; they afterward became common; and thence ἀθέσφατος came to mean nothing more than the explanation given by one scholiast of ἀθέσφατος ὄμβρος; viz. ὃν οὐδεὶς οἷός ἐστιν ἑρμηνεῦσαι λόγος. Still however the hyperbole, "what even a god would not say," appears to me to have been originally excusable, because it was used only in circumstances where the collateral sense was unfortunate, horrible, or otherwise bad. To this class belong most of the expressions in which it occurs, as for instance the only one in which it is found in the Iliad, of *a great and terrible rain*; as at γ, 4. the cranes *χειμῶνα φύγον καὶ ἀθέσφατον ὄμβρον*; at κ, 6. Jupiter hurls his lightning, *Τεύχων ἢ πολὺν ὄμβρον ἀθέσφατον, ἠὲ χάλαζαν, Ἢ νίφετον*: again from the examples in the Odyssey, the vast and terrible sea roused by

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[1] In the manuscript it is *παρακολούθητον*, which in the text is changed into *δυσπαρακολούθητον*. The *ἂν* following is an interpolation from Apoll. Lex.

tempest, *η*, 273. *Ὤρινεν δὲ θάλασσαν ἀθέσφατον*: the long frightful night, *λ*, 372. *ο*, 391.: the pernicious excess of wine, *λ*, 61. *Ἆσέ με δαίμονος αἶσα κακὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος οἶνος*: and in Hesiod's Theogonia, 830. the many voices of the hundred-headed Typhœus. But even the injurious and frightful parts of the idea were lost in the every-day language of life, and there remained only that of immensity and excessiveness, as in the German *ungeheuer, erschrecklich**; and thus the Odyssey has the word twice applied to agreeable objects in the mere sense of *immeasurable, innumerable*; as at *ν*, 244. speaking of Ithaca, *Ἐν μὲν γάρ οἱ σῖτος ἀθέσφατος, ἐν δέ τε οἶνος*: and at *υ*, 211. of the cattle of Ulysses, *Νῦν δ' αἱ μὲν γίγνονται ἀθέσφατοι.* Nay, Hesiod in his *Ἔργα* uses it even of the richness of his poetical talent, when he promises Perses, that although quite inexperienced in nautical matters, he will show him *μέτρα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης* (compare 646. 647. with 659.), and then adds (660.) *Μοῦσαι γάρ μ' ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον ἀείδειν.*

Θοάζειν; vid. Θαάσσειν.

67. Θοός.

1. To the adjective *θοός*, beside its well-known sense of *swift*, is ascribed by the grammarians (see Hesych. Etym. M., &c.) such a variety of meanings, partly general, partly Homeric, and the word really occurs in Homer in so many passages which, separately considered, do favour other meanings, particularly those of *brave, pointed*, that it seems necessary for us first to be convinced that it really has in that poet its most usual sense of *swift*. This question is however at once placed beyond a doubt by the adverb *θοῶς*, which occurs frequently, and never in any other sense, as well as by the expression *θοὸν ἅρμα*, Il. *ρ*, 458. Again, it would be a violence which

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* [Thus *terrible* and *dreadful* are colloquially used by us. See Johnson's Dict.—Ed.]

no sensible reader could approve of, to explain the passage of the lion wounded by the shepherd, *μ*, 306. Ἔβλητο...θοῆς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἄκοντι, by a *brave* hand; nor is it conceivable how any one could have ventured to interpret the banquet commanded by the king Alcinous, Od. *θ*, 38., αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα θοὴν ἀλεγύνετε δαῖτα, by δαῖτα ἀγαθὴν (because forsooth *θοός*[1] means *ἀγαθός* i. e. *brave*), or by still more silly explanations (see Etym. M.), when a banquet *quickly prepared* was so easy and natural a meaning.

2. As this sense then is thus firmly established, we must now proceed to settle the meaning in those passages where, from the context only, there still remains, at least at first sight, some doubt between this and one of the other supposed meanings. For instance, the epithet of *pointed* might be very well applied to the *ship* from the shape of its beak; but then *θοὸν ἅρμα* leaves no doubt as to the meaning of *θοὴ ναῦς*. Again in speaking of the *scourge* or *whip*, *μάστιγι θοῇ* (Il. *ρ*, 430.), we might possibly think of its being felt principally by means of its point or end; and when at Od. *χ*, 83. it is said, Ἐν δέ οἱ ἥπατι πῆξε θοὸν βέλος, we certainly seem to see the point penetrating the liver; but as in the latter case the weapon is an *arrow*, and in the former the scourge wounds by the rapidity of its stroke,—nor is there any one passage where a weapon less characterized by swiftness, the sword for instance, is called *θοός*,—there is no occasion whatever for a deviation from the well-known and common meaning.

3. There is somewhat more difficulty in deciding on those passages where *brave* suits the sense well. The pure, unmixed idea of *swift* I should least of all think of looking for in those cases where the word is a simple epithet of Mars or of a warrior, particularly in such passages as Il. *ε*, 430. Ταῦτα δ' Ἄρηϊ θοῷ καὶ Ἀθήνῃ πάντα μελήσει, where it is opposed to the unwarlike Venus; and I should say the same of Il. *β*, 758. *τῶν μὲν Πρόθοος θοὸς ἡγεμόνευεν.* Here the only natural idea is that of *brave, warlike,* in its more general sense: but this expression also developes itself very easily, as *θοός* implies not only bodily swiftness, but promptness of resolution; which

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[1] Hesych. Θοὴν ἀλεγύνετε δαῖτα, τὴν ἀγαθήν.

kind of transition to the meaning of *brave* is plainly seen in those passages, where a determination to meet danger is notified by an expression added to the word *θοός*; as at Il. *ε*, 536. where it is said that the Trojans honoured the companion of Æneas,

> .... *ἐπεὶ θοὸς ἔσκε μετὰ πρώτοισι μάχεσθαι.*

But when at v. 571. it is said,

> *Αἰνείας δ' οὐ μεῖνε θοός περ ἐὼν πολεμιστής,*

and when at *π*, 494. Sarpedon exhorts Glaucus,

> .... *νῦν σε μάλα χρὴ*
> *Αἰχμητήν τ' ἔμεναι καὶ θαρσαλέον πολεμιστήν·*
> *Νῦν τοι ἐελδέσθω πόλεμος κακὸς, εἰ θοός ἐσσι,*

in the explanation of *θοός* in these two passages every attempt to preserve the common meaning must be useless, and *θοός* must mean plainly and simply *brave*[2].

4. And now comes the question on the verse of Il. *π*, 422., which was sometimes accented thus:

> *Αἰδὼς ὦ Λύκιοι. πόσε φεύγετε; νῦν θοοί ἐστε.*

and in which there was a doubt, of little or no importance, whether the three last words are to be taken interrogatively or not. In either case the sense was reproachful: "Are ye now swift in flying?" or with sarcastic surprise, "Now ye are swift!" The explanation of Eustathius suits both: *Ὀνειδίζει δὲ ὁ λόγος τοὺς ἀνδρίζεσθαι μὲν βραδεῖς ὀξυκινητοὺς δὲ φεύγειν.* But as the succeeding word *γάρ* (*Ἀντήσω γὰρ ἐγὼ τοῦδ' ἀνέρος*) did not seem to follow that sense very connectedly, it was thought better to understand the sentence as imperative, and *θοός* in the sense of *brave*; which explanation is given also by the second Venetian scholiast, who compares with it, and it would seem very aptly, the before-quoted verse 494. *Νῦν τοι ἐελδέσθω πόλεμος κακὸς, εἰ θοός ἐσσι.* And consequently the present reading is, *νῦν θοοὶ ἔστε.* It appears however to me, that what is thus gained in grammatical connexion with the context following, is lost in the strictly psychological connexion. Is it possible in one and the same breath —for if anything is anywhere spoken in one breath, it is the three parts of this verse—is it possible to reproach any one as a shameless coward, and then seriously to say to him, " Now be brave." Even the comparison of this verse with 494. must show at once that such an imperative sentence could be addressed as an incitement to none but those who were already brave and fighting. Voss felt this, and therefore rendered it—the only way in which it could be rendered in opposition to such a reproach—" *Rüstig gewandt nun!*" " Now be on the alert!" Against which the only thing is that it is not in the original. Heyne objects to the reading and explanation which I first mentioned, that *θοός* never occurs elsewhere but in a good sense. This is certainly true; because swiftness is really a desirable quality: but for that very reason the sarcasm against one who applies it to a bad end is excellent, and so Homeric, that on this ground only, if on no other, we might well be unwilling to give it up. For if instead of the German word *schnell*, 'swift', we take one more plainly expressive of praise, " Now be (*rüstig*) active!" every one must feel the point of the exclamation to belong to that era when *θοός, ποδώκης*, &c. gave of themselves alone the idea of great praise. On the other hand, it is absurd, as the prominent sense of *θοός* seems to be *swift*, to call out to those who were running away swiftly and command them to be swift, or quick, and not add *to turn round and fight*. I cannot therefore make up my mind to give up that first explanation; and as the Greeks, and particularly Homer, so often connect *γάρ* with a thought not expressed in words, I think the explanation of Eustathius quite satisfactory. In the exclamation of reproach, " For shame! whither are ye flying? Now ye are swift!"—there is implied a summons *to turn and stand*; and with this the context will connect itself very well, " for I myself will meet that man," &c.

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[2] In the former of the two passages Voss renders it by the German word *rüstig*, 'active'; but in the latter he translates it at once, "if thou art (*beherzt*) courageous."

5. There is another meaning of *θοός, sharp, pointed*, a meaning unquestionably found in the later poets, as *θοῶν ἔμπλειον ὀδόντων*, Apoll. Rhod. 3, 1281. *θοοῖς γόμφοις*, 1, 79. *πελέκεσσιν*, 4, 1683., which also we cannot deny to have existed in that most ancient Epic language. For instance, the verb

θοῶσαι at Od. *ι*, 327. where Ulysses sharpens to a point the large branch of a tree, *ἐγὼ δ' ἐθόωσα παραστὰς Ἀκρόν*, supposes the root *θοός* to be then an old word; and again in the well-known passage of Od. *ο*, 299. speaking of the voyage of Telemachus,

> *Ἔνθεν δ' αὖ νήσοισιν ἐπιπροέηκε θοῇσιν,*

this sense seems to be most certain, as neither of the two others which we have verified above can be thought of for a moment. The poet is there describing the voyage of Telemachus back to Ithaca, in which he sails along the coast of the Epeans toward the islands distinguished by the above epithet. In this description the situation of the Echinades is so clearly marked out that no one can mistake them. Strabo says in book viii. p. 350, 351., where he traces this voyage, Θοὰς *δ' εἴρηκε τὰς ὀξείας· τῶν* Ἐχινάδων *δ' εἰσὶν αὖται*: and in book x. p. 458. speaking of the Echinades, he says, *ὧν τό, τε* Δουλίχιόν *ἐστι, καλοῦσι δὲ νῦν* Δολίχαν, *καὶ αἱ* Ὀξεῖαι *καλούμεναι, ἃς ὁ ποιητὴς* Θοὰς *εἶπεν*. Here it is evident that Ὀξεῖαι was really the current name for some of the Echinades, in the same way as Dolicha was, by which latter some have been so far misled as to place Dulichium among these islands. That by these were meant the islands of Homer is plain from the site; in addition to which we see clearly how the name Ἐχῖναι, Ἐχινάδες agrees with Ὀξεῖαι. That is to say, these islands lay at the mouth of the Acheloüs, being formed by that river emptying itself into the sea; consequently they stretched out to seaward in a number of points, the shape into which they would necessarily be formed by the efflux of the stream. This gave them the form of a *hedgehog*; and the outer islands were therefore very aptly called *ὀξεῖαι*, or, according to an older synonym of this word, *θοαί*. Hence, then, we see plainly why this is the only passage in which Homer uses *θοός* in the sense of *pointed*; namely, because it is not an *epithet* given by him to these islands, but, as the whole context helps to prove, *their proper name*. The adjective *θοός* was not current, in the sense of *pointed*, in the language of Homer's time; there was only a derivative of it (a circumstance common enough in the history of language), the verb *θοῶσαι*, and the name of these islands. In other poets it might have been retained as a common expression; and it is not, therefore, necessary that we should suppose the use of the word in this sense by Apollonius to be a misusage or misunderstanding of Homer's expressions[3].

6. But the most difficult question yet remains,—in what sense the night has the epithet θοή in Homer, and (as far as I know) in him alone. The passages are the following. In Il. κ, 394. 468. ω, 366. 653. stands

> . . . . θοὴν διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν

joined sometimes with ἰέναι, at others with ἰδεῖν τινα, said of one who goes somewhere or discovers some other person in the obscurity of the night. And in the same way the companions of Ulysses complain, Od. μ, 284., that he will not suffer them to land,

> Ἀλλ' αὔτως διὰ νύκτα θοὴν ἀλάλησθαι ἄνωγας.

Again, at Il. μ, 463. Hector storms the Grecian camp,

> Νυκτὶ θοῇ ἀτάλαντος ὑπώπια· λάμπε δὲ χαλκῷ
> Σμερδαλέῳ.

And, lastly, at ξ, 261. Somnus for fear of Jupiter flies to Nox; Jove abstains from punishing him, the reason of which is thus given:

> Ἅζετο γὰρ μὴ Νυκτὶ θοῇ ἀποθύμια ἔρδοι.

7. Commentators have not been wanting who have kept to the simple literal meaning of the word, which they explained

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[3] The point thus ascertained, that θοός had the sense of *sharp, pointed*, in the oldest periods of the language, affords, at least in my opinion, a remarkable instance of the uncertainty of what would appear to be a certain etymology. Θοός, *swift*, has been always from the oldest times derived from θέω, with which it agrees in meaning and orthography. But θοός, *pointed*, can hardly come from θεῖν, *to run*, nor from the idea of *swift*, as an earlier meaning. One should much rather be led by the analogy of ὀξύς, in which there was a similar transition to the sense of *swift*, to suppose that *pointed* is also the ground-meaning of θοός, and that consequently the word is not derived from θεῖν but from some other root. Undoubtedly the verb θήγειν is at least akin to it, which makes me think it probable that ταχύς, θάσσων, also originally came from the same idea.

according to their idea of the thing, namely, that the night was called *θοή*, because it came on so quickly. But these interpreters must have felt that their decision was at variance with their own senses, as the *gradual* transition from day to night is a daily process of nature. Equally unfortunate in their conjectures were those who supposed the word to refer to Night being represented with wings; for this is but another image for describing the same thing. Hence others gave up searching after the truth of the *thing*, and endeavoured to find it in the *feelings*, supposing the expression to imply the swiftness with which Night *appears* to pass away, in comparison of the day, by means of sleep. And, lastly, there were commentators who tried to explain it by the meaning of *pointed*; and the explanation which they hit upon is really remarkable, as being mathematically true. Their mode of explanation is thus proposed by Heraclides in Alleg. Hom. 45. Every opake body which is lighted up by a larger body necessarily throws on its opposite side a shade terminating in a point; consequently the earth, which is illumined by the sun, a larger body than itself, throws a conical shade into space. But the night is acknowledged to be nothing more than this shade cast by the earth; therefore the night is pointed. It is besides remarkable to what an extent they have thought fit to carry the observation, that some words have always the same fixed epithet; as, independently of any other value which the above explanations may possess, not one of them could ever enter the mind of a reasonable poet in such a combination as *ἰέναι* or *ἰδεῖν θοὴν διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν*. In such difficulties as these it was very excusable if some fell into the idea of adopting for this one junction of *θοός* with *νύξ* a meaning different from its other meanings by a difference of root, and which was besides quite obsolete. Thus some conjectured that its root might be *θεός*, making it the same as *θεῖος*; others took *θέω*, *τίθημι*, explaining it by *θετικός*, *ἑδραῖος*, an idea which might be supposed to suit the night, partly as bringing us to rest, partly as being itself without motion, and consequently the opposite of *θοός* as used in prose[4]. Mere attempts these, pretty clearly proving that they despaired of ever finding a reasonable explanation.

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[4] See Schol. and Eust. on Il. *κ*, 394. and Etym. M. in v.

8. As often as I pronounced sentence of rejection on all the above explanations, I always felt something rather restraining me from rejecting the first: in that one there still appeared to be some truth, as far as concerned the feelings. Nothing is more common than the expression, that the night has *surprised* a labourer, a wanderer; while the same can be said of the day only in very particular instances, and even in most of those we are not willing to confess that it does so. In the way, too, that Heraclides from other sources describes this explanation (although he prefers that of the pointed shade), there is something in it which we cannot entirely deny. The night, says he, follows the course of the sun, and as each place is abandoned by the latter it is immediately darkened by the former; agreeably to what Homer himself intimates, when he says in another place that the light of the sun goes down into the ocean

Ἕλκον νύκτα μέλαιναν ἐπὶ ζείδωρον ἄρουραν.

In short, the night appears like a being following the footsteps of the sun, and immediately seizing on everything as soon as he leaves it.

9. One thing however I do not think, viz. that *θοός* has here exactly the *pure simple* meaning of swiftness; but I suppose that idea to be mixed up with other collateral ideas arising out of it; just as we have seen was the case in the first-mentioned usages of this word, and particularly where it was an epithet of Mars. The night is *swift*, and being so it follows the sun irresistibly and incessantly; and, what is mixed up with the idea of a warrior incessantly and irresistibly pushing on, it is *destructive* and *hostile*. Let us look back once more on the word ὀξύς to unravel this complication of ideas. But here there is no difficulty, for it unravels itself, if we keep stedfastly in our recollection that Mars is called ὀξύς in the expressions *μίμνομεν ὀξὺν Ἄρηα, ἐγείρομεν ὀξὺν Ἄρηα,* and *τῶν νῦν αἷμα κελαινὸν....ἐσκέδασ᾽ ὀξὺς Ἄρης*: and in Pindar Ol. 2, 73. the avenging fury is ὀξεῖ᾽ Ἐριννύς. That is to say, this idea of swiftness, which was quickly combined with that of rage, of active hostility, betokening the rapid approach of danger (whence

also νόσος ὀξεῖα), was from the earliest times compared with a quickly-deciding point or sharpness; and ὀξύς, therefore, has the meaning of the German *jäh**. This, then, is the very meaning which we are justified in looking for in θοός when it is an epithet of Mars or of deathful warriors. It is true that we have already in this case ascribed to it the idea of bravery; but all languages afford numerous instances of such a multiplicity of relative ideas combined in the formation of one epithet, though, after all, this variety of meaning is seldom perceptible except in a language which is not our mother-tongue. Thus, for instance, the Latin word *fortis,* which sets out with the general idea of strength, has the particular meaning of bravery and spirit; it then goes at once through that of a firm manly character to the every-day idea of an *excellent upright* man; and *vir fortis* is the laudatory appellation of a good but ordinary character in the peaceful and social relations of life. If, then, this appellation be given to one who shows himself to be *vir fortis* both in peace and war, we, who have no analogous word with just this twofold meaning†, may doubt for a moment, when it occurs, in which sense to take it; but the truth is, that the word, arising as it does from one common idea, is frequently in individual objects melted down again into one joint idea, which appears to the person, in whose mother-tongue the word is, as by no means a twofold meaning, but completely one and the same ‡. For θοός, then, we have abstracted first from the idea of the quick, ever-ready, active warrior, bravery; and now from that of the quick, violent, susceptible character, hostility. In Mars we have a most sensible instance of these ideas coalescing; but the idea which is common to him and to Night, when both are called *θοοί*, is that of *terrible, dreadful.* And had there been no other passages than on the one side *θοῷ ἀτάλαντος Ἄρηϊ*, and on the other *Νυκτὶ θοῇ ἀτάλαντος ὑπώπια*, this is certainly the idea which would have been formed of *θοός* in both these cases from the very earliest times; as indeed *δεινή* does actually stand as one of the explanations given by the grammarians of *θοὴ νύξ* (see Hesych.). For only observe with what epithets the word is found in other passages. Not merely when Night is described as decidedly unfortunate or unfriendly, but as a fixed and natural epithet, we read in Il. κ, 188. of the sentinels on watch, that sleep did not visit their eyes, *Νύκτα φυλασσομένοισι κακήν*: and of the Cimmerians, as having eternal night, it is said (Od. λ, 19.), *Ἀλλ' ἐπὶ νὺξ ὀλοὴ τέταται δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν.* And is it not the terribleness and frightfulness of Night which in Od. λ, 606. is the ground of the comparison made between it and Hercules in the world below, before whom all the shades are struck with terror? *ὁ δ' ἐρεμνῇ νυκτὶ ἐοικὼς Γυμνὸν τόξον ἔχων*, &c.; and consequently the idea is similar in Il. μ, 463. of Hector bursting into the fortified camp of the Greeks; *ὁ δ' ἄρ' ἔσθορε φαίδιμος Ἕκτωρ Νυκτὶ θοῇ ἀτάλαντος ὑπώπια.*

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* [We have no expression that I know of exactly synonymous with this word. It betokens rapidity, but is I believe seldom used, unless it be intended to convey an accompanying idea of awe or fear; thus the *violent* and *precipitous* rush of a torrent, a *furious* rage, a *furious* whirlwind, an *awfully sudden* death, might all be expressed in German by this epithet.—Ed.]

† [It seems not to have struck Buttmann that both Germans and French have a very similar expression. Thus the former say *ein braver Mann,* and the latter *un brave homme, un brave garçon,* something as we should say 'an excellent man', 'a fine fellow'; consequently the original idea of courage is entirely lost sight of, although perhaps the appellation would hardly be given to one who was notoriously deficient in it. We find *vaillant* used in a similar way in old French; "Il alla visiter une vaillant dame, que avoist epousée son premier maistre", Bayard's Life, p. 292.—Ed.]

‡ [Buttmann has unconsciously given the strongest proof of the truth of this opinion by not having himself thought of the *German* expression

10. I translate therefore *θοὴ νύξ* by (*die jähe Nacht*) *the quick and fearful* night*; and if this be once admitted as the established meaning of the Homeric epithet, it will certainly be always intelligible to the hearer and full of expression. "Night," says a German proverb, "is no man's friend;" the

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mentioned in the last note, and which must have struck any one but a German as a case exactly in point. With regard to the similar *French* expression not having occurred to him, it may be perhaps accounted for by his ignorance of *colloquial* French, as he read that language, but did not speak it.—Ed.]

* [" Buttmann in his Lexilogus" (says Passow in his Greek and German Lexicon, speaking of this passage,) " understands *θοὴ νύξ* to mean not merely the rapidity with which the night comes on, but the terrors and dangers by which it is accompanied."—Ed.]

dangers which threaten the nightly wanderer are formed into a quick, irritable, hostile goddess. Even the other deities are afraid of her who is (Il. ξ, 259.) *θεῶν δμήτειρα καὶ ἀνδρῶν*; and Jupiter himself in the midst of his rage refrains from doing what might be *νυκτὶ θοῇ ἀποθύμια*. Nor is the epithet less natural when the night is not personified; for as *ὀξεῖς καιροί* are *dangerous* times, so by this word *θοή* it may be intended to mark the swiftness and imminency of dangers, which threaten men who go *διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν*.

11. Whatever other doubts may arise respecting the meaning of *θοή* as joined with *νύξ* (apparently a solitary combination), they may all, I think, be completely solved by considering the nature of epithets in the old language in general, and in poetical language in particular. That *θοός*, long before Homer's time, meant really and properly *pointed*, we have already seen with full certainty. But while a word, or some certain usage of a word, is gradually disappearing from a language, it remains longest in regularly established epithets, sometimes where they have assumed the nature of a proper name, as in *Θοαὶ νῆσοι*, sometimes where they have become almost proverbial, or at least familiar and convenient to the Epic metre; and thus this meaning of *θοός*, which was otherwise become uncommon, remained in Homer in the expression *θοὴ νύξ*, exactly as *κρατύς*, though completely obsolete, still remained as the epithet of Mercury.

Ἴσκειν; vid. *εἴσκειν*.

Καλινδεῖσθαι, &c.; vid. *κυλίνδειν*.

68. Καμόντες.

1. Οἱ *καμόντες* meant in the old Epic times *the dead*; and this usage remained (only changing to the perfect, *οἱ κεκμηκότες*,) down to the later prose; for Cornutus, *De Nat. Deor.* 1., following the writers of the old classical times, whom I shall

quote by-and-by, says *κεκμηκέναι γὰρ λέγομεν τοὺς τετελευτηκότας.* Let me, however, warn my readers not to suppose from what I have said that either this infinitive or any other part of the verb, except the above-mentioned participle, occurs in the old writers; for although we find this explanation in Hesychius under *καμεῖν, κάμνει, κέκμηκε,* it always relates to the participle only.

2. I know not how it is that a correct explanation of this usage, singular as it certainly is, has nowhere been given; for that of Damm, "defuncti laboribus et *miseriis* vitæ humanæ," "those who have *escaped from* their labours and miseries," is not according to the genius of that antiquity in which the souls are rather described as losing the power and activity of life: and Ernesti's opinion, who finds a complete analogy for *καμόντες* in the word *functus, vita functus,* I confess I do not rightly comprehend; except that he too appears to understand *καμόντες* to mean those who *have laboured,* and whose labours are now finished. That the word is an euphemism every one must, I think, allow; but I am also of opinion that this has been assisted by the alliteration of the two verbs of similar inflection. Instead of *θανόντες, τεθνηκότες, the dead, the deceased,* was used *καμόντες, κεκμηκότες,* i. e. the *weary,* or the *enfeebled.* And thus far, but no further, we are led by the usage of the word elsewhere. Completion is expressed by the aorist *καμεῖν* only when it is followed by the accusative of the work completed, as in Il. σ, 614. *Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πάνθ' ὅπλα κάμεν κλυτὸς Ἀμφιγυήεις*: but when the verb is intransitive, it expresses the consequences of labours and sufferings, as *καμέτην δέ μοι ἵπποι* and the like. Hence *καμεῖν* is also elsewhere an euphemism for *defeat* and *destruction,* words not always willingly used even of an enemy; e. g. Pind. Pyth. 1, 156. *τὸν* (the ode) *ἐδέξαντ' ἀμφ' ἀρετᾷ, πολεμίων ἀνδρῶν καμόντων*: and Æschyl. Theb. 216. *ὁ ναύτης.... εὗρε μηχανὴν σωτηρίας Νεὼς καμούσης ποντίῳ πρὸς κύματι·* where the vessel is not merely in danger of being lost, for the expression would then be *καμνούσης,* but it is actually lost. This kind of euphemism did not therefore soften the idea; it only avoided the unpleasant word. But still the word *θανεῖν,* it will be said, was used, and beyond all comparison more fre-

quently than the other: but this is the case with almost all euphemisms, particularly with those expressive of death; they have their origin in a period when the fear of alarming is more than usually prevalent; they are used, or not, according to the peculiarities of persons and circumstances; and though they again disappear, they yet remain half established in certain phrases and relations, in which they are used in even the most enlightened times among the embellishments of verse and prose.

3. And so it is in the case before us. Nor is the usage here confined, as was before observed, to the participle only, but to the plural of the participle, and to constructions which require, in a very refined state of the language, the definite article; lastly, *to the state of the dead after death.* Now therefore I hope to form a more precise and accurate idea of this euphemism; namely, that it is one by which the dead, whom we consider as still acting and feeling, and consequently as the objects of our kind offices, of which they are conscious, are represented as still living in another state, but deprived of their earthly powers.

4. That this account of καμόντες is correct, within these restrictions, may be seen from a comparison of the following well-known passages: Il. γ, 278. of the infernal deities, οἳ ὑπένερθε καμόντας Ἀνθρώπους τίνυσθον: again, Il. ψ, 72., and Od. ω, 14. ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα καμόντων: and still more to the purpose, from its containing a greater accumulation of particulars, Od. λ, 475. ἔνθα τε νεκροὶ Ἀφραδέες ναίουσι, βροτῶν εἴδωλα καμόντων. From which last example, in the mouth of Achilles, himself dead, and speaking from experience, it is manifest how little this expression is an euphemism, taking the figure in its use of softening the meaning. Instead of the idea of annihilation, the word gives the lowest degree of existence above annihilation; which certainly would be in most cases an euphemism, or at least a qualifying expression, but is something not to be borne for the shade of such a one as Achilles.

5. We first meet with the form κεκμηκότες in the Attic dialect. Æschylus, who in the Suppl. 239. still uses the Epic form Κἀκεῖ δικάζει....Ζεὺς ἄλλος ἐν καμοῦσιν ὑστάτας δίκας, had just before at v. 164. called the same Pluto Ζῆνα τῶν κεκμηκότων. Thucydides 3, 59. makes the Platæans say to

the Lacedæmonians, *ἱκέται γιγνόμεθα ὑμῶν τῶν πατρώων τάφων καὶ ἐπικαλούμεθα τοὺς κεκμηκότας*[1]. Plato de Legg. 4, p. 718. a. recommends to honour ancestors according to existing customs, *τὸ μέτριον τοῖς κεκμηκόσι νέμοντα*: and Aristotle in his Ethics 1, 11. toward the end, makes mention of an inquiry *περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας*, whether they can still partake of the good or evil of this life, and how far the welfare or misfortune of their surviving friends affects them (*συμβάλλεσθαί τι τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν*) without having however an essential influence on their *εὐδαιμονία*: by which therefore we see that *κεκμηκότες* was in the language of the philosopher connected, as a customary expression, with the idea of *εὐδαιμονία*, with which *καμόντες* in the speech of Achilles above quoted accords very ill indeed.

6. This combination of passages is so decisive in favour of what we have supposed to be the sole usage of this expression, that I may now call the attention of my readers to a deviation from it in Euripides. This tragedian, who in the Troad. 96. calls the graves *ἱερὰ τῶν κεκμηκότων*, answering exactly to the usage detailed above, or to the *dîs manibus* of the Latins, makes Adrastus in the Suppl. 756. inquire after the fate of the other dead bodies (not those of the princes), *ὁ δ᾽ ἄλλος ποῦ κεκμηκότων ὄχλος*: to which he receives for answer, *Τάφῳ δέδονται πρὸς Κιθαιρῶνος πτυχαῖς*. Here the dead bodies are called *κεκμηκότες* by one who does not know whether they are buried or not. After all that we have hitherto seen, we must therefore suppose this to be another instance of Euripides' custom[2] of deviating from the ordinary use of a word, and giving it, not without grammatical or ethical sagacity, a meaning unusual, yet well-grounded and easily discoverable. Every Greek ear, as

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[1] It is true that this regular form is found in only one of the Paris manuscripts; but Stephens has it as a various reading, and it is the only one acknowledged by the scholiasts and Pollux in quoting the passage. I consider it therefore to be the genuine form, as no ground whatever can be imagined for the Epic *κεκμηῶτας*, which is the reading of all the other manuscripts; but which therefore, as long as the source of the corruption remains undiscovered, is very properly retained in the text.

[2] See art. 63. sect. 5.

soon as it heard this passage, knew it to signify the *manes*, and at once understood the meaning of the poet, who gives this appellation to the dead, at the moment when the natural duty of interment, refused before, had been now performed.

Καταρχομαι; vid. ἄρχομαι, &c.

69. Κελαινός, μέλας, &c.

An Excursus to Buttmann's large Greek Grammar (Ausführl. Sprachl.), vol. 1. *sect.* 16. *obs.* 2*.

1. The Epic word κελαινός exhibits in sound so evident a connexion with the common word μέλας, μέλανος, μέλαινα, that it is not possible to avoid considering it to be a dialectic variety; and the only wonder is, how two letters which appear to have so little affinity, could change from one to the other. I have therefore laid it down in my Greek Grammar[1] as a general rule, that most cases of this kind may be explained by supposing that in the old language there existed a form containing both letters; and I leave the inquiry still open for particular cases, as to whether the fuller form was the parent of the two others, or whether it was only the form which one took in its transition to the other.

2. A common acknowledged instance of this kind may be found in the two letters *w* and *g*, as exhibited in a number of

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* [The observation referred to is this: " Obs. 2. There are also cases, though rare, of words undeniably akin, in which are changes of letters, not closely related to each other in the above-mentioned way. The following are acknowledged instances: μόγις, more Attic than the common μόλις; κοεῖν, Ionic for νοεῖν; κελαινός, κελαινή, an old form for μέλας, μέλαινα."—Ed.]

[1] That is to say, in my intermediate Grammar, in a note to sect. 16. which I intended to have annexed, when made more full and complete, as an Excursus to my large Grammar (Ausführl. Sprachl.); but as it is more properly a subject for lexicography, I prefer giving it here.

well-known examples in the European languages; e.g. *warrant*, *garant*; *vastare*, *gaster* (*gâter*)[2]; for the point of union of both forms is evidently in *gw*, whence came also *gu* (Ital. *guastare*); and in this instance we are sure that *w* was the original sound, whence came *gw*, the medium of transition to *g*.

3. Still further apart are the sounds *s* and *k* in the words σύν and *cum*. The form ξύν unites them: for there are many traces in the Æolic dialect showing that the Greek double letters had their origin in a transposition of their fundamental sounds: see in the Ausführl. Sprachl. the note to sect. 22. obs. 3[*]. It is probable, therefore, that KYN (*cum*) is the radical form, to which, as in so many other cases, was appended a σ, ΣKYN, and from which again came σύν; a process confirmed by a comparison with σκῦλα, συλᾷν, as the former half of it is brought to a certainty by the forms ξυνός and κοινός, which are so evidently akin to ξύν and *cum*. Compare also κείρειν, κουρά, ξύρειν, ξυρόν.

4. The forms δίς and *bis*, although δ and β are *immediately* akin to each other, must also be regarded in a similar light; for the old Latin *duis* formed from *duo*, which bears the same relation to *bis* as *duellum* does to *bellum*, is evidently the medium of transition. But in this case the fuller form is certainly

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[2] See also art. 96. sect. 4. with the note.

[*] [The observation and note referred to are as follows: " Obs. 3. In the pronunciation of double letters was mixed up also *a transposition*, and in particular σκίφος, σκένος, σπάλις, σπέλλιον, are quoted as Æolic for ξίφος, ξένος, ψάλις, ψέλλιον. This transposition may have been frequently formed to soften the pronunciation; and the contents of the preceding observation (obs. 2. where σκένος is said to be quoted by the grammarians as Æolic for ξένος, and Πέλοπς for Πέλοψ, &c.) joined with these may serve to show that the Æolians generally wrote in the beginning of their words σκένος, σπέλλιον, in the middle and at the end ἱέρακς, ἱέρακσι, Πέλοπς[a]."

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[a] This was also Scaliger's view of it (ad Euseb. p. 115. a.). It is however certain that ξ and ψ frequently arose from an original σκ, σπ. Thus, for instance, ξύν and ξυνός, as we find from comparing them with *cum* and κοινός; thus ψιά (a small stone) is the same with στία, which can be explained only by an intermediate form with σπ (see Riemer v. στία); and the superlative ἔσχατος (*extremus*) shows that the preposition ἐξ was originally sounded as EΣK or EΣX, with a vowel at the end, perhaps ι.—Ed.]

the root. That is to say, δύο, *duo*, *two*, *zwo**, are undeniably the same word: from δύο, *duo* (*dvo*) came ΔΥΙΣ, *duis* (*dvis*), as in German from *zwo* came *zwier* (twice). But from *dvis* came both δίς and VIS, of which *bis* is a slight modification. The same is seen still plainer in two other numerals: from δύω (ΔϜΩ) comes evidently on the one side, by leaving out the Ϝ, δώδεκα, and on the other, by dropping the δ, the Æolic Ϝίκατι[3] and the Latin *viginti*; while the last trace of both consonants disappears in εἴκατι, εἴκοσι.

5. A still more striking analogy is offered by the German language in the provincial forms *Wasen*, *Wocken*, for *Rasen*, *Rocken*, which it would be difficult to bring together without *wr* as the bond of union, and which an examination of the dialects gives us. For, on the one hand, there is a provincialism (Hessian) *Wrasen*; and on the other, we are justified in supposing an old form *Wrocken* by the English term *work*, *wrought*; with which we must again join ἔργον and ῥέξαι, which forms in the Æolic dialect could only have been Ϝέργον and Ϝρέξαι: see ῥέζω in the list of verbs in the Ausführl. Sprachl.† Compare also *ringen* and its provincialism *wrangen*, 'to wrestle'.

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* [Old German for *two*, now a provincialism or rather *patois* among the peasantry in the South of Germany: the word in general use is *zwei*.—Ed.]

[3] See Koen. ad Greg. Cor. in Dor. 88.

† [Extract from the Ausführl. Sprachl. now published as "Buttmann's Irregular Verbs."

"'Ρέζω, *I do*, ῥέξω, ἔῤῥεξα or ἔρεξα ....; or ἔρδω, ἔρξω, ἔρξα ....; perf. ἔοργα, pluperf. ἐώργειν. Of the passive we find only ῥεχθῆναι; as ἔρχθην and ἔεργμαι are formed only from the verb ἔργω, εἴργω. Verbal adj. ῥεκτός, ῥεκτέος.

"In order to form a correct judgement on the connection of these forms, we must first keep in view the mutual change of the [a] middle letters γ and δ, with which is connected the transition of γ to ζ, occurring in other verbs, as κράζω, κραγεῖν. The next thing to be observed is that the forms ἔρδω, ἔρξα, with the substantive ἔργον, have in the old language the digamma; while the aspirate joined with the ρ frequently passed over in the dialects into the digamma; for instance in the Æolic βρόδον, i. e. *wrodon*, for ῥόδον, *a rose*. We must therefore consider ἔρξαι as *werxai*, ῥέξαι as *wrexai*, ἔοργα as *weworga*, in order to discover in them the same appearance as we find in δέρκω, δρακεῖν, δέδορκα. And here the Germanic languages offer us a comparison so palpable and unsought for that we cannot but make use of it; viz. in the English

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[a] Consonants are divided into aspirated, smooth, and middle.

6. I come now to the examples quoted in my Greek Grammar, and first to κοεῖν, an Iono-Doric form for νοεῖν: see ἐκόησε, Callim. Fr. 53., and κοῶ, Epicharm. ap. Athen. p. 236. b. Now no one in his senses will think of separating νοῦς, νοεῖν from γνῶναι, γιγνώσκειν, ἀγνοεῖν. And thus we have at once the form KNOEIN, which we may compare with γναφεύς κναφεύς, γνάμπτω κνάμπτω, Κνωσός Γνωσός. The great European family of languages comes in also to our aid; the plainest instance is the English verb *to know*; and the German verb *kennen* answers to its synonym κοννεῖν in Æschylus Suppl. 171. See also Hesych. in v.

7. In the same way the supposition of an intermediate form KMEΛAN between κελαινός and μέλαν becomes a certainty, by the information in the Etym. M. of a form τὰ κμέλεθρα, which one of the most learned of the grammarians, Pamphilus (see Suidas concerning him), has mentioned in his great glossary, and explained by τὰς δοκούς. The word was therefore a dialect of τὰ μέλαθρα, the beams and framework of the roof, which from their blackness had received this name from the earliest times[4].

8. Less evident is the supposition of an intermediate form between μόγις and μόλις, *scarcely*, and between ὁ μόγος and ὁ μόλος, *pains, labour*; here the bond of union must be γλ. In support of this the form ὁ μῶλος offers itself, as containing a trace of some such intermediate form in the length of its syllable; or perhaps ὁ μοχλός may be preferred as a cognate idea.

9. But suppositions of this nature are always more sure at the beginning of words, where in particular the pronunciation seeks for assistance of every kind. And here we have another very striking but certain and long-known example, in a word

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verb *work*, from which comes the perfect *wrought*, and the substantive *wright*; in which the *w* before the *r* is not pronounced; therefore *wright* is ῥέκτης."—Ed.]

[4] At first I had carelessly copied this gloss from the first edition of Schneider's Lexicon, as a word in the dialect of the Pamphylians. I now see for the first time that this ridiculous mistake, which has been disseminated as widely as possible by a series of editions of Schneider's and Riemer's Lexicons, and of my own Greek and German Grammar, originated in an error of Stephens.

which in the same language branches into five different forms, all passing from one to the other in this manner; viz. ζόφος, δνόφος, γνόφος, κνέφας, νέφος. That ζόφος, *darkness*, is intimately connected with νέφος, *a cloud*, would perhaps be hardly conjectured. But as a ζ is much the same as a δ, we have ΔΟΦΟΣ; between these stands, as the intermediate form, the common expression δνόφος, whence through γνόφος we come straight and plainly to κνέφας, νέφος*.

70. Κητώεσσα, μεγακήτης.

1. The well-known epithet of Lacedæmon in Il. β, 581. and Od. δ, 1. κητώεσσα, it was at first thought possible to understand literally, as from κῆτος, the whale or some huge sea-fish; and among others Ælian in his Hist. An. 17, 6. gives this explanation, adding that huge sea-monsters of this kind infested particularly the Lacedæmonian coast and neighbourhood of Cythera. This explanation, as was naturally to be expected, met with very little approbation; as such an epithet, strange and unusual in itself, appeared quite unsuited to a country which certainly has a coast, but is not generally speaking a *maritime* country.

2. A more admissible explanation is that given in the scholia and almost everywhere else; viz. *large*, by a comparison with the whale; with which the word μεγακήτης was thought to accord extremely well as the epithet of a ship. I would here first observe, what others have already thrown out as a point for consideration, that Sparta was very far from having the character of being a *large* town in comparison with others; at least in the Homeric times, to which these interpreters transferred their idea (formed from the state of the world in a later period,) of a town large enough to present to the mind the image of a huge animal lying in a deep place. Or should it be said that

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* [A well-known instance of the same nature may be cited in the Latin *dies* and the French *jour*, which are to all appearance quite unconnected, until we fill up the intermediate links of the chain as thus, *dies, diurnus*, Ital. *giorno*, Fr. *jour*.—Ed.]

Lacedæmon in these passages meant, according to the older usage of language, the *country* of Lacedæmon in general, and not the mere metropolis; in that case it is not at all conceivable how, or in comparison with what other land, we can imagine Lacedæmon to be *a large country*.

3. But however that may be, I must again protest, with all due respect, against the childishness of this expression. Even Eustathius was offended at it. After having explained it in the way above mentioned, as the epithet of a ship in Il. θ, 222. p. 594., he adds, ἀφ' οὗ κατά τινας, εἰ καὶ πάνυ σμικροπρεπῶς, ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ Λακεδαίμων κητώεσσα. On the other hand, a later mode of explanation gives this silly trash the usual philosophical colouring, and completes the mischief by suggesting the idea of mere bald generalization, informing us that such derivatives of κῆτος meant in the old language any huge size[1]. Now if we apply this information to the μεγακήτεα πόντον, Od. γ, 158., and to the dolphin, which is itself a κῆτος and yet has this epithet at Il. φ, 22., we have the choice whether these expressions are to be considered as poetical epithets, (in which case we have the absurdity immediately before us,) or whether the supposition is, that the comparison with the animal has disappeared; by which an expression, so evidently coined as μεγακήτης is, was explained to be a prosaic adjective. Still in the latter case κητώεσσα must be softened down, for a translator would hardly venture to render it 'huge Lacedæmon'.

4. Strabo 8, p. 367. mentions another reading καιετάεσσαν, which Eustathius and the scholiast on Od. δ, 1. ascribe to Zenodotus. Of this word all give a twofold explanation. One of these, from καιέτα, (otherwise called καλαμίνθη, a kind of mint growing in great quantities in Laconia,) cannot with any reason enter into our consideration for one moment as the Epic epithet of a town or country, although Callimachus has made a very apt imitation, introducing it as an epithet of the Eurotas: see Fragm. 224. as corrected by Bentley. The other expla-

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[1] See Hemsterhusius (from whom indeed have proceeded most of the errors in the field of philosophical etymology,) on Luc. Timon. 26.; and Tollius, who on Apollon. Lex. *in v.* stops the mouth of the respectable Eustathius with this authority.

nation is more suitable. Τὰ καίατα (from καῖαρ, -ατος) or οἱ καιάται, also καίετοι, were the clefts and hollows supposed to have been caused in former times by earthquakes, and which, according to Strabo, were numerous in Laconia; as one of them in particular, called by way of eminence ὁ καιάτας or καιάδας, is sufficiently known as the place into which criminals were thrown. Still however this reading, to say the best of it, can help us only in the case of κητώεσσα; μεγακήτης remains with its derivation from κῆτος, a marine animal; and we should therefore be obliged to content ourselves with understanding it, when an epithet of the ship, as figurative, but when an epithet of πόντος as literally descriptive of the real habitation of those animals; while we must look upon μεγακήτεος δελφῖνος with much the same satisfaction and pleasure as we should upon μεγαβοίου ταύρου. Besides, κητώεσσα was evidently the established traditionary reading, heard, read, and adopted in the best period of the Greek language, and which therefore we ought not to give up so easily merely because we hear of another reading.

5. I have myself great doubts whether this καιετάεσσα was ever a real reading. Hesychius, under the explanations of κητώεσσα has both κοίλη and καλαμινθώδης; and that this may not be rejected as an uncritical medley, let us see the regular grounds of these interpretations in the lexicon of Apollonius: Λακεδαίμονα κητώεσσαν. τὸ μὲν ὑγιὲς μέγα κῦτος ἔχουσαν, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς νηός. τινὲς δὲ ὅτι εἰς ἣν κήτη ἐκβράσσεται. τινὲς δὲ καλαμινθώδη· καιέτα γὰρ φυτὸν ἡ καλάμινθος ὑπ' ἐνίων καλεῖται. But quite independent of the gloss κητώεσσα Hesychius has also the following: Κήτα, καλαμίνθη[2]. From all this it is perfectly clear, that from the syllable κητ- were deduced both κῦτος, *a hollow*, and the *plant* καιέτα; and with these it embraced also the other meaning attributed to the so-called reading καιετάεσσα, viz. that of a cleft in the earth; and καιετάεσσα was therefore only another expression for κητώεσσα, formed in imitation of it, but out of other elements.

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[2] By means of this κήτα comes the reading καιτάεις, as it stands twice in Schol. Od. δ, 1., and indeed the Cod. Harl. and Ambr. agree with it in this; a consideration of some weight against the amendment καιετάεις: see Porson.

This interpretation of καιετάεσσα very naturally soon produced an amendment, which at last assumed the character of a reading.

6. Let us now return to these old interpretations, and examine them critically. The explanation μέγα κῦτος ἔχουσα appears to belong principally to μεγακήτης, with which it stands connected in the scholia and glosses; but in Apollonius, as we have seen just above, and in the scholium to Od. δ, 1., it stands also with κητώεσσαν. With a similar view, that is to say in order to find in the syllable κητ- the idea of a cleft or chasm, others sought to discover an affinity to it in τὰ καίατα. I find, even without that etymology, sufficient grounds for this interpretation in the common meaning of the word κῆτος. It is certain, for instance, that *hollow, chasm,* is the proper meaning of this word, which thus became the natural appellation of those large depths in the sea frequented by whales, sharks, and such like. And now the etymology follows very naturally in the verb χάω, χάσκω, from the old form of which with the κ we have before derived not only ἀκέων (as may be seen in the article on that word), but also κεάζω, *to cleave,* from which verb proceed those very forms κεάδας, καιάδας, τὰ καίατα, &c.

7. In this its oldest and proper sense the epithet μεγακήτης is therefore given by Homer to the *dolphin,* literally 'frequenting the vast abysses of the sea,' while the other fish, which he is in the habit of devouring, are described in the passage already quoted (Il. φ, 22.) as flying before him: in the same way it is joined with the *ship,* which is so called, without any comparison, from its hollow or capacious belly; but above all these is that one vast abyss the *sea* itself, therefore called in very old poetry βαθυκήτης: see Theogn. 175. with Bekker's note. With regard to the epithet κητώεσσα, one thing should have prevented our understanding it in the same sense as the old grammarians did, whom Schneider follows, as μέγα κῦτος ἔχουσα, that is, descriptive of the deep valley in which Lacedæmon lies; because it is impossible that Homer could then have joined together κοίλην Λακεδαίμονα κητώεσσαν. The difference of form, in μεγακήτης and κητώεσσα, will be a better guide to us; as adjectives in εις, εσσα, εν, signify, according to the most common analogy, an abundance of that of which

such adjectives are made up: thus *κητώεσσα*, exactly in one of the senses of that *καιετάεσσα*, will mean 'having many chasms and hollows'.

8. What prevented this explanation being more generally recognised was no doubt the opinion that Λακεδαίμων at Od. δ, 1. was to be understood in its most limited sense, as the *town* of that name, to which certainly the epithet of '*lying in a deep situation*' would be very suitable, but not that of '*having many chasms*.' We must therefore briefly examine how this name is used. That Lacedæmon in its older sense meant the country so called, but that the town was named Σπάρτη (a thing almost self-evident) is manifestly clear from the two verses of Il. β, 581. Οἳ δ' *εἶχον κοίλην Λακεδαίμονα κητώεσσαν, Φᾶριν τε Σπάρτην τε*, &c. That the later custom, which reversed this, is also found in Homer, and that by this name was meant sometimes the whole country, sometimes the town, is asserted by Strabo, but only from that single passage of Od. δ, 1., and is proved by him in the following manner: "At Od. φ, 13. it is related, that Ulysses received his celebrated bow as a present from Iphitus, whom he met in Lacedæmon; *τά οἱ ξεῖνος Λακεδαίμονι δῶκε τυχήσας*: and in the next verse but one, speaking of the same meeting, it is added, Τὼ δ' ἐν Μεσσήνῃ ξυμβλήτην ἀλλήλοιϊν. Consequently in the time of the Trojan war Messene belonged to Lacedæmon, and was comprehended here under that name. Again, at that very same place in Messene where Ulysses and Iphitus had formerly met, that is to say at Pheræ (*Φηραί*), Telemachus afterward passes the night on his journey to Menelaus. This is mentioned in Od. γ, 488.; and as the journey is continued the next morning, it is said, only eleven verses afterward, Od. δ, 1., *οἳ δ' ἷξον κοίλην Λακεδαίμονα κητώεσσαν*. Now since in the first-mentioned passage (Od. φ, 13.) Lacedæmon, taken as the country of that name, comprehended Pheræ in it, it follows that Lacedæmon means here (in Od. δ, 1.) the town: otherwise Telemachus would travel from Lacedæmon to Lacedæmon." Thus far Strabo. I think the mere recital of these conclusions must have sufficed to refute them. That Homer, as from a point in Ithaca, should even once describe a place in Messene as being ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, is remarkable enough; for it is exactly in accordance

with the more modern science of statistics, by which the province is comprehended under the name of the governing country: but this does not do away the fact that the true and proper Lacedæmon is the valley of the Eurotas, divided from Messene by Mount Taygetus. If now in another quite distinct passage, where the poet has not so described it, where he has named Messene not Lacedæmon, the arriving in Lacedæmon properly so called is mentioned under this name (Λακεδαίμων), this, much more than the other, is the natural and common usage of language: on the other hand, when a little before Lacedæmon had been mentioned as the country of that name, the poet could not immediately call the *town* of Sparta by the same name of Lacedæmon.

9. The result therefore of what has been said is this: Lacedæmon is the name of the country so called, and receives all the attributes of a country, even when the poet in naming it has really in his mind the idea of an arrival at Sparta. For in those times when there was no large capital city, but the country was inhabited in districts and patches, with one central point, where the governing power resided, they might indeed use the name Lacedæmon in both ways, without its necessarily having thereby a twofold meaning; they might use Lacedæmon as the town of that name, but in a wider sense; that is, as the bond which united together the different inhabited patches, while Sparta always signified no more than the spot on which stood the principal town itself. This difference disappeared in later times, as the districts became concentrated in the town, which thus received both appellations, while for distinction's sake the whole country took the new name of Laconia.

71. Κλειτός, κλητός, κλυτός, τηλεκλειτός, τηλεκλητός, τηλεκλυτός.

1. The two adjectives κλειτός and κλυτός come from two different verbs, κλέω, κλείω, *I celebrate*, and κλύω *I hear*; but in signification they agree, the former meaning *one much celebrated*, the latter *one much heard of*, i. e. celebrated.

And in Homer they are so completely synonymous, that with this and their similarity of form they may be considered as almost the same word; for when the metre requires a long syllable, κλειτός is used; in the contrary case, κλυτός. This is particularly evident in the compounds, ἀγακλειτὸν Θρασυμήδην, ἀγακλυτὸν Ἰδομενῆα: δουρικλειτὸς Μενέλαος, Ἰδομενεὺς δουρικλυτός: ναυσικλειτοῖο Δύμαντος, Φαίηκες ναυσικλυτοί.

2. But not only what is really and strictly *celebrated*, but also whatever appears to the poet as worthy of being so celebrated, consequently everything *great, magnificent, excellent*, is called κλειτός and κλυτός; which become therefore mere epithets expressive of praise. Thus we have frequently κλειτὴν ἑκατόμβην: at Od. θ, 417. κλυτὰ δῶρα, *magnificent presents*, and elsewhere κλυτὰ τεύχεα, *splendid armour*; Minerva teaches ἔργα...κλυτὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, Od. υ, 72., and the like. In the same way we find also the compounds ἀγακλειτῆς ἑκατόμβης, Od. γ, 59., and ἀγακλυτὰ δώματα of Alcinous, Od. η, 3.

3. Among the compounds are also τηλεκλειτός and τηλεκλυτός, *far-famed, celebrated far and wide*; e. g. Il. ξ, 321. Φοίνικος...τηλεκλειτοῖο, and Od. α, 30. τηλεκλυτὸς...Ὀρέστης.

4. The epithet τηλεκλειτοί is given in the Iliad to the *allies* of the Trojans; but in that case there is always a various reading τηλεκλητοί, the meaning of which is perfectly true as said of these allies, viz. *invited from a distance*. Between these two the text of all the editions, until very lately, has fluctuated; nor do I know one which has the same reading in all the five passages, ε, 491. ζ, 111. ι, 233. λ, 564. μ, 108. Wolf and Heyne were the first to introduce uniformity into their editions, by reading in all of them τηλεκλητοί ἐπίκουροι. It is unfortunate that they decided in favour of this form. That the existence of the old various reading can prove nothing whatever is clear, for in the earliest writing the two forms could not be distinguished from each other; and even in the passages where τηλεκλειτός *can* mean nothing but 'far-famed,' still the same various reading is found; see Heyne on Il. ξ, 321. That Sarpedon at Il. ε, 478. says of himself, Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐπίκουρος ἐὼν μάλα τηλόθεν ἥκω, proves only what was known without that information, viz. that the allies did certainly come from

distant countries; but it does not prove that Homer was obliged to borrow for them an epithet from that circumstance. That this reading, as well as the others, should find supporters as soon as it appeared is no wonder, as its meaning chanced to suit those passages; nor can we draw any conclusion in favour of it from another fact, viz. that Apollonius in his Lexicon has and explains *τηλεκλητοί* only; for we find that Hesychius has only *τηλεκλειτοί, πόῤῥω ἔνδοξοι.* We are therefore reduced to the necessity of deciding for ourselves; and my own opinion is, that no critic, ancient or modern, who should compare the passages as we have done, could allow himself to write in all the others *κλειτός, ἀγακλειτός,* &c., and *τηλεκλειτός,* but in those five relating to the allies *τηλεκλητός.*

5. But what ought at once to decide the point is this, that the desired uniformity cannot possibly be attained by this reading, as the *ἐπίκουροι* are as often called *κλειτοί.* Heyne felt this, and therefore regretted that he had not read in every case *κλητοί,* which certainly does appear as a various reading here and there: see his Notes on ζ, 227. λ, 220. and 563. The word *κλητός* occurs also twice in Homer as the real and precise designation of persons, or as the predicate of the sentence, viz. in Il. ι, 165. Od. ρ, 386.; but how little it is fitted for a poetical epithet was felt by all those who, before Heyne, made no objection to *τηλεκλητοί,* but never admitted *κλητοί.* Nay, even if *κλητοί* had been universally adopted, uniformity would not have been attained, for at Il. μ, 101., where the verse will admit of neither *κλειτῶν* nor *τηλεκλειτῶν,* we find *ἀγακλειτῶν ἐπικούρων.* If the question still wanted a *coup de grace* this must give it.

6. It is clear from many opinions of the most celebrated old grammarians, that however intimately they were acquainted with their Homer, they had not that mechanical and general view of his language which we find in our own Damm. The poet who really had in his storehouse of language *κλειτός, ἀγακλειτός,* and *τηλεκλειτός,* as we have seen Homer had,—in whose mind the common meaning of these three forms was really a fixed attribute of the Trojan allies,—such a one could hardly use the first two forms in that way, and avoid the third so studiously as to choose instead of it a word of almost the same

sound, τηλεκλητοί ; a word too which is neither found elsewhere in the same poet, nor indeed in any of the other remains of antiquity.

7. What appears to have particularly favoured the introduction of this various reading is its corresponding with another epithet of the allies, πολύκλητος. This appellation is given to them in Il. δ, 438. and is the predicate of the sentence ; Ἀλλὰ γλῶσσ' ἐμέμικτο, πολύκλητοι δ' ἔσαν ἄνδρες: and hence it occurs once as a mere fixed epithet for these allies, viz. at κ, 420. where Dolon says of them, in opposition to the waking Trojans, πολύκλητοι δ' ἐπίκουροι Εὕδουσιν. I will not stop here to observe, that the meaning of πολύκλητος is really much more marked and more distinct than that of τηλεκλητός (' summoned from afar'); or that it has more truth, as many of the allies came from places very *near*: but I feel that the comparison of this epithet with the other may serve to confirm the above criticism, in as much as, in the first place, a various reading of this word with the ει is never found, (for though Porphyry, quoting the second passage in his Quæstiones, does write it so, it is not therefore to be reckoned as a various reading because of this solitary instance) ; and secondly, because we never meet with the combination of κλειτός with πολύ, any more than that of κλυτός, (easily as it might be introduced as an epithet,) either in Homer or any of the Epic poets : in the lyric poet Pindar it does indeed occur, but only once*.

8. It may perhaps be worth mentioning, that in the Alexandrine poets there is no imitation of the word τηλεκλητός, only of τηλεκλειτός, viz. in Apollon. R. 3, 1097.

9. On the *accentuation* of these forms I wish for information from others. Contrary to general analogy (e. g. of ὑπέρδεινος, πάνδεινος, εὔχρηστος, πάγχρηστος, εὔπιστος, and in Homer of πολύπικρος, περίσκεπτος, ἐΰκτιτος, ἐΰξεστος), all the compounds of κλειτός and κλυτός, at least in the Homeric poems, are, like their simples, oxytons ; as τηλεκλειτός, τηλεκλυτός, ἀγακλειτός, ἀγακλυτός, περικλυτός, ὀνομακλυτός, ναυσικλυτός, ναυσικλειτός : according to which, in Hymn. Apoll.

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* [Namely in Ol. 6, 120., but it is also found in Frag. Incert. 86. as quoted by Aristides.—Ed.]

31. and 219. it must be accented *ναυσικλειτή, -ῆς*. But I do not wish to enter into an examination of other poets. In Homer *πολύκλητος* is the fixed accentuation in both passages; an analogy which undoubtedly *τηλέκλητος* ought to follow: consequently the accentuation thus handed down is another ground for *τηλεκλειτός* being the old and genuine reading.

[*Supplement to the above article on τηλεκλειτός, &c., in the original at the end of the second volume.*]

1. I have left it a problematical question why all the compounds of *κλειτός* and *κλυτός* in Homer are, contrary as it would seem to analogy, oxytons. I will now try to extract the wished-for information from the five following scholia, involved and obscure as they appear to be, particularly at first view.

Schol. 1. On Od. *α*, 30. *Ὀξυτονητέον τὸ τηλεκλυτός, ὡς ἀγακλυτός. εἰ μὲν πτωτικὸν κατ' ἀρχὴν συντεθείη, βαρύνεται· εἰ δὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπὲρ μίαν συλλαβὴν, ὀξύνεται. διὸ σημειούμεθα τὸ ναυσικλυτός ὀξυνόμενον. τὸ δὲ δουρικλυτός ἐν παραθέσει ἐστίν.*

Schol. 2. On Il. *κ*, 109. *Τυδείδην δουρι κλυτον*[1]. *Τὸ κλυτός, εἰ πτωτικὸν κατάρχοι, ἐν συνθέσει ἐστὶ, τοξοκλυτος, ὀνομακλυτος· εἰ δὲ ἄπτωτον, φυλάσσει τὸν αὐτὸν τόνον, περικλυτος, αγακλυτος. διὸ σημειωτέον τὸ ναυσικλυτος ὀξυνόμενον. ὅτι γὰρ συνθετόν ἐστι, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ μένειν τὸ α τῆς ναυσί δοτικῆς. κατ' ἰδίαν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ ἢ διὰ τοῦ η λέγεται ἢ διὰ τοῦ ε*[2]. *ἐν δὲ συνθέσει διὰ τοῦ α, Ναυσικάα, Ναυσίθοος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δουρι κλυτος ἐν παρασυνθέσει ἐστίν.*

Schol. 3. On Il. *χ*, 51. *Ὀνομακλυτος. Ἀρίσταρχος ὑφ' ἓν* ὡς πασιμέλουσα. ἐν δὲ Ὀδυσσείᾳ ὄνομα κλυτὸς Αἴθων, κατὰ παράθεσιν. εἰ δὲ, φασὶν (write φησὶν), οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξ οὐδετέρου καὶ ἀρσενικοῦ συνθετὸν, τί ἐστι τὸ Ἀστυάναξ καὶ ποιηματογράφος; κατὰ σύνθεσιν οὖν ἐστιν ὡς τὸ τοξοκλυτος παρὰ Πινδάρῳ, καὶ περικλυτος.

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[1] In quoting the Venetian scholia I write the words in question here without any accent, as Villoison does the whole. Bekker too, in his edition, does not give them as they stand in the original Codex, (on which, as on manuscripts in general, very little reliance is to be placed in these minute points, as we may see by comparing the last scholia on the Odyssey quoted here,) but he accents them according to the principles of grammar.

[2] That is to say *νευσί*, which stands also in the Etym. M. (v. *νηῦς*) among the Homeric forms: probably an old various reading, which has disappeared from the text in the process of its purification.

Schol. 4. On Od. ζ, 22. Ναυσικλειτοῖο Δύμαντος . . . ἔνιοι δὲ ναυσὶ κλειτοῖο, ἐν δυσὶ μέρεσι λόγου. ἀμείνων δὲ ἡ πρώτη, ναυσικλειτοῖο, ἐν τοῖς κατὰ ναυτικὴν ἔργοις ἐνδόξου.

Schol. 5. On Od. η, 39. Ναυσίκλυτοι, ὡς ἀγάκλυτοι ἐν συνθέσει καὶ κατ' ὀξεῖαν τάσιν. ἡ γὰρ ναυσὶ δοτικὴ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, ὅταν κατ' ἰδίαν λέγηται, διὰ τοῦ η γράφεται, ὡς οἱ μὲν παρὰ νηυσί, &c.

2. From schol. 1. and 2. we gather the following rule, that when κλυτός is compounded with a πτωτικόν, (i. e. has a declinable word for its prefix,) it is ἐν συνθέσει; that is, it is a proper compound, and is accented on the antepenultima, as τοξόκλυτος, ὀνομάκλυτος: but when it has an indeclinable word, κλυτός retains its accent, and the compound is therefore accented on the last syllable, as περικλυτός, ἀγακλυτός, and consequently also τηλεκλυτός. Hence by antithesis it follows, that compounds of this latter kind are ἐν παραθέσει, i. e. not properly compounded, but their two members only *placed next to each other*; or they arise from mere juxta-position; for instance, from τῆλε κλυτός, *far famed*, πέρι κλυτός and ἄγαν κλυτός, *much famed*; which in truth therefore does not lie in the indeclinability of the former part of the word, but in the *thought*; as there do not chance to be any compounds of κλυτός with particles, which according to the thought would be inseparable, like διάλευκος, ὑπέρθυμος. According to the first part of our scholia we must consider therefore as really συνθετά and βαρύτονα, all that are compounded with a noun: in which we are told to remark (σημειωτέον) as an exception ναυσικλυτός, which is a συνθετόν and yet is oxyton, i. e. has the acute accent on the last syllable. The reason why it is a συνθετόν is given in schol. 1. compared with schol. 5., viz. because the first half is not the pure dative, which in Homer is νηυσί, not ναυσί. The word πτωτικόν is not therefore to be understood generally of any forms of nouns, but we must interpret the scholia more clearly and more precisely thus; κλυτός (and

κλειτός also) is said to be *ἐν συνθέσει*, and is consequently a baryton, i. e. has the accent on the antepenultima, when a *πτωτικὸν*, but not a real case (*πτῶσις*), precedes it; for in this case the whole would be a *παράθεσις*. If then *νηυσικλυτός*, or *νηυσὶ κλυτός*, be found in Homer, this, according to the rule, would be accented like *δουρικλυτός*, or *δουρὶ κλυτός*: for in this last example the expression *ἐν παραθέσει* in schol. 1. appears to me the true reading, but *ἐν παρασυνθέσει* in schol. 2. to be a corruption[3].

3. If now *δουρικλυτός* be a *παράθεσις*, it is remarkable that according to schol. 2. *ὀνομακλυτος* must be a true *συνθετὸν*, where still the *ὄνομα* may be very well explained to be the accusative: but the remark is repeated in schol. 3., where *ὀνομάκλυτος Ἄλτης* in Il. χ, 51. is placed in opposition to the *ὄνομα κλυτόν* (celebrated name) in Od. τ, 183. which is *κατὰ παράθεσιν*. The grammarians therefore held a twofold opinion; and Aristarchus rejected the junction of *κλυτός* with the accusative, either generally, or in *ὀνομάκλυτος* in particular, as this word does not mean 'celebrated by means of his name', but rather 'having a celebrated name'. For that in this case also they looked not merely to the form of the first part, according to which *ὄνομα* would be really a regular case, but to the *thought*, is plain from schol. 4., in which the writing *ναυσὶ κλειτοῖο* is with good reason rejected on account of the meaning, and *ναυσικλειτοῖο* is explained to mean 'celebrated for naval deeds'. Indeed that might be applied also to *δουρικλυτός*; but here the dative appears to have been too evident to the grammarians both in form and sense; this point therefore we will not discuss with them.

4. Thus far the scholia are consistent; and it is therefore but reasonable, that where we find them to disagree, we should attribute it to the fault of those who put the scholia together. Of this kind is the word *περικλυτος* in schol. 3., which is there joined with *τοξοκλυτος*, as a *συνθετὸν*, contrary to the plain

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[3] Probably there stood here at first a *false reading ἐν συνθέσει*, and in correcting this arose a new fault, the double compound in question. We know that *παρασύνθεσις* and *παρασύνθετον* mean in the grammarians nothing more than derivation from a compound, which can have nothing whatever to do with the sense here.

assertions of schol. 2. : but above all, the beginning of schol. 5. is in a hopeless state, if *ναυσικλυτοί* and *ἀγακλυτοί* have the acute accent on the last syllable, as I have proposed in my edition of the scholia to the Odyssey. Consistency requires something like the following: *Ναυσικλυτοί, ὡς ἀγακλυτοί, κατ' ὀξεῖαν τάσιν, σημειωτέον, ἅτε ἐν συνθέσει ὄν. ἡ γὰρ ναυσί*, &c. That is to say, the meaning must be this : *Ναυσικλυτοί,* which is *ἐν συνθέσει*, and yet has the acute accent on the last syllable, is (like *ἀγακλυτοί,* which is *ἐν παραθέσει,*) to be considered as an exception. Again, the comparison of *ὀνομάκλυτος* with *πασιμέλουσα* in schol. 3. is not according to rule; for there are good grounds for supposing *πασιμέλουσα*, like *δακρυχέων* and some others, even if written as one word, to be a mere *παράθεσις,* with which the grammarians therefore might, according to their principles, have compared *τηλεκλυτός* and *δουρικλυτός,* but not *ὀνομακλυτος,* which there and in schol. 2. is treated as a proper *συνθετόν.*

5. Resuming our first question, we find then that the accentuation of *τηλεκλειτός, τηλεκλυτός,* &c. in our Homer arose from an opinion, that every compound, which, according to the thought, was a mere juxta-position of two parts of speech joined together syntactically, or which (like *δουρικλυτός*) appeared to be such, retained the accent of the second word unchanged. But this was the case with almost all the compounds of *κλειτός* and *κλυτός*; and although *ναυσικλυτός, ναυσικλειτός,* did not, according to the above theory, belong to that class, yet the apparent *παράθεσις* had such an influence on this form also, that it was not changed, but noted as an exception ; while *ὀνομακλυτος,* as is evident from schol. 3., remained in dispute. In our Homer this accentuation is now made uniform throughout, and in my opinion correctly so ; as long as it is not wished to take the greater liberty of accenting in general everything, with the same uniformity, according to the existing analogy of compounds.

72. Κολῳός, κολῳᾷν.

1. The meaning of the words *κολῳός, κολῳᾷν,* is undoubted. They imply a *shrill chattering*, joined, at least in the two pas-

sages of Homer where they occur, with the idea of *scolding* and *wrangling*. Thus at Il. β, 212. it is said of Thersites that he alone ἐκολῴα, wrangled shrilly; and in the same sense at Il. *a*, 575. Ἐν δὲ θεοῖσι κολῳὸν ἐλαύνετον, where I understand it merely of the quarrelling of Jupiter and Juno only, with which they disturbed the other deities, and do not with Heyne join ἐνελαύνετον θεοῖσι; as I understand ἐλαύνειν τι to mean *to set anything in motion*, as at Il. η, 6. the sea with the oars, and the like; the meaning therefore here would be, "you raise a noisy wrangling among the gods[1]."

2. With regard to the etymology, the grammarians agree unanimously that it is a metaphor taken from κολοιός, the jackdaw; which was the common explanation of Il. β, 212. in the time of Gellius; see his Noct. Att. 1, 15. The name of the bird occurs in Homer, and the difference of the writing or pronunciation, as it could not be made visible in the oldest writing, is to be considered as traditionary[2]. But against the view here taken of this etymology I must enter my protest: it is one of those which on the surface look plain and indubitable, and yet are perfectly unnatural. Let us only state clearly how we are in the habit of reasoning. If we say that κολῳός is really derived from κολοιός; this is contrary to all grammatical analogy. Or if we suppose that both are properly the same word; it is contrary to all logical analogy to say that a scream has been called a *jackdaw*; even though we should be willing (as Pollux has κολοιᾳν of the cry of the jackdaw,) to suffer such an expression as κολῴᾳ, 'he *jackdaws*', for 'he screeches like a jackdaw'.

3. And here the German language gives us a most complete analogy. As *Dohle*, a jackdaw, comes from *dahlen*, to chatter, so κολοιός comes from a similar root, which means a cry or scream, and with which are connected, as we must at once feel,

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[1] Some of the scholia in explaining it use ἐπιτείνετε, others ἐγείρετε.

[2] This, for instance, holds good of the ι subscript also, as ἐκολώια is expressly mentioned in an old scholium (see Heyne on Il. β, 212.) as a reading of Philoxenus. Although it appears to me very probable that the familiar explanation of these words by means of the cry of the bird had an influence on this way of writing it, and that the older tradition was κολωός, κολωᾳν. Compare κολουᾳν in note 3.

καλέω, κέλω, κέλομαι*. From this root comes the abstract word κολῳός, as well as the name of the bird, κολοιός; or if we consider both as identical in form, then we have the abstract as well as the concrete formed in ος; and from κολῳός, *a scream*, was made a new verb κολῳᾷν; which by others was formed also in έω, as we learn from the example in Antimachus quoted by Eustathius, Schellenb. Fr. 27. Ὥς ῥα τότ' Ἀργείων κολῴει στρατός: for this must certainly be the true reading for ἐκολῴει, the ω being shortened as in some well-known similar cases. This account is confirmed by the gloss of Hesychius, κολοιή, φωνή. And when the same grammarian among the meanings of κόλος has also θόρυβος, this is not to be rashly rejected as a mere corruption of κολῳός; for the word κολοσυρτός, properly signifying a noisy swarm or multitude, leads us to the very word, and thus we draw near to the root with the greatest clearness[3].

4. Toward the explanation of this word we have here gained thus much; that we are not to attribute to Homer, particularly in the expression ἐκολῴα, an intentional comparison with the jackdaw, however correct such a comparison may appear to be in that expression.

73. Κουρίδιος.

1. The derivation of κουρίδιος from κοῦρος, κούρη,—a derivation which strikes us as soon as we look at the word,—has been the cause of much error, particularly in the unphilosophical endeavour to express the supposed etymology in translations and explanations; although experience teaches us that many a word, derived undeniably from some other, often loses entirely in course of usage the meaning of the original. Κουρίδιος πόσις, κουριδίη ἄλοχος are translated, in all cases where there is nothing to oppose it, as in Il. ε, 413. λ, 243. &c., by *youthful*. Where that term is not admissible,—as in Od. ο, 355. of the wife of

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* [Doederling in his Lect. Hom. 1. p. 4. rejects the connexion with καλέω, but allows that with κέλομαι.—Ed.]

[3] The glosses of Hesychius κολουᾷν and κολουμβᾷ, synonymous with κολῳᾷν, appear to show that the word remained in the mouth of the common people and ceased to be a poetical expression.

Laertes, or in λ, 492. ω, 199. where Clytemnestra kills Agamemnon, her κουρίδιον πόσιν,—there it is supposed to allude to a marriage contracted in youth or with a virgin, to the first husband, or the like. For this we need only consult Damm, particularly to see how neatly he helps himself through Il. τ, 298., where however all is of no avail. The only correct way, in this and many similar cases, is to collect and place side by side all the passages where a word occurs, and to see whether we cannot find, *without any regard to etymology*, some one idea pervading them all; which alone must be used even where the meaning drawn from the etymology of the word has introduced itself into the context also; otherwise we are in danger of attributing to the poet ideas which he never had.

2. If now we compare all the passages where κουρίδιος occurs, so far is clear, that it means *wedded*, and is opposed to the union between master and slave, or to concubinage. This is declared most plainly in the passage above quoted from Il. τ, 298. where Briseis, who had lived with Achilles as slave and concubine from the time of his slaying her husband, says that Patroclus had promised to make her the κουριδίη ἄλοχος of Achilles. But even without such a sensible antithesis as the above, this meaning exhibits itself plainly in other passages. In Od. ν, 45. Ulysses says to all the Phæacians, that they should remain at home and cheer their κουριδίας γυναῖκας; and at Il. ο, 40. Juno calls the marriage-bed of herself and Jupiter κουρίδιον λέχος. It is true, that at Od. ο, 22. the κουρίδιος φίλος, as the first husband, is opposed to a second in whose favour the wife is to forget the other; and at Od. τ, 580. φ, 78. the house of Ulysses is called by Penelope her κουρίδιον δῶμα, in opposition to that to which she should follow one of the suitors, which would still be a regular marriage. But in these two passages the once regularly wedded and beloved husband, or the house of such a husband, is feelingly opposed to a second marriage concluded while the first husband was perhaps still alive. Compare Od. ψ, 150. 151. At all events, the very expression here used, κουρίδιον δῶμα, shows that κουρίδιος can never mean *youthful*; otherwise κουρίδιον δῶμα would be 'the house of my youth', i. e. my paternal house. The idea of *marriage* is evident therefore in κουρίδιος, the *true, legitimate*, through which the words

ἀνήρ, γυνή (Od. ω, 196. ν, 45.) first receive the idea of husband, wife: while with πόσις and ἄλοχος this epithet is joined for the sole purpose of marking the above-mentioned antitheses. But in the expression κουρίδιός φίλος this latter word evidently has its common meaning 'dear', and κουρίδιος alone therefore stands for *husband.*

3. This view of the meaning of κουρίδιος is fully confirmed by Herodotus, who in 1, 135, 5, 18. expresses by this epithet the opposition between the wife and the παλλακίς[1].

4. With regard to the etymology, the derivation from κοῦρος must not yet be thrown aside; and perhaps there may be some grounds for it in the expression κούρη in Od. σ, 279. (278.) where it stands for a *bride,* in a sentence indeed where wooing is the subject of the context; but in no case is the idea of youth to be found in κουρίδιος, nor can this derivation be considered as proved. Much better will it be, as everything speaks in favour of some other derivation, to leave to chance the possibility of producing something which may give us the idea of *regular, legitimate,* or perhaps of *pure, chaste* (compare κορεῖν), or even the precise idea of the marriage-ceremony[2].

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[1] The perfect accordance of all the passages mentioned ought therefore to prevent us from understanding κουρίδιος, wherever it may occur elsewhere, in the sense of *youthful*; e. g. in Eveni Epigr. 12. Κουριδίους ἤδη θαλάμῳ λύσασα χιτῶνας. Here it means 'bridal garments'.

[2] Whoever considers that the German *h* so often answers to the Greek κ, as in κοῖλος, Germ. *hohl,* Engl. *hollow,*—in καλάμη, Germ. *Halm,* Engl. *halm* (or 'straw'),—in κύων, Germ. *Hund,* Engl. *dog,* &c.,—such a one will not think me foolish in calling attention to the same relation between κουρίδιος and the German *Heurath,* in old German *Heurde,* (Engl. 'marriage',) for the purpose of observing some traces which may perhaps be worth following up. Such a trace appears to me to lie in the word κύριος, compared with the word κυρεῖν, *to obtain,* and with κοίρανος. These ideas may indeed be very well joined with that of a female slave and concubine; but we must not overlook the information of the grammarians (Schol. Aristoph. Equ. 969.) that κύριος γυναικός was used only with reference to a wife, as δεσπότης was to a female slave. And even if that were not the case, it is usage which in general first gives words their meaning; exactly as in German *Heurath,* 'marriage', is acknowledged to come from the same idea (*heuern,* 'to hire') as the word *Hure,* 'a whore', does; which two words have therefore obtained their opposite meaning from usage only. The German word *Herr,* Lat. *herus,* is connected with the above, and *h* and κ thus answer exactly to each other.

74. Κρήγυος.

1. As *κρήγυος*, a word of rare occurrence in general, appears in Homer only once, viz. in Il. *α*, 106.

> *Μάντι κακῶν, οὐ πώποτέ μοι τὸ κρήγυον εἶπες,*

a dispute in explaining its meaning is not to be wondered at. By some of the grammarians it was translated *good*, by others *true*. That the former is the correct meaning must be clear from the context. Agamemnon does not doubt of the *truth* of the prophet's interpretation, but like such monarchs he is enraged with one who announces to him *evil* tidings, whether true or false. Of a later real and (what is still more) Ionic usage of the word in common life we have an instance in a passage of Hippocrates, Coac. Prænot. p. 425, 16. *ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γουνάτων πόνος κρήγυον*; for here there can be no reason for supposing it to be intentionally preferred as an expression of antiquity. Still more deserving of our consideration in this respect is the passage in Plato's Alcib. 1, 9. p. 111. e. *οὐκ ἐπίστανται, οὐδὲ κρήγυοι διδάσκαλοί εἰσι τούτων.* In Doric prose we have also an example of the Pythagorean Lysis (Gale p. 737.), *ποτ' οὐδὲν κρήγυον σχολάζοντες.* A still later usage, and certainly an intentional imitation of Homer, we find in the author of the Vita Homeri c. 15. and in the 38th Epigram of Asclepiades: in all these instances in the sense of *good*. So much the more remarkable is the passage in Theocritus 20, 19.

> *Ποιμένες εἴπατέ μοι τὸ κρήγυον, οὐ καλὸς ἐμμι;*

We must not for a moment suppose it possible that in his strange use of language the word may have meant *true* as well as *good*. The fact is, that the sense of *true* was brought into existence entirely by the nature of the Homeric passage (which at first sight admits of both meanings), and a way was thus opened for the attempts of some of the critics to introduce reason into Homer, where they imagined they discovered something contrary to reason; and Theocritus, the Alexandrian, furnishes one among many instances of such interpretations of Homer passing afterwards by means of imitation into the real usage of the poets. All however did not hinder this same Theocritus from following the usual meaning of κρήγυος in Epigr. 20.

2. On the etymology of the word, whether it belongs to the family of κρατύς, κρείσσων, or, by an Ionicism, from χρῆσθαι, χρήσιμος, I have nothing certain to offer. From the relations in which it is found I think the latter the more probable. The γ would then belong to the termination: compare ἀμφίγυος.

75. Κυλίνδειν, καλινδεῖσθαι, &c.

1. Κυλίνδω is a verb which has remained in constant use ever since the time of Homer, with the leading sense of a *turning* or *rolling motion*, as of stones (πέδονδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής); but it also took very early the form in -έω (see Lex. Xenoph.): the sense of *turning* we may therefore adopt as its original one. Κυλίνδω is generally supposed to be a form strengthened from κυλίω: but I am of opinion there are better reasons for thinking that κυλίνδω is the older form, whence the future κυλῖσω[1] comes quite as naturally, and the σ in the passive ἐκυλίσθην more so; and that -ίνδω, analogous to the more common ending -ίζω, Dor. -ίδδω, is a termination affixed to the root itself, by which it was perhaps wished to express something answering to the heavy motion of a stone. Homer has only κυλίνδω (which occurs very often) and ἐκυλίσθην; but as early as Pindar we find also κυλίω, which form I think arose out of the future in -ίσω. The meaning passed on figuratively to other kinds of motion, as of the waves, of the uncontrollable course of anything, &c.; besides which it was already used in Homer's time for *the turning* or *rolling backwards and forwards on one spot*, κυλίνδεσθαι κατὰ κόπρον, and such like. Hence figuratively, but always with the additional idea of reproof, it was said of men who are continually *turning about* or *busying themselves* in certain places or certain occupations. This rolling about, in a physical sense, in the sand or dust, referred, as is

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[1] Compare Προβαλίσιος from Προβάλινθος.

well known, to the ancient mode of attending on and treating the bodies of men and horses; in which sense the Attics had another verb analogous to this, viz. ἀλινδεῖσθαι (whence also ἀλινδήθρα, *volutabrum*), and in the active (to make the horse roll, lead him out to roll,) ἀλῖσαι, used however only in its compound ἐξαλῖσαι. See Piers. ad Mœr. p. 52. And hence also the middle verb ἀλινδεῖσθαι was used in a figurative sense; see Hippocr. ap. Steph. in v. ἐναλινδέονται πολλῇσι συμφορῇσι. To these we may add a third very common form, but found only in the middle voice, also used solely of this rolling of animals, and in a figurative moral sense, viz. καλινδεῖσθαι, which passed more into the language of every-day life; and lastly a fourth, εἰλινδεῖσθαι, ἐνειλινδεῖσθαι, which, perhaps by chance, occurs only in a moral sense.

2. Nothing is more difficult than to distinguish etymologically from each other these forms, which I have here placed together; and equally difficult is it to connect them with each other, that is to say, in such a manner that any traces of historical truth in favour of either of them may be discoverable; for otherwise nothing indeed is easier than to form such a series as κυλ-, καλ-, ἀλ-, εἰλ-, or the converse εἰλ-, ἀλ-, καλ-, κυλ-. Perhaps now such a trace may lie in the following circumstance, that of all these forms, not one, except κυλίνδω, κυλίω, has exactly the precise meaning of the *turning* or *rolling motion.* For that single passage in Aristophanes Nub. 33. Ἀλλ' ὦ μέλ' ἐξήλικας ἔμεγ' ἐκ τῶν ἐμῶν, "thou hast *rolled* me out of all my property," not only does not contain that physical sense of rolling, but is probably nothing more than a comic use of ἐξαλίσας from the preceding verse, (used there of leading out a horse to roll,) with the literal force of the ἐξ preserved. Further, as καλινδεῖσθαι, if we consider it to be merely a different pronunciation of κυλινδεῖσθαι, bears too plainly to be mistaken the mark of having been corrupted in common use,—and yet this form is used by the best authors in the highest style of writing, while on the other hand the forms εἰλ-, ἀλ-, καλινδεῖσθαι, have the analogy of εἴλη, ἀλέα, *calor*, in support of their belonging to each other,—I conjecture that the two roots or stems, εἰλοῦμαι (which, as we have seen in the article on εἰλεῖν, began with the idea of *pushing* or *thrusting*, and had almost the same

meaning of *turning* or *busying oneself about anything*,) and κυλίνδω (of which the proper sense is *to turn* and *roll*,) have coalesced by mere chance in this particular meaning, so that in the language of every-day life frequentatives similarly formed have arisen from them. For that εἰλινδεῖσθαι is not found earlier than in Josephus and Plutarch, proves nothing more than that, beside the Attic ἀλῖσαι, formed from ΕΛΩ by the change of vowel, ἀλινδεῖσθαι had also taken the form with the ει in the dialects of common life[2].

76. Λέγειν, λέξαι, λέξασθαι.

1. Three various readings of the forms λέγειν and λέξαι are on the whole certain; viz. 1. *to say*; 2. *to choose* and *collect*; 3. (λέξαι in particular) in the Epic poets, *to lay to rest*. In an examination of these meanings the first question is, whether they are connected with each other, and if so, how? The second is, to decide which of these meanings belongs to each passage. We will begin with the second question, leaving the first for the present untouched.

2. When in Il. β. the sacrifice and banquet are finished, Nestor says to Agamemnon (v. 435.),

> Μηκέτι νῦν δηθ' αὖθι λεγώμεθα, μηδ' ἔτι δηρὸν
> 'Αμβαλλώμεθα ἔργον. . . . . .

This λεγώμεθα we find explained in each of the above three senses. Aristarchus understood it to mean συναθροιζώμεθα, paraphrasing it with this explanation, μηκέτι νῦν ἐπὶ πολὺν

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[2] Still less reason is there for suspecting the form εἰλινδοῦμαι to be an error of transcription, because it has the various reading ἀλινδ. in Plutarch and Alciphron: see Bast, Ep. Cr. p. 210. and Schneider's Lexicon. It exists in two other passages, one in Josephus (B. J. 4, 9, 10.) quoted by Schneider under ἐνειλινδέω, and another by Stephens from Synesius. It is not therefore possible to imagine how this form, deviating as it does from the Attic, could have arisen and kept its ground in learned writers, if there had not been old and good reasons for its existence.

χρόνον αὐτοῦ συνηθροισμένοι μένωμεν: by which this explanation is at once condemned; for that such cannot be the sense of the present, needs not a moment's consideration. In Eustathius and the minor scholiast it is explained *to sit still, to rest,* and, as it were, *lie down.* If this meaning were so near the surface, it is scarcely possible that Aristarchus should not have noticed it. But my opinion is, that those older grammarians knew or felt that the present *λέγω, λέγομαι,* in the sense of *to lay* and *to lie down,* was not Greek. In the whole range of Epic poetry, early or late, there never occur in this sense any but the aorists *ἔλεξε, ἐλέξατο, ἔλεκτο.* But no critic will adopt a form which occurs nowhere else, particularly in a passage of which the reading, as we shall presently see, is not at all fixed or certain. There remains then only the meaning of *λέγειν, to say, speak,* which we must examine in connexion with the different readings.

3. From the scholia we see that the present reading of this passage is that of Aristarchus. The reading of Zenodotus, as there given, is too short by a syllable, *Μηκέτι νῦν ταῦτα λεγώμεθα*: but that of Callistratus runs thus, *Μηκέτι δὴ νῦν αὖθι λ*.... Of these the reading of Zenodotus is evidently in favour of the sense of *speaking,* and so agrees with the same expression four times repeated, *Ἀλλ' ἄγε μηκέτι ταῦτα λεγώμεθα,* Il. *ν,* 292. *υ,* 244. Od. *ν,* 296., and *Μέντορ, μηκέτι τ. λ.*, Od. *γ,* 240. But in those four passages the words in question occur in each instance in the course of a dialogue, which they are intended to break off; whereas in the passage of Il. *β.* it is quite the contrary, for here there is no previous conversation, but the words are introduced by the well-known *Τοῖς ἄρα μύθων ἦρχε*.... This then tells against the reading of Zenodotus in the scholia. But who will say which of the three abovementioned readings is the old traditionary one, or whether there is not a fourth? Even the reading of Aristarchus is called only *ἡ Ἀριστάρχου,* and quoted from (*αἱ Ἀριστάρχου λέξεις*) his explanations of words. We have certainly, therefore, quite as good grounds for considering the reading of Zenodotus to be the traditionary one, or at least to be *a* traditionary one. Nay, the very argument mentioned above as telling against it, intimates that this reading was really handed down by tradition,

and changed for some such reason as that mentioned. At all events, there can be no doubt that, as the phrase *μηκέτι λεγώμεθα* in the two different expressions of Il. *β*. and of the four passages above quoted (whatever the reading may be) has the same force and tendency, it must have the same meaning. If now we apply this meaning to the reading of Aristarchus, *δηθ' αὖθι λεγώμεθα*, we must understand *λέγεσθαι* as absolute, which Aristarchus evidently wished to avoid, for otherwise he would certainly have understood and explained this passage analogously to those others. On the other hand, all is clear if we consider *μηκέτι ταῦτα λεγώμεθα* as *a customary formula* for breaking off a conversation; and that when Nestor rose from table, at which there had naturally been some conversation, though the poet does not mention it, he broke it off with these words. In order now to reconcile the two readings, we shall want to complete the reading of Zenodotus, as mutilated by the scholiasts, thus, *Μηκέτι νῦν δὴ ταῦτα λ....* But this is not an Homeric position of the particle *δή*; the construction requires *Μηκέτι δὴ νῦν τ. λ.* as in the reading of Callistratus. This *δὴ νῦν* therefore I consider genuine; and Aristarchus must have been the first to have reversed the two words, in order to be able to make *δηθά* out of them. The correctness of the reading *ταῦτα λεγώμεθα* will very soon receive an additional confirmation.

4. Some of the ancients maintained that the verb *λέγειν* does not occur in Homer in the sense of *to say, speak*; see Eust. on Il. *ν*, 275. *υ*, 244. Steph. Thes. 2, p. 606. g. Eustathius, and with him some later commentators, thought this sufficiently disproved by the phrase which we have been considering, and by some others. To me, however, the question appears to deserve at least a closer examination. That is to say, it is certain that from the meaning *to choose out, gather up, collect*, which is so common in Homer, there arose, through the idea of *to reckon up, relate*, the meaning of *to announce, tell, say*; and the question is, how far the word had proceeded in this course in the old Epic language. And first then, thus much is certain, that *λέγει, ἔλεγε, ἔλεξε*, used like *φησί, ἔφη, εἶπε*, was unknown to that old language. On the other hand, of such expressions as either belong to common usage or lead

to it, there are in Homer the following. At Il. ν, 275. Idomeneus says to Meriones, who had just been referring to proofs of his valour, Οἶδ' ἀρετὴν οἷός ἐσσι· τί σε χρὴ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι; that is, not merely εἰπεῖν *to say*, but properly *to reckon up, enumerate*, and so in a general sense *to bring forward, name*. Again, at Od. μ, 165. in the active voice, τὰ ἕκαστα λέγων ἑταροῖσι πίφαυσκον. To which belongs also that frequently-recurring compound καταλέξαι, as at Od. ω, 302. καταλέξω ὅσα ὑπέσχετό σοι δῶρα, and so in a general sense of giving any information, account, or relation. It is evident that all these expressions proceed not from the idea of *to speak, say*, but quite clearly from the idea of *to collect, arrange, enumerate*. And thence by a very easy transition comes[*], as in German, *to relate* (see sect. 7. of this article). Thus at Od. ψ, 308, ὅσα κήδε' ἔθηκεν 'Ανθρώποις, ὅσα τ' αὐτὸς ὀϊζύσας ἐμόγησεν Πάντ' ἔλεγε. At Od. λ, 374. (to Ulysses, desiring him to relate,) σὺ δέ μοι λέγε θέσκελα ἔργα : to which belongs also τ, 203. Ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων, as the thing spoken of is a feigned *narration*. The only passage where the word at all agrees with the later usage of it is that of Il. β, 222. of Thersites; τότ' αὖτ' 'Αγαμέμνονι δίῳ....λέγ' ὀνείδεα : but as the word is used in every other passage of Homer in the sense of enumerating, it appears to be selected here to express the long string of abuses which Thersites immediately afterwards repeats against Agamemnon.

5. At all events it is clear, from this comparison of the different passages, that in Homer this verb has necessarily an *accusative* case after it, which may be omitted only where it can be inferred from the preceding part of the context. Therefore in the sentence μηκέτι ταῦτα λεγώμεθα, the accusative ταῦτα is essential to it, as referring to the narratives and conversations which preceded, or which, in the case of the feast in Il. β., are presumed to have preceded. On the contrary, λέγεσθαι taken absolutely, in the sense of *to speak, talk*, would

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[*] [Not only in German, but in most, if not all, of the modern European languages, we find this very natural transition. Thus in German *zählen* or *herzählen*, ' to reckon', *erzählen*, ' to relate' ; in French *compter* and *raconter* ; and in English *to count* and *recount* ; the verb *tell* and the substantive *tale* both used in either sense.—Ed.]

be an usage to be compared only with that of the active in the later Greek, as δεινὸς λέγειν and the like.

6. Lastly the compound διαλέγεσθαι also is found in the Epic language, but in a form of the middle voice, διαλέξασθαι, in the often-repeated formula Ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός: only this must not be superficially considered as a soliloquy; but διαλέγεσθαι is very correctly explained in Damm by *disputare*, 'to discuss', literally 'to reckon backwards and forwards'; whence arose in common language the idea and the expression of a *dialogue*.

7. That the physical idea *to gather up, take up separately*, is the radical meaning of this verb, is proved also by its remarkable coincidence with the Latin *legere* and the German* *lesen*; nay, the proof is the clearer, because the idea when transferred to language is different in the Greek from what it is in the Latin and German. In these two we see how the separate knowledge of marks or characters on a stone, a table, &c. appeared to the simple understanding as a *picking up* and *collecting* of them; with which corresponds in the Greek ἀναγιγνώσκειν, and still more particularly the Ionic ἐπιλέξασθαι, *to read*. On the other hand in the Greek the simple verb λέγειν proceeded without doubt through the idea of *gathering up* and *arranging* stones or the like to that of *counting* them; and thence, as in all languages, to that of *recounting* or *relating*; which last idea was by degrees generalized into that of *to say*. Compare the English verb *to tell*, and still more the Danish verb *tale*, which is synonymous with it.

8. The expression αἱμασιὰς λέγειν Od. σ, 359. is, in the physical sense of the word, a very remarkable one. It means *to raise a hedge* or *fence*, because the most simple way of doing this was, by merely *collecting together*, piling up and arranging stones in the manner of a dry wall. See the scholiast, and Mœris, who explains αἱμασιά by λιθολογία[1].

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* [The verb *lesen* in German, like *legere* in Latin, means both 'to gather' and 'to read'.—Ed.]

[1] The explanation 'to collect or gather together *thorns*' must not be used. If indeed αἱμασιά originally meant a thorn-hedge, this meaning was obsolete even in Homer's time.

9. And now, lastly, as to the meaning *to lay, to lie,* I can very well believe that those who are in the habit of explaining all similarly sounding roots to be identical, may know how to trace this, like the others, from the foregoing meaning; perhaps indeed from the laying down different things in order, although the word is used only of laying down living objects to rest. There is however a passage which appears to favour such a derivation. When at Od. δ, 451. Proteus reckons up his seals, and amongst them the strangers concealed in their skins, it is said

> . . . . πάσας δ' ἄρ' ἐπῴχετο, λέκτο δ' ἀριθμόν.
> Ἐν δ' ἡμέας πρώτους λέγε κήτεσιν, οὐδέ τι θυμῷ
> Ὠΐσθη δόλον εἶναι. ἔπειτα δὲ λέκτο καὶ αὐτός.

Here certainly one is very strongly tempted to explain the verb, which recurs three times in three lines, to be the same, and belonging to the same root. "He counted the number of the seals; he reckoned us amongst them, and then he lay himself down with them as though he were reckoned one of the number." But this would be a strange mixture of ideas. Above at v. 413. Idothea says nearly the same thing in these words:—

> Αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν πάσας πεμπάσσεται ἠδὲ ἴδηται
> Λέξεται ἐν μέσσῃσι, νομεὺς ὣς πώεσι μήλων.

Here is no reference to the previous reckoning and mustering the seals, nor any *καὶ αὐτός*, which would be a necessary addition if this λέξεται were to be translated as we have done λέκτο above; but λέξεται here means merely 'he will lay himself down to rest,' and λέκτο therefore in the other passage has the same meaning. But the *καὶ αὐτός* does not refer to the foregoing λέκτο or λέγε, but to what is said two verses above of the seals; *αἱ μὲν ἔπειτα Ἑξῆς εὐνάζοντο παρὰ ῥηγμῖνι θαλάσσης*: and no one can suppose that on account of their lying down in regular order, λέκτο was afterwards used of their keeper lying down in the midst of them, as that word is constantly used of single objects.

10. I shall content myself therefore with supposing in the Greek λέξαι (as in the German verb *legen*, 'to lay,') a separate root, although written exactly the same as that first λέγω. But

I maintain, even in opposition to the old grammarians, that it is not written the same; but that because ἔλεξα is common to both roots or stems, and the γ appears in λέγμενος (Od. χ, 196.), it seems to be so. And we need only compare δέγμενος, and appeal to the regular verbal substantives, τὸ λέχος, ὁ λόχος, and ἡ λεχώ, in order to be convinced, in my opinion, that the root or stem of the verb *to lay* is in the Greek ΛΕΧ[2].

77. Λιάζω, ἀλίαστος, λελιημένος.

1. In the majority of passages where the verb λιάζομαι occurs it has the sense of *to go aside, turn away from,* as the grammarians also generally explain it. Thus at Il. χ, 12. Apollo says to Achilles, whom he had by a delusion drawn off from pursuing the enemy, "thou troublest thyself no more about the Trojans, who are driven into the city, σὺ δὲ δεῦρο λιάσθης," that is, according to the explanation of the grammarians, παρεξέκλινας δρόμῳ, ἐξετράπης τῆς εὐθείας ὁδοῦ. Again at Od. ε, 462. of Ulysses saving himself from the stream, ὁ δ' ἐκ ποταμοῖο λιασθείς. At Il. ψ, 231. Πηλείδης δ' ἀπὸ πυρκαΐης ἑτέρωσε λιασθείς, *going away or aside from the pyre.* And so νόσφι λιασθείς, Il. α, 349. λ, 80. One of the plainest instances of the same sense is at Il. ω, 96. of the waves, which *make way* for the goddesses as they rise from the depths of the sea, which *turn aside* and yield them a passage, ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρα σφι λιάζετο

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[2] The form λόχος indeed is generally derived from λέγειν, *to select*; but it is not probable that so old a verb as λοχῆσαι should be derived thus, unless the *lying* in wait were the radical idea. And still less reason is there for supposing that to be the radical idea, when λόχος expresses the very act of lying in wait, as at Od. δ, 395: compare 441. On the other hand, as the meaning of λόχος, as a band or company of men, is also an old one (Od. υ, 49.), it is very conceivable that a number of soldiers, who might be placed perhaps as a guard or an ambush, might be called a λόχος. The numerous words with the ο proceeding from the same form, and having a reference to child-birth, including ἄλοχος, confirm this view of the subject. And we may also observe that ὁ λόχος and τὸ λέχος bear the same relation to each other as those verbal substantives mentioned at the beginning of the article Ὅρκος.

κῦμα θαλάσσης. And so in a more general sense *to retire, withdraw,* as Od. δ, 838. of the vision vanishing away, σταθμοῖο παρὰ κληῗδα λιάσθη Ἐς πνοιὰς ἀνέμων. But the sense of *turning aside* is still plainer when joined with ὕπαιθα, where it has the force of ὑπεκκλίνειν: as at Il. ο, 520. Τῷ δὲ Μέγης ἐπόρουσεν ἰδών· ὁ δ' ὕπαιθα λιάσθη Πουλυδάμας· καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀπήμβροτεν...: and φ, 255. where Achilles flies from the pursuing stream by *turning aside* out of its way, ὕπαιθα δὲ τοῖο λιασθεὶς Φεῦγε.

2. In the smaller number of passages lies the idea of *to fall, sink*; as Il. ο, 543. of a combatant wounded behind, ὁ δ' ἄρα πρηνὴς ἐλιάσθη: and υ, 418. of another struck in the same way, προτὶ οἱ δ' ἔλαβ' ἔντερα χερσὶ λιασθείς: and again of the same person at 420. Ἔντερα χερσὶν ἔχοντα, λιαζόμενον προτὶ γαίῃ. With these agrees Il. ψ, 879. of the dying bird, σὺν δὲ πτερὰ πυκνὰ λίασθεν, its wings *dropped*; in which interpretation the reading of Aristarchus λίασσεν makes no other difference, than that this would be the only instance of the active voice of this verb, 'the bird dropped its wings'. The gloss of Hesychius relating to this passage, ἐλίασεν, ἐτίναξεν (compare also λιάζει), gives this word therefore a meaning not confirmed elsewhere; nor indeed is it suitable here, as the poet is evidently describing the last moments of the dying bird (αὐχέν' ἀπεκρέμασεν), when breath and the powers of life are leaving it, and it is too late for a convulsive motion, such as the *clapping* of the wings. The word πυκνά is therefore here and at λ, 454. to be understood as the regular and constant epithet of the wing, like χλαίνη πυκνή, λόχμη πυκνή. At the same time it cannot be denied that the reading of Aristarchus has much in its favour: Αὐχέν' ἀπεκρέμασεν, σὺν δὲ πτερὰ πυκνὰ λίασσεν.

3. If now we compare these two leading senses, we shall see that they differ in the two collateral ideas, *aside* and *downwards,* which are sometimes indeed added, and if not, are supplied by the context. The common idea therefore is κλίνειν, *to bend* or *turn,* and this sense will render the majority of both kinds of passages quite intelligible; as 'bending sidewards', 'thou hast bent or turned aside hither', 'the waves bent or turned aside', and 'he bent himself down to the earth,' 'the bird bent its wings together'. And this is fully confirmed by

the adjective ἀλίαστος, literally *unbending, unyielding, not to be turned*; and thus it became the epithet of a violent, uncontrollable, incessant tumult, battle, lamentation, &c., as at Il. μ, 471. β, 797. ω, 760.; and as an adverb at ω, 549. Ἄνσχεο, μηδ' ἀλίαστον ὀδύρεο.

4. All the other explanations given by the grammarians of these words and forms I pass over in silence; and it will now be easily seen that they all arose, as usual, either from a partial view of the passages, or from the usual misleading of etymology, as is the case here with λίαν and the like[1]. We see, for instance, that there is no idea whatever of *haste* in any of the above-mentioned passages; and as little in the well-known passage of Euripides Hec. 100. Ἑκάβη σπουδῇ πρὸς σ' ἐλιάσθην Τὰς δεσποσύνας σκηνὰς προλιποῦσ' . . ., where the idea of haste lies only in the word which expresses it, and the verb is explained by the verse following; according to which therefore it means nothing more than it does in some of the Homeric passages, i. e. merely a departure from the proper place of stay or residence. See Hermann.

5. On the other hand, the idea of haste does lie decidedly and exclusively in the Homeric participle λελιημένος. From its form this participle would certainly seem to belong exactly to our verb, as the forms in άζω and άω so frequently coincide; and there is another case, βιάζομαι, ἐβιήσατο, βεβίηκε, very similar to the one before us. Besides, the idea of haste might be drawn from that of bending, as one who runs in haste does incline forwards. But setting aside the consideration that in this way we might draw almost any inference whatever, this idea certainly does not suit those passages where the description is not of running, but only of *eagerness in action*, as Il. δ, 465. Ἕλκε δ' ὑπὲκ βελέων λελιημένος, ὄφρα τάχιστα Τεύχεα συλήσειε, where this combatant must certainly have bent or stooped down, but not for the purpose of haste. Since then the participle always expresses haste or eagerness, but never has the sense of λιάζω, and again this latter never occurs with the other meaning, we are necessarily led to suppose a radical

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[1] I have no doubt of λιάζω being etymologically akin to κλίνω, as κνέφας is to νέφος, χλιαρός to λιαρός, &c.

difference between them. Let us now take a survey of the four passages of λελιημένος, viz. the one just quoted, that at ε, 690. Ἀλλὰ παρήϊξεν λελιημένος, ὄφρα τάχιστα Ὤσαιτ' Ἀργείους· and μ, 106. π, 552. Βὰν δ' ἰθὺς Δαναῶν λελιημένοι, and we see that the idea of *haste* is only a collateral one, while the principal idea is *eagerness, desire.* I have no hesitation therefore in agreeing with the grammarians, who saw in this participle not only the same stem or root to which λιλαίομαι belongs, but this verb itself in its more simple form λιλάω; that is to say, they took λελιημένος for λελιλημένος. For we know that before a language is written such sacrifices are very commonly made to soften the pronunciation, which in a later æra would be barbarisms or unformed language: an instance of which we have in the omission of a λ from the same cause in ἔκπαγλος for ἔκπλαγλος, and in πύελος for πλύελος from πλύνω.

6. In the time of the older grammarians this explanation must have been the only current one, as Apollonius joins the word with the genitive, e. g. 1, 1164. λελιημένοι ἠπείροιο, and uses also a tense of the verb itself (for elsewhere only the participle occurs) exactly in the sense of *to desire, wish,* with an infinitive, e. g. 3, 1158. οὐδ' αὐδῆσαι ἀνειρομένῃ λελίητο.

78. Μεγαίρω, ἀμέγαρτος.

1. The derivation of the verb *μεγαίρω,* and the mode of tracing its meaning, have been long correctly understood in all essential points: the only mistake has been the introducing of the verb *αἴρω.* Μεγαίρω is formed immediately from *μέγας,* in the precise sense of *μέγα ποιοῦμαι* or *δεινὸν ποιοῦμαι, I look on it as something great, it appears to me great, too great, too much*[1]. And thus we have at once joined with it the idea of *annoyance,* and of *envy,* which then becomes the prevailing meaning. This

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[1] There are sufficient etymological grounds for deriving the ρ in *μεγαίρω* from the *s* in *μέγας,* and we may cite *γέρας, γεραίρω* in confirmation of it. But this latter verb comes yet more immediately from *γεραρός,* as *καθαίρω* does from *καθαρός.* Consequently in the former case we are led to *μέγαρον*; which makes it probable that *μέγαρος,* as well as *μέγαλος,* was a form of *μέγας,* of which the neuter only remained elliptical, 'the large room of the house, the great hall'.

is the clearest way of tracing its sense in the two passages of Il. ψ, 865. and Od. γ, 55. In the former of these it is said, Teucer missed the dove—*μέγηρε γάρ οἱ τόγ' Ἀπόλλων*—but he hit the string. Here we can clearly trace the train of thought: Apollo was unwilling to grant it to Teucer, as being something too great for him; but he granted it afterwards to the prayer of Meriones. Compare Hymn. Merc. 465. We may see the same in the other passage in the prayer to Neptune, *μηδὲ μεγήρῃς Ἡμῖν εὐχομένοισι τελευτῆσαι τάδε ἔργα*, the proper sense of which is, the petitioner prays for something great, and begs the god not to refuse it as too great; but in other instances the idea is not so full and circumstantial in the mind of the petitioner, and hence it is only a strong expression for *disliking to grant a thing, refusing it*; which sense it has in its simplest form at Il. η, 408. where the Trojans *are not refused* leave to bury their dead; *κατακειέμεν οὔτι μεγαίρω*.

2. This verb is somewhat more obscure, when, instead of the action refused to be done, the thing or object refused is added in the genitive. Thus at Il. δ, 54. Juno offers to permit Jupiter to destroy her dearest cities, and adds, *Τάων οὔτι ἐγὼ πρόσθ' ἵσταμαι, οὐδὲ μεγαίρω*. For that the genitive *τάων* is here common to the two verbs, which unite to make up the joint idea of protecting those cities, is clear from another passage, (which is elucidated in its turn by the above,) viz. Il. ν, 563. where Neptune, in order to save Antilochus, weakens the force of the spear hurled at him by Adamas: *ἀμενήνωσεν δέ οἱ αἰχμὴν Κυανοχαῖτα Ποσειδάων βιότοιο μεγήρας*. That the life here mentioned can be no other than that of Antilochus, is evident at first sight. But the question is, whether the dative, to which *μεγήρας* refers, and which is not expressed here, is Adamas himself or his spear. If the former, the expression is strikingly harsh, 'refusing him the life', that is to say, 'refusing to permit him to take away the life of his enemy'*. At least something must in that case be supposed to be granted him, in opposition to the life which was refused him, for example to wound his enemy. Hence the only correct explanation is that at last adopted by Heyne, and made quite clear by the previous

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* [Yet we meet with a not very dissimilar phrase in Scripture; "Thou hast not asked the life of thine enemies," 1 Kings, iii. 11.—Ed.]

passage. The god deprives the *spear* of its force, and refuses (it) the life, i. e. refuses to permit it to take away the life of Antilochus. Thus by referring the refusal to the spear, there is a sufficient contrast to the life refused, viz. that the shield, as mentioned immediately afterwards, is pierced by it.

3. The idea of *refusing* or *objecting to* lies also in Od. θ, 206., where Ulysses challenges all the Phæacians to contend with him, Ἢ πὺξ, ἠὲ πάλῃ, ἦ καὶ ποσὶν, οὔτι μεγαίρω, where the verb implies a refusal accompanied with a disdainful feeling toward the persons challenged; as it is explained just afterward at v. 212. οὔπερ τίν' ἀναίνομαι οὐδ' ἀθερίζω. But this last verb refers immediately to the person, while on the other hand, οὐ μεγαίρω, as is always the case, refers to the action not refused to be done: nor is there any intimation whatever in Homer that it can be used quite absolutely in the sense of *to wish evil to any one.* When therefore at Il. ο, 473. Ajax says to Teucer, whose bow had fallen on the ground with its string broken, that he had better let bow and arrows lie there, ἐπεὶ συνέχευε θεὸς, Δαναοῖσι μεγήρας, the latter verb refers, as before, to the shot: "a god grudges or refuses the Grecians thy shot." Lastly, we have the idea of *displeasure, annoyance,* growing out of that of δεινὸν ποιεῖσθαι at Od. β, 235.; where Mentor says to the Ithacans, μνηστῆρας...οὔτι μεγαίρω Ἔρδειν ἔργα βίαια, "for they," says he, "risk their lives by it; but ἄλλῳ δήμῳ νεμεσίζομαι."

4. Apollonius 4, 1670. has invented a perfectly new use of this verb, joining it with a simple accusative: ἐχθοδοποῖσιν Ὄμμασι χαλκείοιο Τάλω ἐμέγηρεν ὀπωπάς. Here μεγαίρειν means *to consider* or *treat as an enemy*, and taking it in a more definite sense, *to bewitch*, 'fascinare'. As the addition of the genitive in this passage makes it impossible to add the dative of the person even in thought, μεγαίρω has quite changed its original relation; and thus we have a new proof how blindly or arbitrarily those poets acted in forming their usage of words from the old Epic.

5. For the adjective ἀμέγαρτος we deduce therefore, from the common meaning of μεγαίρω, the sense of *not an object for envy, unenvied.* Hence its acknowledged meaning in many of

the passages of the old poets is, *unfortunate, wretched, mournful.* But as *φθονέω* and *μεγαίρω* are similar in meaning, it has been the custom to consider (in Homer for instance) *ἀμέγαρτος* as synonymous with *ἄφθονος*, i. e. to mean *abundant, great.* Now in all the passages quoted for this purpose the word stands joined with unfortunate or mournful objects; for instance at Il. β, 420. *πόνον δ' ἀμέγαρτον ὄφελλον.* At Hesiod. θ, 666. (of the deities warring with the Titans) *μάχην δ' ἀμέγαρτον ἔγειραν Πάντες, θήλειαί τε καὶ ἄρσενες.* At Od. λ, 400. Ulysses asks the shade of Agamemnon, "Did Neptune destroy thee, *Ὄρσας ἀργαλέων ἀνέμων ἀμέγαρτον ἀϋτμήν*;". Now it would be singular that this particular word should always occur in this relation in an improper sense,—that is to say, of a number of objects which are not the object of envy, and should not be found once in its natural relation of *ἄφθονος* to property, riches, &c. Besides, the thought given in the passage of Hesiod by this interpretation would not be a correct one: "All the deities, female as well as male, waged an *immeasurable* war." Here *ἀμέγαρτος* can be nothing but a fixed epithet, in a sense exactly similar to *δαΐ λυγρῇ* in a similar kind of phrase just before (v. 650.). And in no other sense does it occur in the tragedians, as may be seen by the passages quoted in Schneider's Lexicon[*], to which we may add one from the comedian in his Thesm. 1049. For even the passage cited by Schneider from Eurip. Hec. 191. *ἀμέγαρτα κακῶν*, as an instance of the meaning of *great, endless*, speaks loudly in favour of the other meaning; particularly as it is far less natural for Polyxena, on receiving intelligence of her approaching sacrifice, to say, "O mother, what *numerous, endless* woes thou tellest me," than "what *cruel, wretched* woes," &c. The scholiast too explains it not by *ἄφθονα*, but by *ἀφθόνητα, διὰ τὸ εἶναι λίαν κακά· τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ.* In short, in every passage, as, for instance, in all the Epic ones, we can substitute *λυγρός* for *ἀμέγαρτος* with most perfect suitableness to the sense.

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[*] [Schneider quotes from Æschyl. Prom. 402. *ἀμέγαρτα*, 'wretched sufferings, such as no one could envy'. From the Suppl. 657. *ποίμνα ἀμέγαρτος*, 'a wretched band, more to be pitied than envied'.—Ed.]

6. This is also the only correct meaning of ἀμέγαρτος when it is an epithet of *men*, as when Eumæus is twice addressed in the Odyssey (ρ, 219. φ, 362.) reproachfully, ἀμέγαρτε συβῶτα. With this we need only compare Il. ν, 119., where a coward is called λυγρός; and particularly Od. ι, 454., where Polyphemus complains in language similarly reproachful, that an ἀνὴρ κακὸς σὺν λυγροῖς ἑτάροισι has blinded him. In this case therefore ἀμέγαρτος is very properly understood to mean *bad, miserable, worthless*; by which means the person is treated as a thing. If now, in this case also, we start from the idea of *unfortunate*, that is, poor, beggarly, we shall go astray from the analogy of the expression ἀμέγαρτος. For since μεγαίρω, as we have seen, never refers absolutely to a person, but always has a reference to something which one grudges to another, or objects to another's having; so there is no reason for understanding ἀμέγαρτος in that case otherwise than as said of an object 'which one should grudge or envy to no one'; a very expressive term as used of a man who is thereby vilified as a *wretched, worthless* fellow. Æschylus may indeed appear to have gone a step further than others, in making the suppliants call themselves (Suppl. 657.) ποίμνα ἀμέγαρτος: but here is introduced the image of a flock or band, which is a thing; the unhappy speakers call themselves therefore very aptly 'a band in no enviable situation', i. e. in a wretched one.

Μεγακήτης; vid. κητώεσσα.

Μέλας; vid. κελαινός.

79. Μεταλλᾶν.

1. We certainly do here and there meet with allusions to the correct etymological view of the words μεταλλᾶν and μέταλλον (see Damm toward the end of the article Μεταλλάω); but yet there is no account drawn out with sufficient precision and correctness, to prevent our apprehending that some interpreters

may still explain the Homeric verb as an expression drawn from mining. Μετ' ἄλλα means *after another*, i. e. in the sense of μετά, the German *nach* [and English *after*], in such phrases as *to go, seek, inquire after*. The curiosity of a man inquisitive after other things than those immediately around him, was therefore very naturally represented by joining these two words in the form of a verb, μεταλλᾷν, which must have originally had an absolute sense, *to inquire after other things, be inquisitive*. It then took an object, and in this construction was introduced into the Epic language. With a person as the object it now meant *to interrogate, examine*: with a thing as its object (which however might also be a person) it meant *to inquire after something, examine into it, inform oneself about it*. But its most general meaning in Homer, in this construction as well as the other, is its original sense of a careful and even inquisitive investigation; as at Il. α, 550. Jupiter says to Juno, Μήτι σὺ ταῦτα ἕκαστα διείρεο μηδὲ μετάλλα. It is however conceivable that in this sense it may in time have lost some of its force, not only in an interrogatory address, but in any general one; and that μετάλλασε in Pind. Ol. 6, 106. is so to be understood, 'he addressed him'; but on this passage I do not feel confidence enough to speak more decisively[1].

2. With regard to the substantive μέταλλον, I consider it to be a kind of abstraction from the sense of the verb, answering

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[1] Böckh, following the scholiast, in favour of whose interpretation Damm had before declared himself, thinks that Pindar may have used the word not improperly in a particular meaning, 'to show oneself solicitous about a person's welfare'. If by this it is meant that Pindar has used the word *here* with lyric boldness, the opinion does not satisfy me; for neither in the word itself, nor in the construction of the passage, is there enough to give the hearer or reader notice of such a sense; on the other hand, it is possible for the word to have arrived at such a sense in the usage of the poets, but of this proofs are wanting. Heyne has recommended the explaining it as a *mere address*; and this explanation has certainly thus much in its favour, that supposing the present reading of the text to be the true one, most readers will understand it in this sense, and imagine it to be a peculiar application of the old Epic word. The corrections attempted are not satisfactory. That of Hermann, μεταλλάσαντί ἰν, is liable to the same objection as in the other passages of Pindar, in which he wishes to introduce this pronoun, namely, that according to the analogy of ἐμίν and τίν it cannot be enclitic.

exactly to the French word *fouille*, and expressing originally a *rummaging* or *searching into*, and, secondly, the place where such a search is made. But this cannot be proved, as we never find the word in any author before the invention of writing, when it has at once the definite meaning of *searching in the earth*, but so that it comprehends not only mines but quarries also. Much later is the usage where it stands for the *minerals* themselves dug out of these mines, and the latest of all that which confines it to what we call *ores* and *metals*.

80. Νηγάτεος.

1. Heyne rejects, and with great justice, all the explanations given by the grammarians of the word νηγάτεος, except one; which explanations may be found in their writings by any one who is fond of seeing miserable examples of want of judgement[1]. But I have not been lucky enough to meet with any better one than the following, which is also the most common, namely, that it stands for νεήγατος (from γείνω, γέγαα, like τατός from τείνω), *become new, newly made*, which meaning is also the best suited to the sense of the only two passages in Homer where it occurs, viz. Il. β, 43. ξ, 185. of the king's tunic and the veil of the goddess, which are said to be καλὸν, νηγάτεον· καλῷ, νηγατέῳ. The composition of νεήγατος is quite analogous to νεηγενής, Od. δ, 336.

2. Now the form before us may be deduced from νεήγατος by contracting the two first syllables, and lengthening the termination. But this mode of lengthening (in place of which that in ιος would be more agreeable to analogy, as ὕστατος, ὑστάτιος, &c.) is to my mind harsher than (which may perhaps appear astonishing) the opinion adopted by the old grammarians, that νηγάτεος came from νεήγατος by *changing the place of the* ε. It is true, that the grammarian, who comes to such a decision as this without philosophical and physiological grounds,

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[1] Suidas has collected a number of explanations without any foundation; and Schneider has done them too great honour in paying any attention to them.

but merely from outward appearances, can only be right by chance. To me the reason seems to be plain: I consider it to be one of those cases where the formation of the verse had an influence on the framing of the word. Νεήγατος was indisputably a word in common use. When the singers wished to introduce into their verse καλὸν νεήγατον, they changed the place of the ε, not arbitrarily, but from an obscure feeling of analogy, which was thus satisfied that εος was a common termination, and νη a beginning more familiar to the ear than the other. The number of the syllables and the value of the quantities remained the same, and the verse had a more harmonious cadence.

3. As far as regards the post-Homeric usage of the word, the passage in Hymn. Apoll. 122., where it is an epithet of the swaddling-clothes of the infant Apollo, agrees exactly with the usage of Homer. In Apollonius 4, 188. it is also the epithet of a garment or covering, but so that the idea of *new* does not necessarily present itself. But we have in the same poet at 1, 775. νηγατέῃσι....καλύβῃσιν; which indeed the scholiast explains by νεοκατασκευάστοις; but the whole passage is still obscure. Compare the scholium, and Schneider* on παστάς and πάσσω, in conjunction with Hesych. v. πάσσε.

81. Νήδυμος.

1. The word νήδυμος occurs in Homer twelve times, and always as a fixed and regular epithet of *sleep*. The meaning of it according to the earliest and most common acceptation is *sweet, refreshing*, as it is considered to be derived from ἡδύς, which itself is an epithet of sleep in Od. α, 364. But with this is connected a question as old as most of the criticisms on Homer, whether the true form of the word be νήδυμος, or (which comes nearer to the original derivation) ἥδυμος. In five pas-

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* [The two references here made to Schneider's Lexicon refer to Apollonius 1, 729. δαίδαλα πολλ' ἐπέπαστο (where Brunck reads ἐκέκαστο), explained by ποικίλλειν: and to 1, 789. where καλὴ παστὰς is explained to be the same as πρόδομος, a kind of vestibule, through which Jason was conducted from the court into the inner apartment.—Ed.]

sages (namely, at Il. β, 2. κ, 91. ξ, 242. Od. δ, 793. μ, 311.) it is preceded by a word capable of receiving the separable ν, e. g. *Δία δ' οὐκ ἔχε νήδυμος ὕπνος*, where therefore it may also be divided as *ἔχεν ἥδυμος*. See the scholia and Eustathius on this passage, and the Etym. M. on both forms. In the other cases, where the ν cannot be removed, (at least in this manner,) as at Il. κ, 187. *Ὣς τῶν νήδυμος ὕπνος*, and ψ, 63. where *νήδυμος* begins the verse, the grammarians quote these passages as a proof that this is the true reading in the other five[1]. Hence therefore it is evident that in the Homer handed down to those grammarians, *νήδυμος* was really the received reading; nor, as far as I know, is *ἥδυμος* now found in the manuscripts as a various reading in any one of those passages. In Homer therefore, considered as *handed down to us*, *νήδυμος* must be the established reading, according to all the rules of sound criticism.

2. But the rarity of this form is certainly striking. How came it that from *ἡδύς* was formed *νήδυμος*? The formation, like that of many others, is certainly possible; but the Greek language furnishes no analogy[2]. Aristarchus, as an accurate grammarian, felt this; but in the narrowness of his views he thought it a great help to give *νήδυμος* a different meaning, de-

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[1] Schol. Il. κ, 187. *ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι σαφῶς τὸ νήδυμος σὺν τῷ ν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀμφιβόλων οὖν οὕτως γράφεται.* ψ, 63. *ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι σαφῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ν ἄρχεται τὸ ὄνομα.*

[2] It is true that the pronoun *νίν* comes undoubtedly from *ἵν*, but yet I would not quote it here as a parallel case. Such small constantly-recurring words are in their nature very variable; and this change is a most natural one, as there was already a ν in the word. Ruhnken, in his Ep. Crit. 1. p. 92., has brought *νηλίτης* for *ἠλίτης* or *ἀλίτης* into the same class with *νήδυμος*: but this is not borne out by sound criticism; for the explanation of some of the grammarians *νηλίτης*, *ἁμαρτωλός* depends entirely on a misunderstanding of Od. π, 317.[a], and all that Ruhnken has brought forward on this word and on *νηλιτόποινος* requires to be made much clearer by the light of criticism than he has made it. Nor is *νητρεκής* for *ἀτρεκής* a case at all similar; as the only change here is that of the inseparable particles *νη-* and *ἀ-*, which are of similar meaning; from which, and the verb *τρέω*, both forms come quite naturally; *ἀτρεκής* from *τρέω*, like *ἐνδυκέως* from *δύω*.

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[a] [*Νηλίτης* in Od. π, 317. seems to have been completely misunderstood by Aristarchus and the other grammarians. It is formed from the negative particle *νη-* and *ἀλείτης*, consequently the sense is, *not in fault, innocent*. The sentence is repeated in Od. τ, 498. χ, 418.—Ed.]

riving it from νη- and δύω, and explaining it by ἀνέκδυτος, *from which one does not easily free oneself*, consequently synonymous with νήγρετος, which is found joined with νήδυμος at Od. ν, 79. 80. Whether this meaning could be a fixed epithet, was a consideration which did not trouble him; though it was easy enough to see what a contradiction it made when said of the guards on watch at Il. κ, 187. that "sleep, from which it is difficult to be roused, did not visit their eyes all the night."

3. If modern criticism possessed the materials which lay at the disposal of an Aristarchus, a satisfactory answer would probably have been given long ago to many disputed questions, and to this perhaps amongst others. But even a small store well used goes a considerable way. We will first then observe that although the form ἥδυμος is not found in Homer as a various reading, yet it is, if I may use the expression, an *Epic* various reading. The scholiasts on Homer (Il. β, 2.) cite it from Antimachus in this fragment, ἐπεί ῥά οἱ ἥδυμος ἐλθών, where the other form is not admissible. Again it stands in a situation equally indisputable in two passages of the old Hymn to Mercury, 241. προκαλεύμενος ἥδυμον ὕπνον, and 449. Εὐφροσύνην καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ἥδυμον ὕπνον ἑλέσθαι; and an authority perhaps still older is given us by Tzetzes on Homer (p. 4. Herm.), where we see Hesiod reproached for having corrupted many words of Homer, for instance for having said Ἰλεύς for Ὀϊλεύς, and ἥδυμος for νήδυμος. From which we see that this form did occur in some of the poems attributed by antiquity to Hesiod, and which at all events belong to the Cyclic period*. These authorities, as well as the usage of Alcman, from whom the Etym. M. quotes ἡδυμέστατος, and that of Simonides in the probably anapæstic verse, cited by the scholiast at Il. β, 2. Οὗτος δέ τοι ἥδυμον ὕπνον ἔχων, are very much against the probability of ἥδυμος having arisen from grammatical speculations on the Homeric word. We will suppose that Alcman and Simonides borrowed the word entirely from the Epics; then from all that has been said above thus much follows, that in the traditional songs of the rhapsodists was heard sometimes ἥδυμος, sometimes νήδυμος. Nay more, as ἥδυμος is drawn from such

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* [Those who do not understand the term *Cyclic* may see it explained at p. 457.—Ed.]

old sources, νήδυμος on the contrary is found in none of the older writers except in the passages of Homer above mentioned, and three others in the Homeric Hymns, viz. Hymn. Ven. 172. Hymn. Pan. 16. Batrach. 47. I do not hesitate to conclude from this, joined with the analogy of the form, that ἥδυμος alone is the genuine word.

4. Ἥδυμος, for instance, belonged to the words which had the digamma, as did ἡδύς, in which the digamma is so undoubted that not a single passage can be quoted to the contrary; and in its derivative ἦδος there is nothing opposed to the digamma except ἔσσεται, which precedes it twice (Il. α, 576. Od. σ, 403.), and which therefore without further ado is to be changed with Heyne into ἔσται. There is nothing then to prevent our supposing, that wherever νήδυμος now stands, originally stood ἥδυμος; at Od. μ, 366. for instance ἐξέσσυτο ἥδυμος ὕπνος is as good as at Il. φ, 508. ἀνείρετο ἡδὺ γελάσσας: and φέρειν καὶ ἥδυμον ὕπνον (Il. π, 454.) is as good as φίλον καὶ ἡδὺ γένοιτο (η, 387.). This hiatus, when the digamma had disappeared from the language, was at first tolerated by the ear of the rhapsodists in these passages, as in so many others; but where the separable ν could be introduced, as in Δία δ' οὐκ ἔχε ἥδυμος ὕπνος, the later reciters did not object to soften the hiatus in this natural manner; they spoke it ἐχενήδυμος.

5. Now came the time, still a very remote one, when this adjective was no longer in common use, but belonged to the thousand forms, known only from the old poetry, and in which the sense of such fixed epithets as this was obscure to all, to many quite unknown. The ear therefore knew not how the words in those Homeric passages should be separated, whether ἔχε νήδυμος or ἔχεν ἥδυμος. Hence both crept into popular recitation, as the rhapsodist was no scholar, and still less a critic: consequently the corrective, offered by those passages where the ν was wanting, never came to his aid in any way; and two of these passages even assisted the delusion, namely, Il. κ, 187. Ὡς τῶν ἥδυμος ὕπνος, and ξ, 354. Ἀχαιῶν ἥδυμος ὕπνος. From the uncertainty which thus arose in the pronunciation of the word, the incorrect νήδυμος naturally crept into those passages also in which no other ν was near (as Il. ξ, 253. π, 454. ψ, 63. Od. μ, 366. ν. 79.);

but where it always found room without injuring the metre, because the ν merely occupied the place of the old digamma. It is no wonder, that *νήδυμος*, being agreeable to the ear, prevailed over its sister-form in Homer; and it would have done so everywhere else had not some of the earlier post-Homeric poets, in whose language the digamma no longer existed, used *ἥδυμος* in those passages where *ἥδυμος* with the digamma (and consequently *νήδυμος*) could not have been admitted, as in those verses of the Hymn and of Antimachus. But that a poet and grammarian like Apollonius should use *ἥδυμος* and not *νήδυμος* (*οὐ κνέφας ἥδυμος ὕπνος*, 4, 407.), is a proof that in the older editions of Homer *ἥδυμος* not only existed as a various reading, but that before the time of Aristarchus it was preferred by the more learned to the other form. Still however the judgement of these scholars, who so frequently suffer themselves to be led astray by etymological speculations, would prove nothing if we had not (as was before said) the usage of poets, whom we cannot conceive capable of such a weakness, to decide us in favour of *ἥδυμος* and make *νήδυμος* appear to be an ancient error become common.

82. Νῶϊ, *νώ, σφῶϊ, σφώ, νωΐτερος, σφωΐτερος, σφωέ, σφέ, σφίν, σφάς.*

1. As most of these forms belong only to the Epic language, this would seem to be the proper place to collect together the most certain accounts which we have of them.

2. Herodian taught, as we see in the schol. to Il. *α*, 574.[1], that *σφώ* is the stem or root, of which *σφῶϊ* is merely a lengthened form; that *σφώ* is the common dual termination in *ω*, and consequently has the acute accent, as this termination does not admit the circumflex. Hence a suspicion might have arisen that the writing *νώ, σφώ* (instead of *νῷ, σφῷ*, from *νῶϊ, σφῶϊ*,) originated entirely in this theory. But that way of writing it

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[1] *Σφώ· πρωτόθετον αὐτήν φησιν Ἡρωδιανὸς, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς σφῶϊ· διὸ ὀξύνεται· τὸ γὰρ ω τῶν δυϊκῶν ἀπέστραπται τὴν περισπωμένην.*

is too firmly fixed in usage[2], for us not to recognise in that observation the grammarian who explains according to his own ideas an appearance which presented itself to him. Now of this kind is the explanation which would suppose, without any philosophical or really experimental grounds, that a letter, appearing more frequently in the less common form, is merely an addition made to the word. But any one who suffers no theorist to mislead him, will recognise in *νῶϊ* the old form, which was contracted into *νῷ*, but which lost the heavy tone in the course of daily pronunciation; while in writing, the *ι*, which was only etymological, very properly fell away, leaving *νώ*[3].

3. Whoever considers languages philosophically, will soon clearly perceive, that a dual, regularly and uniformly distinct from the plural, is not among the earliest necessities of a language, nor does it appear from the records of literature to be anything original. On the contrary, it is plain that dual forms in general are mere chance modifications of the plural form, which usage, always aiming at copiousness, adopted gradually and unobserved, to mark such a difference; while a regularity formed as gradually fixed this difference again on usage. No

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[2] Compare Etym. M. v. *νώ*, an article as empty as it is long, but where these forms are directed to be written without the *ι* subscript, with this observation, *ἀλλ' ἡ παράδοσις οὐκ οἶδε τὸ ι ἐγκείμενον*. It will be readily allowed that whatever we here bring forward respecting *νώ, σφώ*, holds good likewise of the particle *πρώ*, which is contracted in the same way from *πρωΐ*, and its termination cut off: see Timæi Lex. *in v.* and the note on Plato's Crito 1.

[3] For the satisfaction of those who desire more particular etymological grounds for the above, I subjoin the following. The terminations *ε* and *ι* are merely abbreviations of the more full plural form *ες, εις*, Latin *es, is*; in the same way as in the genitive terminations *αο, ωο, οιο*, the *ο* is an abbreviation of that which was originally the general termination of genitives, *ος*. The termination *ε* became limited, except in the plurals *ἄμμε, ὔμμε, σφέ*, entirely to the dual (*ἄνδρε, παῖδε*). The form *ι* appears pure only in the old Epic duals *νῶϊ, σφῶϊ*; impure in the plural terminations *αι* and *οι*, corresponding with the Latin *æ* and *ī*. And lastly, it is quite obliterated (as is *ε* too,) in the dual terminations *α* and *ω*, which, as we learn from the analogy of *νῶϊ, νώ*, are again in every instance abbreviations from *αϊ, ωϊ*, or *αε, ωε*. But these are fragments of a more comprehensive theory, which I am perhaps injuring by giving them thus isolated.

literary remains which have come down to us are old enough not to have been composed long after the dual had so originated, consequently none are too old to have it; nor has any language lived so long as not to be able to do without a dual, although it may have possessed one and lost it again. For all languages, from the earliest time, have been and still are fluctuating between individual copiousness and poverty. Homer has a fixed and completely formed dual, but this does not prevent our still finding in his works traces of an older time when these forms were not so fixed. Such are the well-known *plural* dual-forms, which no art can remove from Homer, and of which it is only astonishing that they appear so seldom.

4. But νῶϊ and σφῶϊ occur throughout Homer, and as far as I know without a single exception, as evident duals. For although Damm, p. 864., maintains that it is used for the plural "*plerumque*", yet I have not found one among the passages noted by him where there are not plainly two persons to whom it is to be referred. Would any one, for instance, at Il. ν, 326. explain νῶϊν merely by ἡμῖν, i. e. ἐμοί, instead of making it refer to Idomeneus and Meriones? Or shall it be said at Il. ο, 217. that νῶϊν points to all the gods, instead of Jupiter and Neptune only? On the other hand, later writers (Quintus for instance) use νῶϊν without hesitation as a plural for ἡμῖν[4].

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[4] See for example Quint. 1, 213. 369. 725, &c. Struve has touched on this point in a lecture entitled "Observations on passages in the Greek writers," No. 7., where he says that this is, as far as he knows, the only exception to a remark made by me in my Grammar, that the use of the dual as a plural is confined to verbs and participles. The case is however somewhat different; for there the inflexion only is spoken of, whilst νῶϊν has nothing dual in its termination (compare τεΐν, ἡμῖν, &c.); but an old usage appropriated to the dual the root itself of this pronoun, νω, which in Latin, the cognate language of Greek, is plural. On the contrary, a real exception is θηρητῆρε, in Oppian, 1, 72. But exceptions ought to be drawn only from those writers who help to form rules. That Quintus may have borrowed his νῶϊν from an older Epic poet, is possible, but it is only just possible: that Oppian's θηρητῆρε is a mistaken imitation, is in my opinion certain. Among the rules for regulating the usages of Greek, or for composing a Greek Thesaurus, this should be one,—not to place these writers, as we see frequently done nowadays, in the same rank with those whose scholars they were, as we now are.

I will here add some observations on νῶϊ. There were introduced into

5. According to this there can be no doubt of νωΐτερος and σφωΐτερος relating only to two persons. That this is the case with νωΐτερος in one of the only two passages where it occurs (Il. ο, 39.), and where it is used of Jupiter and Juno as a wedded pair, cannot be doubted. With regard to the other passage (Od. μ, 185.), it is true that the supposition of the Sirens being only two in number, arises in Homer entirely from the use of the dual form; but who can suppose that Σειρήνοιιν, which occurs twice (Od. μ, 52. 167.), and this νωϊτέρην,—forms never found in the plural,—should be used here together, by an enallage already mentioned as of great rarity, merely to deceive us?

6. The same holds good of σφωΐτερον also, which occurs only once in the well-known speech of Achilles to Minerva, Il. α, 216. Χρὴ μὲν σφωΐτερόν γε, θεὰ, ἔπος εἰρύσσασθαι. The idea of σφωΐτερον standing here by a surprising enallage for τεόν, ought never to have been entertained for a moment[5]. It was more excusable to be swayed by the sense, and to take it for ὑμέτερον, "You deities must be obeyed." But all that has been said above concurs to put beyond a doubt the explanation, which is now indeed the current one, of "you two,

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the language of the earliest Greek people (to attempt the unraveling of which would here lead us too far,) two quite different plural forms for the first and second personal pronoun, νῶϊ and ἡμεῖς, σφῶϊ and ὑμεῖς; which, as they were so completely different in sound, usage separated into dual and plural. This process was already complete before Homer's time, in the language of that tribe or race to which he belonged. That part of the Italian people which was akin to the Greeks, but used the Latin language (among whom the necessity of a dual does not seem to have developed itself), established in their usage one form only, as plural, which in the first person is the same as the Greeks used for their dual, νῶϊ, *nos*; a plain proof that the dual in this form is entirely accidental; and equally accidental, with regard to the dual, is the sound of the ω, which appears to be characteristic in νώ, σφώ, τούτω, &c. It is remarkable too that the present Italian *noi* is the old Greek word unchanged. This will appear somewhat astonishing to any one who thinks that the road for tracing an Italian word up to antiquity must lead through the Latin. But do not the old Greek forms ἰώ (Bœot.), τύ, τοί, ἵν, ἕ, still exist in the modern languages, Ital. *io*, Fr. *tu*, *toi*, Germ. *ihn*, Low Germ. *he*? Amidst the most monstrous changes of language individual forms are often preserved in an astonishing state of purity.

[5] See Etym. M. *in v.*

thine and Juno's." The reciter intentionally chose this form, which the ear so seldom met with, in order to make it at once perceptible that Achilles intended only the two goddesses, who were in this case the sole agents (see v. 208.); although afterwards (218.), by a very natural transition to a more general mode of expression, he speaks of all the deities collectively. It was not until the later Epics that the faulty usage of changing one word for another was applied to this *σφωΐτερος*, as well as to other pronouns, particularly by Apollonius, who uses it exactly like *σφέτερος* in the multifarious senses which that word has in his writings[6].

7. The genitive and dative *νῶϊν, σφῶϊν*, have a fixed *ν*, without which they would be the same as the nominative and accusative. Nor have *νῶϊ, σφῶϊ* ever been properly used as a dative, though the ignorance of later times may have occasionally mistaken them, as in Lucian's Solœcista c. 6. a person is laughed at for saying *νῶϊ τοῦτο δοκεῖ*: and this may have been increased by passages misunderstood, as Il. δ, 286. *Σφῶϊ μὲν, οὐ γὰρ ἔοικ' ὀτρυνέμεν, οὔτι κελεύω.* But Heyne does

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[6] In Antimachus *σφωΐτερος* was kept within the reasonable limits of relating only to the dual of the second person; consequently he formed it from *σφωέ*, as we learn from Apollon. de Pronom. p. 141. But Apollonius Rhodius certainly did not set out with this derivation, otherwise the dual meaning would be at least the leading one in his usage, whereas it does not once occur in the third person in his whole poem; but we only find *σφέτερος* and *σφωΐτερος* (forms corresponding in their root,) clumsily used for each other,—an exchange probably adopted before him by the later rhapsodists, to whom that old Epic language was no longer a mother-tongue. Now *σφέτερος* has, 1.) the relation of the third person (not reflective) in all numbers; and thus *σφωΐτερος* stands for *his* in Apollon. 1, 643. "The Argonauts gave Æthalides the staff of Mercury, *σφωϊτέροιο τοκῆος*:" 2.) that of the reflective third person in all numbers; thus again *σφωΐτερος* is used for 'his own' (*suus*) 3, 600. "The Sun had warned him to avoid *δόλον γενέθλης σφωϊτέρης*, of his own posterity:" and 3.) that of the pure reflective without a person, consequently relating equally to either; and so we find *σφωΐτερος* for *thine*, 3, 395. "If thou desirest to subdue any people *σφωϊτέροισιν ὑπὸ σκήπτροισι*," which we must not suppose to be a false imitation of the Homeric passage mentioned above; for *σφωΐτερον*, taken in the sense of *thine*, would be in that passage without any reflexion; but it stands here in Apollon. for *σφέτερος*, which holds good as a general reflective for all numbers and persons, e. g. for *thine* in Theocr. 22, 67. *σφετέρης μὴ φείδεο τέχνης.*

Eustathius an injustice when he makes him say that Homer in this passage used *σφῶϊ* for *σφῶϊν* to suit the metre; on the contrary Eustathius agrees with all good commentators, saying that Homer in the passage in question used on account of the metre a new construction[7], namely *κελεύειν τινὰ* without an infinitive, whereas in this case the dative is more common[8].

8. But even the form with the *ν* is in danger, in one or two passages, of being taken for the nominative or accusative, which it has been attempted, contrary to all analogy, to adapt to the verse by means of this *ν*. One of these passages is Od. *ψ*, 52. *Ἀλλ' ἕπευ, ὄφρα σφῶϊν ἐϋφροσύνης ἐπιβῆτον Ἀμφοτέρω φίλον ἦτορ.* But here *ἀμφοτέρω* is the nominative, and *σφῶϊν* the *dativus commodi* to *ἦτορ* instead of the genitive, "that you both may give up to joy the heart *to you*," i. e. your heart: and no one would have doubted about this solution if there had not been a far more disputable passage at Il. *π*, 99. There Achilles says to Patroclus,

> *Μήτε τις οὖν Τρώων θάνατον φύγοι, ὅσσοι ἔασιν,*
> *Μήτε τις Ἀργείων, νῶϊν δ' ἐκδῦμεν ὄλεθρον.*

Such is the text in the general editions before Wolf, who follows the old grammarians in the Venetian scholia. That is to say, these, in order to have the dative in this passage, consider the verb as an infinitive, and therefore accent it thus, ἐκδύμεν. Consequently they acknowledge the υ in this infinitive to be short, and suppose that the metre alone makes the syllable long.

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[7] *Ὀφεῖλον γραφῆναι σφῶϊν ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑμῖν, ἵνα ᾖ, σφῶϊν οὔτι κελεύω...., ὅμως διὰ μέτρου εὐχρηστίαν ἄλλως καινῶς ἀπεδόθη καθ' ἑτεροίαν σύνταξιν.*

[8] Damm, under *κελεύω*, will furnish examples of both kinds. But in the passage above mentioned he wishes to join *σφῶϊ κελεύω ὀτρυνέμεν* scil. *λαούς*: which the following verse (*Αὐτὼ γὰρ μάλα λαὸν ἀνώγετον ἶφι μάχεσθαι*) might seem very much to favour, and by which *σφῶϊ* would be in its usual construction. But *ὀτρυνέμεν* standing without a case is too harsh a construction for the other not to force itself upon us at once as the more natural.

Another passage, where *νῶϊ* appears as a dative, is in Eurip. Iph. Aul. 1207. *Εἰ δ' εὖ λέλεκται νῶϊ, μὴ δή γε κτάνῃς Τὴν σήν τε κἀμὴν παῖδα.* But this need not mislead us; for as the context requires the first pers. sing., we must suppose that Euripides has united in a plain iambic two things unheard of before, *νῶϊ* for *νῶϊν*, and this dual form for *ἡμῖν*, i. e. *ἐμοί*. The passage therefore still wants the assistance of the critic. Musgrave's proposal of reading *γνῶθι* seems to me an amendment not to be rejected; but then the rest must run thus, *Εἰ δ' εὖ λέλεκται, γνῶθι, μηδέ γε κτάνῃς*, &c.

9. I must here detain my readers for a moment. This accentuation of the grammarians, if the word be really the infinitive, is false. The infinitives in -μεναι and -μεν, which do not allow of being separated from each other, most certainly shorten the long vowel preceding the common termination ναι, as in δοῦναι—δόμεναι, δόμεν· θεῖναι—θέμεναι, θέμεν: to which δῦναι—δύμεναι, δύμεν, appears to be an exactly parallel case. But the υ of the aorist ἔδυν is not to be compared with the changeable vowel in ἔδων, δοῦναι, δότε, δόμεναι, but with the regularly long vowel in ἔγνων, γνῶναι, ἔγνωτε, γνώμεναι· ἔβην, βῆναι, ἔβημεν, βήμεναι[9], in which the short vowel in βάτην is an exception. Hence the long υ in ἔδυτε (Od. ω, 106.), in ἐδύτην (Il. ζ, 19.), and in δῦθι, δῦτε: and hence, as without an exception we always write δόμεναι, so on the other hand δύμεναι is always found without an exception with the long υ, as in Il. γ, 241. ζ, 185. 411. ξ, 64. τ, 313. But if the υ in δύμεναι be long by nature, it will remain long also in the shortened form; and δῦμεν would therefore even as an infinitive have its circumflex. Here then we have a clear instance how little those grammarians were secured by their antiquity and nationality against introducing into their authors forms and accents not Greek; and the common traditional text νῶϊν δ' ἐκδῦμεν is therefore, as far as concerns the individual forms, perfectly correct. But those grammarians had in their mind the analogy of ζευγνύμεναι, ζευγνύμεν, in which the case is totally different. In those presents in -υμι the υ is, excepting in the singular indicative, naturally short, as in ζεύγνυμεν, ζεύγνυτε, ζευγνύναι, &c.; at Il. π, 145. it is therefore (as a metrical exception only) long in the infinitive ζευγνύμεν, as the passage itself where it stands announces; so that there is no necessity for either the reading recommended by Hermann (de Ellipsi et Pleon. p. 232.)

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[9] See my Grammar, sect. 95. obs. 7. and sect. 99, 12, 2. c.

ζευγνύμμεν, nor for the accentuation adopted by Wolf, *ζευγνῦμεν*[10].

10. But however correct the forms *νῶϊν* and *ἐκδῦμεν* may be, the infinitive would make a very incorrect construction. Suppose *γένοιτο* to be understood with *νῶϊν*.—But this kind of elliptical wishing is scarcely ever met with elsewhere in the simplicity of the Epic language; for as soon as an infinitive expressing a wish is used, the subject becomes the accusative. And, to settle this point by one question, Why did not Homer say *ἐκδῦναι ὄλεθρον*, as he has elsewhere said *δῦναι ὅμιλον*? Nothing therefore remains but that *ἐκδῦμεν* should be the *optative*[11], which besides is supported by the construction of the sentence, and we shall then have a case where *νῶϊν* must be the nominative. But Heyne very justly inclines to the reading of *νῶϊ δ' ἐκδῦμεν ὄλεθρον*, which is not only found in some Codd., but adopted by Eustathius, in whose commentary we see *νῶϊ* plainly written. An ignorance of the more ancient forms had very early introduced the *ν* to suit the apparent ne-

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[10] My suspicion of Wolf's reading, which I mentioned in the first edition of this work, I so far retract, in as much as the old grammarians might certainly have established *ζευγνῦμεν* quite as well as *τιθήμεναι*. Still Hermann's *ζευγνύμμεν* appears to me more analogical, as I have explained in my large Grammar (Ausführl. Sprachl.). There is however one objection to both, that deviations from the customary reading must not be lightly made in such instances as these, where the consequences, if followed up, would lead in a number of other cases to arbitrary decisions or the introduction of unusual forms. The scholar knows already how he must look upon *Φίλε κασίγνητε*, and *αἰόλος ὄφις*, and *ὀλοῇσι φρεσὶ θύει*: we will leave him also *ζευγνύμεν ἄνωγεν*.

[11] To write this word, as Hermann proposes, *ἐκδυῖμεν*, is one of those extreme cases to which we are led (as was remarked in the preceding note) by an ignorance of consequences. And here I cannot avoid praising the caution of an old grammarian, Apollonius of Alexandria, who, according to Chœroboscus ad Theodosii Canones, fol. 316. r. (Bekk. 1292.), wrote the optative of *ὄμνυμι*—*ὀμνύην*, (and not, as according to analogy he might have written it, *ὀμνυίην*,) because the optative passive must be written *ὀμνύμην**. Compare Eustath. ad Il. *l. c.* p. 1060, 31. 32. Basil.

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* [If we follow in this verb the strict analogy of verbs in -*μι*, the active optative would be *ὀμνυίην*, and the passive *ὀμνυίμην*: but as this diphthong is never found before a consonant, the passive became *ὀμνύμην*, and then to preserve conformity the active was written *ὀμνύην*. See the act. opt. *φύη*, Theocr. 15. 94. and Buttmann's Irregular Verbs, p. 73. 261.—Ed.]

cessity of the metre, and thus furnished a subject for the ingenuity of the more learned grammarians.

11. The dual of the third person, σφέ, σφωΐν, is distinguished from that of the second (beside the accent, of which hereafter,) only by the ε of the first form, which moreover occurs only as an accusative, *never as a nominative*; and this for no other than that general reason, according to which the singular also has no nominative, and the plural (in Homer at least) none; but the investigation of this belongs to grammar[12]. Besides, in the ancient writers the difference between the second and third person by means of the terminations ε and ι was not much to be depended on; and as some poets of considerable antiquity used in the first person νῶε instead of νῶϊ (Apollonius de Pronom. p. 373. quotes it from Antimachus and Corinna), so σφῶε for the second person is also agreeable to analogy; and indeed a part of the grammarians did actually write it so at Il. η, 280. instead of σφῶϊ[13]. Whether the exact observance of this difference in the text as it is handed down to us really existed in the old language, or whether we are to attribute it to those who revised the works of the old poet, lies far beyond our means of deciding[14].

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[12] What may be found in Fischer ad Well. vol. 2. p. 202. of a nominative σφῶε, accusative σφωέ, arises entirely from a misunderstanding of the passages quoted there from the grammarians.

[13] Apollonius (de Pronom. p. 374.) says this of the Homeric critic Ixion, and it is found also in a Vienna manuscript. See Heyne.

[14] This unusual appearance of an almost complete identity between forms of the second and third person is not grounded on any old change, (such as those mentioned before in note 6., and which, as was there observed, are unknown to Homer,) but entirely on this, that both persons came originally from the demonstrative power of the pronoun. But the demonstrative form was σ as well as τ, as we see by the derivatives σήμερον, σῆτες, the Latin *sic*, the German and English *so*. This *s* was again polished off in the most common forms, as in ὁ, *is*, *ibi*, and many others. We see therefore a possibility of the forms σύ, τύ, *se*, σφέ, ἕ, ἵν, &c. being in their initial letters and aspirates (i. e. in their root) akin to each other and to the demonstrative. But the *terminations* also, which expressed the various sorts of relations, became quite as much changed in the daily language and in the dialects; and thus arose that multiplicity of pronominal forms, which usage again was continually distributing into different meanings, without keeping constantly in view the original characteristics of each element. Thus we see the ε (which is commonly a termination of the dual) in ἄμμε, ὔμμε, as plural, and in ἐμέ, σέ, ἕ, as accusative of the singular, to which there is nothing

12. A similar contraction of this *σφωέ* into *σφώ* was adopted by some of the grammarians, and not indeed without an authority, viz. that of Antimachus: *τῷ καί σφω γείνατο μήτηρ* (Apollon. de Pronom. p. 363.). But in Homer there is no authority for adopting it, as the case of Il. *ρ*, 531. may be considered an elision, and in fact it is written *Εἰ μή σφω' Αἴαντε*[15].

13. There are better grounds for saying that the dual *σφωέ*, *σφωΐν* is shortened to *σφέ*, *σφίν* (this however merely when they are datives); only that these forms are the same as the plural, and cannot therefore be brought forward as duals in particular, because the plural always contains the dual in itself. *Σφέ* stands for *σφᾶς*, as well as *ἄμμε*, *ὔμμε* do for *ἡμᾶς*, *ὑμᾶς*; and *σφί*, *σφίν* is as natural an abbreviation from *σφίσι*, *σφίσιν*. In

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analogous in the whole language; and the preceding *s*, which in the Latin appears to be characteristic of the third person, is in Greek peculiar to the second. I have been obliged to premise all this in order to place the following account in its correct light.

It is well known that the pronoun *ἕ* (*οὗ*, *οἷ*) had in the old language the digamma, consequently it was *ve*; in Latin it has an *s*, making it *es*. According to an analogy which I have proposed elsewhere (Greek Grammar, sect. 16. note 2.) I unite these elements into *sve* as the older form, of which *σφέ* is a bolder pronunciation. From this stem or root, *σφ*, have arisen the dual and plural of the third person, with all their various lengthened and shortened terminations which are in use; and among the shortened ones sprung up again this same *σφέ* (see below), which had already the force of a singular; all useful in verse, and everywhere intelligible by the context. But in the nominative of the second person, *συ*, we have plainly the same elements as in that *sve* for the sound *σφ*. The caprice of usage has also actually established it in the dual *σφῶϊ*, *σφῶϊν*; and to prevent its being confounded with the dual of the third person, care was taken to mark it by the accent thus, *σφωέ*, *σφωΐν*, wherever the context or the slightness and uncertainty of the difference did not sufficiently point it out.—In favour of the *sve* which I have adopted, we have besides the evidence of the *u* in *sui* and *suus*, which, being spoken as *svi* and *svus*, lead us to the Greek possessive *σφός*. Usage has distinguished the possessive of the second person *σός* from this last, because there was an absolute necessity for such a distinction; otherwise this *σός* might have been *σφός* quite as well as that dual *σφῶϊ*: and in the forms *tui* and *tuus*, the *t* of which answers to the Greek *σ* in *σύ*, the same *u* is again visible as in *sui*, *suus*; and the *u* therefore in the one is quite as much connected with the *φ* in *σφῶϊ* as the *u* in the other is.—And, lastly, the old Æolic dative *τυί* in *τυίδε* for *τῇδε* shows that the elements of all this lie in the pure demonstrative power of the pronoun, and thus confirms that with which I set out.

[15] On the other hand, *σφώ* in the second person is written thus, as at Il. λ, 782. *Σφὼ δὲ μάλ' ἠθέλετον*.

the older Epics, however, σφέ certainly appears to have been more appropriated to the dual. See Il. λ, 111. 115. (in the latter passage the dual arises from comparing it with the former), Od. θ, 271. φ, 192. 206., Scut. Herc. 62., against which I can find but one passage, Il. τ, 265.[16] In the later Epics the plural prevails: but in the other poets (the tragedians for instance) it stands, as is well known, for all numbers[17]; a circumstance which supposes the progress of a real usage in language, as the scientific views of those genuine poets could not have been directed to such poor tricks as the change of one form for another; besides it is self-evident that σφέ is quite as likely to be another form of ἕ, *se*, as it is according to the above analogy of σφᾶς[18].

14. The dative σφίν is, as a plural, common to the Epic, Tragic, and Ionic prose writers. By a very rare usage it was known also as a singular; yet never perhaps in the form σφί, as σφίν fell into the analogy of ἐμίν, τίν, ἵν; only that these always retain their accent; σφίν on the contrary is enclitic as a singular as well as a plural. Of this usage I am aware of only four certain instances[19], of which two are Epic passages in the Homeric Hymns (Hymn. 18. or 19. ad Panem, v. 19. and Hymn. 30. ad Matr. Deum, v. 9.), according to the most natural construction (compare v. 8—11.), and two are Tragic, viz. Æschyl. Pers. 756. Soph. Œd. Col. 1490.[20]

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[16] Ὅτις σφ' ἀλίτηται ὀμόσσας, namely τοὺς θεούς. The great preponderance of σφέ as a dual might perhaps induce us to fill up the elision in this passage with σφί, and cite in confirmation of it Od. δ, 807. οὐ μὲν γάρ τι θεοῖς ἀλιτήμενός ἐστιν. But this construction of the participle as a noun can prove nothing against the decisive use of the verb at Od. δ, 378. Ἀθανάτους ἀλιτέσθαι, and ε, 108. Ἀθηναίην ἀλίτοντο.

[17] See Brunck. ad Æschyl. Prom. 9.

[18] See note 3. In the remains which are come down to us of the common language of Greece, that is the prose, σφέ never occurs; for the passage of Herodotus 3, 53. ἢ αὐτός σφε ἀπελθὼν ἔχειν, where it relates to two preceding *things*, viz. τυραννίδα and οἶκον, and consequently stands for a neuter plural, is so plainly in accordance with the constant usage of Herodotus to read σφέα, that it is inconceivable how Valckenaer could speak of this amendment as one so uncertain.

[19] Except those in Orpheus, whose singularities must always be excepted: see Herm. ad Orph. p. 792.

[20] The passage of Od. ο, 523. is better referred to all the suitors, as Voss and others have it: that of Hes. Scut. 113. must relate to Mars and Cycnus.

15. Against the usage of always writing *σφέων, σφέας*, in Homer in this their resolved form, even when they are to be pronounced as one syllable, nothing can be said; at the same time it appears but right, that if the monosyllable arising out of *σφέας* must be spoken short, and consequently both vowels do not flow into each other, but the former is directly dropped, it should be written with only one vowel. The same takes place even between two words; in which case the contraction of the two syllables is left to the pronunciation, but the elision is always expressed by the apostrophe. Barnes and Heyne were correct therefore in writing, after the example of some Codd., in Il. ε, 567. *μέγα δέ σφας ἀποσφήλειε πόνοιο*, where the usual reading *σφέας* stands in striking opposition to the *ἧμας*, which all write thus in Od. π, 372. *Τηλεμάχῳ· μηδ' ἧμας ὑπεκφύγοι· οὐ γὰρ ὀΐω.* And this very *σφάς*, thus abbreviated, I find in the large fragment of Parmenides in Sextus (adv. Math. 7, 111.) v. 12. *Καί σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει.*

16. Lastly, as far as regards the *accentuation*, this only can be said with certainty, that the oblique cases of the dual of both the first and second person *νῶϊ, σφῶϊ*, are never handed down to us as enclitic; on the contrary, the oblique cases of the third person beginning with *σφ* are commonly, as far as concerns Homer, treated enclitically; thus, *δή σφωε, δή σφωϊν, δή σφεας, δή σφεων, δή σφισιν*[21]. We must not therefore make an enclitic of the acutely accented *σφώ*, but it is correctly written *Ζεὺς σφὼ εἰς Ἴδην κέλετ' ἐλθέμεν ὅττι τάχιστα*, as also the Schol. Ven. expressly directs[22]. For if we wish to

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[21] Why the circumflexed forms *σφῶν, σφᾶς* always retain their accents in common language, while *σφέων, σφέας*, which are spoken the same, are enclitics, it is difficult to say. I suppose that it was wished not to deprive these contracted forms of their external mark of contraction, the circumflex; not, however, that they were on that account pronounced less enclitically.

[22] *Καὶ τὸ Ζεύς καὶ τὸ σφώ ἐγκλιτέον τουτέστι βαρυτονητέον, ἐπεὶ δευτέρου προσώπου ἐστὶ καὶ μεταλαμβάνεται εἰς τὸ ὑμᾶς.* The word *ἐγκλίνειν* we see is used here of the grave accent in the connexion of the words with each other (see article 104. sect. 7. and Schol. Od. ζ, 149.); for in no other sense can the word *Ζεύς* be subjected to anything of the kind: but if *Ζεύς* be accented thus, *σφώ* cannot be treated as an enclitic in the usual meaning of this term, for then the other word would

make an enclitic of σφώ, νώ must necessarily be treated the same, which no one thinks of doing[23]. We must adhere then to what is handed down to us[24], however unsatisfactory may be the reasons adduced why νώ and σφώ are not to be treated as enclitics as well as σέ, σοῦ, σοί, and the like[25].

83. Ὀλοοίτροχος.

1. In Il. ν, 137. the course of Hector, at once rushing unrestrained against the enemy, but then suddenly checked in his career, is compared to a stone or piece of rock torn off by a mountain-torrent, and rolling downwards, until arriving in the plain below it all at once becomes stationary. Such a stone or rock is called ὀλοοίτροχος in the following passage:

Ἀντικρὺ μεμαὼς, ὀλοοίτροχος ὣς ἀπὸ πέτρης,
Ὅντε κατὰ στεφάνης ποταμὸς χειμάῤῥοος ὤσῃ.

The word remained in use, although varying in its orthography, through the whole of the Ionic and Attic æras. For Herodotus 8, 52. relates that the Athenians in the Acropolis, προσιόντων

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have the acute: the fact is, that with regard to the preceding word, it is indeed ὀρθότονος, i. e. retains its tone or accent, but with regard to the following word it is again a baryton.

[23] The case would occur in Od. π, 306.

[24] The directions to do so are expressly given in Apollon. de Pronom. p. 369; compare p. 358. a.

[25] If we wish to compose from the accounts of the grammarians a theory at least consistent, although we may not be able to satisfy ourselves on historical and physiological grounds, we must set out with this rule, that a *properispomenon* is not capable of being enclitic (see Apollon. de Pronom. p. 307. b. 308. c., where the rule is incorrectly extended to all barytons). This is the case with νῶϊ, νῶϊν, σφῶϊ, σφῶϊν. It is conceivable that the ear, once accustomed to these forms always retaining their accent, preserved the same rule in their abbreviations as they were gradually introduced, νῷν (νῷ), νώ, σφῷν (σφῷ) σφώ. And for this same reason must also the dual of the third person, which is not known from tradition to retain the accent (for it occurs only, as far as my knowledge goes, as an enclitic), be written, independent of its enclitic nature, σφωέ, σφωΐν; so inconsistent are the grammarians: see Apollon. de Pronom. p. 373. sqq. and Etym. M. v. σφῶε.

τῶν βαρβάρων πρὸς τὰς πύλας, ὁλοιτρόχους ἀπίεσαν: and Xenophon in his Anab. 4, 2, 3. in similar circumstances, where the Greeks were approaching a height, says that τηνικαῦτα ἐκυλίνδουν οἱ βάρβαροι ὁλοιτρόχους ἁμαξιαίους, καὶ μείζους καὶ ἐλάττους λίθους. I have written the word in these passages according to the preponderating tradition; and indeed in both the prose instances the writing it as a word of four syllables with λοι is pretty certain[1]; but with regard to the aspirate, it naturally depended in the Homeric verse on the grammarians. The reading with the *lenis* has maintained its ground in Homer; but that with the aspirate had also its authority, as may be seen in the scholia, in Apollonius, &c.

2. By these passages taken from the pure olden times thus much is clear, that the word was used as a substantive[2]; and that it did not mean any large piece of stone such as is found in the fields, but a mass of rock, which rolls down from a height either of itself or by the hands of an enemy. And, independently of any hostile idea, its derivation from ὀλοός is the most natural which can be imagined. Our ideas of the power of such a piece of rock, of its weight and impetus increasing as it rolls further down, so that nothing can stop it, but it must be left to take its headlong course, dashing to pieces everything in its way, could not easily be expressed by a more suitable term than a *destructive roller*. So that the explanation of those grammarians, who derive the word from ὅλος from such forced interpretations as may be seen in their writings, can only be made conceivable by supposing that the reading of ὁλοίτροχος with the aspirate had earlier or later really become general in the current language of Greece. In Herodotus it is not improbable that the Ionic dialect excluded the pure aspirate, and Schweighäeuser therefore adopted, perhaps correctly, the reading ὀλοιτρόχους from one single Florentine manuscript. But to the Attic tongue the aspirate was quite as

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[1] It is true that in Xenophon the common manuscripts have ὁλοτρόχοις; but the reading οι, which agrees with that of Herodotus, is copied correctly from at least one.

[2] For the passage of Xenophon, as quoted by Suidas, where the word λίθους stands before ὁλοιτρόχους, is of no weight against such concurrent testimony.

natural, which therefore in this abbreviated form slid into an apparently different signification.

3. The word occurs again in Herodotus 5, 92. in an oracle which announced the birth of Cypselus, the destroyer of the sovereignty of the Bacchiadæ; in which it is said, *Λάβδα κυεῖ, τέξει δ' ὀλοοίτροχον, ἐν δὲ πεσεῖται Ἀνδράσι μουνάρχοισι*, &c. Thus Schweighäeuser has correctly written it, according to the quotation of the same oracle in Eusebius, instead of the unnecessary hiatus of δὲ ὁλοίτροχον found in all the manuscripts of Herodotus. And the sense of this oracle clearly confirms our acceptation of the word. But that the idea of *round* (which the grammarians gathered partly from the latter half of the word compared with τροχός, *a wheel*, partly from the word ὅλος itself, and which Eustathius besides explains to proceed from the stones rubbing off their roughness by mutual collision,) is not contained in the word, is certain from the Homeric passage alone, in which the piece of rock is described as torn off at once from its native height. For the fact itself, it was sufficient that the rock should not present any very considerable flatness; as then its *rolling down* would be the consequence of its weight and the steepness of the descent. However a surface approaching to the cylindrical very much diminished that mischievous usage; and so it is very conceivable, particularly as the expression κυλίνδειν was in this instance the proper one, that Democritus, who had a poetical style and many peculiar expressions, called the κυλινδρικὸν σχῆμα (as we are informed by the Schol. Hom. and Etym. M.) ὀλοοίτροχον.

4. The more striking is the decided deviation from the above usage in Theocritus 22, 49., where the body of the pugilist Amycus, and his muscles in particular, are thus described:

Ἐν δὲ μύες στερεοῖσι βραχίοσι ἄκρον ὑπ' ὦμον
Ἕστασαν ἠΰτε πέτροι ὀλοοίτροχοι, οὕστε κυλίνδων
Χειμάῤῥους ποταμὸς μεγάλαις περιέξεσε δίναις.

As the firm round projecting muscles are here compared with this word, it must evidently mean the larger gravel or pebbles of a stream or torrent; which is so very considerable a deviation from the usage of the older writers, that Xenophon in the passage above quoted mentions in particular after the ὁλοιτρόχοις ἁμαξιαίοις the μείζους καὶ ἐλάττους λίθους, which were also hurled down. It is therefore clear that shortly before the Alexandrian æra the word had received for the first time, through a defective understanding of the older usage, this meaning of a large round rolling pebble[3].

84. Ὅρκος, ὅρκιον.

1. Against the well-known usual derivation of the word ὅρκος no objection can be made. Coming from the same stem or root as τὸ ἕρκος, (like ὁ βόλος and τὸ βέλος, ὁ μόρος and τὸ μέρος,) it is traced up to the original meaning of an oath, by virtue of which it *holds*, as it were, him who promises anything, *within the limits* of his promise. Nor has any one been puzzled with regard to the exact meaning attributed to the word; as every one easily explains to himself whatever may appear peculiar in Grecian usage compared with our word *oath*, by giving it a figurative turn. In this way however the proper ancient idea of a word is not unfrequently lost, as is the case in my opinion with the one before us.

2. For instance, in our word *oath*, at least in our present association of ideas, (for on the etymology of the German word *Eid* I have nothing particular to remark,) we set out from the act of swearing; since the word is to us either the abstract idea of the thing, or the form of words used in taking it. This abstract idea is supposed to be personified or embodied in certain phrases; and thus all the passages of the ancients are explained without any perceptible obstacle. But the Greek word does not, as we have seen, originate in such ideas of the understanding, but in something physical; and this is, according to my observations, essential to our forming a right judgement of the *ancient* usage of the word. That is to say, as ὅρκος

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[3] Theocritus may have adopted this meaning and still kept to the Epic form ὀλοοίτροχοι or ὀλοοίτροχοι, between which and ὀλοότροχοι the manuscripts fluctuate. That the reading of ηὖτε (necessary in that case) has Homeric authority, we have seen in the article on that word. Valckenaër however prefers reading ἠΰτε . . . ὀλοίτροχοι.

literally means the *fence* or *check*, it is not properly the act of swearing with the mouth, like *Schwur*, *serment*, *juramentum*, 'oath'; but it was originally the object which *checked* or *restrained* within certain limits the person so bound; in other words, it is *that by which a person swears.* When it is said then at Il. ο, 38.

> Ἴστω νῦν τόδε Γαῖα καὶ Οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὕπερθεν,
> Καὶ τὸ κατειβόμενον Στυγὸς ὕδωρ, ὅστε μέγιστος
> Ὅρκος δεινότατός τε πέλει μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν,

these last words do not refer to the whole preceding formula of swearing, but they relate to the Styx alone; and even then, not to the swearing by the Styx, but the Styx itself is the ὅρκος, the thing which restrains, which bears witness, and in case of perjury punishes. And this will be the more easily believed, as no other mode of interpretation renders the expression in Hesiod θ, 784. natural. In that passage Jupiter dispatches Iris

> . . . . . . θεῶν μέγαν ὅρκον ἐνεῖκαι
> Τηλόθεν ἐν χρυσέῃ προχόῳ πολύωνυμον ὕδωρ
> Ψυχρὸν, ὅ τ' ἐκ πέτρης καταλείβεται ἠλιβάτοιο.

And now another Homeric expression improves in simplicity of thought; when, for instance, it is said of the river Titaresius, (Il. β, 755.) as a reason for the wonderful appearance which it presents,

> Ὅρκου γὰρ δεινοῦ Στυγὸς ὕδατός ἐστιν ἀποῤῥώξ.

With which may be compared Hesiod θ, 400. where the Styx comes in person to Jupiter to demand honour and precedence for herself and children, and where it is then said,

> Τὴν δὲ Ζεὺς τίμησε περισσὰ δὲ δῶρα ἔδωκεν·
> Αὐτὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔθηκε θεῶν μέγαν ἔμμεναι ὅρκον.

In the same sense also Ὅρκος is said by Arrian (see Eustath. ad Od. l. c.) to have been the name of a river in Bithynia, by which the people there swore, and which drew the perjured into its stream.

3. From this idea of ὅρκος may be explained another established usage posterior to Homer. We read in Origen that Archilochus punished Lycambes for having broken the ties of

hospitality existing between them[1], as described in this verse:

Ὅρκον δ' ἐνοσφίσθης μέγαν, ἅλας τε καὶ τράπεζαν·

where ὅρκος, as plainly as anywhere else, means nothing but the pledge. And the same form of expression we find again in a very late period in Lucian *pro Lapsu* 5. ἡ τετρακτὺς ὁ μέγιστος ὅρκος αὐτῶν: and *de Calumn.* 17. μέγιστος ὅρκος ἦν ἅπασιν Ἡφαιστίων: and again in the formula of swearing in Vitar. Auct. 4. Οὐ μὰ τὸν μέγιστον ὅρκον, τὰ τέτταρα: while in other languages it would be a logical confusion to say, *per juramentum*, 'by my greatest oath,' or any similar expression.

4. In this sense then it was also more natural that Ὅρκος itself should be personified in a general way. He is the *witness of an oath*, the *avenger of perjury*, described either as taking vengeance himself, or as having the Furies for avengers. Both representations are in Hesiod θ, 231.

Ὅρκον θ', ὃς δὴ πλεῖστον ἐπιχθονίους ἀνθρώπους
Πημαίνει, ὅτε κέν τις ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ.

and in ε, 217. where a warning is given against injustice, with the addition,

Αὐτίκα γὰρ τρέχει ὅρκος ἅμα σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν·

where the expression shows a personification of Ὅρκος and the Σκολιαὶ Δίκαι (as Horace personifies the *Fides arcani prodiga*); but the meaning is, that Horcus follows close upon the perverters of justice, in order to punish those who commit perjury. Lastly at ε, 800. where the common reading runs thus:

Ἐν πέμπτῃ γάρ φασιν Ἐριννύας ἀμφιπολεύειν
Ὅρκον τιννυμένας, τὸν Ἔρις τέκε πῆμ' ἐπιόρκοις.

This passage might create some difficulty, as τίννυσθαι certainly means to *avenge*; but then it is always in the sense of to *punish*, and ὅρκος cannot possibly mean perjury. But Grævius has produced on sufficient authority the reading Ὅρκον γεινόμενον*, which is confirmed by the preceding word ἀμφιπολεύειν. For this word nowhere means *to go* or *range about*, nor has it ever any other meaning than *to attend upon, take care of*. The fifth day of the month then, according to an old saying, was the birthday of Horcus; the Furies attended on the new-born child; consequently they protect him, and avenge any injury offered to him. In this sense of Ὅρκος Pindar also swears by him, Nem. 11, 30. Ναὶ μὰ γὰρ Ὅρκον[2].

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[1] Orig. c. Cels. lib. 2. p. 76. καὶ ὀνειδίζων γε ὁ Πάριος Ἰαμβοποιὸς τὸν Λυκάμβην τὰς μετὰ ἅλας καὶ τράπεζαν συνθήκας ἀθετήσαντά φησι πρὸς αὐτόν.—I have inserted the words Λυκάμβην τὰς instead of the faulty Λυκάμβαντα.

* [. . . . . quintam fuge; pallidus Orcus,
Eumenidesque satæ.—*Virg. Georg.* 1, 277.—Ed.]

5. There are but few passages in the oldest writers which cannot be explained without any force, if we set out with this sense of the word ὅρκος. For even in such cases as Il. ψ, 42. —ἐπὶ δ' ὅρκον ὄμοσσεν· Οὐ μὰ Ζῆν' ὅστις τε—I see no reason why we should not suppose that in the poet's mind Jupiter was put in apposition to ὅρκον; exactly in the same sense as ὅρκος is actually found in apposition to Ζεύς in Pindar Pyth. 4, 297. καρτερὸς ὅρκος ἄμμι μάρτυς ἔστω Ζεὺς ὁ γενέθλιος ἀμφοτέροις. Further, the expressions μέγας ὅρκος, καρτερὸς ὅρκος, suit much better the idea of the witness or pledge of the oath, than they do the oath itself; e. g. Il. α, 239. ὁ δέ τοι μέγας ἔσσεται ὅρκος· that is to say, the sceptre which had been just described: and in the same way, a few verses before, καὶ ἐπὶ μέγαν ὅρκον ὀμοῦμαι· Ναὶ μὰ τόδε σκῆπτρον, &c. Although we here see how natural the transition is in this expression from the witness or pledge of the oath to the form which comprises it; yet I still think that in the case of υ, 313.

Ἤτοι μὲν γὰρ νῶϊ πολέας ὠμόσσαμεν ὅρκους,

we shall only hit the poet's real meaning by interpreting the expression according to our previous supposition. For Juno does not here mean that she has sworn the destruction of Troy in many and oft-repeated oaths, but in one single oath, which indeed is a multifarious one, and in which she swore at the same time by *many different objects*; as in that, the beginning of which we have quoted above from Il. ο, where this same Juno swears by earth and heaven, and by the Styx, and then by the head of her husband and her marriage-bed. To this class belongs also the other oath of Juno at ξ, 278. where it is said, *θεοὺς δ' ὀνόμηνεν ἅπαντας Τοὺς ὑποταρταρίους οἳ Τιτῆνες καλέονται.* For we see from these instances, that in a formal oath made on any solemn occasion the person swearing recited separately the individual names which might be included in one comprehensive appellation. There is indeed a later usage, in which the plural number *ὅρκοι* certainly does betoken a repetition of the oath; but I should rather cite that as a contrast to confirm the above explanation of Homer's expression. In the second of the Dialog. Meretr. of Lucian, at the very beginning, the jealous mistress says to her lover, *οἱ τοσοῦτοι δὲ ὅρκοι οὓς ὤμοσας...οἴχονται.* As the later usage is here announced by the nature of the thing itself, (for the oaths of lovers are innumerable,) so is the older usage in the other instance; for it befits a deity to swear but once, and then solemnly.

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[2] The expression of the punishing power of Ὅρκος remained in very late authors. In Pausan. 2, 2. mention is made of a sacred place in the temple of Palæmon: Ὃς δ' ἂν ἐνταῦθα . . . ἐπίορκα ὀμόσῃ οὐδεμία ἐστὶ μηχανὴ διαφυγεῖν τοῦ ὅρκου. The explanation of the genitive with ἕνεκα is contrary to all usage; but διαφυγεῖν τινος is in use among the later writers; as in Petri Epist. 2, 1, 4. ἀποφυγόντες τῆς φθορᾶς: and in this way the sense in Pausanias is clear.

6. In saying this, however, it is by no means our opinion that the *common* meaning of *ὅρκος*, *an oath*, does not occur at all in the Epic language. The transition of the ideas into each other, as we have remarked above, is too natural for such an opinion to be maintained for a moment; for instance in the well-known expression, *ἐπεί ῥ' ὀμοσέν τε τελεύτησέν τε τὸν ὅρκον*, the meaning of *τελευτῆσαι τὸν ὅρκον* can be no other than the full and complete recital of everything by which I swear, consequently of the oath. And thus between the two relations of the word *ὅρκος*, viz. the *pledge* of the oath and the *oath* itself, there arose an ambiguity of expression to be decided by the context. For while we saw the Styx quoted above in the former sense as *θεῶν μέγαν ὅρκον* (Hes. θ, 400.) so on the other hand at Od. β, 377. it is said of an old woman, *γρηῢς δὲ θεῶν μέγαν ὅρκον ἀπώμνυ*, the plain meaning of which is, "she swore *an oath by the gods*." Compare Xen. Cyrop. 2, 3, 12. *σὺν θεῶν ὅρκῳ λέγω, ἦ μὴν*, &c.

7. The strong expression of Herodotus, *ὅρκους ἐπελαύνειν*, (apt as the phrase may seem to be for expressing beings who are sent to punish the perjured,) I cannot admit to have that

meaning. It is true, that the passage 1, 146. might contribute to lead us into such an error if pointed in the following manner; *διὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν φόνον* (i. e. on account of the murder of their fathers and former husbands) *αἱ γυναῖκες αὗται, νόμον θέμεναι, σφίσι αὐτῇσι ὅρκους ἐπήλασαν…, μήκοτε ὁμοσιτῆσαι τοῖς ἀνδράσι.* Misled by this punctuation, Schweighäeuser in his Lex. Herod. directs us in the other passage (6, 62.) after the words *ἐπὶ τούτοισι* (upon this) *δὲ ὅρκους ἐπήλασαν*, to supply *ἀλλήλοισι.* We ought rather to collect from this latter passage, that in the former the *ἐπί* in *ἐπήλασαν* refers to the thing, and *νόμον θέμεναι* must be joined to *σφίσι αὐτῇσι.* *Ὅρκον ἐπελάσαι* means therefore in both passages ‘ to lay a solemn oath on a thing, bind oneself to it by an oath’. With reference to the person swearing Herodotus uses *προσάγειν ὅρκον* in the following passage, 6, 74. (of Cleomenes) *συνιστὰς τοὺς Ἀρκάδας ἐπὶ τῇ Σπάρτῃ, ἄλλους τε ὅρκους προσάγων σφι, ἦ μὲν ἕψεσθαί σφεας αὐτῷ τῇ ἂν ἐξηγῆται, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐς Νώνακριν πόλιν πρόθυμος ἦν τῶν Ἀρκάδων τοὺς προεστεῶτας ἀγινέων ἐξορκοῦν τὸ Στυγὸς ὕδωρ.* The construction of the passage is, “ He bound the Arcadians with all sorts of oaths to follow him wherever he led them; among others, he was desirous of conducting their chief men to Nonacris, in order to make them swear by the river Styx, which rises near that city.” We cannot but feel that the original idea of *ὅρκος* still predominates in this passage; and thus *ὅρκον προσάγειν τινί* must be understood to mean, ‘ to prescribe to a person the object by which he is to swear’. With the Attics originated the expressions *ὅρκους ποιεῖσθαι, δοῦναι* (to take an oath), *λαβεῖν* (to receive an oath from another, make a person swear to a thing), &c.*

8. There is a derivative form of *ὅρκος*, viz. *ὅρκιον*. This, like many words of the kind, might be considered as a neuter adjective of *ὅρκιος*: but it appears to me safer to suppose that it has the force of the so-called *ὑποκοριστικόν*, by which the Greek language frequently endeavours to individualize an idea†,

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* [*Ὅρκους ἔδοσαν καὶ ἔλαβον παρὰ Φαρναβάζου*, Xen. Hell. 1, 3, 7.—Ed.]

† [Passow, on the contrary, says in his Lexicon that “ *ὅρκιον* is by no means to be considered as a diminutive of *ὅρκος*, but rather as a neuter of *ὅρκιος*, by supplying in most cases *ἱερόν* or *ἱερά*.”—Ed:]

as βίβλος βιβλίον, χρυσός χρυσίον, μηρός μηρίον, φόρτος φορτίον. According to one rule indeed these words so formed ought, when they are dactyls, to be paroxytons; but κώμιον, ποίμνιον and others are exceptions to that rule, and to them will belong ὅρκιον also. This word occurs in Homer as a plural only; in Herodotus, Thucydides, &c. more commonly in the singular. According to the rule of these derivatives it would have the more definite meaning of a contract or agreement on oath: and as this is concluded by a sacrifice of lambs, the throats of which are cut by the contracting parties (Il. γ, 292. Ἦ, καὶ ἀπὸ στομάχους ἀρνῶν τάμε νηλέϊ χαλκῷ), this is sufficient to explain the meaning of ὅρκια ταμεῖν, without the necessity of supposing that ὅρκια was used in this single phrase in another sense, viz. as an adjective, ὅρκια *scil.* ἱερεῖα: particularly as the analogy of the Roman custom and of the Latin language in the formula *ferire fœdus* agrees with it so decidedly. At all events, it is clear that as early as Homer's time the expression was understood in no other sense, as he was able to join (Il. γ, 73. 94.) φιλότητα καὶ ὅρκια πιστὰ ταμεῖν. More remarkable is the use of the word ὅρκια, when at Il. γ, 245. speaking of what took place before the celebration of the sacrifice, it is said, Κήρυκες δ' ἀνὰ ἄστυ θεῶν φέρον ὅρκια πιστά, Ἄρνε δύω καὶ οἶνον: and again at v. 269. κήρυκες ἀγαυοὶ Ὅρκια πιστὰ θεῶν σύναγον. In these passages I see clearly that the proper meaning of ὅρκος, as we have given it above, is transferred to the form ὅρκιον; but in a somewhat modified and more definite sense, that is to say, in the sense of bodily objects which serve as a *pledge* or *sign* of the oath. And we find a corresponding usage in the poets which followed Homer; as when in Pindar the betrothed Eriphyle is called the ὅρκιον πιστόν of future peace, and at Ol. 11, 6. the Hymns are the πιστὸν ὅρκιον of future fame.

85. Ὁρμήματα.

1. It will be difficult to find a word in the Homeric text, in the interpretation of which, whether we follow the commentators or (if I may judge of others by myself) our own inquiries,

we are so puzzled and perplexed as in the word ὁρμήματα. Nor is this to be wondered at, as we have no means of comparing it; for the word occurs in Homer twice, it is true, but then in a repetition of the same verse, and in no other writer whatever[1]. If under these circumstances the result of our inquiries should be certainty, we must arrive at it by all the ways, right or wrong, which may offer themselves.

2. The two passages of Homer are Il. β, 356. and 590. where the great object of the campaign is stated to be

Τίσασθαι Ἑλένης ὁρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε.

At first sight every one will and must consider the two last substantives as similar expressions, contributing to form one and the same leading sense; and as ὁρμαίνειν means *to reflect upon, think anxiously about,* the old explanation of ὁρμήματα by *cares, vexation* (the only explanation found in Hesychius and the oldest interpreters), is so agreeable to the context, that nothing but a doubt arising from some external source could again unsettle our opinion. Now a leading doubt of this nature did arise very early from the fact of Helen following Paris *voluntarily*; and as she frankly and plainly says so at Od. δ, 261. &c., those who ascribe the Iliad and Odyssey to different writers (called in the scholia οἱ χωρίζοντες) adduce the contradiction in this verse as one of the proofs in support of their opinion. But the opponents of this doctrine, who are the majority in the great collection of the scholia, could find no other means of weakening this proof than by joining the genitive Ἑλένης with περί, and supposing the cares and sighs of the Greeks *about Helen* to be mentioned as the object of their revenge. Another pretty instance of the way in which these Greeks treated their language[2]!

3. But there was an easier way of removing the objection

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[1] Stephens and Schneider speak indeed of another meaning of the word ὅρμημα elsewhere, but they cite no authorities; and the assertion would appear therefore, as the word is clearly and plainly a *verbal* substantive, to rest only on the etymological interpretation of some later commentator.

[2] Heyne too suffers this so-called interpretation, or rather his own vexation at finding neither of these opinions satisfactory, to have such an influence on him, that he declares the whole verse, of which the con-

of those critics who would separate the two poems. In Il. γ, 173. &c. as well as in the Odyssey, Helen gives it to be understood plainly enough that her quitting her husband was voluntary. But the fascination of Paris acting on a weak woman was, and continued to be, a kind of violence committed on her: what was therefore her own fault, was at the same time the influence of Venus dazzling and blinding her, and consequently a misfortune; and so it was soon followed by repentance and tears, and a longing for home, all of which is expressly related in the passage of the Odyssey. Nay, not merely was this change of mind to be expected, but the Greeks had information of it from prisoners and spies, particularly from Ulysses, whose secret conference with Helen is mentioned in the same passage. And thus the words of Helen, *τὸ καὶ κλαίουσα τέτηκα*, Il. γ, 176. and *ἄτην δὲ μετέστενον*, Od. δ, 261. considered in this way give the most satisfactory explanation of the expression *Ἑλένης ὁρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε.*

4. This consideration would certainly be perfectly satisfactory to every reader, if there were only one of these passages, viz. Il. β, 590., where it is said of Menelaus, *μάλιστα δὲ ἵετο θυμῷ Τίσασθαι Ἑλένης ὁρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε.* But in the earlier passage, v. 356., it is certainly very surprising that Nestor, addressing all the Greeks, should propose vengeance for the repentance and vexation of a thoughtless woman who had left a husband for a lover, as the great object which every one of them should have in view, and the great argument by which he might hope to restrain them all from a precipitate return to their own homes. It may well be supposed that this comparison of the two passages must have very early given rise to a conjecture, (announced however first by Heyne,) that in the oldest Homeric text the verse might have stood only in the second passage, where it expresses the natural feelings of the still loving and forgiving husband; but that by the treacherous memory of the rhapsodists it had been inserted like so many other verses in a false place. This supposition will have doubt-

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struction is perfectly clear, to be harsh and ambiguous. "Dura et ambigua versus sententia. Aut enim ipsius Helenæ sunt *ὁρμήματα* et *στοναχαὶ*, aut aliorum propter illam," &c.

less satisfied many, as indeed it took me by surprise when, independently of Heyne, I first entertained it. But our opinions do not always continue the same.

5. If we look more accurately into the former of the two passages, we shall see that the verse in question is by no means one which we can there dispense with, as we can with so many other stray verses in different parts of Homer. The Greeks, says Nestor, ought not to think of returning home

> *Πρίν τινα πὰρ Τρώων ἀλόχῳ κατακοιμηθῆναι,*
> *Τίσασθαι δ' Ἑλένης ὁρμήματά τε στοναχάς τε.*

The manner of taking vengeance stands here in such plain relation to the offence received by the rape of Helen, that it is impossible the mention of it can be entirely owing to a thoughtless rhapsodist. As soon therefore as we come again to this point, another suspicion arises; namely, whether the explanation which we have given of *ὁρμήματα* is the correct one. The verb *ὁρμαίνειν* never in any instance occurs in the sense of *afflictive* care, but always with the idea of reflection, of deliberating what to do; generally indeed, as might be expected from the stem or root *ὁρμᾷν*, accompanied by a quickness or warmth of feeling, but in almost all cases without the slightest collateral idea of vexation, which in some few passages lies not in the word but in the context. It is therefore to be expected that the expression *ὅρμημα*, if it comes from *ὁρμαίνειν*, should betoken only a deep thought and consideration: this may certainly be applicable to Helen, but it would not be the first word to present itself in depicting a situation demanding vengeance. Let it not be said that, even if we should succeed in attaching another meaning to *ὁρμήματα*, still the *στοναχαὶ* Ἑλένης would always be liable to the objection of unsuitableness as a motive for influencing the Greeks. Should we succeed in finding that *ὁρμήματα* may mean *the separation* of Helen from her husband, then may her vexation, as the consequence of that, be mentioned with it in any and every sentence as a part belonging to the whole.

6. And such explanations do offer themselves to our notice. Eustathius, indeed, knows no other meaning for *ὁρμήματα* than the voluntary *voyage* of Helen to Troy. But if the word be so

understood, then τίσασθαι would necessarily express the punishment of Helen, which is not to be thought of for an instant. And even if we are willing to allow that ὁρμήματα does not actually and plainly express the voluntary part of the act, still it would be an extraordinary expression to say, "avenge the voyage and the sighs of Helen." If ὁρμήματα refers to the former of these, it must express that event as the act of the seducer, for τίσασθαι to be an appropriate word to join with it. And so it is understood by one interpreter in the small scholia, who to the first interpretation of *care* adds μᾶλλον δὲ ἁρπαγήν. Damm makes this still plainer by understanding it of the ravisher 'rushing on his prey'. And certainly, as ὁρμᾶν and ὁρμηθῆναί τινος do sometimes occur in Homer of a hostile attack, ὅρμημά τινος might mean 'an attack on some one'. But neither can this interpretation of the passage be true, as we must then adopt the idea of violence done to Helen, in contradiction not only to the Odyssey, but also to the sense of Il. γ, 173, &c. which cannot be mistaken, and to the most common account of the event. Besides, in this way of explaining it, one other point has not been at all considered, viz. that there would then be no grounds whatever for the use of the plural in the simple language of Homer, at least in the momentary idea of a rape; and of long *voyages* no one will think for an instant.

7. On the other hand, this very plural leads us back again, whither we must return, to στοναχάς. The resemblance between these two words, which we mentioned at the very beginning of our article, becomes by this plurality complete. This and authority must decide us, as all else only serves to perplex. One thing we might promise, that if we had but a trace how Æschylus or Pindar or Plato understood the expression, we would blindly adopt it. This knowledge however fails us. But the way in which the oldest of the scholiasts speak of it, leaves not a doubt remaining that no other meaning of the word than the one there given was handed down to them. On the certain conviction that ὁρμήματα like στοναχαί meant only vexation and care, one part of them founded a proof of contradiction between the Iliad and Odyssey, and the other part referred the word in the most forced manner to the vexation of the Greeks,—a certain proof that all the ex-

planations of ὁρμᾷν as a *rape* or a *voyage* were unknown in the older time. Let this therefore be our authority; and, supported by this, we will examine the difficulties once more. That which did not come to us in the regular straightforward way, still, given as we here find it, is not to be rejected. Ὁρμήματα *may*, according to etymology, mean *any violent emotions of the mind*, and usage might have joined it generally with στοναχαί, although it is come down to us in this one verse only. If now we were to read but once that all the Greeks sallied forth to avenge on the wives of the Trojans the vexations and sighs of the ravished Helen, we should at once know how to explain this poetical fact. In Grecian story Helen was the beloved, the mistress, of all Greece. Fifty princes had been her suitors, and had pledged their word to each other, that though only one could gain her, yet all would make common cause with that one against any who by injuring her should injure him. In this respect then all Greece was the husband of Helen, and consequently the poet could well transfer to all the Greeks the feelings which he ascribes to Menelaus.

86. Ὄσσομαι, ὄσσα.

1. The most natural analogy explains the verb ὄσσομαι to be a sister-form of ὄπτω (ὁράω); not merely on account of ὄσσε, *the eyes*, but because the σσ appears elsewhere as a sister-form of πτ, for example in πέσσω πέπτω. And we have so plain an instance of its meaning of *to see* in Od. η, 31. Μηδέ τιν᾽ ἀνθρώπων προτιόσσεο μηδ᾽ ἐρέεινε, that any other examples, particularly of the usage of the later writers, would seem quite superfluous. Hence comes very naturally the idea of *foreseeing*, which becomes the leading sense; for example, in Od. σ, 154. of Amphinomus, who *foresees* his impending fate, δὴ γὰρ κακὸν ὄσσετο θυμῷ; and in Od. ε, 389. of Ulysses, who faces death, πολλὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη προτιόσσετ᾽ ὄλεθρον. Hence arises the idea of *prognosticating*, *foreboding*, as proceeding from beings which have in themselves a presentiment of something to happen, and therefore serve as a prognostic to others;

for example, at Il. ξ, 17. of the sea, which by its agitation foretells a storm, Ὀσσόμενον λιγέων ἀνέμων λαιψηρὰ κέλευθα. The prognosticating, however, by means of looks and mien appears to be the particular sense of this verb; as in Od. β, 152. of the eagles soaring over the assembly of the people, and foreshowing destruction, Ἐς δ' ἰδέτην πάντων κεφαλὰς, ὄσσοντο δ' ὄλεθρον: and in Il. ω, 172. Iris says to Priam, Οὐ μὲν γάρ τοι ἐγὼ κακὸν ὀσσομένη τόδ' ἱκάνω, Ἀλλ' ἀγαθὰ φρονέουσα. With this is mixed up imperceptibly an *intentional predetermination*; and Hesiod in his Theogonia 551. says of Jupiter, κακὰ δ' ὄσσετο θυμῷ Θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι, τὰ καὶ τελέεσθαι ἔμελλεν.

2. In the passage of Il. α, 105. Κάλχαντα πρώτιστα κάκ' ὀσσόμενος προσέειπεν, the first and most simple meaning may certainly be used, *he looked at him malevolently*; but doubtless ὄσσεσθαι is chosen as the more expressive word, to show that his look *threatened* and *foreboded* evil.

3. In Od. υ, 81. Penelope wishes that Diana would kill her, ὄφρ' Ὀδυσῆα Ὀσσομένη καὶ γαῖαν ὑπὸ στυγερὴν ἀφικοίμην, which correctly understood will mean, "having Ulysses always in her mind's eye:" and the same at α, 115. where a hope is added, and it is said of Telemachus, Ὀσσόμενος πατέρ' ἐσθλὸν ἐνὶ φρεσὶν, εἰ πόθεν ἐλθὼν......θείη. As these passages show clearly the transition from the bodily *sight* to that of the mind[1], they serve to trace the word from its first meaning to that of *foreseeing*, and fully confirm our statement, which supposes *to see* to be the radical meaning, from which all the others are to be derived.

4. According to this account, the opinion of other grammarians, that the word ὄσσα, *a voice*, is the root of ὄσσομαι, falls to the ground of itself. For independently of the consideration, that as ὄσσεσθαι is used of seeing literally with the eyes of the body, we must therefore suppose two quite different radical verbs, ὄσσομαι *I see*, and ὄσσομαι *I speak*, and still be unable to arrange those meanings correctly,—independently, I say, of this,

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[1] The verb προτιόσσομαι in the speech of the dying Hector to Achilles, Ἦ σ' εὖ γιγνώσκων προτιόσσομαι, οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔμελλον Πείσειν, Il. χ, 356. evidently contains an union of both ideas, "I see thee exactly as thou art."

the passages in which the compound *προτιόσσεσθαι* is used in the sense of *to foresee* do not at all admit of the other explanation; for then *προτί* must stand for *πρό*, which is impossible. It is also to be observed, that though all the grammarians explain *ὄσσομαι* in this latter way, yet I do not know of a single passage in the later poets where *ὄσσεσθαι* has that meaning; on the contrary, there are many in Apollonius where it has the usual sense of *to see*.

5. The source of this mistaken explanation was the expectation of finding in the substantive *ὄσσα* in Homer the meaning of a *foreboding, prophetic voice*; and many are still of this opinion, but they are quite wrong. A prophetic voice is called in Homer *ὀμφή* (Il. *υ*, 129. Od. *γ*, 215.), or *φήμη* (Od. *β*, 35. *υ*, 100.), or *κλεηδών* (Od. *σ*, 117.); on the contrary, *ὄσσα* in the same poet is never anything but *the voice of rumour, report*, as seen most plainly in Od. *ω*, 413. *Ὄσσα δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἄγγελος ὦκα κατὰ πτόλιν ᾤχετο πάντη Μνηστήρων θάνατον ἐνέπουσα*; whence there can be no doubt of its meaning being the same at Il. *β*, 93. of the Grecians preparing for their departure, *μετὰ δέ σφισιν Ὄσσα δεδήει Ὀτρύνουσ᾽ ἰέναι, Διὸς ἄγγελος*. Hence it is remarkable that scholars (for example Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 197.) who explain the above passages in that sense, yet in the case of Od. *α*, 282. (repeated at *β*, 216.) adhere firmly to the explanation of those who suppose *ὄσσα* in these passages to mean a *φήμη* sent from Jupiter, i. e. a voice or message prophetic, and significative to the hearer without the consciousness of the speaker. The words are addressed to Telemachus, who is about to travel in order to obtain tidings of his father, and run thus:

Ἔρχεο πευσόμενος πατρὸς δὴν οἰχομένοιο
Ἤν τίς τοι εἴπῃσι βροτῶν, ἢ ὄσσαν ἀκούσῃς
Ἐκ Διὸς, ἥτε μάλιστα φέρει κλέος ἀνθρώποισιν.

It is true that the expression *ἐκ Διὸς* is here made use of, and is certainly put in opposition to the saying of man. But it must be recollected that in the other passage (Il. *β*, 93.) the rumour or report of men is also called *Διὸς ἄγγελος*. That is to say, a distinction must be made between that which a man, who has himself seen anything or been otherwise informed of it, imparts to another, and that which arises from *common fame, the common report of men.* This latter has almost always an obscure origin, and spreads with such wonderful rapidity, that the ancients looked upon it as not proceeding from men, but as something divine; hence it is said to come *ἐκ Διὸς,* or is personified as a divine being and the messenger of Jove*. In no other way can the latter part of the sentence, *ἥτε μάλιστα φέρει κλέος ἀνθρώποισιν,* be explained consistently with the rest. Telemachus might, therefore, in the course of his travels find some one who had been informed of the particulars of his father's place of abode and fate; but he might also arrive at places where some general rumour of Ulysses had been already spread, while no tidings whatever had reached Ithaca.

6. After the meaning of the word is thus ascertained from Homer himself, we shall not be misled by any usage of other poets and writers, which can have no retrograde effect on that of Homer. When, for instance, in Pindar Ol. 6, 106. the voice of Apollo answering his son is called *πατρία ὄσσα,* and in Apollonius 1, 1087. 1095. the voice of a foreboding bird is called *ὄσσα,* these passages do not at all correspond with the proper meaning of the word in the Homeric passage: in these it is no such involuntarily-spoken prophecy as in Homer; nay, the poets just quoted have used *ὄσσα* here merely as synonymous with *ὄψ* (for the divine and prophetic lies in the epithets); and in this they had also an ancient precedent in the Theogonia 10. and 43. where the Muses are described as *περικαλλέα ὄσσαν ἱεῖσαι, ἄμβροτον ὄσσαν ἱεῖσαι.* As *ὄσσα* then is used in the Theogonia for the voice, and for any sound in general,—for instance, at 832. of the lowing of the bull, at 701. of the noise made by the fighting of the gods, and in the Hymn to Mercury 443. of the sound of the lyre,—all this is to be observed and distinguished from the definite usage of the word in Homer; but this same general meaning made it natural that it should also be used in the case of anything being foreboded. And as it gradually became less used in that general sense, it retained in the common prose of the day, as an old word, the presaging sense only, as in Plato and in the passages quoted by Ruhnken from other

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* [Compare Hes. Op. 762.—Ed.]

writers. Hence was formed also the verb ὀττεύεσθαι, which the grammarians confounded with the Homeric verb ὄσσεσθαι. See Ruhnken, Mœris, and Pierson.

87. Οὐλαί, οὐλοχύται.

1. The generally received account of οὐλοχύται in Homer is this, that it means *whole barleycorns,* which were strewed over the sacrifice and the altar, and that it is so called παρὰ τὸ οὔλας, τουτέστιν ὅλας, χέειν τὰς κριθάς. Now, as what the Romans used for a similar purpose was called *mola,* which means *grain coarsely ground,* we see here a difference between the Greek and the Italian usage. The former is explained by the Greek custom of retaining in their sacred offices the most ancient mode of living; consequently they used *whole* corn, merely a little roasted and mixed with salt, because it was so eaten before the invention of that simplest way of managing the grain by treading it out. See Heyne's Opuscula 1. p. 368. 369., Voss on Virgil's Eclog. 8, 82., Schneider's Lexicon under Οὐλαί and Οὐλόχυτα. This account of the old Grecian usage is supported also by plain passages of the grammarians; above all by Suidas: Οὐλοθυτεῖν[1], κριθὰς ἐπιχέειν τοῖς θύμασιν· οὐλὰς γὰρ ἔλεγον τὰς κριθὰς κατὰ ἀντίθεσιν τῶν ψαιστῶν, ἅπερ ἦν ἄλφιτα ὑπὸ τῆς μύλης κατεψηνισμένα[2]. τὰς γὰρ οὐλὰς πρόσθεν

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[1] Schneider's Lexicon in the article on this word has οὐλοχυτεῖν.

[2] This word is evidently a corruption, as the meaning of ψηνίζω is quite different. Nor can the gloss in Suidas ψηνίξαι, ξύσαι, σοβῆσαι, be made to apply to this in any way. Under ψαιστά Suidas has the corruption somewhat differently; ἅπερ ἦν ἄλφιτα ὑπὸ μύλης κατεψητισμένα. This is altered to κατεψηγμένα. Toup, on ψαιστά, informs us in his positive manner that it must be κατεψημένα, resting on the authority of Suid. ψᾷν, ὁμαλίζειν, λεπτύνειν. But learned as these scholars were, they were the more so from having the usage of Sophocles floating before their eyes, who in the Trach. 698. has κατέψηκται χθονί, having a little before used ψῇ. The meaning in this passage is to *bruise in pieces, change to dust.* This is therefore very much in favour of that amendment; particularly as ψαιστά is before explained ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ μύλου περιψήσεως, of the circular friction of the mill-stone. It is however inconceivable how that κατεψηνισμένα or -ψητισμένα could arise out of -ψηγμένα. Whence I think that the word was originally

ἔκοπτον οὐδέπω τῆς κατεργασίας αὐτῶν εὑρημένης. καὶ τὰς μὲν κριθὰς μέχρι νῦν ὅλας χέουσιν οἱ ἐπιθύοντες ταῖς σπονδαῖς, ἐπεὶ σύμβολον τῆς παλαιᾶς τροφῆς· τὰ δὲ πόπανα τῆς ἄρτι ὥρας, τουτέστι τῆς αὖθις. Schol. Il. *α*, 449. Οὐλοχύτας. τινὲς τὰ κανᾶ δι' ὧν ἐπέχεον τὰς οὐλάς· αἳ πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν εἴρηνται τῶν ψαιστῶν[3]. ἀπαρχὴ δὲ τῆς προτέρας ζωῆς ἀπεδίδοντο τοῖς θεοῖς αἱ κριθαί. πρὸ τῶν πυρῶν γὰρ εὕρηνται, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ προκριθῆναι τῶν βαλάνων οὕτως ὠνομάσθησαν.—Οὐλοχύτας[4], οὐλάς. εἰσὶ δὲ κριθαὶ μετὰ ἁλῶν μεμιγμέναι, ἃς ἐπέχεον τοῖς ἱερουργουμένοις ζώοις πρὸ τοῦ θύεσθαι, ἤτοι πολυπληθείας χάριν, ἢ μνήμην ποιούμενοι τῆς ἀρχαίας βρώσεως. ὡς γάρ φησι Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ περὶ εὑρημάτων, πρὶν ἢ μάθωσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀλεῖν τὸν δημητριακὸν καρπὸν, οὕτω σώας αὐτὰς ἤσθιον. ὅθεν οὐλὰς[5] αὐτάς φησιν ὁ ποιητής. Eustath. ad Il. *α*, 449. p. 100, 11. Basil.—αἱ οὐλαὶ προεβάλλοντο, αἵτινες τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅλαι ἤτοι σῶαι ἠσθίοντο πρὶν ἢ γενέσθαι τὰ τοῦ ἀλετοῦ. διὸ καὶ οὐλαὶ λέγονται κατὰ πρόσληψιν τοῦ υ, ὀλαὶ ἄλλως ὀφείλουσαι λέγεσθαι. Schol. Apollon. 1, 409. Οὐλοχύτας δὲ οἱ μὲν τὰ κανᾶ, ἐπεὶ δι' αὐτῶν φέρεται τὰ πρὸς θυσίαν. οἱ δὲ τὰς κριθὰς, ἐπειδὴ οὐλὰς (perhaps οὔλας) ἐνέβαλλον τοῖς βωμοῖς. Apollon. Lex.

κατεψαισμένα, used with the view of explaining *ψαιστά*, as the verb *ψαίω* was not a very common one elsewhere; at least I know it only from the passage of Porphyry (which I shall have to quote hereafter), where it is again used with *ψαιστός*, but so that it may be doubted what it exactly means. As I cannot here satisfy myself about this word, I must refer to Fœs. Oec. Hippocr. v. *ψαιστὴν μάζαν*. From the passages there quoted, compared with that of Porphyry and this in Suidas, it appears to me that *ψαίειν* properly meant to moisten the coarsely-ground corn, and make it into dough, of which were made the altar-cakes offered up at the end of the sacrifice, as the salted barley was at the beginning.

[3] This is the reading in Wassenbergh. In Villoison, on the contrary, it is *τας οὐλας· και κριθαι δε προς ἀντιδιαστοληνη των ψ.*: the words from *ἀπαρχὴ* to *κριθαί* are wanting.

[4] In the old collection of the scholia and in Wassenbergh this stands as a separate scholium, but Villoison gives it connected with the former one, thus; *ὠνομασθησαν. κριθας δε μεθ' ἁλων μεμ. ἐπεχεον τοις ἱερουργημενοις ζ.* &c.

[5] Thus the Schol. min. and Leid. ap. Wassenbergh. Villoison, on the other hand, and the Etym. M. (in which stands this same scholium,) have *ὅλας*.

v. Οὐλοχύτας:—ὅταν δὲ λέγει, καὶ οὐλοχύτας ἀνέλοντο, σαφὲς ὡς αὐτὰς τὰς κριθὰς σημαίνει, οἷον τὰς ὅλας χεομένας ἐπὶ τῶν σπονδῶν.

2. We will for the present say no more of the antiquarian supposition that the Greeks strewed the sacred barley whole. But before we leave the subject, we will endeavour to prevent any one taking the etymology of the word as one of the proofs of this supposition. If οὐλοχύται had been the only word extant, its etymology, combined with those testimonies above detailed, would certainly have made it very probable. But there occurs also in Homer Od. γ, 441. and in the later writers, for this same sacred barley, the simple word οὐλαί itself. This word however is always an oxyton,—an accentuation contrary to all analogy. The adjective is writen ὅλη, Ion. οὔλη: if now by the omission of κριθή, κριθαί, it were used as a substantive, whence came the change? for neither in Greek nor in German are the accent and pronunciation of an elliptical adjective ever changed. But should any one doubt whether this accent were transmitted down to the grammarians, still less would these latter have introduced it of themselves,—they who rather, as we see, use every means to make us feel the correctness of οὔλας κριθάς. And still more forced would seem to be the attempt to distinguish this word by its so-called radical accentuation of οὖλαι from another οὐλαί signifying *scars*. Nay, even if we overlook all this, what is to be said to the form ὀλαί, as good Attic writers called the sacrificial barley? See Aristoph. Equ. 1167. Pac. 948. 960. The Ionic dialect, which generally substitutes the lenis for the aspirate, does so more particularly in certain changes of the vowels, as in ὅλος οὖλος, and also in ὅρος οὖρος, ὁδός οὐδός: but where in the Attic dialect is the analogy for this ὀλαί coming from ὅλαι?

3. In addition to this comes a doubt of another kind. The name οὐλαί, οὐλοχύται is evidently the ancient name, that which was handed down from the olden time with the thing itself. How came it then that the sacrificial barley was so studiously called by a name signifying *whole*, at a time when grinding was scarcely, if at all, known? The language would not have had recourse to this appellation until a later time, when the use of unground corn was something remarkable.

Do we not therefore see here the inexperienced etymologist, who unreflectingly supposes that what appears remarkable to him must have appeared so to the primitive framers of language?

4. To these doubts may be added a positive trace. What the Greeks called οὐλαί, ὀλαί, the Latins called *mola*. It seems to me that the following analogy is clear enough for us to infer the same relation between *mola* and ὀλαί, as we find between μία—ἴα: *Mars, mas, maris*—Ἄρης, ἄῤῥην: μάλη, μασχάλη—*ala, axilla*: μονθυλεύω—ὀνθυλεύω: μόσχος (in the sense of a *branch*) synonymous with ὄσχος. Further, as the Latin *mola* is an old verbal substantive of *molere*, so is also ὀλή a regular verbal form, and the synonymous verb offers itself to us at once in ἀλέω, which by the change of vowel is only another form of ἕλω, a verb still extant in Homer (Od. ε, 132. Ζεὺς ἕλσας ἐκέασσε) in the sense of *to strike*; and *to beat, beat in pieces*, is well known to have been the fundamental idea of *grinding* in that early time, when corn was not yet rubbed but trodden to pieces. As μονή then comes from μένω; τροπή from τρέπω, τράπω; τομή from τέμνω, τάμνω; βολή from βάλλω; so is ὀλή (as it speaks for itself) a verbal substantive from ἕλω, ἀλέω[6]. But the Latin and German verbs *molere, mahlen*, are naturally and etymologically the same with this Greek verb, of which, if another proof were wanting, we have the information of Helladius, that ἄλευρον, evidently derived from ἀλέω, has another form μάλευρον[7].

5. Let us now shut our ears for a moment against the

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[6] From the same verb doubtless comes (and this is a further confirmation of the above,) the word ὅλμος*, *a mortar*, in which the aspirate is introduced, exactly as in ὅρμος from εἴρω and from ὄρω, ἅρμα and ἁρμόζω from ἄρω. See Art. 52. sect. 2.

[7] Chrestom. p. 8. Ed. Meurs. Ap. Phot. p. 867. Hœsch. Ὅτι τὸ ἄλευρον κατὰ πλεονασμὸν τοῦ μ ἐστὶν εὑρεῖν μάλευρον· καὶ τὸ μία δέ ἐκ τοῦ ἴα γεγονὸς κατὰ πλεονασμὸν ἔχει τὸ μ. It would be agreeable to the correctest principles to say, that in those forms where the μ is wanting it is cut off, and consequently the Latin and German form would be thus proved to be the older. In this case therefore we should naturally look around in search of the radical idea *to beat*. This is unfortunately lost, but *malleus* and *mulcare* are plainly derivatives of it.

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* [But see note, p. 270.—Ed.]

account which we have met with of the *whole* barley in the Grecian sacrifices: and let us ask ourselves the question, Whether, if we had never heard of that usage, but knew only the *mola* of the Romans and the ὀλαί of the Greeks, and had before our eyes the analogy above described, we should not think that we had a decisive etymological proof that those two sister-nations used in their sacrifices corn coarsely ground.

6. Hence then a suspicion may arise, whether that historical information, like many others with which we are acquainted, does not owe its origin more or less to the etymology of ὅλος, οὖλος; as it is well known that etymological speculation was a family failing of the Greek grammarians. Nor let us be led astray by the name of Theophrastus, as occurring in one of the passages quoted in its favour. Theophrastus says nothing more than what we knew without him, "that men, before they invented the treading or bruising of corn, ate it whole." For the application to the οὐλαί "of the poet" evidently does not belong to Theophrastus, who was not obliged to resort to Homer for ὀλαί or οὐλαί, as the thing was so called all around him; but it belongs to the grammarian from whom the Etym. M. and the scholiast have taken this remark.

7. The same Theophrastus is said indeed to have spoken more clearly on this point in Porphyry de Abstin. 2, 6. *Ταύταις (ταῖς κριθαῖς) ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐλοχυτεῖτο κατὰ τὰς πρώτας θυσίας τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος. ὕστερον δὲ ἐρειξαμένων τε αὐτὰς καὶ τὴν τροφὴν ψαισαμένων . . . . τοῦ ἀληλεσμένου βίου παρὰ τὸν πρόσθεν μακαρισθέντος, ἀπήρξαντό τε τῆς ψαισθείσης τροφῆς πρῶτον εἰς πῦρ τοῖς θεοῖς. ὅθεν ἔτι καὶ νῦν πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῶν θυηλῶν τοῖς ψαισθεῖσι θυλήμασι χρώμεθα*[8]. But it should be remarked, that though Porphyry names Theophrastus many times from section 5., he by no means does it in such a way that this writer is to be considered the author of all which is there advanced; hence, then, none of the separate subjects in which he is not immediately named (he is not, for instance, in section 6.) can be with any certainty attributed to him. Whatever therefore can be gathered from this passage—and it is neither much nor clear—is of no further value than as the opinion and authority of one more of the later writers.

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[8] See above, note 2.

8. But the supposed difference between the Greek and the Roman usage is merely a remark of the moderns grounded on the above information, and compared with the somewhat verbose description which Servius gives on Virg. Ecl. 8, 82., of how the Roman *mola* was bruised, ground, and prepared with salt. No trace of a distinction maintained with such formality is to be found in that writer in whom every one would look for it,—Dionysius of Halicarnassus. On the contrary, that author (7, 72. p. 478. 479. Sylb.) shows the exact agreement of the Roman with the Homeric usage in sacrifices, namely, that the former prepared the sacrifice *Δήμητρος καρποὺς ἐπιῤῥάναντες*, with whom he then compares the Homeric heroes as *οὐλαῖς χρωμένους*. He who goes on to show how, amidst all the differences produced by nationality and time in the customs of the two people, they still essentially agreed, would surely have mentioned that difference of usage, and given the reasons for it, if it had been something so notorious; as he has in fact contrasted the *far* or *ζέα* of the Romans with the barley of the Greeks. But as he draws a distinction between *ζέα* and *κριθή*, while on the contrary he uses *Δήμητρος καρποί* and *οὐλαί* as expressions intended to give only the same common general idea, it is evident that had he known *οὐλαί* to have that meaning, he could and must have avoided the name here, if he wished not to touch on that difference as being one of no essential importance.

9. I hope now to be able to satisfy my readers by the following account. *Ὀλή, ὀλαί, mola,* was the old name for grain in general; in its strictest sense, for that which was ready-prepared for food by treading or grinding: but it was very natural, that this name, taken from the process through which the grain passed, should be the same general name for grain which it had borne previously to that first simple process; in the same way as both the Germans and English call by the same name of *corn* (Germ. *korn*) the grain prepared for grinding and the green plant still standing in the field. Equally natural is it that this name should have remained appropriated to that species of grain which was first in general use, viz. to *barley*, as in German the name *Korn* [answering to the English word *corn*, and signifying grain in general,] is given more particularly to

rye [the grain most used in Germany], as in French wheat is called *froment*. And as a proof that this account is the only correct one, another species of grain akin to barley bore the name of ὄλυρα. With regard however to the barley itself, the old name ὀλή was driven out of common use by another word κριθή[9], and the former then retained exclusively the sacred meaning. The most ancient simple process by which grain was prepared for food was by merely treading it out, the object of which was not so much to bruise the corn as to free it from the chaff. Now it cannot be supposed that there existed any tradition whatever of the times before men had learned even to tread out the corn. But that, before the invention of baking, the raw corn was moistened and salted to give it a relish, and that the *mola salsa* or ὀλαί was an offering of this the oldest kind of farinaceous food, is a very natural and probable supposition. The only thing necessary in this case was to preserve a visible contrast between this and the fine flour or baked dough of the later times. Raw barley, coarsely-ground barley, or barley-grit are all in this respect one and the same thing; although it is possible, nay, in the minuteness of the sacerdotal regulations it is very probable, that in the form and manner of preparing this *mola* there were different observances in different temples. But no supposition of a regular and constant distinction between the Greeks and Romans, the one using the barley whole and the other coarsely ground, possible as the thing may be in itself, is to be entertained without the express testimony of the ancients.

10. That it is far more probable for the ὀλαί of the Greeks, like the *mola* of the Latins, to have been also barley somewhat trodden and bruised, of which in all cases could be made a kind of dough, is shown by the jest in Aristophanes Equ. 1167. where Cleon offers Δῆμος a μαζίσκην Ἐκ τῶν ὀλῶν τῶν ἐκ Πύλου μεμαγμένην. But where coarse grit was in use, there it is evident that this coarsely-trodden barley, necessarily mixed

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[9] When I compare the word κρῖ with κρύος and ὀκριοείς, and the Latin *hordeum* with *horrere*, it appears to me probable that the *horridum*, the pointed, prickly beard, which particularly characterizes barley, is the origin of this name.

with a great deal of whole grain, must have been opposed to meal, as if it had been *whole* barley, *whole* corn. Thus, therefore, we must interpret the ἔτι καὶ νῦν in the passage in Suidas; and thus certainly might have arisen in a very early period (in Theophrastus perhaps) the etymology of the word οὐλοχύται from ὅλος, οὖλος; although it is also possible that from this etymology was first formed the exact supposition that in the Homeric times they really did use in their sacrifices corn literally *whole*. From such suppositions, (brought forward in the shape of historical facts,) which we can no longer read in their original authors, arose first the confused and contradictory scholia and glosses, such as those which we have quoted above, and from which men fancy they can draw antiquarian proofs.

11. That the prevailing testimony in the case before us is in general nothing but speculation of the grammarians is clear also from this, that the explanation there given was by no means universally current, as very many good scholia and glosses do not at all mention it. For instance we have in Hesych. Ὀλαί, κριθαί, ἀπαρχαί. Οὐλάς, κριθάς. Οὐλοχύτας, ...κριθὰς πεφρυγμένας. And from the corrupted gloss Ἐπιπελάνιαι, ὀλαὶ, καὶ πόπανα, we see at least that the subject of it is a piece of dough, or a baked cake, which nevertheless is explained by ὀλαί. By comparing this last with the gloss Ἐμπέλανα, πόπανα, I would propose to read it Ἐπιπέλανα, αἱ ὀλαί, καὶ πόπανα. Probably ἐμπέλανα and ἐπιπέλανα were the names for cakes which were *laid upon* the animal for sacrifice, and therefore another form of the *mola*. Suid. Ὀλαὶ καὶ οὐλαὶ, αἱ μεθ' ἁλῶν μεμιγμέναι κριθαὶ καὶ τοῖς θύμασιν ἐπιβαλλόμεναι. Moschop. ad Hom. Il. α, 449. Οὐλοχύτας ἔλεγον τὰ κανᾶ δι' ὧν αἱ οὐλαὶ ἐχέοντο· οὐλαὶ δέ εἰσιν αἱ κριθαὶ, ἐνταῦθα δὲ αἱ μετὰ ἁλῶν μεμιγμέναι κριθαὶ λέγονται ἀπὸ μέρους, ἃς ἐπι.... (lege ἐπέχεον) τῷ βωμῷ πρὸ τοῦ ἱερουργῆσαι τὰ ἱεοεῖα. Schol. Hom. Od. γ, 441. οὐλάς, ἐλαιοβρόχους κριθάς.

88. Οὖλος, οὔλιος, οὖλε.

1. The epithet οὖλος occurs in so many and such completely different kinds of expression in Homer that it is extremely difficult for us, even supposing a twofold leading sense proceeding from a twofold root or stem, to see our way through it. If we look at the form of the word in search of its meaning, the most natural supposition will be that οὖλος is the common Ionicism for ὅλος; but this is the very sense with which we can make the least progress in explaining the Homeric passages, although Gesner (ad Orph. Arg. 955.) and Damm endeavour, in a manner forced beyond example, to reduce almost everything to that sense. Far greater progress may be made by deriving the word from ὀλεῖν, by virtue of which οὖλος is the same with ὀλοός; but this again leaves out a number of passages, in which, if we form our judgement from what the context evidently requires, we should generally be satisfied with the sense of *soft, woolly*; which meaning is again supported by what we know to be its common use in prose, in which it means *crisp* or *curled*.

2. If we pass in review all the Homeric passages, we shall see that it is the epithet,

1.) of the χλαῖνα and the τάπης, Il. π, 224. ω, 646. Od. δ, 50. 299. η, 338. κ, 451. ρ, 89. τ, 225., to which must be added the οὔλη λάχνη of the χλαῖνα, Il. κ, 134.
2.) of the *hair of the head*, Od. ζ, 231. ψ, 158., to which belongs also οὐλοκάρηνος in Od. τ, 246.
3.) of *Mars*, Il. ε, 461. 717.
4.) of *Achilles*, Il. φ, 536.
5.) of *the dream*, Il. β, 6. 8.
6.) of *the cry* of the starlings or daws, and of the fugitives, Il. ρ, 756. 759.
7.) of *a loaf of bread*, Od. ρ, 343.
8.) of *a month*, Od. ω, 118.

No one will ever succeed in bringing these passages under any two of the three leading senses given above without proceeding in an unphilosophical manner. On the contrary, at first sight they range themselves thus: *first*, the passages 1. and 2.; *secondly*, from 3. to 6. inclusive; *thirdly*, 7. and 8.; which three divisions we must now consider separately.

3. The Ionicism of οὖλος for ὅλος is indeed difficult to be proved from any other source than the Homeric passages which we are here examining; but it is undoubted, not only from such compounds as οὐλομελής, οὐλομελία, οὐλοθυσία, but also especially from the other form ὅλος never appearing in any of the remains of Epic poetry which have come down to us, whether Homeric, Hesiodic, or Cyclic*; where also we never find ὅρος, *a boundary*, but always οὖρος†. In Homer, on the contrary, we find without any appearance of force οὖλος for ὅλος in two of the verses above referred to; viz. in Od. ω, 118. (of a distant journey),

> Μηνὶ δ' ἄρ' οὔλῳ πάντα περήσαμεν εὐρέα πόντον,

and Od. ρ, 343.

> Ἄρτον τ' οὖλον ἑλὼν περικαλλέος ἐκ κανέοιο
> Καὶ κρέας, ὥς οἱ χεῖρες ἐχάνδανον ἀμφιβαλόντι.

To which may be added from the Homeridic poetry Hymn. Merc. 113.

> Πολλὰ δὲ κάγκανα κᾶλα . . . . . .
> Οὖλα λαβὼν ἐπέθηκεν

(of the *whole* pieces of wood laid on the fire after it was made), and again at v. 137.

> Οὐλόποδ', οὐλοκάρηνα πυρὸς κατεδάμνατ' ἀϋτμῇ,

and from the later imitation of Aratus 717. Why I do not quote οὐλοχύτας also, is evident from the account given of it in the last article.

4. Equally certain also is the meaning of οὖλος as derived

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* [Under this term were included all the *early* Greek poets who imitated Homer by describing in Epic poetry some circumstances of the Trojan war or of the destruction of Troy, as well as those who chose their subjects from the earliest mythological stories of Greece until the return of Ulysses. For a copious account of them see Heyne's Excursus 1. ad Æneid. 2.—Ed.]

† [It is evident therefore that this, like many other things, escaped the observation of the later Epics, Apollonius and Callimachus, who use the form ὅλος.—Ed.]

from ὀλεῖν. For, in the first place, the formation is perfectly analogical, as the verb itself in its participle οὐλόμενος lengthens the first syllable; and both forms ὀλοός and οὖλος stand extremely well side by side to supply the necessity of the metre, and even to mark a difference of meaning, in as much as the former retains that of ὀλεῖν more literally than the other does. In the more general sense of *bad*, *horrid*, οὖλος occurs, without any force and very consistently, in the passages above mentioned from 3 to 6. This epithet, for instance, is most naturally given to Mars, but equally so to Achilles also, as the appellation is applied to him by the Trojans (Il. φ, 536.), *Δείδια γὰρ, μὴ οὖλος ἀνὴρ ἐς τεῖχος ἅληται.* And it quite accords with the language of the common people to call a screaming cry *a vile, horrid cry*; nor can the expression be used more appropriately than at Il. ρ, 755. et seq., where it is said, that as starlings or daws, when they see the hawk, fly away, οὖλον κεκλήγοντες, so did the Greeks flying before Æneas and Hector. And lastly, with regard to the *dream* (Il. β, init.), it might appear a debateable point whether the epithet should be understood here in that sense, because it is used in the eighth verse as a word of address where nothing is meant unkind or offensive. Hence it has been wished to apply to it the idea of *soft*: but, besides that it never occurs in this more definite idea of softness, we must recollect that what may be a very suitable epithet for sleep is a very unsuitable one for a dream. The error was that a *fixed* epithet was expected here, whereas it is evidently a *distinctive* one. So far, therefore, those were in the right who wished to explain οὖλος by στρεβλός, only that they misunderstood the difference which belongs to the passage. For this dream speaks quite plainly and straightforwardly, not in riddles; but what it says is not true. Dreams were of two sorts, deceptive and true, as we know from Od. τ, 560. et seq. And as in that passage (v. 568.) Penelope gives her dream, which she thinks a deceitful one, the passionate epithet of αἶνος (Ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν—from the true gate—ὀΐομαι αἶνον ὄνειρον Ἐλθέμεν), so here the really deceptive dream, which Jupiter sends to Agamemnon, is called in the cooler narrative οὖλος, *pernicious*; and with this significant epithet Jupiter, according to Homeric usage, addresses it very appropriately.

5. It is worthy of mention as an error of the later Epic, that Apollonius, resting on the authority of οὖλος and οὐλόμενος, frequently uses οὐλοός for ὀλοός; for if this form had really existed in the older language, it would surely have appeared under some similar necessity of metre in the writings of the oldest Epic poets also.

6. The third leading meaning of the word οὖλος results from the passages mentioned above under Nos. 1. and 2., and is radically different from the others[1]. As an epithet of the χλαῖνα and of the λάχνη on the χλαῖνα it gives the idea of *hairy, woolly*. This however appears not to suit equally well the two passages under No. 2., viz. Od. ζ, 231. and ψ, 158. καδδὲ κάρητος Οὔλας ἧκε κόμας. But even here the epithet οὔλας must prevent our thinking of long softly-flowing hair, which would suit well an Apollo or a Paris, but not an Ulysses. The term καθῆκε depicts merely a head of hair falling down thick and full, and οὔλας denotes it to be in large locks, bushy, curly. And in this sense only can it be also an epithet of the head itself, as when the aged herald Eurybates is called (Od. τ, 246.) οὐλοκάρηνος, *curly-headed*. With this agrees also the usage of succeeding prose writers, as Herodot. 7, 70., where οὐλότατον τρίχωμα denotes the woolly, curly hair of the negroes, who thence are called in other writers οὐλότριχες. In Pollux 2. chap. 3. οὖλός with its compounds is quoted from the language of common life as used of hair, and in 4. chap. 19. it is cited more than once, among the characteristics of tragic personages, as the mark of arrogance and rudeness, exactly similar to the βοστρύχοισι γαύρῳ στρατηγῷ in Fragm. 9. of Archilochus. Hippocrates too has the word in precisely the same sense as Homer, using οὔλῳ ἐρίῳ of wool, as we learn from Erotian, who explains it by μαλακῷ; and in so doing he is quite correct as to the sense; only it is clear from what has been said that the radical idea is not softness, but the *winding, curly ringlets*

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[1] I call *radically* different, not only such words and meanings as no longer announce their derivation to the speaker, but those in which, supposing that originally an affinity really existed (here it would be with one of the other two οὖλος), the intermediate ideas or mediums of transition joined by the same or by cognate tones have disappeared from the language.

of hair producing softness: hence the derivation of the word in this sense from εἰλεῖν, by the change of the vowel, is not improbable; in the same way as οὐλαμὸς ἀνδρῶν, *globus virorum*, comes from that same verb[2], and the verbal substantive ἐξουλή is acknowledged to come from ἐξειλεῖν. On the other hand, it must now be clear how incorrect the old grammarians were in deriving τὰ οὖλα, *the gums*, from this sense of the word οὖλος. They were satisfied, without looking philosophically to the radical idea, with the sense of μαλακός (evidently joined with the idea of οὖλος by mere chance) as the foundation of a new radical idea *tender*, which appeared to them to suit the gums. But is it not better to leave the derivation of τὰ οὖλα undecided, and place it as a word by itself, until other combinations may chance to throw some light upon it? The other varieties of meaning in which the adjective οὖλος occurs in prose, and in the later poetry, have evidently arisen from that original sense of *curly* by unobserved deviations of usage and by artificial orators and poets, and must not therefore be applied with a retrograde effect to the Epic usage. The Lyric poet Stesichorus comes however very near to it when he uses the word as the epithet of a wreath of violets (p. 28, 5. Suchf.), ἴων τε κορωνίδας οὔλας: as such a wreath consists of twisted or curled flowerets pressed close together, which make it soft, as the fleece was in the former instance[3].

7. Next to οὖλος comes the form οὔλιος, which occurs only once in Homer, viz. Il. λ, 62., where Hector, now fighting in the rear of the army, now in the van, is the subject of the following comparison:

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[2] For a somewhat corrected account of the radical idea of οὖλος and οὐλαμός, see Art. 44. sect. 21.

[3] Passages from the later poets may be seen in Steph. Thesaur. in v., as also in Callim. Epig. 5, 5. Hymn. Jov. 52. H. Dian. 247. H. Del. 302. and in Antip. Sid. 73. (οὖλον ἀείδειν); while in the Latin dictionaries *crispus* may be compared with οὖλος, and will be found to undergo the same transitions. On the gloss of Erotian, Οὖλον ὀρόβιον τὸ πυῤῥόν· τινὲς δὲ τὴν ἰσομεγέθη ὀρόβῳ ἀκροχορδόνην, I hardly know what to say; the former part appears to me to arise from the comparison of a red wart with a scar or with the gums; but the other seems to be an explanation of οὖλος for ὅλον, like a wart which in shape and size resembles a whole pea.

Οἷος δ' ἐκ νεφέων ἀναφαίνεται οὔλιος ἀστὴρ
Παμφαίνων, τότε δ' αὖτις ἔδυ νέφεα σκιόεντα·
Ὣς Ἕκτωρ, &c.

As neither the context nor etymology speaks decisively here on the word οὔλιος, and Homer himself offers no parallel passage, the corresponding usage of the oldest of the other poets would appear to deserve our first attention. In the Shield of Hercules οὔλιος is twice an epithet of Mars; Pindar uses it as the epithet of battle and of an elegy; and Sophocles (Aj. 933.) makes Ajax curse the Atreidæ οὐλίῳ σὺν πάθει. The passage of Homer therefore has been correctly explained from the earliest times by that sense of οὔλιος, according to which it is the same as οὖλος from ὀλεῖν, and the οὔλιος ἀστήρ has been supposed to denote Sirius by a reference equally correct to Il. χ, 26. &c. where Priam sees Achilles,

Παμφαίνονθ' ὥστ' ἀστέρ' ἐπεσσύμενον πεδίοιο,
Ὅς ῥά τ' ὀπώρης εἶσι· ......
Λαμπρότατος μὲν ὅγ' ἐστὶ, κακὸν δέ τε σῆμα τέτυκται,
Καί τε φέρει πολλὸν πυρετὸν δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν·
Ὣς τοῦ χαλκὸς ἔλαμπε περὶ στήθεσσι θέοντος.

These verses give full and sufficient grounds for that sense of οὔλιος. Nor is the designation of the star by οὔλιος in this particular passage idle or unmeaning, since it is the hostile Hector, threatening destruction to the Greeks, who blazes forth in so many parts of the battle. All else therefore which ancients and moderns have produced on this verse needs no further notice. One thing only I will not omit to mention, that by the passage of Callimachus H. Del. 302., where the evening-star is called οὖλος ἐθείραις Ἕσπερος, any one might be misled to understand οὔλιος in the same sense; nay, it is possible that Callimachus had the Homeric expression in his mind when he wrote it. But this supposition must be at once rejected: for neither can οὔλιος be used simply for οὖλος, *curly*, nor is the transition from *curly*, *woolly*, to the *gleaming*, *twinkling* rays of a star, Homeric, however respectable a rank it may obtain among the modifications of meaning introduced by the later poets[4].—The various reading αὔλιος (see Heyne), old as it is,—for Apollonius (4, 1629.) had it in his mind,—carries but little weight, as there are no grounds elsewhere for *αὔλιος* in the adjectival sense of *evening, vesper, bringing the herds home to the stall.*

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[4] See above, note 3.

8. It is certainly remarkable that this very οὔλιος, fem. *οὐλία,* should as a name of Apollo and Diana (see Steph. Thesaur. 2, 1283. c. d.) have a sense just opposite to the above, viz. *healing.* But I see nothing so totally inadmissible in the idea of understanding this form here also in its common meaning, which is favoured by the very name of *Ἀπόλλων,* and seems to me to suit extremely well in the mouths of simple men those two powerful deities so frequently bringing death with their swift arrows: and to this may be supposed to refer the gloss of Hesychius, *οὐλία, ὀλεθρία.* Nor is there anything strange in that plain contrast of meanings; as οὔλιος in this sense is a sacred mystical word, coming down to us from other times, perhaps also from other stems or roots. But there are in the language quite as good grounds for the derivation as it is commonly formed (see Steph. l. c.); namely, that in οὖλος, ὅλος, lies the idea of *whole, sound, healed**, with which is joined the verb οὔλειν, of which the imperative has been preserved in Homer as a term of salutation, Od. ω, 401.

Οὖλέ τε καὶ μέγα χαῖρε,

and of which the verbal substantive οὐλή, *a cure,* remains in the language of common life in the sense of *a scar.* On this I will only remark, that in the same way the German adjective *heil*†, ‘salvus’, means in the Northern dialects (in which it is written *heel,*) ‘entirely’, and that the term of salutation *salve,* answering to οὖλε, is joined in the same way with the corresponding Latin word *salvus*[5].

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* [A striking analogy exists in our word *whole* in its meaning of *entire, sound, healed.*—Ed.]

† [Hence our English words, *hail, heal, health,* &c.—Ed.]

[5] Whoever listens merely to the nearest resemblance of sounds, will join the Latin *vale* etymologically with οὖλε. But in *valere, validus,* the idea of health does not come from that of totality or entireness, but merely from that of strength and excellence; and thus *validus* is akin to *βελτίων,* to the Old German *bold, bald* (Angl. bold), to *walten* (Angl. to rule or dispose of at one's will and pleasure), to *gewaltig* (Angl. pow-

Οὐλοχύται ; vid. οὐλαί.

89. Ὄχα.

I introduce this word merely in order to remark, what appears to have entirely escaped observation, that it occurs only in Homer, that it always precedes and strengthens the superlative, and indeed that (to be still more precise), in the only expression in which it has been preserved to us, it stands before ἄριστος. The common explanation of it by ἔξοχα says nothing: for by taking away the ἐξ you deprive the word of its significant part. It appears indeed difficult to derive it from anything but ἔχειν, but how it is to be deduced from this general idea is left entirely to conjecture, as the word does not occur in any other relation which might offer the means of forming a comparison. All that can be said therefore is, that it is a word used to increase the force of ἄριστος, and perhaps of superlatives in general*.

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erful), and to *wohl* (Angl. well). On the other hand, that ὅλος, οὖλος is also etymologically identified with the German *heil, heel,* may be made credible, even to one not very experienced in etymology, by the sound of the vowel in the English words *whole* and *wholesome* [German *heilsam*]. But as the Greek ὅλος became in Old Latin *solus, sollus,* as we learn from Festus, so is also the Latin *salus, salvus,* akin to the German *Heil, heil,* (Angl. health, healthy,) by which therefore οὖλε and *salve* are connected. The Old German term of salutation *heil!* (Angl. *hail!*), which is generally taken to be a substantive, and so construed, may also quite as well have been the imperative of the verb *heilen* (to heal), which, like old verbs in general, has the intransitive sense, (to be or become healthy or sound) as well as the transitive, both in German and English, as we say in both languages with regard to an unsound part, 'my finger is healing'. In this way too,—that is to say, by a comparison with the German *heil, heilen,*—the common explanation of Apollo's epithet of Οὔλιος will be supported by the German *Heiland,* a healer or saviour.

* [Döderlein, by a very happy comparison, says that ὄχα bears the same relation to ὀχυρός as the Old German word *fast* (Angl. very much) does to *fest* (Angl. fixed, firm). We may add the Latin *valde, validus,* and the French *fort* in its two senses of *very* and *strong*.—Ed.]

90. Ὀχθῆσαι.

1. The principal meaning given in the lexicons to ὀχθέω, viz. *to sigh* or *groan deeply*, appears to be founded on that etymology of the old grammarians which derives it from ὄχθος, *a hillock* (ἀνάστημα τῆς γῆς), meaning thereby the heaving of the breast, and metaphorically of the mind (μετεωρίσαι τὴν ψυχήν). But the idea of sighing and groaning little suits Jupiter or Neptune in such passages as Il. *α*, 517. *θ*, 208. Nor can it be supposed to mean properly anger, or a threatening posture, as it is frequently directed toward beloved persons, as in that very passage of Il. *α*, 517. and at *π*, 48. It certainly does express also the feelings of an inferior at the arbitrary conduct of his superior in power, as at Il. *α*, 570. at the threats of Jupiter to Juno Ὤχθησαν δ' ἀνὰ δῶμα Διὸς θεοὶ οὐρανίωνες, or at *ο*, 184. the feelings of Neptune at the threats of Jupiter. We see therefore that it denotes in general *every kind of violent emotion* (*Unmuth*, ‘displeasure, ill-humour’, as Voss renders it, appears to me somewhat too weak an expression,) at events, actions, and words which strike the mind *unpleasantly*. Hence it is used in the soliloquy of one vexed, (Il. λ, 403. σ, 5.) Ὀχθήσας δ' ἀρὰ εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν.

2. Hence it would be difficult to conceive how, among so many passages of this kind, it should ever express in any one instance mere *astonishment*, as Schneider in his Lexicon* says that it does. At Il. *φ*, 53. Achilles is indeed astonished at the unexpected re-appearance of an enemy whom he thought long ago in slavery: his astonishment however would not have been expressed by ὀχθῆσαι but for the vexation which accompanied it. Nor can the passage of Od. δ, 30., where the predominant feeling is pure displeasure or indignation, be quoted as a proof of this meaning but by mistake.

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* [This may perhaps refer to the first or second edition of Schneider; in the third and last edition there is nothing of the kind. The whole account of the word there given is an abridgement of this article of Buttmann.—Ed.]

3. According to this I have no doubt of the perfect correctness of the other derivation, which is likewise an old one, and which connects ὀχθῆσαι with ἄχθεσθαι; although the latter differs in this, that it is used primarily of the literal sense of a burden, as at Od. ο, 457. *κοίλη νηῦς ἤχθετο, was laden,* which is similar to Il. υ, 247. *οὐδ᾽ ἂν νηῦς ἑκατόζυγος ἄχθος ἄροιτο*: thence metaphorically of bodily pain, and by a similar metaphor of the mind also (Il. ν, 352.), *ἤχθετο γάρ ῥα Τρωσὶν δαμναμένους.* Nor could any one have overlooked the connexion, had not the change of vowel in the first letter of the word given it a quite different shape in our eyes, which are accustomed to alphabetical arrangement (compare ὅρμος from εἴρω in art. 52. sect. 2.). But the same relation which ὀχέω has to ἔχω, ὀχθέω has to ἄχθω; for the change of the vowel α to ο is verified by βάλλω, βολή, βολέω, and in cases exactly parallel in the initial letters by ὄρχαμος from ἄρχω, and ὄγμος from ἄγω[1].

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[1] The change of vowel is always fluctuating between α, ε, ο; hence to βάλλω, βολή, belongs also βέλος. Compare the changes of ἀλέω in art. 87. And for a further confirmation of this opinion, we have as a companion for ἄχθομαι, ὀχθέω, another form with ε, drawn from one of the few sources of the old provincial dialects which are come down to us. The verb ὑπέχθηται, *subvehat,* 'should import (into a country),' and the derivative formed from it ὑπεχθέσιμα, 'imports', are found in an inscription containing a treaty between the Hierapytnians and the Priansians, inhabitants of Crete, given in Chishull Ant. As. p. 130., which I will copy word for word from Chishull, omitting only the accents, which are an addition of his own: *ει δε τι κα ο ιεραπυτνιος υπεχθηται ες πριανσιον—ατελεα εστω και εσαγομενωι κα εξαγομενωι αυτα*: and again a little further, *ων δε κα αποδωται κατα θαλασσαν εωσας εξαγωγας των υπεχθεσιμων αποδοτω τα τελεα.* The connexion of these forms with ἄχθεσθαι, *to be freighted,* seems to me beyond all doubt: nor should I have any hesitation in deriving also the family of ἔχθος, ἐχθρός, ἔχθεσθαι from the idea of *burdensome, insupportable,* and classing it etymologically with the above, (as I have done before,) if this opinion were not outweighed in my mind by another, according to which these words appear to come from ἐκ, ἐξ, (compare Hesych. ἔχθοι, ἔξω,) as *hostis* seems to be derived from the idea of *strange, estranged.*

91. Πέρα, πέραν, πέρην.

1. Πέρα and πέραν have been hitherto explained in the lexicons to be the same word, or to differ only in sound *euphoniæ gratia,* whereas we find in the two words an almost constant difference of usage; in order to give an account of which we must first call attention to the difference between the ideas of *trans* and *ultra.* In both these I figure to my mind two separate spaces, and suppose myself in one of them. But in *trans* my first thought is of the object which separates, and of that as occupying a space of a certain proportionate size, generally a river or something which may be compared with it; and so by *trans* I speak of the other side of it. In *ultra* my first thought is of one of the two spaces, and of myself in it, but of the separating object only as the distant line of boundary, and by *ultra* I speak of passing that line. Both are frequently translated in German by *jenseit,* 'on the other side'; but, to be more accurate, *trans* would mean *jenseit,* 'to or on the other side, over', and *ultra, darüber hinaus,* 'beyond'. When I say *trans Euphraten* I imagine myself near to that river, and speak positively of the other side; for instance, 'he is fled *over* the Euphrates'; in which the thought is, *he is now on the other side.* When I say *ultra Euphraten,* I am at a distance from that river, and speak of the other side only in opposition to this side; for instance, 'he is fled beyond the Euphrates'; in which the thought is, *he is nowhere to be found from this place to that river**.

2. If now we compare accurately the passages of the ancients we shall find that the Greek language had fixed in essential points the usage of πέρα for *ultra,* πέραν for *trans.* Stephens

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* [The distinction between *trans* and *ultra,* as explained here by Buttmann, cannot be *exactly* preserved either in German or in English, as our corresponding expressions give no idea of the person speaking being *near to* or *distant from* the separating object; indeed it seems hardly probable that the Latins observed this distinction in their *general* usage. I have given *trans* a twofold rendering, to suit its twofold use as a preposition of rest and of motion.—Ed.]

however defines the usage of πέρα in a most remarkable way, by stating that it is not used in (what is its proper meaning) describing locality[1]. The fact is, that Budæus, whom Stephens follows, confines πέρα to the sense of ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον, which certainly every one will remember to be its principal sense; as πέρα τοῦ δικαίου, i. e. beyond the boundaries of justice; or absolutely, in Xen. Anab. 6, 1, 28. οὐκέτι πέρα ἐπολιόρκησαν. It is possible that from the frequency of instances of a moral kind, the ear was less accustomed to the word expressing ideas of real locality; and thence, whenever such a case occurred, other expressions like ὑπέρ or ποῤῥωτέρω were preferred. But to say that πέρα was never used in that sense is incorrect: for instance, we find in Plat. Phæd. p. 112. e. [chap. 60. p. 299. Forster] of the rivers flowing from this world to the world below, δυνατὸν δέ ἐστι ἑκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθιέναι (to flow downward), πέρα δ' οὔ. Again at Eurip. Herc. 234. Ἀτλαντικῶν πέρα Φεύγειν ὅρων: and Ælian. ap. Suid. v. ἐξῆκον: Ἑώρων φάσμα τὸ μέγεθος ἐξῆκον πέρα καὶ ἀνωτέρω τοῦ ἱστοῦ.

3. It is certain that we cannot easily produce from the other word πέραν, Ion. πέρην, a usage transferred to anything moral, because the person thinks himself near to the separating object. The most general construction of this form, as of the other, is, that the separating object is joined with it in the genitive, as πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ, πέραν θαλάσσης; and this is the only one mentioned in the lexicons. Now as Homer also uses the word thus in Il. ω, 752. πέρνασκε πέρην ἁλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο, "was accustomed to sell them on the other side of the sea," so in this verse of Il. β, 535.

Λοκρῶν, οἳ ναίουσι πέρην ἱερῆς Εὐβοίης,

no other interpretation was thought possible than 'on the other side of Eubœa': and Wood, Heyne, and others thought to draw from this a fine-spun argument, that Homer lived in Asia or in one of the islands on the coast of Asia. But how could this be? Is it likely that Homer should speak here so plainly and as it were audibly, from Asia? and that none of the ancients, who have handled this often-discussed subject, none of the grammarians, should have remarked it,—no mention should be made of it in the scholium to the verse? I consider this to be impossible, and regard it as a decisive proof that none of the ancients understood it so. Besides, it is difficult to suppose that the poet, who through his whole poem is always in the midst of the scenes which he describes,—who, for instance, in this geographical episode leads us round all Greece,—should at once in this particular passage fix himself in his own home. And lastly, it is not to be supposed that from the distant coast of Asia, from which no eye could reach to Greece, the poet's first thought should be fixed on the island of Eubœa, just as if it were in sight and obstructed his view, and that he should then have marked the coasts before which it lies with such an expression as '*on the other side of*'; an expression which, as spoken from Asia, could have no meaning but with reference to the Ægean sea, certainly not to an island out of sight.

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[1] See Steph. Thes. under πέραν: "Πέραν de loco tantummodo dicitur: at præcedens πέρα nunquam."

4. But there can be no doubt on the subject; *πέρην* here means *opposite*. That is to say, *πέραν ἁλός* was certainly the natural combination; whence *πέραν* was also used absolutely in the sense of *on the other side*; for instance in Xenoph. Anab. 2, 4, 20. *πολλῶν ὄντων πέραν*, *many being on the other side* (of the river); and 7, 2, 2. *πέραν εις τὴν Ἀσίαν πάλιν διαβῆναι* (from Thrace); so also *τὰ πέραν*, *what is* or *happens on the other side*, and the like. From this was now formed a new construction, by joining (as before in the genitive case) with *πέραν* in its first meaning, but now used absolutely, the point *from which* something was considered as lying on the other side; consequently the sense would be, *on the opposite side from*, *opposite to*. That this is the true sense of the Homeric passage is shown clearly by tracing the narrative. The poet leads us from the Bœotians, through the Phocians, to the Locrians, and from them to the island of Eubœa. In this series, therefore, that designation of the Locrians could mean nothing else than that they lived opposite Eubœa: and as long as the idea of a place separated by water, or by something comparable with it, was joined with *πέραν*, there was no ambiguity. If the

genitive denoted such a separating object, πέραν meant *on the other side*; if it marked a point or a country on such an object, it then meant *opposite*; which latter was afterwards expressed more plainly according to subsequent invention by ἀντιπέραν, ἀντιπέρας, καταντιπέραν, ἀντικρύ, &c.; when of course that other more simple but not so expressive term became less used.

5. That the ancients also understood the passage in no other way is proved, first by the unequivocal usage of this word in Æschylus, when speaking of the same geographical point (Agam. 198.) it is said of the Grecian army Χαλκίδος πέρων ἔχων (halting) παλιῤῥόθοις ἐν Αὐλίδος τόποις. Next comes Strabo's quotation of this very verse (lib. 9, p. 426.), where he infers from it that Homer knew the other Locrians; and consequently he looked upon the expression πέρην Εὐβοίης as an antithesis added by the poet to mark the locality more accurately; for which purpose a point of view must be taken not in Asia, but on the spot. And lastly Pausanias, when (at lib. 10, 8.) he is reckoning up the deputies sent to the Amphictyons, says, Πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ Λοκροὶ οἵ τε καλούμενοι Ὀζόλαι καὶ οἱ πέραν Εὐβοίας ἕνα ἑκάτεροι: from which passage we may fairly conclude that the phrase οἱ πέραν Εὐβοίας became from Homer's time a kind of fixed designation for these Locrians.

6. If however we compare other passages of Pausanias for this word, we shall obtain a further result, of importance for the understanding of that writer; in as much as our having an accurate idea of the places which he describes must frequently depend on this word. Πέραν then occurs frequently in Pausanias in descriptions, where the situation is not represented as being on or near a river: nay, the object which stands with πέραν in the genitive is very commonly a building. If now the only meaning for this word in the mind of the historian were *on the other side*, such a phrase as 'on the other side of the temple' could be understood no otherwise than as relative to the road of the traveller, or of the person passing through a town; the meaning therefore would be, 'beyond the temple, further off than the temple', consequently much the same as the idea of *ultra*, which, as we shall see below, the form πέραν does sometimes take. At the beginning therefore of lib. 2, 22.

where a ditch is mentioned, and some columns stand *πέραν τοῦ τάφου*, this would be understood to mean that these columns stood further off on the same road; and in a similar way soon after (p. 162. Kuhn.), Τοῦ δὲ ἱεροῦ τῆς Εἰλειθυίας πέραν ἐστὶν Ἑκάτης ναός: and at c. 23. (p. 163.)....*ἱερὸν Ἀμφιαράου, καὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ πέραν Ἐριφύλης μνῆμα.* Some other passages however made me doubt the truth of the above rendering; and at last I became convinced by others more decisive, that Pausanias at least, perhaps in consequence of his affecting a simple and Ionic style, uses the word *πέραν* in the sense of *opposite*; so that the thing analogous to the river is then *the street* or *the space* before a building. The following passages may serve to convince us of it. In lib. 5, 15. (p. 415.) a description is given of the Altis at Olympia, within which was also the Prytaneum; of which it is said that it is built *παρὰ τὴν ἔξοδον ἥ ἐστι τοῦ γυμνασίου πέραν.* That is to say, the Altis had several entrances (*ἔξοδοι* they are called here, because Pausanias gives his description from the inside), one of which is to be specified, and this is naturally done by some object situated without it. That object was the gymnasium; and *πέραν* therefore in this passage can have no reasonable meaning but the very probable one, that 'opposite the gymnasium' was one of the entrances into the Altis. Again in lib. 8, 10. (p. 618.) is described the temple of Neptune on the road from Mantinea to Tegea. Afterwards (at p. 619.) it is said, Πέραν δὲ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος τρόπαιόν ἐστι λίθου πεποιημένον.... If we are to suppose that *πέραν* is here said of the point of view taken by the traveller, meaning therefore "on the other side of the temple, further along the road, you come to a trophy," then the description of the road beyond must be continued from the trophy: whereas after the occasion of this monument has been related, the new paragraph (c. 11.) begins immediately with, Μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος χωρίον ὑποδέξεταί σε δρυῶν πλῆρες.... It cannot surely be argued without doing violence to the sense, that the trophy may indeed have been situated between the temple and the wood of oaks, yet is not reckoned in describing the chain of localities, but is as it were thrown in with the temple. The reader, instructed by the other passages, will discover the true sense of this. The traveller proceeds from Mantinea as far as the temple of Neptune; this building is described, then the trophy *opposite*, i. e. on the other side of the road; and then the journey proceeds onwards from the temple through the wood. Again in lib. 10, 36. the interior of Anticyra is briefly described. Ἀντικυρεῦσι δὲ εἰσὶ μὲν ἀνδριάντες ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ χαλκοῖ· ἔστι δέ σφισιν ἐπὶ τῷ λιμένι Ποσειδῶνος οὐ μέγα ἱερὸν.... (then follows a short description of it)... Τοῦ γυμνασίου δὲ, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὰ λουτρά σφισι πεποίηται, τούτου πέραν ἄλλο γυμνάσιόν ἐστιν ἀρχαῖον· ἀνδριὰς δὲ ἕστηκεν ἐν αὐτῷ, &c. We see that the objects in the town are not mentioned regularly one after the other as they stand in the road of a spectator, but are taken here and there promiscuously. It is impossible therefore that the sense can be 'beyond that gymnasium *follows* another'; but the fact is simply this. The gymnasium, i. e. the proper, regular, common gymnasium, is named in one word, and it is added that the baths were in it. *Opposite* this, i. e. on the other side of the same place or square of the street, stood the *old* gymnasium, in which an ancient statue is pointed out as worthy of observation. Again at lib. 2, 27. the grove of Æsculapius at Epidaurus is mentioned, and the statue of the god described. The particular temple, ναός, in which it was placed, is not named, as being a thing understood; but it is immediately added, Τοῦ ναοῦ δέ ἐστι πέραν, ἔνθα οἱ ἱκέται τοῦ θεοῦ καθεύδουσιν. We must indeed have recourse to most artificial refining before we can force these words to mean *on the other side*: whereas nothing is more natural than that *opposite* the temple, that is to say front to front, should stand the building in which those slept who wished to be healed. And in the same way there is no reason whatever why we should understand πέραν otherwise in the passages before mentioned (2, 22. and 23.); on the contrary, the sense of *opposite* will appear in every instance to be the most natural both in the expression and in the thing itself.

7. We will now show by some examples from other writers that this form πέραν does however deviate from the relative meaning first laid down, viz. that of *trans*, and makes a transition to its near neighbour *ultra*. When in the Theogonia, v. 814., the residence of the Titans is placed πέρην χάεος ζοφεροῖο, this may still be compared, as far as a general repre-

sentation of it can be made, with the *πέρην ἁλός, πέρην ὠκεανοῖο*. But in Pindar Isth. 6, 34. we read, that the fame of great exploits penetrates *καὶ πέραν Νείλοιο παγᾶν καὶ δι' Ὑπερβορέους*. Here the sources of the Nile are evidently supposed to be a boundary of the known world, and *πέραν* means *beyond* in the full sense of *ultra*; still however differing in one point from the examples given above (sect. 2.) of *πέρα* as a term of locality, viz. that here there is no *motion* over the boundary. What the exact meaning of *πέραν Ἰνδῶν* is, as quoted by Stephens from a later work, entitled *De Mundo*, I know not: but in the expression of Euripides Hipp. 1053. (to drive any one) *Πέραν γε πόντου καὶ τόπων Ἀτλαντικῶν*, *πέραν* is to be considered as in construction with *πόντου* only, to which (not to *πέραν*) the other is joined. On the other hand, the passage in a chorus of the Alcestis 588. is decisive, where the hind dances to the lyre of Apollo, *ὑψικόμων πέραν βαίνουσ' ἐλατᾶν*, 'going *beyond* the firs', i. e. leaving the wood; and another (Suppl. 676.) where the charioteers drive their chariots *πέραν ἀλλήλων*, *beyond* each other, i. e. each passing his enemy; on which see Hermann's explanation. Thus we are very near the meaning generally given to the word in Pausanias, but at the same time travelling on poetical ground; and poets, we know, are accustomed to turn words intentionally in new directions, keeping only within the bounds of what is intelligible.

8. I must here examine one other poetical passage in which the word *πέρην* occurs, because it has been the subject of dispute. In Apollonius 2, 532. the departure of the Argonauts from Thrace and the residence of Phineus is thus related:

> *Ἐκ δὲ τόθεν μακάρεσσι δυώδεκα δωμήσαντες*
> *Βωμὸν ἁλὸς ῥηγμῖνι πέρην, καὶ ἐφ' ἱερὰ θέντες,*
> *Νῆα θοὴν εἴσβαινον ἐρεσσέμεν·* . . . . . .

The scholiast keeps to the most common meaning of *πέρην* in the following periphrasis; *Μετὰ ταῦτα πλεύσαντες εἰς τὸ πέραν τῆς ἁλὸς, ἤγουν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, βωμὸν ἐν τῷ αἰγιαλῷ ᾠκοδόμησαν*[2].

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[2] This is the reading in the Paris collection of the scholia. The common scholium, which in the editions is falsely pointed, must be read thus: *Ἐν δὲ τῷ πέραν, φησὶν, αἰγιαλῷ τῆς Ἀσίας, διαπλεύσαντες ἐπ' αὐτὸν, βωμὸν* . . . . . *ἐδομήσαντο*.

—Brunck says that nothing can be so obscure as not to admit of being explained in this way. Without doubt he stumbled at this circumstance, that the poet, who makes no express mention of sailing toward the opposite shore, does not describe, until after he had used *πέρην*, their going on board preparatory to setting sail. He tries to interpret or amend the word *πέρην*, so that the transaction described should take place on this shore. If we call to our aid the meaning of *opposite*, and compare the passage 2, 177. where *ἀντιπέρην* is joined with a dative, we might understand *ῥηγμῖνι πέρην* to mean '*opposite* (i. e. in sight of) the breakers'. But what the scholiast further tells us must prevent our doing so. *Φανερὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἐν Εὐρώπῃ. καὶ γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν Ἱερόν ἐστιν οὕτω καλούμενον ἐν τῷ πέραν τῆς Εὐρώπης τῆς Ἀσιάδος.* (In this late Grecian writer we observe another instance of that usage of *πέραν*; for the construction is *τῆς Ἀσιάδος ἐν τῷ πέραν τῆς Εὐρώπης.*) The words *φανερὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἐν Εὐρώπῃ* (which are wanting in the Paris collection of the scholia) I can only understand to mean, that the situation of the altar is visible from the European side; where the interpreter grounds the use of the present in his expression on the *γάρ* following. In the Paris collection the remainder runs thus: *Ὁ δὲ τόπος ἐν ᾧ τὸν βωμὸν ᾠκοδόμουν ἔτι καὶ νῦν Ἱερὸν καλεῖται.* I have distinguished the word *Ἱερόν* as a proper name; for this is the place at the entrance of the Pontus which Polybius quotes as *τὸ καλούμενον Ἱερόν* (see lib. 4. c. 39. 50. 52.), and which is sometimes called by this name in Demosthenes (*ἐφ' Ἱερῷ, ἐφ' Ἱερόν*, Leptin. § 29. Lacrit. p. 926, 5. Polycl. p. 1211.), and in the Periplus of Scylax, p. 28. Hudson. In Strabo it is called *τὸ Ἱερὸν τὸ Χαλκηδόνιον* (lib. 12. p. 562. &c.). It was a strong place or castle on that narrow entrance of the Bosporus, which belonged originally to the Chalcedonians, afterwards to the Byzantians, and of which, beside the passages of Polybius quoted above, the most complete account is given by Gyllius de Bosporo 3, 5., who used principally the Anaplus Bospori (now lost) of Dionysius of Byzantium. Dionysius says that Phryxus built this temple on his voyage to Colchis; Polybius tells us, that Jason sacrificed here to the twelve deities on his return. The scholia on the passage in Apollonius have also (according to the Paris manuscript) the following: Τιμοσθένης δέ φησι, τὸν μὲν Φρίξον (in the common edition, perhaps more correctly, τοὺς μὲν Φρίξου παῖδας) βωμὸν τῶν δώδεκα θεῶν ἱδρύσασθαι, τοὺς δὲ Ἀργοναύτας τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος. Ἡρόδωρος δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ βωμοῦ τεθυκέναι τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας φησὶν ἐφ' οὗ καὶ Ἄργος ὁ Φρίξου ἐπανιὼν ἐτεθύκει. To this I subjoin what Marcian of Heraclea (p. 69. Hudson) quotes from the voyage of Menippus: Κατὰ τὸν Θρᾴκιον Βόσπορον καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου, ἐν τοῖς δεξιοῖς τῆς Ἀσίας μέρεσιν ἅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ Βιθῡνων ἔθνους, κεῖται χωρίον Ἱερὸν καλούμενον ἐν ᾧ νεὼς ἐστι Διὸς Οὐρίου προσαγορευόμενος. τοῦτο δὲ χωρίον ἀφετήριόν ἐστι τῶν εἰς Πόντον πλεόντων. I have placed all these passages here together, that there may be no doubt of their all meaning the same place; which moreover is known by the fuller appellation of the Temple of Jupiter Urius, the particulars of which may be seen in Chishull's Antiq. Asiat. p. 61., Tzschuck. ad Pomp. Mel. 1, 19, 5.[3] We see, further, that this spot was fabled to have been dedicated properly and originally to the twelve deities; and as this very circumstance is related in the passage of Apollonius, it is not possible to suppose that this learned poet spoke of any other than that same temple, which was the most celebrated in the neighbourhood, that he followed any other than those universally known fables, or that he thoughtlessly altered them. It follows therefore from what has been said that πέρην in this passage is used in its common meaning; which in this particular instance, where the poet has expressly transported the reader into those celebrated straits, could not be changed without leading him into error. And for the same reason it was unnecessary to mention in the verse itself that they sailed over to the opposite side for the purpose of building the altar (an omission which the scholiast supplies by πλεύσαντες), for the word πέρην of itself implied that. Besides, in so narrow a strait—the Bosporus there being only from four to five stadia broad—the temporary residence or occupation of those heroes on both shores may be considered as on one and the same; and their departure, properly so called, first took place from the spot, which, as we have just seen, continued always in later times to be the ἀφετήριον to the Pontus*.

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[3] As I quote Chishull, I must also correct what in him needs correction. Cicero Verr. 4, 57. calls, as every one knows, this same Pontic Jupiter (and two similar images of the same god which he likewise mentions,) "Jovem *Imperatorem*, quem Græci Οὔριον nominant." One is naturally surprised at this Latin appellation; and Chishull thrice proposes to read there *Impuberis, Impuberem*, explaining the *youthful* Jupiter, who was worshiped in many places, to be properly this *Juppiter Serenus* or Οὔριος. This supposition has something to recommend it, and I once thought to be able to make it more probable by substituting the name of *Juppiter Imberbis*, from comparing the passages in Schol. Acr. and Cruq. on Hor. Sat. 5, 26. and Pausan. 5, 24. *bis*. But everything historical which Chishull quotes in support of his conjecture is totally untenable; and, to mention one particular, his assertion that Dionysius of Byzantium did really so describe the statue of Urius in that temple on the Bosporus, is totally false. The words, as Gyllius (de Bosporo 3, 5.) quotes them from that writer, do not refer at all to the statue of the god, but mean another image of a youth which was to be met with in that temple. Under the name of *Juppiter Imperator*, as *Urius*, we have therefore the ruler of the elements, the ruler even in the kingdom of the other gods, and consequently in the kingdom of Neptune.

Πευκάλιμος, πευκεδανός; vid. ἐχεπευκής.

92. Πῖαρ.

1. All analogy makes the word πῖαρ to be a neuter substantive, from the same root of which πίων is the adjective; consequently πίων, *fat*, πῖαρ, *the fat*. And the word is so used twice in the Iliad, viz. λ, 550. and ρ, 659., and that too in the proper sense of *fat*; for I cannot think that when it is said 'the hunters do not suffer the lion βοῶν ἐκ πῖαρ ἑλέσθαι', the explanation, old as it certainly is, of the lion always *choosing out* (Il. ρ, 62.) the *best* and *fattest* cow, will still find supporters. Heyne makes a very apt comparison of the expression ἐκ θυμὸν ἑλέσθαι. Nay, there appears to me in these two expressions to be an intentional relation between the man, whose superiority lies in his mind, of which the enemy endeavours to deprive him, and the

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* [Some rather ingenious remarks on πέραν will be found in Peile's Agamemnon of Æschylus in the first appendix to his notes.—Ed.]

cow, whose superiority lies in her fat, for which the beast of prey is particularly ravenous.

2. But in the third Homeric passage, Od. ι, 135., this same word is now pretty generally taken for the adjective, and written accordingly,

. . . . ἐπεὶ μάλα πῖαρ ὕπ' οὖδας,

where before was written ὑπ' : according to which accentuation, if it could be depended on, πῖαρ would be a substantive here as in the other passages. The oldest external grounds for the present reading I find in the smaller scholia, where πῖαρ is explained by λιπαρὸν, εὔγειον, which cannot be taken as the explanation of an abstract substantive, but can only be joined with οὖδας; consequently the preposition must stand for the verb ὕπεστι, 'for fat is the soil beneath'.

3. I will not assert it to be improbable that πῖαρ should be at the same time substantive and adjective; for if the last passage be correctly explained, πῖαρ is always an adjective, and τὸ πῖαρ, i. e. τὸ λιπαρὸν, *that which is fat,* stands in the first passage also for τὸ λίπος, *the fat.* But then I cannot but feel surprised at nowhere finding a word to confirm the analogy of the neuter adjective πῖαρ. The only one which can be brought forward I will at once mention, at the same time it must be confessed that this is completely begging the question. It is, that πῖαρ must be at once masculine and neuter, in the same way as μάκαρ, if it occurs anywhere as a neuter, can only be written μάκαρ. Perhaps also the ρ of the feminine form πίειρα has been supposed to furnish grounds for the existence of an adjective πῖαρ; but this cannot be satisfactory; for μάκαρ has μάκαιρα, and πίειρα could, therefore come only from πίηρ; unless -ειρα should be introduced even without any such grounds as a feminine sister-form, as in πρέσβειρα. That is to say, as -ηρ and -ειρα were a common masculine and feminine termination, the latter was adopted whenever a necessity led to it, even without the masculine termination. But there is one objection against πῖαρ as an adjective, in my opinion decisive of itself, that there is no conceivable reason whatever why the reciter did not say ἐπεὶ μάλα πῖον ὕπ' οὖδας. The form ὁ, ἡ πίων, τὸ πῖον is complete in

Homer, for he has πίονι δήμῳ, πίονες αἶγεϲ, and as a neuter πίονα μηρία and πίονος ἀδύτοιο. Where the form πίειρα occurs there is a metrical reason for it; but before we can adopt the supposition that without such a reason the reciter used sometimes πῖον sometimes πῖαρ, or, if you will, by metaplasmus πῖαρ, gen. πίονος, plur. πίονα, we must have from some source or other very decisive grounds for it.

Hence I conjecture that some such ground was supposed to exist in its adjunct μάλα, which indeed one is accustomed to see joined only with attributives, consequently sometimes with adjectives and adverbs, sometimes with verbs. On the other hand, πῖαρ, *the fat, fertility*, is a separate and independent word, with which of course an adverb like μάλα cannot be joined. But it must also be considered that μάλα stands not only like the German *sehr* [Lat. *valde**, 'very'], in this its sense of strengthening attributes or qualities, but that in Homer it is used for adding force in a most general way, and strengthens not only parts of, but a whole sentence. So indeed we say in German *er glänzet sehr*, 'he shines very (much)', *er bittet sehr*, 'he begs very (much)'; but we do not readily say *er isset sehr*, 'he eats very (much)', but *er isset sehr stark*, 'he eats very much', still less can we say *er isset es sehr auf*, 'he eats it up very (much)'. Homer, on the contrary, says at Il. γ, 25. μάλα γάρ τε κατεσθίει (the stag), and so also at κ, 108. σοὶ μάλ' ἕψομ' ἐγώ, "I will certainly, or very willingly, follow thee wherever thou leadest." And again the expressions at ρ, 67. μάλα γὰρ χλωρὸν δέος αἱρεῖ (where certainly no one would think of joining μάλα χλωρόν), and at 399. οὐδ' εἰ μάλα μιν χόλος ἵκει, and at ψ, 308. οὔτι μάλα χρεώ, are sufficiently similar to πῖάρ ἐστιν ὑπ' οὖδας to prevent this latter (supposing it to have been a current phrase, and introduced, as it is, by the strengthening μάλα,) from appearing to us so strange, that we should prefer the groundless supposition of πῖαρ being an adjective when the metre does not require it, and we have already the analogous *πῖον*.

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* [We cannot always translate the German adverb *sehr* by 'very': the general difference is this; 'very' can be joined with adjectives, but not with verbs; *sehr* can be joined with either: when 'very' is joined with a verb we are obliged to add some such word as 'much'. In this respect the Latin *valdè* comes nearer to the German.—Ed.]

4. Let us now examine the *ὑπό* in both kinds of expression. The absolute *ὑπό* or *ὕπο* is certainly not unfrequent in Homer; but in every instance where it is found we see an evident relation of the word *under* to that which precedes it, either a man standing upright, whose knees shake *under* him, a furious army *under* which the earth trembles, or some such thing; and so it would be a very suitable expression in this respect, if, for example, a luxuriously growing tree were mentioned with the addition *ἐπεὶ μάλα πῖον ὕπ' οὖδας*. But in the passage in question mention had just before been made of a corn-field (*λήϊον*), and one indeed not actually existing; for on the supposition that the Cyclops would cultivate their land, it is said,

> ...... *μάλα κεν βαθὺ λήϊον αἰεὶ*
> *Εἰς ὥρας ἀμῷεν· ἐπεὶ μάλα πῖαρ ὑπ' οὖδας.*

In this passage therefore, if we accent *ὕπ'*, and join *πῖαρ οὖδας*, it is difficult to say to what the word *under* relates. This want of a relation for *ὕπο* seems to me still more visible in a very old imitation of the Homeric verse in Hymn. Apoll. 60. The island Delos is there *addressed*, and after it has been described as unfruitful, the speech ends with *ἐπεὶ οὔ τοι πῖαρ ὑπ' οὖδας*. Here, in order to find some grounds for taking *ὕπο* for *ὕπεστι* (bad indeed they must be, as in the former passage concerning the Cyclops), we must suppose Delos in a human form walking on her own island and talking with Latona: but surely this is no genuine ancient idea, nor does it agree well with the poet's imagery, when he afterwards makes Delos say, *Πουλύποδες δ' ἐν ἐμοὶ θαλάμας ..... ποιήσονται.* The true account is, that the island itself is here supposed to be talking intelligibly with the goddess Latona; and *ὑπό* taken by itself can only therefore be what is in and under its soil; in which sense it must be taken if the words here were *ἐπεὶ οὐ μάλα τοι ὕπο πῖαρ*. But instead of *ὕπο* the sentence is completed by *ὑπ' οὖδας*. The word *οὖδας* too appears to me better suited to our view of the meaning than to any other. Nowhere else in Homer do we find this word with the attributes of fertility, but always as that on which we stand, and tread, and fall. It is therefore the hard dry surface of the earth considered as a rind or skin, under which is situated the *fat*, which makes the plants &c. spring up. And thus the phrase *πῖαρ ὑπ' οὖδας* appears exactly calculated for the language of common life, which is fond of such half-figurative expressions; "This land has plenty of fat (or no fat) under its surface"[1].

5. And lastly, with respect to the authority for our explanation of the verse in the Odyssey, I lay no little stress on the negative testimony, that except in the smaller scholium, which

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[1] There is somewhat more to be said on the criticism of this passage of the Hymn, which we may very aptly introduce here. Latona is representing to Delos its barrenness, and then continues, "But when thou shalt possess Apollo's temple,

> *"Ἀνθρωποί τοι πάντες ἀγινήσουσ' ἑκατόμβας*
> *'Ενθάδ' ἀγειρόμενοι, κνίσση δέ τοι ἄσπετος αἰεὶ,*
> *Δηρὸν ἄναξ εἰ βόσκοις, θεοί κέ σ' ἔχωσιν*
> *Χειρὸς ἀπ' ἀλλοτρίης· ἐπεὶ οὔ τοι πῖαρ ὑπ' οὖδας."*

The third verse, we see, is quite destroyed. Hermann restores it thus:

> *Δηρὸν ἄναξ βόσκοι σε, θεοὶ δέ κέ σ' αἰὲν ἔχωσιν.*

Because however the sense ends so well with *ἄσπετος αἰεί*, but the connexion between that and *Δηρόν* is so very slight that we may without improbability suspect it to be one of those ill-jointed patchings so frequent in these hymns, he considers the third and fourth verses to be an interpolation substituted for the second, and patched up with it in after times. I will not attack this criticism in its leading point, but I will at all events suppose the genuineness of the fourth verse; as I do not see why the third verse alone should not be considered as the supposed substitute for the second. For the fourth, as Matthiæ also remarks, follows the second most connectedly, as thus; "thine will always be the vapour of the sacrifice from foreign hands," i. e. from the numerous deputations of foreign people. But now, as far as regards the correction of the verse, which, whether interpolated or not, must have had a meaning, there can be scarcely a doubt as to the former half of it, as Hermann's restoration is confirmed by the cæsura alone, and *βόσκειν* can mean only an action of the god. For, as Ilgen aptly observes, *βόσκειν* can only be used with reference to an animal, or (but still not without a degradation of the term) to a man. Here therefore, where the god nourishes his subjects or slaves, the word, according to Hermann's amendment, is unobjectionable. Equally necessary is the connecting of the following words by *δέ*; and the *κέ* belonging to *ἔχωσιν* is certainly found in the verse. Whether *ἔχωσιν* is to be changed into *ἔχοιεν*, I leave to those, who may also decide whether Wolf in an exactly similar case (Il. ω, 655.) is right in having changed the *γένηται* of all the manuscripts into was perhaps the original source of the error, neither in Eustathius nor in any grammarian who has collected the opinions of those before him, is there any trace of the adjective *πῖαρ*. For the gloss of Apollonius, *πῖαρ, τὸ λιπαρὸν καὶ πιότατον*, evidently refers to the two passages in the Iliad, and the old explanation of them quoted above; the adjective is therefore here only an explanatory expression instead of the acknowledged substantive *πῖαρ*. But the total silence of Eustathius on the passage in the Odyssey appears to me an important proof; for if the word had been considered to be an adjective, neither he nor his predecessors could have passed it over without remarking that *πῖαρ*, which in the Iliad and all succeeding poets is a substantive, is here an adjective. And this same decisive usage of the post-Homeric poets, at whose head stands the author of the Hymn to Venus (perhaps the oldest of the Homeridic hymns), is likewise no trifling confirmation. For when it is said of Vesta at v. 30 of that Hymn,

> Καί τε μέσῳ οἴκῳ κατ' ἄρ' ἕζετο, πῖαρ ἑλοῦσα,

here too the transition from the adjective to the substantive is not possible; but *πῖαρ* in this case means *the fat*, and stands for *the fattest, best*; whereas the adjective in the positive could not stand in that way unless followed by a genitive.

γένοιτο. Thus much therefore of the above verse stands almost established:

> Δηρὸν ἄναξ βόσκοι σε, θεοὶ δέ κε ἔχωσιν,

and the question is, what are we to substitute for the σ', the only letter remaining in the hiatus? I am not satisfied with the way in which Hermann fills it up, on account of the connexion with what follows. But as the wants of a country are twofold, the nourishment of the inhabitants, and sacrifices for the gods, the sense of the accusative, which is wanting before *ἔχωσι*, seems to me clear; and I propose to fill it up thus until something better can be found,

> Δηρὸν ἄναξ βόσκοι σε, θεοὶ δέ κε μηρί' ἔχωσιν
> Χειρὸς ἀπ' ἀλλοτρίης·

i. e. 'thy God will nourish thee, and the gods themselves will receive their sacrifices, which thou art too poor to give them, from foreign hands.' And now we may as well leave the question undecided, whether the repetition of the same leading thought at the end of the second and of the third verse is to be attributed to the old poet himself, or to the reciter who patched up his verses.

93. Ποιπνύειν.

1. This word is very often used of a person serving and waiting on another, as at Il. σ, 421. ω, 475., and yet it does not contain this idea, but the general one of *active exertion*, as is clear from Il. ξ, 155. where Juno sees Neptune busily occupied on the field of battle, Τὸν μὲν ποιπνύοντα μάχην ἀνὰ κυδιάνειραν. And hence in Od. υ, 149. it is joined to the idea of service, and the female servants are ordered δῶμα κορήσατε ποιπνύσασαι. The word represents therefore the idea which we express by *to move and bustle about*: and it is this busy bustling which so amuses the gods in the limping Vulcan[1] at Il. α, 600.

2. The grammarians have two derivations for this word. They acknowledged it to be a reduplication, (for those who looked in the first syllable for the idea of ποιεῖν do not come under our consideration,) and were only in doubt whether it was from πονέω or from πνέω. The meaning seems to favour the former, as a breathless motion is too strong, at least for Il. ω, 475. of the heroes attending on Achilles; but the formation is in favour of the latter. The grammarians indeed, who make letters skip about at their pleasure, easily find a way out; but no one who looks to analogy will be able in the derivation from πονέω to give any correct grounds for the οι or the υ. For, as the υ is carried on to the aorist 1., there is no possibility of thinking here of a termination like that of

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[1] Heyne furnishes us here with a strong instance of the way in which a commentator, by constantly endeavouring to clear an explanation of everything which can look far-fetched, may on the other hand efface the meaning of the poet. He will not allow the ἄσβεστος γέλως to be anything but a divine laughter, produced by the good-humour into which the gods are put by Vulcan's obliging exertions; the charm of novelty he certainly does allow to have some effect ("*accedente novitate rei, quod Vulcanus pincernæ partes ageret*"), but he rejects entirely any thought about his limping, as Homer does not mention it. Heyne must have here entirely forgotten that Vulcan, who was always called ἀμφιγυήεις, κυλλοποδίων, was, like all the superior gods, an intimate acquaintance of every Grecian, and no one could imagine him moving without seeing him limp.

δείκνυμι, δεικνύω. If on the other hand we set out with πνέω, ἔπνυτο, we have the stem or root plainly before us, and the οι in the reduplication is confirmed by ποιφύσσω from φυσάω, and δοίδυξ from δύω; for οι is near akin to υ, and reduplications are fond of such affinities. But with regard to the meaning, it is clear that ποιπνύω is a very old word, which became obsolete soon after Homer's time; and therefore its original sense 'to be out of breath' was already softened down in his time into the mere idea of *great exertion*. Hence arises another question of importance, whether ποιπνύειν, as used of the very moderate exertion of the heroes attendant on Achilles, is not a trace of the later poet, whom the ancients thought they recognised in ω, 24. of the Iliad? For as soon as any poet used ποιπνύειν merely in imitation of the old reciter, still greater errors were possible; as that of Apollonius, who (4, 1398.) could write of the Hesperides watching the golden apples in these words:

....................ἀμφὶ-δὲ νύμφαι
Ἑσπερίδες ποίπνυον ἐφίμερον ἀείδουσαι.

3. The use of the aorist of this verb requires a little more examination. At Il. α, 600. some old copies had Ὡς ἴδον Ἥφαιστον....ποιπνύσαντα. On the contrary, at Od. υ, 149. with κορήσατε ποιπνύσασαι we have the various reading ποιπνύουσαι. If we consider this latter passage more closely, we shall find in it the well-known peculiarity of the action which is joined with an aorist added in the participle of the aorist, on which see Heindorf on Plat. Phæd. 10. As little attention therefore is to be paid to the various reading ποιπνύουσαι here as to the other ποιπνύσαντα at Il. α., for there ὡς ἴδον ποιπνύοντα is quite as necessary as ἔγνω τὸν μὲν ποιπνύοντα at Il. ξ, 155. Let us now turn to a third passage, Il. θ, 219.

Εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκ' Ἀγαμέμνονι πότνια Ἥρη
Αὐτῷ ποιπνύσαντι θοῶς ὀτρῦναι Ἀχαιούς,

where there is no various reading, and we must endeavour to understand the participle ποιπνύσαντι in the same way as at Od. υ. The common punctuation, which incloses αὐτῷ ποιπνύσαντι between two commas, supposes this participle to be a supplementary thought to the foregoing. Voss translates it in German hexameters thus:

> Legete* nicht Agamemnon ins Herz die erhabene Here,
> Ihm der auch selbst umeilte, die Danaer schnell zu ermuntern.

But then the aorist is quite inconceivable. At no period of the Greek language would any other than the imperfect have been placed here in prose, and consequently the participle if used would be the participle present. But let us only go back to Homer's description. The last mention of Agamemnon was the following, at verse 78.

> Ἔνθ' οὔτ' Ἰδομενεὺς τλῆ μίμνειν, οὔτ' Ἀγαμέμνων,
> Οὔτε δύ' Αἴαντες μενέτην, θεράποντες Ἄρηος.

We see clearly therefore that not only the other Greeks but *Agamemnon himself* required to be inspirited. And this is done by erasing those commas and joining *αὐτῷ ποιπνύσαντι* with *ὀτρῦναι*, in order that Juno may put it into Agamemnon's mind,

> Selber umher sich tummelnd die Danaer schnell zu ermuntern†.

Now then both verbs stand correctly in the aorist, as at Od. υ., to express the quick completion of the thing, for in the imperative it would be *αὐτὸς ποιπνύσας ὄτρυνον*, &c.

94. Πρήθειν.

1. The verb *πρήθειν* means in the first place *to burn* in a transitive sense, which meaning is expressed in common Greek by the present *πίμπρημι*. Il. ι, 589. *ἐνέπρηθον μέγα ἄστυ*. The other tenses or forms are found indifferently both in the Epic and in the common language; for instance, the aorist *ἔπρησα, ἐνέπρησα, to burn the ships, the gate*, Il. θ, 217. χ, 374. β, 415.; to which is commonly added *πυρί* or *πυρός*, *with fire*.

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* ["Had not venerated Juno put it into the mind of Agamemnon, who was also himself hurrying about, to inspirit the Greeks."—Ed.]

† ["To inspirit the Grecians (by) hurrying about himself."—Ed.]

The shortening of the long vowel of this tense to ἔπρεσε in Hesiod θ, 856. is remarkable, of which I have taken notice in my Grammar.

2. Beside the above meaning this aorist has in Homer another quite different one, expressing *the violent streaming* of a liquid, and consequently also *a current* of wind. For instance, at Il. π, 350. τὸ δὲ (αἷμα) ἀνὰ στόμα καὶ κατὰ ῥῖνας Πρῆσε χανών, "he made the blood stream (i. e. the blood streamed) from his mouth and nose." So at Il. ι, 433. δάκρυ' ἀναπρήσας, *shedding tears.* Used of the wind we find ἔπρησεν or ἐνέπρησε with the accusative of the object against which the wind blows with force, Il. α, 481. and Od. β, 427. 'Εν δ' ἄνεμος πρῆσεν (or Ἔπρησεν δ' ἄνεμος) μέσον ἱστίον[1]. And to this sense we may add εὔπρηστος (Il. σ, 471.) as an epithet of the wind streaming from a pair of bellows. For all similar forms, as εὔξεστος, εὔπηκτος, εὔδμητος, are used in a passive sense, and εὔπρηστος too may be very well taken passively of the stream of wind driven out of the full bellows, as in αἷμα and δάκρυα. But if we derive it here, as some do, from πρήθειν, *to burn*, because these currents of air increase the burning of fire, εὔπρηστος would be active; which is contrary to the Homeric analogy just laid down.

3. This second leading sense of πρήθειν does not occur in any but the Epic language[2]: there exist however derivatives of it. For the most common meaning of πρηστήρ, *a whirlwind* or *water-spout*, comes from it[3]; and to the same meaning belongs also πρῆστις or πρίστις, by which is understood a whale, on account of its power of breathing and ejecting water from the aperture on its head; whence one particular

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[1] There is an imitation of this in Phalæcus Epigr. 5. Βίῃ νότου πρήσαντος ἐσχάτην ἅλα.

[2] Except that a grammarian in Hesych. v. πρῆξαι (πρῆσαι), and in Etym. M. v. πρήθω, explains from the usage of his own times (ὅθεν καὶ ἡμεῖς is his expression) πεπρημμένους or πεπρησμένους by τοὺς πεφυσημένους, *inflated* or *blown out.*

[3] The meaning of *a flash of lightning* is rare, and may have been introduced by misunderstanding the word, and by deriving it from πρήθειν, *to burn.* See Aristot. de Mundo 4. p. 468. g. Meteorolog. 3, 1. Xen. Hell. 1, 3, 1.

species was called in later times φυσητήρ. For the form πρίστις is likewise, as I shall presently show, an old pronunciation, which appears to come from the verb πρίειν, of which one meaning, agreeing with that of πρήθειν, is incorrectly rejected by Schneider* in his Lexicon. Apollonius† for instance (4, 1671.) says of a person violently enraged, Λευγαλέον δ' ἐπί οἱ πρῖεν χόλον. Πρίειν is indeed, according to another meaning, with the addition of ὀδόντας or σιαγόνας, used of an angry person gnashing his teeth (see Steph. Thes.); but we see at once that nothing but the most intolerable force can join the accusative χόλον to it with this meaning. Doubtless therefore Apollonius in this expression imitated with grammatical premeditation an older and Epic usage of this verb, deviating entirely from its common meanings; and Brunck was correct in comparing with it the Hesychian gloss πρίεται, φυσοῦται, in order to explain the expression of Apollonius by "spirting bile against any one." Nor was it possible for the author of the Etym. M. (v. πρήθω) to have derived this word (although in the sense of *to burn*) from πρίω, if he had not had before him some other meaning of πρίειν beside *to saw* and *to gnash*[4].

4. It was but natural that endeavours should be made from a very early period to connect etymologically the two leading senses of πρήθειν, πρῆσαι; and intermediate ideas may be found in all cases to connect the most dissimilar meanings. In the case before us very different ways were tried for this purpose. If however we would preserve a sound and correct interpretation of Homer, we must reject them all; nor must we allow, let the etymology be what it may, that the meanings can by any means play into each other metaphorically; but we must maintain the two leading senses firmly and surely, as we are certain that it

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* [Passow in his Lexicon (4th Edit.) acknowledges this meaning of πρίω, gives as an example the passage of Apoll. Rh. 4, 1671., and allows that Buttmann has made it very probable that πρίω and πρήθω are cognate words.—Ed.]

† [See at the end of this article a Supplement (published in the original at the end of the second volume), in which this passage is more fully examined.—Ed.]

[4] Compare however the different view which Meineke takes of this, ad Menandr. Inc. 326.

means, 1. *to burn anything*; 2. (as certainly) used of the thicker fluids, *to spirtle, pour out*; used of the air, *to blow*[5].

5. I revert now to the name πρῆστις. That this word has never any other meaning than *a whale*, and that the above is the true way of writing it, Conrad Gesner has endeavoured to show in lib. 4. De Nat. Aquatilium; and Schneider (on Oppian. Hal. 1, 370.) at first followed him; but in his Hist. Litt. Piscium, p. 29. the latter declares it to be undecided, and in his Lexicon he inclines again to the explanation of the *sword-fish*,

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[5] Some of the interpreters set out from the idea of *to burn*, and suppose that by transferring it to *blowing* and *streaming* they express a violence in these two motions; how forced this is will be particularly felt in the phrase δάκρυ' ἀναπρήσας. Conrad Gesner in the passage referred to in No. 5. sets out from the other meaning, and finds the transition to the idea of *to burn* in the *puffing* or *swelling up* of a burn; an idea much too limited. The greater number take *the blowing up and kindling* of fire as the ground-idea. It would perhaps be more satisfactory if we were to take the *blazing up* of flame as an intermediate idea, in the same way as *flagrare* reminds us both in sense and sound of *flare*, and thence *conflagrare* means *to burn*. But the idea of *to blaze up* belongs to the Greek words φλέγω, φλόξ; on the contrary, πρήθειν, as a simple verb, has no other meaning than that of *consuming* by fire. If therefore there are any grounds for such a derivation, they lie at least far beyond Homer; the intermediate ideas have disappeared in the course of usage, and thus πρήθω and πρήθω are and remain two words. The view becomes somewhat clearer as we look into the wider field of the affinities of language. Πρήθω and πρίω in one of their senses are still quite near to the natural word (formed by onomatopœia) from which they originally sprung, and identical with the German words *sprützen* ['to spirtle' as a liquid does], and *sprühen* ['to emit sparks' as from red-hot metal]. This latter is used indeed only with relation to fire as the former is to water, but still the transition from emitting sparks to the idea of burning anything is neither so quick nor so easy. I leave this therefore undecided, and will only add one remark, that on the other side πρήθειν, πιμπράναι, is as certainly identical with the German *brennen*, 'to burn'. And it is a coincidence curious enough, that the transposition of the two letters in the old German *bernen*, 'to burn', occurs also in the Greek πέρθειν, the original identity of which with πρήθειν has been already acknowledged by others, and is constantly felt in pronouncing the aorist ἔπραθον. As then with πρήθω, so also with πρίω, we must suppose a twofold root for its two different meanings; only that in this latter both senses arise by onomatopœia from *one* natural sound πρι, by which was expressed partly the spirtling and streaming of liquids, partly the harsh grating noise made by the collision of rough bodies, whence *to saw, to gnash*.

in which case therefore the more correct way of writing it would be *πρίστις*. In order to examine the thing as fundamentally as possible, I found it necessary to begin with the Latins. With them the form or word *prestis* never occurs, but only *pristis, pistris, pistrix,* pure undoubted forms[6] which mutually confirm each other by the transition so natural in the mouth of the common people to a Latin word apparently significative, and which show in a most striking manner the genuineness of the *i* in the stem or family from which they come. But all these three are used without any variation for large sea-fish and whales, in which class we cannot include the sword-fish, as Cicero for instance always calls the constellation Cetus by the term *pistrix,* and Virgil in the Æn. 10, 211. says of the Triton "*in pristin desinit alvus.*" Pliny too (9, 1—15. and 32, 11.) always classes the *pristes* with the *balænæ,* without mentioning the saw, which as a natural historian he could not possibly have omitted; on the contrary, he brings forward at 32, 11., soon after the others, the *gladii* and the *serræ* as particular kinds of fish, where the mere mention of the name therefore made it unnecessary to specify the saw. Hence we can have no doubt of the Latin usage.

6. Among the Greeks both *πρῆστις* and *πρίστις* are generally found in connexion with whales; see particularly Polycharm. ap. Athen. 8, p. 333. f. where are mentioned as rare fish, only occasionally seen, *ἐνίοτε δὲ φάλαιναι ἢ πρίστεις.* And Leonidas of Tarentum, in Epigr. 95. speaking of a shipwrecked sailor, the lower half of whose body was devoured by some sea-monster, calls it first *κῆτος,*—*κῆτος* Ἦλθεν, *ἀπέβρυξεν δ' ἄχρις ἐπ' ὀμφαλίου*: and then *πρίστις*—*ἥμισυ δὲ πρίστις ἀπεκλάσατο.* Certainly this was no whale, and as certainly not a sword-fish, but a large kind of shark: and the passage serves only to show that *πρίστις*, like the Latin *pristis* and *pistrix,* was (exactly like *κῆτος*) a general name in the language of the common people for the large sorts of sea-fish; which idea could not arise from the particular form of the sword-fish, but might very well originate in the size of the cetaceous fish. To

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[6] Which of these forms is the genuine one in the passage of Virgil is a difficult question that I shall not enter on here.

this we may add Epicharm. ap. Athen. 7, p. 286. b. Ælian. N.A. 9, 49. Oppian. Hal. 1, 270. But all these passages and their various readings (compare Schweighäeuser on both passages in Athenæus) do not enable us to decide between πρῆστις or πρίστις; nor is there the slightest reason for supposing a separation of the two names, the one to signify a whale, the other a sword-fish. Now as the form with the *ι* is established by the Latin, and the same uncertainty between the two vowels is found in other roots (compare σκήπων and σκίπων), I am the more inclined to consider both forms genuine, as the above account has also shown us a verb πρίειν with the meaning of *to spirtle* or *spout out* anything. Both forms therefore express what Conrad Gesner has allowed the one to mean, viz. a *spouting-fish*; and it is very conceivable that the name might have been first formed from this very striking peculiarity of the cetaceous tribe, and then remained as a regular fixed appellation of all the larger sea-fish.

7. We must now examine a passage which bears the mark of a scientific pen. It is in Aristotle's H. A. 6, 12. Δελφὶς δὲ καὶ φάλαινα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κήτη, ὅσα μὴ ἔχει βράγχια ἀλλὰ φυσητῆρα, ζωοτοκοῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ πρίστης καὶ βοῦς. This is the only passage from the ancients where the form πρίστης appears as a fish; but it was not therefore necessary that Stephens should consider it to be a corruption (see Thesaur.); and still less ought Schneider, particularly in a name so problematical, to have been induced by this to adopt, from no other authority than an old Latin translation, the common form πρίστις. One thing however is clear, that the πρίστης is here distinguished from the cetaceous fish, and is not supposed to have like them apertures on the head for breathing and spouting. But in bringing forth its young alive it corresponds, as I have heard from those who know[7], with the sword-fish. Unless I much mistake, Aristotle is here arranging them (as he is fully justified in doing) as a natural historian and at the same time as a grammarian. The name πρῆστις or πρίστις, which occurs nowhere in his writings, he appears to have quite thrown aside

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[7] The sword-fish like many creatures lays an egg, of which the shell or covering frequently breaks the moment it is laid.

as an indefinite and uncertain name of vulgar use, with which was probably mixed up what was at that time known of the sword-fish. This last seems to be particularly probable, as one kind of armed vessel, which occurs first in Polybius, was called *πρίστις, pristis*[8]. Of this Nonius says, "Pristis navigii genus a forma pristium marinarum, quæ longi corporis sunt sed angusti." This is not a description corresponding with the general idea of the whale tribe, which we have hitherto found under the name *pristis*. But one thing we learn from this passage, that the ships so called were long and narrow in comparison with other vessels of war: the oars protruding on each side contributed to this form, and we have thus the exact shape of the saw of the sword-fish[9]. It is conceivable therefore that the form in ις might no longer be available to the scientific writer in any sense whatever: consequently Aristotle established πρίστης (probably from some precedent in the common language of his day) as the name of the sword-fish only*. This name, taken literally, means for instance *the sawyer*, or even *the saw* itself. Hesychius has πρίστης, ῥίνων, πρίων; hence also πριστηροειδής, *in the form of a saw*, from πρίστης or πριστήρ. For that πρίστις meant also a common saw, rests on an error of transcription in Pollux 7, c. 26. πρίων, πρίστις, ἡ καλουμένη ῥίνη, which ought beyond a doubt to be πρίστης.

[*Supplement to the above Article, but with particular reference to Sect.* 3.]

1. In that part of the above article to which this supplement

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[8] We must not, as many do, bring the ship *Pristis* in Virgil's Æn. 5, 116. under this class; it had its name from the figure at its head, which was a kind of whale.

[9] One might be inclined to derive this name, given to a certain kind of goblet in Athenæus, from the name of the ship, as ships and cups have so many names in common. But the form of the ship, as here described, does not seem to me to suit a goblet at all; while the form of a large fish, like the whale, wound or twisted into a cup, might suit it very well indeed; and thus we have another proof of this name πρίστις having been used for a whale.

* [Passow in his Lexicon doubts whether Aristotle may not have meant by πρίστης the ῥίνη, a species of the dog-fish, the skin of which was used for polishing wood and marble.—Ed.]

more particularly refers, I have pronounced too confidently that the supposed verbal stem or root of the form *πρίστις*, with the *ι* and the meaning of *to spirtle,* can be proved to have been in actual use. Lobeck, in a note on Soph. Aj. 1019. which I had overlooked, maintains the possibility of explaining the expression in Apollonius 4, 1671. *πρίειν χόλον* by the gnashing of the teeth, making it therefore to mean ‘ to gnash bitter rage’, an explanation which I pronounced to be insufferably harsh; and he supports it by an expression of Oppian Cyn. 4, 138. *θυμὸν ὀδὰξ πρίοντες*, and by one of Apollonius himself 3, 1170. *δακὼν χόλον*. But I now see more clearly than ever, that what opposes our giving that sense to the expression *πρίειν χόλον* is nothing in the grammatical construction of the words, but in the context of the passage. For *δακὼν χόλον* is a perfectly natural expression for one who cannot *give vent to* his rage (*Ἴδας ἧστ' ἀπάνευθε δακὼν χόλον*); and Oppian uses the other expression of lions who fly before horsemen pursuing them with torches; when therefore it is said of these beasts ‘ they gnash with their teeth their fury’, this is only another phrase for *δάκνειν*, or *champing rage,* but more expressive and more suitable to the fury of the lion. On the other hand, in the passage in question Medea is described as enchanting from a distance the brazen giant Talos: at first she looks on him with hostile eyes; and then immediately follows, that she *λευγαλέον ἐπί οἱ πρῖεν χόλον*, and lanced at him hideous magic images, *ἐπιζαφελὸν κοτέουσα*. I must admit the possibility that a poet like Apollonius might in the passage before us apply the term *to gnash* (used elsewhere only of powerless or suppressed rage) to the active giving vent to it, and might say ‘she gnashed her fury at him ’. But it must also be granted me that the image of the enchantress *spirting* her rage as it were invisibly against the giant, forces itself upon our notice both of itself and by the *ἐπί οἱ* (*ἐπιπρῖέν οἱ*), and thus justifies our adopting, or at least conjecturing, that *πρίειν* meant also *to spirtle,*—a conjecture drawn from the form *πρίστις* as used of the *spouting*-fish, and from the circumstance that an old grammarian derived *πρήθειν* (no matter whether in the sense of *to burn* or *to blow*) from *πρίειν*.

2. The proof which I had drawn from the gloss of Hesychius, *Πρίεται, φυσοῦται,* I give up, agreeably to the opinion of Mei-

necke on Menand. Inc. 326. An expression διαπρίεσθαι, used of inward rage, derived no doubt from διαπρίειν τοὺς ὀδόντας (Lucian. Calumn. 24.), was very common in the ecclesiastical writers: see Gatak. Adv. Misc. posth. 47. p. 914. The simple verb already existed in the same sense in the earlier language: for that the above-mentioned fragment of Menander, ἔνδοθεν δὲ πρίεται, quoted in the Etym. M. (v. Πρίεται) as a proof that the Attics used πρίω, not πρίζω, may have had the same sense, is very probable in itself, as well as from the analogy of that later διαπρίεσθαι, and from the more complete phrase in Lucian (Dial. Meretr. 12.), where the verb is also in the middle voice, τί με ἀποβλέπεις καὶ πρίῃ τοὺς ὀδόντας. Hence also I no longer doubt that the Hesychian gloss, as well as that in the Etym. M., refers to the passage of Menander; and we have now our choice, either with Meinecke to read θυμοῦται for φυσοῦται, according to the other gloss Διεπρίοντο, ἐθυμοῦντο, or to suppose that the grammarian intended by φυσοῦσθαι, in the sense of to swell or be puffed up internally, to express only the swelling with rage; but this seems to me too slight an authority to prove that πρίειν had the meaning of φυσᾶν.

95. Πρήσσειν.

1. In the Epic phrases πρήσσειν, διαπρήσσειν, κέλευθον or ὁδοῖο, the verb is derived by the old grammarians most decidedly from περάω, or rather from the fut. περάσω, πρήσω; see Etym. M. in v. Schol. Il. π, 282. Eust. ad Od. ο, 219.: but this derivation is as decidedly rejected by the moderns; see Schneider's Lexicon on πρήσσω*. The general sense of the familiar

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* [We find in Schneider's Lexicon the following article on this word: "Πρήσσω, Ion. for πράσσω, *I do, act.* 2.) same as περάω, and formed according to the grammarians from its fut. περάσω. In this sense they understand Il. ω, 264. Od. γ, 476., as also the compound διαπρήσσω in Il. β, 785. ι, 326. But there is no occasion for supposing this form to be different from πράσσω, either on account of the meaning or construction; for in πρήσσειν ὁδοῖο we may understand διὰ, as in κονίοντες πεδίοιο, and other like phrases."

Passow in his Lexicon decidedly rejects this second sense of πρήσσω, and considers it as Ion. for πράσσω.—Ed.]

verb *πράσσω* coincides so easily with all the most different thoughts and constructions in which we find *πρήσσω*,—appears so intelligible when joined for instance with the idea of *a way* [or, in the English idiom, *a journey*], and is so strongly supported by similar expressions in other languages*, that the attempt to derive *πρήσσειν* in those Greek expressions from anything but *πράσσειν*, must appear almost like reversing the natural order of things. But, for this very reason, it is not possible to conceive how the Greek grammarians should have neglected an explanation lying so plainly in their way. We have indeed frequent occasion to condemn the opinions of those ancient scholars, for whom no derivation was too forced; but the totally overlooking that which is near, in order to go in search of that which is distant, scarcely amounts to such a reversal of nature. I think therefore that this explanation was handed down to the later grammarians from ancient times, and I find it grounded in the nature of the Homeric passages, which, accurately considered, do not all coincide with that other common explanation, but all suit this one very well.

2. For instance, beside such expressions as Il. ξ, 282. *ῥίμφα πρήσσοντε κέλευθον*, Od. ο, 219. *ἵνα πρήσσωμεν ὁδοῖο*: and Od. β, 213. *οἵ κέ μοι ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διαπρήσσωσι κέλευθον*, we find also these: Il. β, 785. *μάλα δ' ὦκα διέπρησσον πεδίοιο*, and Od. ι, 491. *'Αλλ' ὅτε δὴ δὶς τόσσον ἅλα πρήσσοντες ἀπῆμεν*. We must not however overlook the circumstance, that in those first examples the idea of the common *πράττω* suits very well, merely because the only meaning which it can have lies already in the idea of *the way* or *road*; but in the words *πεδίον* and *ἅλα* this is wanting. Notwithstanding this the compound *διέπρησσον* would also suit every case, because the idea of the way may be laid in the preposition, in the same way as the idea of *passing* or *employing* in *Ἤματα δ' αἱματόεντα διέπρησσον πολεμίζων*, Il. ι, 362. But *πρήσσειν ἅλα* with the idea of *to do* or *make*—as if Homer had said, 'atque jam bis tantum,

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* [Thus the Germans say, '*einen weg machen*', literally, '*to make a way*', as we say 'to *make* a journey'; 'er hatte schon ein Stück *Weges gemacht*', which may be translated literally in French, 'il avait déjà *fait* une partie du *chemin*'.—Ed.]

mare facientes, aberamus'—is an untenable expression ; so that one feels a great inclination to adopt the reading of Rhianus, ἅλα πλήσσοντες, if it were not clear that this is merely an amendment arising from Rhianus' already thinking that in those other phrases, agreeably to the now current opinion, he saw only the common πράττω. If, on the other hand, we take πρήσσω for a form of περάω, περαίνω, we have a natural and uniform meaning in all those expressions.

3. But how is this to be done? Are we to take πρήσσω περαίνω, and πρήσσω *facio*, as two stems or roots radically different, and corresponding in sound by chance only? That would be indeed a strong assertion in a case of such striking uniformity in root, in form, and in quantity. But there is no occasion for this ; and whoever is regularly convinced of the correctness of explaining πρήσσειν κέλευθον by περᾷν, will soon discover the true relation of the word. Πρήσσω or πράσσω in the sense of locality is the proper and the oldest general usage of this verb, but it now occurs in this sense in Epic poetry only; the common usage arose out of this, but is never found in its later and general meaning in the Epic language. That is to say, πρήσσειν means in Homer, in all other expressions as well as those here mentioned, nothing more than περαίνειν, i. e. *to bring to an end, complete*; thus at Il. λ, 552. οὔτι πρήσσει is the same as in prose οὐδὲν περαίνει, *he completes* or *accomplishes nothing*; and at σ, 357. Jupiter says to Juno, Ἔπρηξας καὶ ἔπειτα .... Ἀνστήσασ᾽ Ἀχιλῆα, 'thou hast completed it then, thou hast succeeded in accomplishing it',—expressions in which originates, as we clearly see, the common word πράττειν, *to do*, as spoken without reference to any result. And equally natural according to this derivation is the intransitive sense of the word with the adverb, as we should say, 'I pass or get (happily, unhappily, &c.) through life, through certain circumstances'. And lastly, the quantity of the vowel in πράσσω, πρήσσω, arises, as in θρᾱττω, τέτρηχα (see art. 100.), from its being removed from before the ρ in the root περα[1].

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[1] I have remarked above in article 63. that ἄσσω appended to the stem or root as a mere termination, like ἄζω elsewhere, is contrary to analogy ; ἀλλάσσω, for instance, does not come immediately from ἄλλος,

Πρίειν; vid. πρήθειν.

96. Προσελεῖν.

1. One of the most enigmatical words in the Greek language is the compound *προσελεῖν, to use* or *treat ill,* an examination of which is rendered very difficult by its rarity; for except in two passages of Attic poetry, it is nowhere found. The enigmatical part strikes us first in the prosody, the preposition appearing long. Aristoph. Ran. 730. *Τῶν πολιτῶν θ' οὓς μὲν ἴσμεν εὐγενεῖς καὶ σώφρονας* (here follow two whole verses) *Προσελοῦμεν.* Æschyl. Prom. 435. *Ὁρῶν ἐμαυτὸν ὧδε προσελούμενον.*

2. That the digamma comes into play here is easily perceived, and Dawes was as ready as any one to admit it, by writing a pure Attic word in his way with the *w* before the *ε*, but without giving any reason how he could think of doing so in the really old writing and language, and, what is still more, in the Attic dialect. Porson proceeded more correctly. In the Etym. M., in a false etymology of the word Προσέληνοι, is preserved a more complete scholium on the passage of Æschylus, in which is said, *προυσελλεῖν λέγουσι τὸ ὑβρίζειν.* Here the *λλ* at all events is faulty; but the *ου* Porson recommended as correct; and accordingly Blomfield in Æschylus, and Dindorf in Aristophanes, have now written it so. Afterwards came a confirmation of this opinion; for in the Cod. Ravenn. of Aristophanes Bekker found plainly *προυσελοῦμεν.* But this ap-

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but from the stem *ἀλλαχ-* in *ἀλλαχοῦ,* &c.; and in the case of *ταράσσω* we have no authority for supposing *ταρ-* to be the stem. This analogy would certainly be opposed by *πράσσω* as formed from *περάω,* but only in case we were obliged to suppose an older form *περάσσω.* For this however there is no necessity; the form *πρᾱσσω* appears to be originally grounded on the contraction of a dissyllabic stem into a monosyllabic one, *πρᾱ, πρῆ,* to which also analogy points in the forms *πτήσσω* and *πτώσσω.*

pearance itself is now explained, as is also that exactly similar one which we have noticed in art. 65. sect. 5. and the note. That is to say, the simple of this compound verb, as it is now etymologically decided to be[1], had originally the digamma, the trace of which is preserved from some unknown causes in the prosody of this word, even in the Attic language. Still this does not make the case quite clear.

3. In Hesychius, besides Προσέλει, προπηλακίζει, (which shows the common way of writing this verb,) is also a gloss Προυγελεῖν, προπηλακίζειν, ὑβρίζειν. It would be easy to get rid of this gloss by supposing it a fault of transcription for προυσελεῖν. It is true that in Stobæus 41. (43.) where the passage of Aristophanes is quoted, the common editions have προσελοῦμεν; but in the first edition of Trincavellus and in one manuscript is προυγελοῦμεν. This appears to me to show a twofold tradition, and grounded on that a twofold opinion of the grammarians on the orthography of a word which in their time was quite obsolete.

4. The digamma, for instance, in some words and dialects was changed into γ, as in γέντο, and without doubt in all the words which in Hesychius have the γ instead of the aspirate: see Salmas. ad Inscr. Herod. Att. p. 47. Many indeed attribute this to an error of the lexicographer, in mistaking the digamma and confusing it with the gamma: see Taylor, Lectt. Lysiac. cap. 9. I grant that the appearance of a great number of words, of which the pronunciation with a γ is known only from Hesychius, and many of which are of the most common occurrence, as γοῖνος, γοῖδα and γοίδημι, γέαρ, γεστία, γέλουτρον (ἔλυτρον), &c., must have appeared at first sight to require consideration; but when deliberately considered, a mistake so great and constantly recurring will appear scarcely possible. On the other hand, if we reflect that in other languages also, for instance in the Latin and its descendants, the *w* and *v* change through *gu* into *g*, as in *guêpe*, *gâter*, from *vespa*, *vastare*, and a hundred others,—we shall not wonder at

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[1] The common derivation from ἕλος is very bad, on account of its apparent agreement with a word of similar meaning, προπηλακίζω, which is derived from πηλός.

the same appearance in the ancient languages; particularly when in them it is so evident, as we see from instances preserved in Hesychius, where, arising out of ἡδύς, ϜΗΔΥΣ, ἥδομαι, we find Γάδεσθαι, ἥδεσθαι: Γαδέω, χαρά; which answers so clearly to the Latin *gaudere, gaudium*[2].

5. This γ then gives very considerable weight to προυγελεῖν (thus come down to us in two ways) as a various reading of ΠΡΟΣϜΕΛΕΙΝ, to which I will now add what is quite decisive on the subject. There was a Dorico-Æolic dialect of πρεσβύς, viz. πρεῖγυς, known through the forms πρείγιστος, πρειγήϊον, πρειγεύτης, in the Cretan inscriptions. That the β corresponded with the digamma in the dialects, needs no discussion. Consequently σβ (*sw*), which we have here seen changed into γ, with the preceding ε lengthened into ει, corresponds exactly with ΠΡΟΣϜΕΛΕΙΝ, which by the lengthening of the ο into ου becomes προυγελεῖν. This, as likewise the no less authentic προυσελεῖν, which arose in the way above mentioned, were both therefore in existence in the popular language of the older time; and both were known, but probably only by grammatical tradition, to the later Greeks, to whom it was already become a doubtful question which of the two forms should be ascribed as an old Atticism to Æschylus and Aristophanes. It was probably the preponderance of authority which decided in favour of προυσελεῖν, and rejected the other as too much like a Doricism.

6. Thus much respecting this enigmatical verb may be considered with some justice as historically made out from a survey of real information and tradition; I will now subjoin what appears to me to offer itself in the way of etymological combina-

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[2] To these I subjoin the gloss Γέντερ, κοιλία: that this is the Lat. *venter* is as clear as the day. Now whether this be a γ or a digamma, it could not have had a place in this lexicon if it had not been a Greek dialect; for the Latin word itself would certainly not have been written with the unknown digamma in connexion with a Greek one. But if it be a Greek dialect, it is a dialect of γαστήρ, in which the ν is lost, as in κεστός from ΚΕΝΤΩ κεντέω, in *trimestris* and the like. Whoever is not convinced by this, may perhaps advance toward conviction by observing the German 'Wanst' (venter), and (dropping the *n*) the English 'waist'.

tion. The comparison of this verb with προπηλακίζειν led me to divide ΠΡΟΣϜΕΛΕΙΝ into ΠΡΟ and ΣϜΕΛΕΙΝ, and consequently to suppose as a root some old word beginning with *sw*, in the same way as δεῖσαι and δίς began in the old language with *dw*. And as I was considering what idea in the sense of ὑβρίζειν, drawn from some physical action, could suit an expression so strong as both the passages of Æschylus and Aristophanes evidently require, I hit upon *proculcare*, and at once all the rest proceeded smoothly. For προπηλακίζειν, it seems to me, is very well explained by 'to trample in the dirt'. Therefore ΠΡΟ-ΣϜΕΛΕΙΝ will be 'to trample with the feet'. And now to find a probability of ΣϜΕΛΕΙΝ meaning *to trample*, we must remember that in art. 82. note 14. the connexion between the pronouns ἕ, σφέ, σφός, *se*, *suus*, led us to adopt an old form *sve*, out of which arose σφέ. In the same way we arrive here at once at the words σφέλας, i. e. βάθρον, and σφάλλειν, which is acknowledged to come from the idea of *to trip or kick up** *a person's heels*. If now we carry on σφέλας, ΣϜΕΛΑΣ, into the languages akin to Greek, we meet with the German *Schwelle* (a threshold), for which there is a dialectic word in a more definite sense, *Sült* [pronounced *silt*, Fr. *seuil*, Eng. *sill*]; and in Latin we find (still of the same family, as coming from the idea of 'to tread upon') the words *solum* and *solea* with the *v* omitted, or rather changed into the cognate vowel *o*. And if we consider further that the sound *sv* is the same as the simple digamma in the following cases,—(*sve*) σφέ, ϜΕ, ἕ; *suavis*, ϜΑΔΥΣ, ἁδύς; *suesco*, ϜΕΘΩ, ἔθω; *Schweher*, *socer*; ϜΕΚΥΡΟΣ, ἑκυρός,—we bring ΣϜΕΛΕΙΝ back to the stem or root ΕΛΩ, which we have proved (in art. 44.) to have in a variety of instances the meaning of *to stamp, tread*†.

Ῥύεσθαι, ῥῦσθαι; vid. ἐρύεσθαι.

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* [Like our English verb *to supplant*, as used by Milton in its original and literal sense, and metaphorically in its now common usage. —Ed.]

† [Passow in his Lexicon is not satisfied with this derivation from σφέλας, σφάλλω, and proposes σίλλος.—Ed.]

97. Στοναχίζειν, -ῆσαι, στεναχίζειν, -ῆσαι.

1. We find in Homer (as lengthened forms of the verb στένω,) στενάχω and στοναχίζω, but in the aorist στοναχῆσαι only; the two last have always in Homer, and in Hesiod also, the various reading of στεναχίζω, στεναχῆσαι. In the common editions we have sometimes the reading with the ο, sometimes with the ε, as either may chance to occur; and I know of nothing in the old grammarians on this point, except the mere mention of the fact in Eustathius on Il. β, 95. τοῦ δὲ στεναχίζετο, οὗ πολλάκις ἡ ἄρχουσα καὶ διὰ τοῦ ο μικροῦ προφέρεται, διπλῆ ἡ παραγωγὴ ἐκ τοῦ στένω, &c. The Venetian scholia say nothing about it; but the Venetian text has always the reading with the ε, with one single exception of στοναχῆσαι at σ, 124.

2. Modern criticism must naturally try to bring even this trifling difference to some fixed rule. Wolf writes the form in ίζειν always with the ε, but that in ῆσαι with the ο. As the internal reasons seem to leave this a point of indifference, perhaps some external reason led him to that decision. The form in ίζειν occurs, for instance, in Homer seventeen times, that in ῆσαι only twice; viz. Il. σ, 124. στοναχῆσαι; and ω, 79. ἐπεστονάχησε: and it is just one of these two passages which, as we have said above, is the only one with the ο in the edition of Villoison. If both passages there had been written with the ο, we should have decided, with the highest degree of probability (considering the weight and importance of the Venetian manuscript), that some leading grammatical authority—that of Aristarchus perhaps—had fixed the difference to be στοναχῆσαι and στεναχίζειν. But as all depends on the reading of one single passage, this decision, if there are no internal grounds to support it, is a very weak one. Heyne's opinion on Il, σ, 124. ω, 79. that it must be written στεναχίζειν and στεναχῆσαι throughout, is, according to the same principle of deciding from externals, quite unobjectionable. For from the reading of the Venetian manuscript being, with one single exception, uniform throughout, and the best manuscripts as it would seem generally agreeing with it, supported by the preference for this

reading implied in the words of Eustathius quoted above,—it would certainly appear that general authority is in favour of the reading with the ε: and to form an edition of Homer agreeing in its leading points with that tradition which is best supported, is indisputably an unobjectionable principle.

3. But the following is equally so, viz. in all cases where we can take our stand on the same ground which those old critics took before us (and there are very many such for the firm but circumspect modern critic), to give the results of this proceeding. From στένω comes a lengthened form with a stronger sense στενάχω (στενάχουσι, στενάχων, στενάχοντο), of which the termination, less used elsewhere, seems to imitate (compare ἀχέων) a natural sound. Hence first comes, with the vowel changed, the substantive στοναχή[1], occurring in Homer as frequently as the foregoing. Any further lengthening of the original verb might now certainly be made without the change of the vowel; but as soon as this change takes place in a substantive, it is customary for the lengthened verbal forms to pass through the same change, or, which is the same thing, to be formed from the substantive, as φέρω, φορά, φορέω; φένω, φόνος, φονεύω, and the like. Now as στοναχή is an Homeric word, it would be contrary to analogy that a lengthened form shaped so exactly like a derivative as that in -ίζω should not be modelled according to this noun. The form στοναχίζω therefore stands firmly established by internal analogy.

4. On the aorist in -ῆσαι opinions may be divided. The form στενάχω has not the inflexion of -άξω, -άξαι; and for this reason, that the natural sound above mentioned might not be obscured. Hence the aorist in -ῆσαι, like μέλλω μελλῆσω, καθεύδω, καθευδήσω, &c. may be considered as a mere flexion or tense of στενάχω, in which case the change of vowel would not take place. And so it would appear most agreeable to analogy to fix στενάχω with the flexion στεναχήσω, &c. and with a sister-form στοναχίζω. But even if these were the original Homeric forms, one can easily conceive that they could

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[1] On στοναχή it may be observed, that if the scholia on Od. ε, 83. are to be trusted, Aristophanes wrote the dat. plur. στοναχῇσιν in that passage with the ε.

not have been always kept distinct from each other. The aorist in -ῆσαι has quite as much the appearance of a lengthened derivative (στοναχέω) as the form in -ίζω has, and hence it took quite regularly the change of vowel. From the various readings therefore, which are equally in favour of both forms, we may without arbitrariness adopt, not στεναχῆσαι, στοναχίζω, but only στοναχῆσαι, στοναχίζω.

5. There is besides a true poetical ground in favour of this decision: that is to say, the change of vowel carried with it an assurance that the result must be a vowel of a stronger and harsher sound, which would be very useful in such cases as ὑπὸ δὲ στοναχίζετο γαῖα, περὶ δὲ στοναχίζετο δῶμα, ἐπεστονάχησε δὲ λίμνη: in which sense a verb of such constant occurrence as στενάχω is found only once, viz. at Il. π, 391. χαράδραι ... μεγάλα στενάχουσι ῥέουσαι[2].

6. We will now go back to the authority of tradition. And here we must not overlook the circumstance that the form στενάχω has *never* the various reading of the ο, but those in -ῆσαι and -ίζω have it *always*. If therefore the ο had come from a more modern poet or a later pen, that form would not have remained free from it; particularly as there is some ground for στονάχω in the substantive στόνος, and that verb was actually in existence; Hesych. στονάχων, στενάζων. From this alone the converse is quite clear, namely, that στοναχῆσαι, στοναχίζειν are genuine forms, but that those with the ε were introduced into Homer's poems only through the obscurely-felt impulse of attaching them to the principal form, because it could be done according to analogy. And when this reading was once admitted, it is still more easily to be conceived that grammarians like Aristarchus, who were strangers to the principles of true criticism, would receive this form as the only regular one.

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[2] A conclusion, which would lead us still further—that perhaps *to sigh* was the proper meaning of στεναχίζειν, -ῆσαι, and *to resound* that of στοναχίζειν, -ῆσαι—must be at once rejected by our reflecting that the language of the ancient poets was not refined enough for such niceties.

Σφάς, σφέ, σφίν, σφῶϊ, σφώ, σφωΐτερος; vid. νῶϊ, νώ.

98. Τέκμωρ, τεκμαίρεσθαι.

1. Damm, following Eustathius, remarks that τέκμωρ in Homer has never any other meaning than *finis, exitus, scopus,* ‘an end or termination, the object proposed or marked out’, and τεκμαίρεσθαι, *finio, pro fine constituo, confirmo et ex dubitatione eximo,* ‘to finish, destine, fix, appoint’; but that the former never means, as later writers have it, *signum,* ‘a sign’, nor the latter *signis ostendere, ex signis observare, conjectare,* ‘to decide or conclude by signs’, &c. Essentially Damm is right, although, in order not to approach too near to the meanings which he rejects, he interprets some passages obscurely. In most of them τέκμωρ certainly does mean an *end, object,* or *point proposed*; for example, Il. ν, 20. it is said of Neptune ἵκετο τέκμωρ, Αἰγάς: at π, 472. τοῖο εὕρετο τέκμωρ, “he found out (planned) an end of this confusion;” and at η, 30. εὑρεῖν τέκμωρ Ἰλίου.

2. But the connexion between this meaning and that of the well-known passage of Il. α, 526. Τοῦτο γὰρ (i. e. Jupiter’s nod) ἐξ ἐμέθεν γε μετ’ ἀθανάτοισι μέγιστον Τέκμωρ, can scarcely be preserved without force by any other means than by supposing the idea of a *sign* to be the ground-meaning. Only we must not imagine to ourselves any casual trifling sign, but one solemnly appointed for that particular purpose, as Voss admirably expresses it, “the most sacred pledge .... of my promises.” It was by such sacred signs that limits and boundaries were fixed from the earliest times; and thus τέκμωρ came to have the general sense of a *boundary, end,* and particularly the end which fate has fixed to some duration, τέκμωρ Ἰλίου.

3. Now the action by which a ruler or person with power and authority fixes such a τέκμωρ is the original sense of τεκμαίρεσθαι: and hence it means in Il. ζ, 349. η, 70. Od. η, 317. Hes. ε, 227. 237. 396. (διετεκμήραντο) *to fix, appoint, destine.* Very nearly bordering on this is the use of the word in Od. κ, 563. where Circe, knowing the decrees of fate (consequently

every τέκμωρ), *announces* to Ulysses that he is destined to visit Hades, &c.—ἄλλην δ' ἧμιν ὁδὸν τεκμήρατο Κίρκη. With this again agrees the usage in Od. λ, 111. where the same Circe, supposing the case that Ulysses should kill the cattle of the Sun, says to him, τότε τοι τεκμαίρομ' ὄλεθρον. For the expressions of a supreme power *decreeing*, and of another *announcing* from divine knowledge those decrees, are commonly the same. And now we see how, from the connexion in which this word stands in the last-quoted passage, the common meaning of it arose; which deviates from the older in this alone, that it is not confined to such solemn occasions, and does not mark an announcement accompanied with the same certainty and precision that it does in Homer.

4. Still the substantive τέκμωρ, or τέκμαρ, never sinks, even in post-Homeric times, to the every-day idea of a sign; but either remains a high and heavenly sign, as the full moon is to mortals in the Homeric Hymn to Luna v. 13., or is exalted into the higher and more solemn style of language, as that of tragedy; see Eurip. Hec. 1273. where the cape which preserves the memory of Hecuba (κυνόσσημα) is called a τέκμαρ of sailors.

5. I will transcribe here at length a fragment of Hesiod in which the word τέκμαρ occurs, because in the collection of Fragments it has hitherto stood divided into two parts*. It is from the Melampodia.

Ἡδὺ [γάρ] ἐστ' ἐν δαιτὶ καὶ εἰλαπίνῃ τεθαλυίῃ
Τέρπεσθαι μύθοισιν, ἐπὴν δαιτὸς κορέσωνται·
Ἡδὺ δὲ καὶ τὸ πυθέσθαι, ὅσα θνητοῖσιν ἔδειμαν
Ἀθάνατοι, δειλῶν τε καὶ ἐσθλῶν τέκμαρ ἐναργές.

The two former verses are from Athenæus 2. p. 40. f., where however the epitomist has only added that they are from Hesiod's Melampodia. The γάρ belongs to the editors. The two latter verses are preserved by Clemens of Alexandria, Strom. 6. p. 751. (266.), and introduced with the words Ἡσίοδος ἐπὶ τοῦ Μελάμποδος ποιεῖ. This, and the affinity of the subject, and the similarity of the opening in both fragments, leave no doubt of their belonging to each other; although it is possible that the sense of the two former verses may have been drawn out more at length in some additional intervening verses; for Clemens introduces the two latter, as taken from Musæus, with the addition *καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς*. In the third verse we must take care not to understand the *τὸ* as the article to *πυθέσθαι*: it stands as a demonstrative for *τόδε*, and is afterwards again taken up by *τέκμαρ*, while *ὅσα* refers to the following *δειλῶν τε καὶ ἐσθλῶν*. Still, however, the reader is somewhat obstructed in the two latter verses. In the first place I do not know of any other instance of *δειλῶν* as a neuter, which its connexion with *ὅσα ἔδειμαν* requires it to be; and to alter it to *δεινῶν* appears to me not allowable in the Epic language[1]. At all events the sense requires *bad things*: but *τέκμαρ ἐναργές* can be nothing else than the certain limits, the fixed designation, in duration and extent, of the good and evil sent by the gods to men; just as Hesiod (*ε*, 667.) uses *τέλος* in the same kind of expression, where it is said of Jupiter and Neptune,

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* [In Gaisford's edition of the Minor Poets they stand as No. 46. and 55.—Ed.]

> *Ἐν τοῖς γὰρ τέλος ἐστὶν ὁμῶς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε.*

If therefore I do not mistake, *familiar discourse, conversation, μῦθοι*, is put in a general opposition to the instruction and advice with which the sages or soothsayers, like Melampus, were accustomed to lecture their hearers on their weal and woe.

99. Τεταγών, τῆ.

1. The verb *τεταγών* occurs twice in Homer. At Il. *α*, 591. Vulcan is telling how Jupiter had once served him,

> *Ῥίψε ποδὸς τεταγὼν ἀπὸ βηλοῦ θεσπεσίοιο*[1].

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[1] It is true, that *δεινά*, in a case exactly parallel to this, is opposed to *ἐσθλά* in the verses of an old poet quoted in Plato's Alcibiades secund. p. 143. a. But undoubtedly the Attic writer had introduced into the old verse his own expression; for the same verse in the Anthologia (Analect. Adesp. 466.) has *λυγρά*. But who knows whether it ought not to be *δειλά* there also instead of *δεινά*, as in the passage above? For a confirmation of this conjecture see the note on that passage.

[1] See an imitation of this passage in the fragment of the small Iliad

And at ο, 23. Jupiter is describing how he had served the gods,

> .... ὃν δὲ λάβοιμι ,
> Ῥίπτασκον τεταγὼν ἀπὸ βηλοῦ.

The latter passage is only an angry and more general repetition of the former, referring to the same story. But the former contains the phrase more complete and explains the latter, making it quite clear by the addition of the genitive ποδός, that τεταγών is only a more forcible expression for λαβών, λαβόμενος. In the explanations which we find in the grammarians (Hesych. Etym. M. &c.), ἐκτείνας, τινάξας, ῥίψας, we see that they are conjectures drawn partly from the context, partly from the derivation, which first offered itself to the commentators, of τείνω, τέτακα[2]. In the same way the old interpreters hit upon λαβών, λαβόμενος (see Schol. Lips. Eustath.), and at last arrived at the connexion of τεταγών and τῆ, a supposition which appeared to Eustathius very daring, but which is now generally and correctly adopted. Schneider also was right in distinguishing the two roots to which τείνω, τέτακα on the one hand, and τῆ, τεταγών on the other, belong; for although there may be grounds for the original identity of both, yet such an identity lies beyond the bounds of all grammatical and exegetical etymology[3].

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in Tzetzes ad Lycophr. 1263., where Neoptolemus is described as serving Astyanax in a similar manner, Παῖδα δ' ἑλὼν ἐκ κόλπου ἐϋπλοκάμοιο τιθήνης Ῥίψε ποδὸς τεταγὼν ἀπὸ πύργου.

[2] An old authority for one of these explanations lies concealed in an error of transcription. In Apollonius 2, 119. the scholiast adopted the common but indefensible reading Αἶψα μέλαν τεταγὼν πέλεκυν μέγαν. Brunck took from some manuscript μάλα for μέλαν. But who would not adopt the conjecture of Sanctamandus, Αἶψα μάλ' ἀντεταγὼν πέλεκυν μέγαν? The artificial poet, who understood τεταγών in much the same sense as τινάξας, ventured on a compound after the analogy of ἀμπεπαλών: which last word Ruhnken (see Ep. Crit. 2. p. 205.) would have therefore introduced, but for which he would certainly have not received the thanks of Apollonius.

[3] Schneider's classing τεταγών with the Latin *tango* is more certain and more fruitful in results; for how near the ideas of *taking hold on* and *touching* are to each other, is shown by the Greek ἅπτω, ἅπτομαι, and the German *anfassen* (to lay hands on) used for *anrühren* (to touch): see also note 8. of art. 23. Who now will totally reject the connexion of τεταγών with the English *take*, Danish *tage*? by which the correctness of the above explanation of that word is placed beyond a doubt.

2. From the latter root then there was a verbal stem TAΓ- for which τεταγεῖν is the old reduplicated form of the aorist[4], and another verbal stem TA-, the only remains of which is the imperative τῆ, formed like ζῆν according to Doric analogy[5]. We might, it is true, remove this latter entirely, explain it as identical with the demonstrative τῆ, and confirm the explanation by appealing to the analogy of the German *da !* (there !). But this last comparison need not prevent our examining each of these expressions in its own language, as the result may be in both cases the same[6]. The plainest instances of the verbal meaning of τῆ are those where it is joined with such

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[4] Lucian, near the beginning of the Dialogue Charon, makes Mercury quote ironically from Il. α, 591. μὴ ῥίψῃ κἀμὲ τεταγὼς τοῦ ποδὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ θεσπεσίου βηλοῦ. That this reading is false is clear from the scholiast on Lucian, who explains only τεταγών. That excellent critic Hemsterhuis could have been induced only by his well-known grammatical prejudices, to think of finding here for Homer himself a more correct reading than the "operosum grammaticorum aoristum 2. τεταγών ab ἔταγον."

[5] Compare τέτμηκα—ἐτμάγην.

[6] I have long suspected that the German *da !* (there !) used in offering or presenting a thing, is an old imperative, though the appearance of the word is against it; and in etymology from natural causes we have always to contend against appearances. In some parts of Germany in the language of common life this word is actually inflected, and when more things than one are offered they say *dat !* a usage corresponding with τῆτε in common Greek; see Sophron. in Schol. Aristoph. Ach. 204. It is true, that we may consider both as a popular error arising from the apparent sense of this expression; but even this popular error presupposes in this case a kind of necessity for an imperative; and consequently this necessity was as likely to have produced it before as to have introduced it afterwards. If, on the contrary, an adverb had been the part of speech really required here, one so plain and well known as *da* would have scarcely been mistaken for such, and consequently would not have been inflected by any one. Besides, there is some additional trace of a verb in the accent or stress laid on the word, as far as this is possible where the sound in so trifling. *Dă !* when used in offering anything is always spoken *short*, even when the greatest stress is intended to be laid on it; a thing can never be offered with *dā !* (thēre !): whereas the adverb is long by nature, and this length is almost always preserved, even when not the slightest stress is intended to be laid on it. But by this quantity *dă* is very like such imperatives as *gib* (give)! *nimm* (take)! and lastly we may subjoin the analogy of the French *tiens*! and the Greek τῆ!

particles as νῦν, δέ, &c. For example, in Il. ψ, 618. Τῆ νῦν, καί σοι τοῦτο, γέρον, κειμήλιον ἔστω. In Od. ε, 346. Τῆ δὲ, τόδε κρήδεμνον ὑπὸ στέρνοιο τάνυσσαι. But the accusative is found as seldom joined with τῆ as it is with the corresponding French expression *tiens! tenez!* In all cases it stands either quite absolute, that is, with the object understood, as in the former of the instances above quoted; or the accusative belongs to a verb immediately following, as in the latter. According to this analogy, Wolf has been correct in rejecting the only instance of τῆ with an accusative, Od. κ, 287.

> Τῆ τόδε φάρμακον ἐσθλὸν, ἔχων δ' ἐς δώματα Κίρκης
> Ἔρχευ,

in which he has followed the Cod. Harl., where there is no δέ after ἔχων; a change certainly recommended by its very much improving the construction of ἔχων.

Τετραφάληρος; vid. φάλος, &c.

100. Τέτρηχα.

1. I have briefly laid down in my Grammar, that the perfect τέτρηχα does not come either from a verb τρήχω or from τραχύς, which I will here prove more fully. It occurs in Homer only twice, and in both instances in speaking of the assembly of the people: Il. β, 95.

> Τετρήχει δ' ἀγορὴ, ὑπὸ δὲ στοναχίζετο γαῖα
> Λαῶν ἱζόντων, ὅμαδος δ' ἦν.

and η, 346.

> Τρώων αὖτ' ἀγορὴ γένετ' Ἰλίου ἐν πόλει ἄκρῃ
> Δεινὴ, τετρηχυῖα, παρὰ Πριάμοιο θύρῃσιν.

Heyne, on the first passage, thinks it perfectly clear that this word comes from a verb τρήχω, from which was afterwards formed τρηχύνω, and that in its proper sense it is used of a smooth surface which *turbatur, asperatur,* and thence of any *turbatio.* Now it is evident that the opposition between *smooth* and *rough* is introduced here only because the sound of the verb reminded the ear of the better-known adjective τρηχύς. But neither in the old Epic, nor in the Lyric or Tragic poets, is there any other passage where the verb occurs.

2. In both the passages of Homer, however, the context shows at once that the true idea—δεινὴ, τετρηχυῖα—is not mere unevenness, or obstinacy, but *disturbed motion.* To this I have to add a verse from Stobæus, of what period I know not[1],

> Ἀμφὶ δέ τοι νέαι αἰὲν ἀνίαι τετρήχασιν,

which is also favourable to the idea of restless motion. It is true, that both the word τρηχύς and its meaning are akin to that of a moving crowd; but τρήχω does not come naturally from τρηχύς,—on the contrary the adjective comes very naturally from the verb. We have therefore to examine the verbal form τέτρηχα, and that from its very source.

3. Now the unanimity of the old grammarians which we meet with in this examination is very remarkable. Some of them indeed have τετράχυντο as an explanation of the sense; but as soon as they come to explain the form, they invariably derive it from ταράσσω; see Schol. Ven. Eustath. Etym. M. Suid. This unanimity is, I say, very remarkable, because the adoption of a theme τρήχω, which offered itself so naturally, and was so agreeable to the common grammatical mode of proceeding, and which, as we shall see below, some did actually adopt, was yet most determinately rejected, in order to make way for one far less natural. I conjecture therefore that this latter was supported by some old authority, derived from a period when the feeling of the meanings was yet sufficiently alive to determine, without the aid of grammatical art, what forms belonged to each other. But in any case it is inconceivable how any one could reject this explanation (see Heyne) as perfectly untenable, without thinking of the Attic form θράττω for ταράττω. This θράττω, which contains the aspirate before the ρ, much as φροίμιον for προοίμιον, is a contraction of that kind

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[1] I know it only from the quotation of Sopingius in Hesych. in v.

by which two vowels separated by a liquid are united into one long vowel after the liquid, as στορέννυμι, στρώννυμι· μαλακός, βλᾱξ. For that the α in θράττω is lengthened, is shown by the accent of the neuter participle τὸ θρᾶττον[2]. If from that verb we form a perfect, it must be τέτρᾱχα, and consequently Ionic τέτρηχα; exactly as πρήσσω, πέπρηχα and πέπρηγα. It is true that the meaning of ταράσσω and θράσσω is transitive, *turbare*, while the perfect in question means *turbatus sum*; but this is so exactly in accordance with the analogy of the language, particularly of the older writers, that this point needs no further examination. And even the question whether τέτρηχα is to be considered a perf. 1. or 2.* appears to be superfluous. Whoever is desirous, from the stronger analogy, of having the perf. 2. for the intransitive meaning, might, by a comparison with πέπρηγα, desire to write τέτρηγα also. But I would not have that person satisfied of the truth of the reading by referring to the Etym. M.; for the reading τετρήγει, which is there supported by τετάραγα, &c. proves to be an old various reading for the former of the two Homeric passages, but one which I have met with nowhere else. I have only to remind my readers, that as πρᾶγος points to the letter γ for πράττω, so ταραχή points to χ as the most common radical letter for ταράττω; and thus the perf. 1. and 2. coincide.

4. It is not necessary for us in the old Ionic language to suppose the other forms or tenses answering to the Attic θράσσω ἔθραξα, as this kind of contraction was principally wanted only in the perfect for τε̆τᾰρᾰχᾰ, in the same way as in κέκληκα and similar cases. Hence the aorist appears in Homer in the unchanged form from ταράσσω; for instance in Od. ε, 291. 304. ἐτάραξε δὲ πόντον. The relation which these meanings bear to each other,—in the one case of the god agitating the

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[2] Plato Phæd. p. 86. e. It is true, that the authorities which I have at this moment before me give both readings θρᾶττον and θράττον; but the former can be only from tradition. This and general analogy would therefore direct us to write in Æschyl. Prom. 633. θρᾶξαι, if the manuscripts do not already give it so.

* [What the Germans call perf. 2. is very improperly called by us *perfectum medium*.—Ed.]

sea, in the other of the agitated and tumultuous assembly,—must be at once felt; even though *τέτρηχα*, which we have said occurs but twice in Homer, cannot be shown to have been used by him exactly in connexion with the sea. But an instance of this usage, if it be not superfluous to quote it, we find in Leonidas, an old poet belonging to the period preceding the Alexandrine æra; Epigr. 96.

> *Τετρηχυῖα θάλασσα, τί μ' οὐκ οἰζυρὰ παθόντα*
> *Τηλόσ' ἀπὸ ψιλῆς ἔπτυσας ἠϊόνος;*

In the same way *κινεῖν* also is used both of the sea and of an assembly; as at Il. β, 395. *ὅτε κινήσει νότος ἐλθὼν* (*κῦμα*), and at v. 144. *Κινήθη δ' ἀγορὴ ὡς κύματα μακρὰ θαλάσσης.* From which passages, if read in connexion with each other, it is clear, that the difference between *τετρήχει* and *ἐκινήθη* consists only in this, that the passive aorist is used to express the moment of transition from calm to tumult, but *τετρήχει*, as is usual with these perfects, marks the continuance of the agitation.

5. As the Homeric *τέτρηχα* coincides therefore so exactly with *ταράσσω* in form as well as in meaning, the adoption of another theme for it is the more untenable. But the adjective *τραχύς, τρηχύς*, proves nothing more than that the transition from the idea of *agitated* (particularly as shown on a surface rendered uneven by agitation) to that of *uneven* and *rough* is ancient. The same transition might very well take place in the verb too; but examples from the Alexandrine writers (for instance *τετρηχότα βῶλον*, Apollon. 3, 1393.) can prove nothing in favour of the real usage of the more ancient authors; and still less can we conclude, from finding a present in Nicander Ther. 521. *τρήχοντι πάγῳ*, that it existed also in the older times[3]. This latter example proves only that some of the older grammarians likewise traced back this perfect to the same erroneous theme; as we might have already guessed from the gloss *τετράχυντο*. If we were inclined to suppose any other grammatical usage from

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[3] With this poet we may join another of the same kind, Demosthenes Bithynus, who uses *τρήχουσα* in the same sense in a fragment in the Etym. M. v. *Ἡραία*.

finding a form in Nicander, we must surely be deterred by the present ἔπουσι, which his grammatical art formed from εἶπον and ἐνέπω, and which he accordingly used at Ther. 508. and elsewhere.

Τῇ; vid. τεταγών.

Τηλεκλειτός, τηλεκλητός, τηλεκλυτός; vid. κλειτός, &c.

101. Τηλύγετος.

1. The epithet τηλύγετος, is given to sons and daughters in order to represent them as objects of the particular affection of their parents; but we cannot see clearly what the exact sense of the word is. At Il. ι, 143. Agamemnon sends to Achilles, as his future son-in-law, the following promise:

> ....τίσω δέ μιν ἶσον Ὀρέστῃ,
> Ὅς μοι τηλύγετος τρέφεται θαλίῃ ἐνὶ πολλῇ.

At Od. δ, 11. Menelaus marries his son,

> Ὅς οἱ τηλύγετος γένετο κρατερὸς Μεγαπένθης
> Ἐκ δούλης.

And at Il. γ, 175. Helen reproaches herself with having left her home,

> Παῖδά τε τηλυγέτην καὶ ὁμηλικίην ἐρατεινήν,

by which is meant Hermione. In the same way is described, though only in idea, paternal love for a dear child, at Il. ι, 482.

> Καί με φίλησ' ὡσεί τε πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φιλήσῃ
> Μοῦνον, τηλύγετον, πολλοῖσιν ἐπὶ κτεάτεσσιν.

and at Od. π, 19. where a father receives with joy his son returning to him after a long absence, ὃν παῖδα ... Μοῦνον, τηλύγετον.

Lastly at Il. ε, 153. two brothers, slain by Diomedes, have this epithet,

> Φαίνοπος υἷε,
> Ἄμφω τηλυγέτω· ὁ δὲ τείρετο γήραϊ λυγρῷ,
> Υἱὸν δ' οὐ τέκετ' ἄλλον ἐπὶ κτεάτεσσι λιπέσθαι.

2. These are all the passages from which we can gather the domestic relation of those to whom this epithet is given. And thus we see how mechanically and injudiciously those proceeded who derived the word from τῆλε and γείνομαι; which not only does not suit any of the passages quoted, but possesses no one qualification that might fairly have led to the *catachrestical* application (as the grammarians term it) of this word to tenderly beloved children in general; as a son born in the absence of his father can by no means excite that tender affection which is necessary to such a usage[1]. Hence the common explanation of the word is, that it is a child born when the father is τηλοῦ τῆς ἡλικίας; which certainly suits very well the sons of Phænops, but not the others, and least of all Helen, by whom it is therefore supposed to be said καταχρηστικῶς. But the great objection to all this is, that neither τῆλε nor τηλοῦ are ever used with reference to time; and although with the genitive defining the sense—'far advanced in years'—this might be conceivable, still it is impossible that such an expression as a *far-born* or *distant-born* child can mean one born in his father's old-age.

3. If we give up the derivation of the word, and by a comparison of passages search for some more accurate sense founded on parental affection, the idea of *only one* offers itself to us (see Schol. Il. ε, 153. Od. δ, 11. Hesych. &c.): but then this will not suit the *two* sons of Phænops, ἄμφω τηλυγέτω; and the twice-recurring combination, μοῦνος, τηλύγετος, requires that the latter word should have its own separate idea. Nothing therefore remains for us but to suppose it to mean, what may very well be the literal sense of the word, *tenderly beloved*, as in the expression at Od. β, 365. of Telemachus, Μοῦνος ἐὼν

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[1] The usage of later poets, who have τηλύγετος simply in the sense of *distant*, is too great a deviation from Homer to lead us astray. See Simmias ap. Tzetz. 8, 144. (quoted in Schneider's Lexicon) τηλυγέτων Ὑπερβορέων, and Hesych. τηλυγέτων ἀποικιῶν.

ἀγαπητός. Only that τηλύγετος is a more forcible expression for this idea, as is evident from the bad sense in which the word is used at Il. ν, 470.,

> Ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἰδομενῆα φόβος λάβε, τηλύγετον ὥς.

Here the meaning of a child *spoiled* by the love of its parents is too evident for us not to be convinced at once, that the only idea of the poet in all those passages was that of an object of the most tender love and affection, applied in a good or bad sense according to the context. The word is also used absolutely, but in a good sense, by Euripides in the Iph. Taur. 828., where he make Iphigenia say to Orestes, ἔχω σ' Ὀρέστα τηλύγετον χθονὸς ἄπο πατρίδος, undoubtedly with reference to the passage quoted above from Il. ι, 143.*

4. With this half-positive half-negative result, which we obtain within the bounds of certainty, we may, as far as our object is to understand the sense of the poet, rest satisfied; and for anything further, we will venture a little on conjecture. In the Excerpta of Orion which Sturz has appended to the Etymol. Gud. we read at p. 616. the explanation of τηλύγετος, ὁ τελευταῖος τῷ πατρὶ γενόμενος. This explanation certainly suits all the above passages; for although by the expression τελευταῖος the thought is generally carried back to some others preceding, yet its principal relation is to the future, and it necessarily expresses the meaning of *none since*: so that when the idea of *the last-born* acquired in the course of usage the definite collateral idea of extreme affection, and even of an injurious excess of it, the idea of the *only* child was necessarily comprehended under it. And when this collateral idea of tender affection was thus become firmly united to the word, there appears to me to have been no objection in the language of Homer to the joining of μοῦνος, τηλύγετος. But it is evident that the author of this explanation acknowledged also an etymological connexion between the words τηλύγετος and τελευταῖος; and there is certainly an analogy in the case

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* [Both Schneider and Passow differ from Buttmann's interpretation of τηλύγετος in this passage of Euripides; they understand it to mean '*distant*', and the latter in particular mentions it as the only instance of this sense in an Attic writer.—Ed.]

which deserves attention. From the more simple form, which is supposed to be the substantive τελευτή, arose very naturally the compound τελεύγετος; and hence again the form more convenient for the hexameter, τηλύγετος, *by transposing the quantities** on account of the rhythm, a practice resorted to on other occasions, as in ἀπερείσια for ἀπειρέσια; for ευ shortened gives υ, and ε lengthened becomes η or ει; and, whether τῆλε be really or only apparently akin to this stem or family, it is very conceivable that from the familiar sound of that word the η prevailed over the ει. And thus it appears also very probable, that Orion, in this derivation from the idea of τελευταῖος, has retained an old tradition, of which the unintelligible derivation from τῆλε is only a kind of corruption.

Τρυφάλεια; vid. φάλος, sect. 12.

Ὑπερηνορέων; } vid. ὑπερφίαλος.
Ὑπέροπλος; }

102. Ὑπερφίαλος, ὑπερηνορέων, ὑπέροπλος.

1. That ὑπερφίαλος is used in the most decidedly bad sense, and at the same time in speeches where a reproachful epithet is not at all suitable, has been remarked in various ways; but the contrast has never been made so distinct as may be done by a survey of passages in the Odyssey alone. It is there a regular fixed epithet of the suitors; and most decidedly a term of reproach at α, 134. where Telemachus is afraid that the guest will be uncomfortable and annoyed at the repast, ... ὑπερφιάλοισι μετελθών: and again at β, 310. where he says,

> Ἀντίνο', οὔπως ἔστιν ὑπερφιάλοισι μεθ' ὑμῖν
> Δαίνυσθαί τ' ἀκέοντα καὶ εὐφραίνεσθαι ἕκηλον.

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* [" As we find in Apoll. Dysc. (de Pronom. p. 329. B.) indications of an adverb τῆλυ, a sister-form of τῆλε, there is no occasion for setting out with this transposition of the quantities." Passow's Lexicon.—Ed.]

But at ο, 315. Ulysses uses it in the character of a beggar with a very different meaning. And it must necessarily be free from everything of a reproachful tendency, when at φ, 289. Antinous himself says to the supposed beggar,

> *Οὐκ ἀγαπᾷς, ὃ ἕκηλος ὑπερφιάλοισι μεθ' ἡμῖν*
> *Δαίνυσαι;*

which is consequently a mere repetition of the passage quoted above from β, where the word has so different a meaning. It has been attempted here to explain these words as ironical, and such they might certainly be in the mouth of the high-spirited suitor if addressed to Telemachus, but by no means when spoken to the beggar. It is clear therefore, that the proper meaning of the word must have been such as should imply, according to the person who used it and him to whom it was spoken, more or less reproach, or none at all; and this appears to me to be the attribute of a man *who thinks that he can set himself above much or everything*. And in the same way, though I might not exactly follow the scholiast in explaining the Cyclops (with the exception of Polyphemus) to be men observant of right and justice, yet I should be inclined to agree with him in opinion that they are called at ι, 106. ὑπερφίαλοι ἀθέμιστοι only as monstrous children of nature, who needed no social or legal relations among themselves, and consequently did not acknowledge them toward others.

2. It is the same with the word when an epithet of a speech or address. At Od. δ, 774. Antinous warns the suitors against uttering any *μύθους ὑπερφιάλους*; which can only refer to a speech of one of them just before, in which he had spoken of looking forward with delight to the Queen's marriage and Telemachus's death, and which must have appeared to that most high-spirited of the suitors over-hasty and imprudent, as the Queen might by these means get some intelligence of it. It is quite otherwise at δ, 503. where Proteus blames the presumptuous boast of Ajax (Εἰ μὴ ὑπερφίαλον ἔπος ἔκβαλε, καὶ μέγ' ἀάσθη), that he would escape the waves even if the gods willed it otherwise.

3. In another passage of the Odyssey (ζ, 274.) the adjective is an epithet of reproach. Nausicaa there says that she

shuns the conversation and jokes of a certain class of men, and adds as the reason,

> . . . . . . *μάλα δ' εἰσὶν ὑπερφίαλοι κατὰ δῆμον.*

The difference of meaning here from the first ὑπερφίαλοι is at once perceptible, and we might be inclined to render it merely by *regardless of right and reason*, did not the really unbecoming ridicule, to which the young princess suspects she may be exposed from any one of those persons, show a somewhat closer accordance with the usage of the word elsewhere, in as much as the persons here meant are such as exalt themselves above all decorum and respect toward their superiors.

4. On the other hand, it is not to be denied, that if we had only the Iliad, we should fix on the decidedly reproachful sense as the ground of the meaning. There the Trojans are called ὑπερφίαλοι, but always by an enemy or by hostile deities, and with great bitterness of expression, as at *ν*, 621. *φ*, 224. 414. 459.; Priam's sons at *γ*, 106. are ὑπερφίαλοι καὶ ἄπιστοι: Juno says at *ο*, 94. that Jupiter is ὑπερφίαλος καὶ ἀπηνής; and Menelaus denies at *ψ*, 611. that these same qualities can be attributed to him. Still however these passages, if duly considered, coincide with the usage of the word as observed in the Odyssey. The Trojans, as barbarians, are considered by the Greeks to be less observant of right and reason than themselves; and when the youthful sons of the king are called ἄπιστοι, this at once raises the meaning of the accompanying ὑπερφίαλοι. The same kind of climax is formed by ἀπηνής when said of Jupiter, and shows therefore that ὑπερφίαλος can only belong to the category of selfish rulers, regardless of all but their own absolute will; although Juno utters it in a tone of ill-humour, and increases its severity by the addition of ἀπηνής, which however is used in a rather milder sense than usual: compare *α*, 340.

5. But it is a point deserving of particular attention, that the *adverb* ὑπερφιάλως is entirely free from any meaning strictly reproachful. It is true, that at Od. *α*, 227. the guest says of the suitors, ὑβρίζοντες ὑπερφιάλως δοκέουσιν: but here the reproach is already fully expressed in the participle, and the

adverb only heightens the sense, as at σ, 71. where the suitors admire the majestic limbs of the supposed beggar;

Μνηστῆρες δ' ἄρα πάντες ὑπερφιάλως ἀγάσαντο:

nay, it is used where the thing done is perfectly correct and right, as at ρ, 481. where the same suitors are justly angry at the outrageous act of Antinous;

. . . . . . οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ὑπερφιάλως νεμέσησαν.

And here too the Iliad does not disagree with the Odyssey. For when Hector at σ, 300. says of the wealthy inhabitants of Troy,

. . . . . . ὃς κτεάτεσσιν ὑπερφιάλως ἀνιάζει,

the context there requires but a slight increase of force, as if we should say 'whoever is too fond of his possessions'; and when Idomeneus at v. 293. breaks off the idle conversation in the battle,

. . . . μή πού τις ὑπερφιάλως νεμεσίζῃ,

he is certainly thinking of incurring a *violent* reproach, but yet a just one.

6. It is certain, therefore, that the word in its first and proper sense only raises or increases the general force of the sentence; but it may likewise contain the reproachful meaning of too much and too great. For a comparison of the popular language of all nations shows how little moderation is observed in the choice of adverbs, and that ideas like *enormous, excessive, nimium,* are used without any meaning of reproach: on the other hand, these very terms of exaltation, when used as adjectives with persons or with anything bearing a moral relation, pass over at once into what is odious. That we should not give up too easily the literal derivation of the word from *φιάλη*, is a point which certainly requires consideration. Thus much however arises from what has been said, that the explanation of it by *one who breaks his oaths and engagements, τὸν παραβαίνοντα τοὺς διὰ φιαλῶν γενομένους ὅρκους* (see Etym. M. and compare Schol. Od. α, 134.), is inadmissible; not only because, if it were said of Jupiter in that sense, it would be a

perfectly outrageous expression even in Juno's mouth, but also because it is not conceivable that a word used in so bad a sense, and with so definite a meaning, can be softened and brought to mean anything *excessive* and *surpassing*, and that too in a good sense. It would be more suitable, even by comparison of the German, to take the literal idea of *beyond measure, excessive*; but we nowhere find that φιάλη was used for a measure, nor have I met with this explanation in any of the old writers; for although we see in the Etym. M. τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα τῇ ἀμετρίᾳ, ὡς τῆς φιάλης ἀμέτρου οὔσης, this is only an indistinct abridgement of a longer account, quoted by Porphyry in Schol. Il. β, 169. and ν, 295. as from Aristotle, in which it is expressly said that φιάλη is *no measure*, and which unravels the idea of ὑπερφίαλος in the sense of *beyond measure, immeasurable*, with that fine-drawn subtilty which we cannot but be surprised to see quoted from so respectable a writer. There remains then for this derivation nothing but the image of an *overflowing goblet* (see Schol. Apoll. 2, 54. and the last edition of Schneider's Lexicon[1]), which I am as yet unwilling decidedly to reject, though at the same time I have no confidence in its correctness. For it appears to me that neither one who 'is himself like an overflowing cup', nor one who 'overfills his cup', can be called according to the natural formation of words ὑπερφίαλος.

7. On the other hand, no synonym offers itself so naturally, particularly to the adverb ὑπερφιάλως and its usage above detailed, as ὑπερφυῶς: see Eustath. ad Od. σ, 71. I have al-

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[1] Schneider in the earlier editions of his Lexicon rejected as forced any derivation from φιάλη: but in the last[a] he has admitted, in accordance with my opinion, all that can be said in support of this derivation, and at the same time the evidence from Pindar in favour of deducing it from ὑπερφυής.

[a] [In his third and last edition Schneider says: "Perhaps the ground of ὑπερφίαλος lies in the idea of something overflowing, overfilled, or filled beyond all measure; with which were afterwards joined the other meanings of arrogance and violence. In that case the derivation from φιάλη might be maintained. Pindar appears to have taken it for ὑπερφυής, when he calls Etna the ὑπερφίαλον δεσμόν of Typhœus, Fragm. p. 17. Heyne."—Ed.]

ready mentioned the transition from υ to ι in Schneider's Lexicon* under φιαρός, which, even if left uncertain by the examples there given, is still confirmed in the case of φύω by φίτυ, φιτρός. But strictly speaking even this is unnecessary; for the interchange of very similar forms is almost a law of language; and thus ὑπερφύαλος, if such a word existed, must have passed almost necessarily into ὑπερφίαλος, just as if it came from φιάλη[2]. But ὑπερφύαλος appears to me to find its analogy in ὁμαλός (from ὁμός, ὁμοῦ), and to be a very good expression for signifying one who goes beyond the bounds of nature, and thence one who oversteps the bounds of custom. What speaks particularly in favour of this view is, that Pindar, to whom we cannot attribute any usage not grounded in the old language, calls Etna in the 93rd Fragment (in Böckh) the δεσμὸν ὑπερφίαλον of Typhœus, where it can only mean *enormous,* exceeding the usual appearances of nature. It is evident that, while the word in the course of usage as an adjective took more or less a moral relation, still the usage of the adverb, being the only one which remained current, presupposes ὑπερφυές to be the true ground-idea; and this particularly speaks for itself in the passage of Homer which I have hitherto deferred quoting, Od. δ, 663., where the suitors speaking of Telemachus's unobserved departure, and at π, 346. of his return, as of something which must have been brought about by *supernatural* assistance, express their astonishment in these words:

> ......ἦ μέγα ἔργον ὑπερφιάλως ἐτελέσθη (τετέλεσται)
> Τηλεμάχῳ ὁδὸς ἥδε.

For it is impossible that they could, even in their enmity to him, impute this to overbearing insolence or arrogance; but the adverb is here the same as in all the other passages, only that in this instance it is most conformable to its proper meaning. Besides, Pindar's usage of the adjective agrees exactly with that of Homer, in as much as he has ὑπερφίαλος as an epithet of the Centaur and of the Molionides, as well as of the usurper Pelias; in which it is difficult to decide whether in the first case the poet looked to stature of body more than to some quality of mind. On the other hand it is clear that bodily power only is intended in Theocritus 22, 97., where it is said of Polydeuces engaging with Amycus in a pugilistic combat, ἔσχεθε δ' ὁρμῆς Παῖδα Ποσειδάωνος ὑπερφίαλόν περ ἐόντα: whence it is plain that even in the traditionary usage of later times the word was not confined to moral relations only.

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* [In Schneider's Lexicon the only thing bearing the least on this point is, that Schneider derives φιαρός from φῶς, as μνιαρός from μνοῦς, and adds at the end of a rather long article, and after a number of quotations, that Buttmann supposes two ground-meanings, one from φῶς and another from φύω, like θίασος from θύω.—Ed.]

[2] In Schol. Od. β, 320. the reading is ὑπερφυάλοισι,—a circumstance of little importance, but as it perhaps supposes the other derivation to be an acknowledged one.

8. By way of comparison we will now take the epithets ὑπερηνορέων and ὑπέροπλος. As ἠνορέη in Homer answers exactly to the common word ἀνδρία, and that epithet is given only to men and youths, we are justified in taking the idea of strength and spirit as the ground of its meaning[3]. Now as the word ὑπέρ does not necessarily imply anything reproachful, ὑπερηνορέων as well as ὑπερφίαλος may be considered an epithet not expressive in a moral sense either of good or ill. Like ὑπερφίαλος it would acquire therefore a meaning of reproach only from the context and the tone in which it was spoken; as when used of the suitors at Od. ρ, 581. Ὕβριν ἀλυσκάζων ἀνδρῶν ὑπερηνορεόντων, or at ψ, 31. Ὄφρ' ἀνδρῶν τίσαιτο βίην ὑπερηνορεόντων, and more particularly when at β, 266. and δ, 766. the word κακῶς is added to the participle for this express purpose. This uncertainty is also particularly striking at Il. ν, 258. where Meriones applies the word to Deiphobus, of whom we know nothing whatever in the sense of reproach from any other quarter. However he is a Trojan and a son of Priam; otherwise this epithet is given to the Trojans only in general, as at Il. δ, 176. (in the mouth too of Agamemnon), to the Cyclops at Od. ζ, 5. by the poet, and to the tyrant Pelias, who is called ὑπερήνωρ, in Hesiod θ, 995. Besides, the

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[3] That is to say, we might set out from ἀνήρ in its old general meaning of *man*, and understand the epithet to mean one who sets himself above every human relation; but the idea of manliness and spirit is evidently the predominating one in all the compounds of -ήνωρ.

idea of *high-spiritedness** is an almost literal translation of the word compounded of ὑπέρ and ἠνορέη; and the Grecian hero might very well call every bold attack of a Trojan warrior (consequently of Deiphobus in the passage in question) by the term *high-spirited* or *daring*. And lastly, the verbal form ὑπερηνορέων, which expresses the *actual exercise* of the quality meant, appears to me as an epithet to suit only the reproachful sense of daring; and supposing ὑπερήνωρ to mean one who is over-daring, that participle could hardly be used as a regular fixed epithet in this sense, as meaning therefore 'one continually exercising an over-daring spirit'.

9. Ὑπέροπλος is used in Homer and Hesiod in a decidedly bad sense. In the former it occurs but twice, and in both instances refers to speaking, viz. at Il. ο, 185. and ρ, 170. ὑπέροπλον εἰπεῖν, to speak arrogantly or presumptuously; with which may be reckoned the ὑπεροπλίαι, *arrogancies*, of Agamemnon in the commencement of his quarrel with Achilles (Il. α, 205.), and the verb as used of the king's farm at Ithaca (Od. ρ, 268.) in these words,

> ..... οὐκ ἄν τίς μιν ἀνὴρ ὑπεροπλίσσαιτο,

which Aristarchus (see Apollon. in v.) foolishly explained by *to take by force of arms*, whereas the meaning clearly is *to treat with arrogant contempt*. But in the Theogonia 516. 619. 670. there occur only ἠνορέη ὑπέροπλος and βίη ὑπέροπλος, of the Titans, the hundred-handed giants, and the giant Menœtius, consequently of all ὑπερηνορεόντων; and ὑπέροπλον is therefore everything *which goes too far* in word or action; so that one is surprised to see Pindar, who at Pyth. 6, 47. (ἥβαν ὑπέροπλον) uses the word exactly in this sense, giving the same epithet at Pyth. 9, 24. to the Lapithæ, who have nowhere deserved one taken from the sense of over-daring. There appears therefore to have been a precedent in the older language for using ὑπέροπλος, in addition to the above meaning, of everything which surpasses in strength the ordinary standard,—an idea which is also implied in ὑπέροπλος ἄτα, with which in Ol. 1, 90. Pindar expresses the excessive suffering of Tantalus in the world below[4].

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* [The German word *übermüthig* (compounded of *über* 'over', and *müthig* 'spirited') is a literal translation of the Greek epithet; but, unlike the Greek, it is used I believe always in a bad sense. Perhaps our word *daring*, which may be understood either as an epithet of praise or of reproach, according to the context, will come nearest to the Greek epithet.—Ed.]

103. Φάλος, φάλαρα, τετραφάληρος.

1. Among the parts of the helmet we frequently find in Homer ὁ φάλος[1], of which we have no satisfactory explanation. For although the most common opinion, according to which it is the *conus,* the projecting knob or highest part of the helmet, is not contradicted by anything in the passages where the word

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[4] On the derivation of such a word it is much easier to make negative than positive assertions. The old superficial one, from ὅπλα *arms,* shows the great danger of attempting to make words, which consist of the same letters, coincide in sense also. This is the fault too of that derivation mentioned by Schneider, according to which the idea of youthful strength is deduced from ὁπλότερος, in order to explain ὑπέροπλος to be the same as ὑπερήνωρ. How improbable is it that this should be the ground-idea of ὁπλότερος, when we read in Homer such expressions as ὁπλότερος γενεῇ, and (Od. φ, 370.) καὶ ὁπλότερός περ ἐὼν...., βίηφι δὲ φέρτερός εἰμι, and Χαρίτων μίαν ὁπλοτεράων, and (Od. ο, 363.) τὴν ὁπλοτάτην τέκε παῖδα, &c. As yet I can offer nothing better than the conjecture which I formerly proposed[a], that ὁπλότερος (see Schneid. Lex. in v.) comes from ἕπομαι, with which may perhaps be compared ὄπιθεν also. On the contrary, it appears to me more certain, that ὅπλον, *a tool* or *instrument,* comes from ἕπω, the proper word for work or labour of every kind. In either way ὑπέροπλος may be brought to an affinity with ἕπω and ἕπομαι; for which there appears possibility enough, though there is not the evidence requisite to establish it. And whoever should wish to add ὁπλή to the same family, must not omit the German *Huf* (a hoof),—an easy stipulation for those who etymologize in the usual way.

[1] Possibly τὸ φάλον, for the passages where it occurs do not decide which; and in the Etym. M. there is an article entitled φαλά plur. of which the contents are similar to φαλός; nor are the grammarians agreed respecting the accentuation.

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[a] [Passow in his Lexicon rejects all the above derivations as far-fetched or too refined, and gives as his opinion that ὑπέροπλος is formed from ὅπλον as ὑπέρβιος is from βία.—Ed.]

occurs, still there is nowhere sufficient evidence to prove that it is so; for Heyne's account of it at Il. γ, 371. and ε, 743. is puzzling, and contains much that is erroneous; while the explanations of the old grammarians, whom Schneider still follows, can neither be reconciled with Heyne, nor are they themselves satisfactory. Without pretending to give an accurate account of the word, or one which shall be certain in all its details, I content myself with making what progress I can in the way of explanation, leaving it to be completed by some one more intimately acquainted than I am with ancient art.

2. The passages are the following. At Il. γ, 362. Menelaus draws his sword against Paris, and

Πλῆξεν ἀνασχόμενος κόρυθος φάλον. . . . . . .

which therefore shows that the φάλος was at the top and front of the helmet. The sword breaks against it; and the same thing happens again at π, 338. in another combat.—At Il. δ, 459. and ζ, 9. is the following description:

Τόν ῥ' ἔβαλε πρῶτος κόρυθος φάλον ἱπποδασείης,
Ἐν δὲ μετώπῳ πῆξε· πέρησε δ' ἄρ' ὀστέον εἴσω
Αἰχμὴ χαλκείη, τὸν δὲ σκότος ὄσσε κάλυψεν.

Here then the φάλος is so completely in the fore part of the helmet, that the lance, which is thrust straight forward and strikes against it, goes into the forehead.—At Il. ν, 614. Pisander engages Menelaus with the axe, and

. . . . . . κόρυθος φάλον ἤλασεν ἱπποδασείης
Ἄκρον ὑπὸ λόφον αὐτὸν,

but does not wound him.—At Il. ν, 132. and π, 216. a closely pressed throng of combatants is described in these words:

Ἀσπὶς ἄρ' ἀσπίδ' ἔρειδε, κόρυς κόρυν, ἀνέρα δ' ἀνήρ.
Ψαῦον δ' ἱππόκομοι κόρυθες λαμπροῖσι φάλοισι
Νευόντων· ὣς πυκνοὶ ἐφέστασαν ἀλλήλοισιν.

As in the first of these verses is depicted the closeness of their array as they stood *side by side,* so it is evident from νευόντων that by the second verse is expressed how near they stood *behind each other,* in as much as when one stooped his head forward he touched with his φάλος the helmet of the one before him. To these passages we may add the compound ἀμφίφαλος at ε, 743. where Minerva's helmet, and λ, 41. where Agamemnon's, are thus described :

> Κρατὶ δ' ἔπ' ἀμφίφαλον κυνέην θέτο τετραφάληρον.

We must defer the consideration of the *last* word for the present; but ἀμφίφαλος combined with the above passages produces the following result.

3. The φάλος was a hard substance rising from the top of the helmet, against which swords were broken, and which even a battle-axe did not penetrate; but on the forehead we see that it could not resist the force of the hurled spear. This elevated substance reached from the crest to the forehead; whence it follows most naturally that when the helmet is called ἀμφίφαλος, the φάλος stretched from the crest backward as well as forward. For we find no trace whatever of anything going *round* in the other passages, which when speaking of one helmet invariably mention the φάλος in the singular number. The φάλοι of the different helmets projected somewhat forward, so that by their means the helmets of the throng of combatants described above (particularly if we suppose the majority of them to have been ἀμφίφαλοι) touched each other whenever the wearers bent forward.—The last passage for our consideration is κ, 258. where the φάλος is mentioned as wanting, and Thrasymedes gives Diomedes, who is going out as a nocturnal spy, a κυνέην

> Ταυρείην, ἄφαλόν τε καὶ ἄλοφον, ἥτε καταῖτυξ
> Κέκληται.

It is clear that we have here described a helmet, distinguished by nothing externally, but calculated to make the spy as little remarkable as possible. As for the rest, we may gather from this and the above-mentioned passage of ν, 614. the exact connexion of the φάλος with the plume of the helmet; and we may observe likewise, that in the majority of the other passages, when the φάλος is mentioned, the helmet is particularized as being plumed. This therefore completes the certainty of that view of the subject which regarded the φάλος as actually the same with, or occupying the same place as, what was afterward called κῶνος. It was a curved elevation on the top of the helmet, in which was inserted the plume, and which at the same time by its hardness and firmness furnished an additional defence against the blow of an enemy.

4. Before we compare the explanations of the grammarians with these results, we must mention two or three words which, both on account of the similarity of their radical syllable, and their connexion with the helmet, are always introduced in this investigation. The first is the word *φάλαρα*, which occurs in Homer only once, at *π*, 106. where it is said of Ajax when very much pressed by the enemy,

> ....*δεινὴν δὲ περὶ κροτάφοισι φαεινὴ*
> *Πήληξ βαλλομένη καναχὴν ἔχε· βάλλετο δ' αἰεὶ*
> *Καπφάλαρ' εὐποίητα.*

In this passage there is a various reading Κ*αὶ φάλαρ'*, according to which *βάλλετο δ' αἰεί* must be considered as in a parenthesis, and the rest of the sentence be connected thus: *Πήληξ βαλλομένη καὶ φάλαρα καναχὴν ἔχε*. But this reading of Aristarchus is justly rejected, as the repetition *βάλλετο δ' αἰεί* is not justified by the mere *αἰεί*, which in fact is already implied in the present *βαλλομένη*. The meaning of *φάλαρα* however is not clear from this passage, which unfortunately, as we said above, is the only one; for beside this instance *φάλαρα* is well known in all writers as the proper term for horse-trappings. The word therefore in Homer is brought into connexion with another form, *φάληρος*, which is supposed indeed to be the same word, but has not been preserved in that older language in so simple a state: it is found only in the epithet of the helmet *τετραφαλήρος* at *ε*, 743. *λ*, 41. where its meaning is not clear; and also in the verbal form *φαληριόωντα*, which occurs at Il. *ν*, 799. as an epithet of the waves, and where the image of a helmet-plume may certainly represent very easily the foam-crowned wave*, still however without the explanation of the words before us being thereby advanced.

5. Let us now turn to the old grammarians, from whose explanations I will select what may be necessary to enable

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* [The very same metaphor occurs in stanza 26. of the last canto of Scott's Marmion:

> "And plumed crests of chieftains brave
> "Floating like foam upon the wave."—Ed.]

us to form a judgement on them and on the point in question. The passage which appears to contain the most information is in Schol. A. ad κ, 258. *φάλος ὀμφαλός ἐστι μικρὸς ἀσπίδι μικρᾷ παραπλήσιος. κεῖται δὲ κατὰ τὸ μέτωπον, ὑπερέχων τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀποσκιάζων τὴν αὐγὴν τοῦ ἡλίου, οἷαι τῶν Κορυβάντων αἱ κόρυθες καὶ τῶν Παλλαδίων*: and then from δ, 459. and ν, 132. it is shown that the *φάλος* is on the forehead; a proof to us, that these grammarians, like ourselves, first tried to find out what the *φάλος* was from the passages themselves. Now independently of the value which this scholium may have as giving us information respecting the helmets of those old priests, it is only a ridiculous union of two accounts which cannot be united. For instance, one old superficial explanation of the *φάλος* was, that it is a boss for ornament: Schol. A. ad γ, 362. *λαμπροί τινες ἧλοι ἕνεκα προκοσμήματος.* ad κ, 258. *τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν περικεφαλαιῶν λαμπρὰ ἀσπιδίσκια.* Schol. ad ε, 182. *φάλοι δέ εισι οἱ κατὰ τὸ μέτωπον τῆς περικεφαλαίας ἧλοι ἢ ἀστερίσκοι.* We see how irreconcileable this explanation (which is everywhere the prevailing one among the grammarians, and according to which there would have been several *φάλοι* on the forehead,) is with those passages which speak so plainly of the *κόρυθος φάλος* as of one single thing, or as one of the principal parts of the helmet, which might certainly be doubled, but of which there could not possibly be a number all round the head. Another account, drawn from δ, 459. ν. 132., represented the *φάλος* as a kind of shade sheltering the forehead from the rays of the sun; and all this is now so absurdly mixed up together in the larger scholium quoted above, that first the *φάλος* is plainly described as an *ὀμφαλὸς μικρός*, i. e. a small round ornament or boss, and then it is added that it projects over the eyes for a shade. But there appears quite accidentally a third account, as irreconcileable with the other two as they are with each other; it occurs in Schol. Victor. ad κ, 258. (*ἄφαλόν τε καὶ ἄλοφον*): *ἄλοφον, πρὸς τὸ λανθάνειν, ἄφαλον δὲ ἀναγκαίως, ἐκ γὰρ τῶν φάλων εἰώθασιν ἐκδεῖσθαι οἱ λόφοι.* On this I would observe, that the excellent Victorian scholiast is the only one which gives the above explanation; the others content themselves with saying that the helmet was *ἄφαλος*, because the gleaming of the *φάλοι* must be prejudicial to a nocturnal expedition.

Still the account of the plume being stuck in the *φάλοι* (*ὧν καὶ ὁ λόφος ἔχεται*) is found also in the other scholia, but at *ν*, 132. where it is joined with the information that the *φάλος* was on the forehead: for instance, in Schol. A., (from which we extracted above the explanation of the *φάλος* by a shade for the forehead and by bosses,) it is said on this last passage that the *φάλοι* are *συρίγγια ἐπὶ τῶν μετώπων εἰς ἃ καθίενται οἱ λόφοι*, because the expression *ψαύειν λαμπροῖσι φάλοισι* was explained, quite contrary to the meaning of *λαμπροῖσι*, by touching with the plume.

6. The confusion in the scholia is still further increased by the *φάλαρα* in Schol. A. ad *π*, 106. being likewise explained as *τὰ κατὰ τὸ μέσον, τῆς περικεφαλαίας μικρὰ ἀσπιδίσκια, ἅτινα κόσμου χάριν ἐντίθενται.* On the other hand, at *ε*, 743. (*ἀμφίφαλον....τετραφάληρον*), and again in Schol. A., a distinction is carefully preserved between *φάλοι* and *φάλαρα*, the former being explained in the usual way as *ἀσπιδίσκοι* on the forehead, but the latter thus; *φάλαρα δὲ, οἱ ἐν ταῖς παραγναθίσι κρίκοι, δι᾽ ὧν αἱ παραγναθίδες καταλαμβάνονται τῆς περικεφαλαίας*: with which corresponds pretty nearly Schol. B. ad *π*, 106. *φάλαρα δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὰς παρειὰς ἐπιπίπτοντα μέρη, διὰ τὸ φανὰ εἶναι καὶ λαμπρά. ὡς δὲ ὁ Θρᾷξ* (Dionysius) *ἑκατέρωθεν αὐτῆς* (*τῆς πήληκος*) *κόσμος.* And lastly, the word *τετραφάληρον* is again brought into connexion with the *φάλοι* or *φάλαρα*, and, contrary to all sense, explained by Eustathius on the passage in *ε* to have been joined by the poet to *ἀμφίφαλον* as a word of closer and more definite meaning.

7. As far as *φάλος* is concerned in these explanations of the grammarians, I think that the meaning of the bosses will no longer mislead any one. That of the shade for the forehead must also be rejected, from its taking only one side of the question. But the account of the *λόφος* being stuck into the *φάλος* appears, amidst the contradictions of the scholia, to be derived from a better source; and it is perhaps attributable to that mutilated medley that the *φάλος* is nowhere explained at once by *κῶνος*. Nor indeed has any one of the old lexicographers this explanation, which made me curious to know whence it came to be the current one. I have found however nothing but that all the lexicons before Schneider have the article ‘Φάλος, *conus galeæ*’, which they have copied from each other

as far back as the oldest Greek and Latin lexicon of the fifteenth century, in which therefore it must have been derived by tradition from the Greek grammarians[2].

8. For the same reason the explanation of the φάλαρα being that part of the helmet which protects the cheeks, deserves (when compared with the uncritical confusion of the φάλαρα with the φάλος) our entire belief; for at least it cannot be taken from the passage in Homer. It is true, that the word is explained in the glossaries of Hesychius, of Suidas, and elsewhere as a horse ornament, bearing pretty much the same relation to the jaws of the horse as it does in the other account to the cheeks of the man; but this is rather a confirmation than otherwise. For hence we see, that the ornamented straps which hung down from the head of the horse were a principal part of the φάλαρα; and in the same way the side coverings of the helmet consisted of several straps covered with metal scales or plates, and fastened under the chin. It was very natural therefore that this part should have the same name both for men and horses; but when applied to the latter, the name was extended to the similar collective strapping over the whole body. It is very conceivable too that in fighting hand to hand most of the blows aimed sideways at the head would strike this part of the helmet; and thus the passage of π, 106. is fully explained.

9. But when the grammarians again connect the forms φάληρος and τετραφάληρος with this φάλαρα, it is to be hoped that no one will consider as a confirmation of that connexion the Lat. *phaleræ*, which has a short *e*, and has been transformed in the mouth of the Latins from the Greek word; whence I can only approve of writing it *faleræ*[3]. Notwithstanding this, how-

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[2] In the so-called Glossary of Cyril is the unintelligible gloss 'Φάλος habus'.

[3] Schneider, in his Latin Grammar, 1. p. 201. explains the writing with the *ph*, not indeed as the more correct, but as the more sure way; an opinion, which I cannot allow to hold good, except in cases where a Greek word is in other respects unchanged, but still appears on inscriptions and in manuscripts written with the *f*, as in the case of *phaselus*, *sipho*. But *phaleræ* is no longer a Greek word, any more than *phaseolus*: and since the Latin tongue changed the word into a different shape, it would also change the Greek φ into the Latin *f*; and thus, as both ways of writing the words do really occur, that of *faleræ* and *faseolus* ought to have the preference.

ever, the metre and the Ionicism would be good grounds for the change of *φάλᾰρα* to *τετραφάληρος*, if it were correct in other points. But the meaning of the *κυνέη τετραφάληρος* of the goddess can hardly be connected satisfactorily with those *φάλαρα*. Let us take then to our aid what little the Epic language still offers us. The *κῦμα φαληριόων* brings before our eyes very naturally, as was said above, the comparison with the helmet and its white plume. Without therefore suffering myself to be led astray by another word, which does not exactly correspond in sense and sound, I will take it for granted, from a comparison of the two Homeric words *φαληριόων* and *τετραφάληρος* (and I feel confident of the truth of my supposition), that *φάληρος* was either one of the names for the plume of the helmet, or an epithet of it. And thus I find it also very probable that this appellation passed on to the fastening of such a plume in the *φάλος*. In this way the epithets *ἀμφίφαλος* and *τετραφάληρος* suit each other admirably. The *φάλος* of a royal helmet extended both forward and backward, and had four holes or hollows for so many plumes. Whether Apollonius, who at 3, 1228. calls an ornamented helmet *τετραφάληρον*, and at 2, 920. *τετράφαλον*, imagined or could imagine a fourfold crest for four plumes, or whether in this instance as in others a defective comprehension of the old Epic representations determined the imagery of his expressions, I will not attempt to decide.

10. If with these Homeric words we compare some which are later, we must still attend to the quantity of the vowel between the λ and ρ. According to that, many words and passages belong to *φάληρος*, which, together with the Homeric *φαληριόων*, are usually explained by the idea of *white*, this being considered the proper meaning of the word *φάληρος*; but the last point I do not so easily credit on the weak etymological combinations of the grammarians (see Schneider's Lex. v. *φαλαρός**). In Nicander Ther. 461. we find *ὄρη χιόνεσσι*

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* [The article referred to runs thus: " *Φαλαρός, ρά, ρόν, bright, clear, shining, white*: Ion. *φάληρος*, whence *φαληριάω* for *φαλαρίαω, to be white, to shine*; thence also *to foam*. Hesychius has *εὐφάλαρα, λαμπρὰ*, and *φαλαρὸν, λευκὸν*; again *φαλαρὸς, φάλιος, φαλακρὸς, λευκομέτωπος, λευκὸς καὶ φαλέον*. According to this, all the words quoted here have the same origin as *φανὸς* from *φάω, φάος, φῶς*; therefore *φάλιος* means

φάληρα, where the *white* colour certainly shows itself, but it does not therefore follow that the word *φάληρα,* any more than *κύματα φαληριόωντα* (which Nicander certainly had in his mind), must come from the idea of *whiteness.* In Theocritus 8, 27. occurs *κύων ὁ φάλᾱρος,* which is understood to mean a white dog: but at 5, 104. a ram is called *ὁ Φάλᾱρος,* which can hardly be so named from any peculiarity of this colour. I suppose therefore that both those animals were black, with a white star or spot on the head; and hence Schneider, with evident correctness, compares with them the bird which in Aristoph. Av. 565. is called *φαληρίς,* and at Acharn. 875. in the mouth of the Bœotians *φαλᾱρίς,* consequently pronounced by the Latins (see Gesner, &c.) *phalāris* and *phalēris.* This bird, which is called by the scholiast on the first-mentioned passage of Aristophanes *ὄρνεον λιμναῖον εὐπρεπές,* is, as Schneider remarks, the *fulica atra,* of which we know from natural history that it has a white spot or star on its head, whence in some parts of Germany it is called the *star-fowl**. It is true, that the mark of a star on the head is not like a plume; on the contrary, in this bird it is a flat unfeathered protuberance, consequently to be compared in some respects with the *φάλος* only: still, however, in the white protuberance contrasted with the black head, as well as in those foam-

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shining, white, ταῦρος, Callim. Fragm. 176. from *φάλος, shining* : *φάλος, ὁ, a shining body,* like a button on the helmet. *φαλιόπους, λευκόπους,* in Hesych. who has also from *φαλὺς* the word *φαλύνω, λαμπρύνω.* Of a similar kind is *φάλαι, ὅρα, σκόπει,* from *φαλάω,* whence comes *παμφαλάω.* From *φάλιος, φαλίω,* he has also *φαλίσσεται, λευκαίνεται, ἀφρίζει.* That *φαλαρὸς* and *φαληρὸς* mean white and shining, is proved, among other passages, by Nicand. Ther. 461., by the bird *φαλαρὶς, φαληρὶς,* and the verb *φαληριάω* used by Homer of the foaming wave. *κύων ὁ φάλαρος,* for *φάληρος, the white dog,* or *dog with a white face,* Theocr. like *φάλιος ἵππος,* Procop. b. goth. 1. c. 18. As, for instance, from *φαλὸς, shining,* comes the subst. *ὁ φάλος,* so from *φαλαρὸς* comes *φάλαρον, τὸ, the shining or white ornament,* Æschyl. Pers. 661. Homer also uses *φάλαρα* evidently for *φάλοι, οἱ,* Il. π, 106.; hence *τρίφαλος, ἀμφίφαλος, τετράφαλος,* are synonymous with *τριφάληρος, ἀμφ.* &c."

Passow in his Lexicon adopts Buttmann's distinction between *φάλος* and *φάλαρα.*—Ed.]

* [That is to say *Bless-huhn,* from the *Blesse* or star on its head.—Ed.]

crowned waves and snow-capped mountains, there is a similitude to the *crista* on the helmet, which is generally white. And lastly comes the plant φαλαρίς in Dioscorides and Pliny; in the latter (27, 12.) with the various reading *phaleris*. There is indeed here no metre to decide the quantity of the middle syllable; but as Pliny describes the plant thus, "thyrsum habet longum, in summo flore inclinatum," it puts one in mind of the plume of a helmet.

11. It is different with the word φάλαρον, used of the Persian tiara by Æschylus, Pers. 661. The shade of Darius is there implored to appear at his tomb; βασιλείου τιάρας φάλαρον πιφαύσκων βάσκε πάτερ ἄκακε Δαρειὰν, οἶ. Here the middle syllable of φάλαρον is, as the corresponding strophe shows, *short*, and the word is therefore the singular of τὰ φάλαρα; but its meaning could only be determined with certainty by one well acquainted with the whole shape of the tiara of the old Persian kings. I would first remark, that the expression φάλαρον τιάρας, quite as much as the passage in Homer, forbids our thinking with some interpreters of those small bosses which also adorned the tiara in numbers; whereas this, exactly like the φάλος κόρυθος in Homer, is evidently a principal and striking part of the tiara. But that Æschylus really used φάλαρον as something answering to the Homeric φάλος, as perhaps the upright point of the Persian king's tiara, I cannot believe. The tiara had much that hung down; it had for instance παραγναθίδας, and strings hanging at the ears[4]. It is evident that all this on the royal tiara would form a

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[4] The *fila* or *strings* on the tiara of the private man are shown in a passage of Amm. Marcell. 30, 8. where it is related that Artaxerxes, too merciful to inflict the severe corporal punishments enacted by law, instead of cutting off the ears of certain criminals, "ex galeris fila pendentia præcidit." The *covering of the cheeks* is seen on coins in the tiara of the Parthian kings, and is expressly named in a passage of Strabo 15. p. 734. where mention is made of a ceremony of the Magi, at which they attended τιάρας περικείμενοι πιλωτὰς, καθεικνίας ἑκατέρωθεν, μέχρι τοῦ καλύπτειν τὰ χείλη, τὰς παραγναθίδας, according to the reading as now restored from the manuscripts and for the first time made intelligible: see Coray. We observe from the article τάς that all tiaras had these coverings for the cheeks, which only on the occasion of this ceremony covered the mouth.

splendid decoration, uniting in one ornament of precious stones on the forehead, which would thence be represented as a whole; consequently the poet might very aptly use the word *φάλαρον* in the singular as meaning one single thing, even to the ennobling of an expression generally applied to horse-trappings, and perhaps not without an intentional allusion to that application: although the particular gloss of Hesychius *Εὐφάλαρα, λαμπρά*, indicates a generalization of the word[5].

12. In briefly touching on the word *τρυφάλεια*, the most common explanation from *τρι-* and *φάλος* appears to me totally inadmissible; not on account of the change from *ι* to *υ*, but because *τρυφάλεια* is never the epithet of the helmet of any distinguished personage: it is rather, as every one will recollect, one of the usual names of a common helmet.* We have only to refer to Il. *μ*. 22. *ὅθι πολλὰ βοάγρια καὶ τρυφάλειαι Κάππεσον ἐν κονίῃσι.* Hence, according to all that has been said above, the derivation from *τρύω* recommends itself to me as the most probable: a helmet with a hole bored in the *φάλος* to receive the plume is naturally opposed to the above-described *καταῖτυξ*.

104. Φή.

1. Twice in the Iliad the old critics quote a reading of Zenodotus, in which the word *φή* or *φῆ* is used in the sense of *ὥς*. The first is *β*, 144. where the text now has

> Κινήθη δ' ἀγορὴ ὡς κύματα μακρὰ θαλάσσης,

and where therefore there is no necessity for adopting the unusual word: the other is *ξ*, 499. where, after it has been related how Peneleus struck off the head of Ilioneus, in whose eye was still sticking the strong spear with which the former had struck him, the narrative goes on to say,

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[5] The referring all the above words, together with *φαλακρός* and the more unusual gloss *φάλιος* (see Callim. Fr. 176.), to the stem or root *φάλος*, *shining*, from *φάω*, is in the highest degree probable; though I am not fond of setting out with such general etymologies. As I have nothing to add to the evidence already produced in its favour, I shall content myself with this mention of it.

* [Buttmann seems to forget that it is the epithet of the noble helmet of Achilles made by Vulcan (Il. *σ*, 458. *τ*, 380.), of Sarpedon (Il. *ψ*, 799.) and of Minerva in Hesiod. (Scut. Herc. 199.).—Ed.]

> . . . . ὁ δὲ φῆ, κώδειαν ἀνασχὼν,
> Πέφραδέ τε Τρώεσσι, καὶ εὐχόμενος ἔπος ηὔδα.

In order to construe and understand these words, interpreters, both ancient and modern, have recourse to the very harshest methods: ἔφη is to be kept at the beginning of the sentence, and then, after bringing in πέφραδε, is to be repeated by ηὔδα; while κώδειαν is to stand for ὡς κώδειαν, a form of expression harsh in itself, and not occurring in any part of Homer; or, as the moderns have explained the passage, κώδεια is to mean the *detruncated head* itself, according to a usage evidently first invented by the refinement of later poets, (led to it perhaps by this very passage,—see Heyne,) and by which the whole of the beautiful image, the truth and necessity of which were seen by all the old interpreters, is destroyed. Aristarchus therefore, in order to remove at least one harshness, struck out the whole verse Πέφραδε, &c. Now how, it may be asked, was it possible in this instance coolly to throw aside the reading of Zenodotus (if indeed it is to be called a reading, and not rather an explanation of the text as it really stood,) ὁ δὲ, φῆ κώδειαν ἀνασχὼν, Πέφραδε, &c.? Yet the old grammarians, with Aristarchus at their head, ventured to do so, with only this remark, that Homer never used φῆ thus. The moderns mostly agree with them, that is to say in part, (as Heyne does in the former of the two passages,) in as much as they cannot sufficiently express their horror at so barbarous a word.

2. That Zenodotus, in order to help himself out of a difficult passage, invented a word totally unknown, I should hope will no longer be believed: there remains therefore only the opinion that he inconsiderately introduced into Homer the usage of some later Epic, as Antimachus or Callimachus, to which the old poet was a stranger. But the only scholium on the second passage says of Antimachus in plain language, that he may possibly have misunderstood the passage of Homer, and so have brought forward and introduced this φῆ into his own poems,—an inconceivable suspicion this against a poet of Plato's time! Surely Homer's language was not then so obso-

lete, that, at a period when the Greek tongue was in its zenith of life and vigour, a poet could, from misunderstanding one single passage, have borrowed from him an unheard-of word, and immediately have taken it into use. Φή therefore was in the time of Antimachus a word of rare occurrence, it is true, but an undoubted one, and acknowledged to come from the old Epic: and Hermann has with the greatest probability restored it (without any further critical traces to guide him than the thing itself, and the intimations given above,) in one of the remains of that poetry, Hymn. Merc. 241., where it is said of the infant Mercury, that at the approach of Apollo he retired quickly to his swaddling-clothes, and wrapped himself up in them,

> *Δή ῥα νεόλλουτος, προκαλεύμενος ἥδυμον ὕπνον,*
> *Ἐγρήσσων ἐτεόν γε.*

It is true that the text might remain as it is here, for Mercury was really a new-born child; but the δή stands in a part of the construction and of the verse where it is contrary to all we know and feel of Greek. As soon however as with Hermann we write Φή, 'just as a new-born child', all is correct and beautiful. If Antimachus had in his mind some older passage, it was either this or a similar one: for the astonishingly mutilated words of that poet which the scholiast quotes on Il. ξ, 500., φὴ γέρων οἶσιν, can hardly have stood anywhere but at the beginning of a verse, as thus,

> *Φή ῥα γέρων οἶσιν . . . .*

3. According to this, there is no doubt that, as long as the syllable φή stands in the second Homeric passage, it must be construed and explained as Zenodotus has done. For in answer to the observation that Homer nowhere else uses φή thus, I think it would be sufficient to say, that such an unintelligible piece of patchwork as the sentence is according to the common reading does not occur again in all Homer. And do we not make Homer use, in every instance but one, χρή, and in that one δεῖ? in every instance but one ἦρχε, and in that one ἄρχε? In our days that objection can no longer, generally speaking, have any force. For as it is proved from Antimachus alone that the construction with φή existed in the old Epic language, is it to be wondered at (even if Homer himself did not use it) that

it should be introduced once or twice into Homer's poem by rhapsodists, who went on reciting through the whole cycle?

4. This must be therefore in our text the established form for the passage at Il. ξ, 499., because it stands there correct to the very letter, because it is not only Greek but old Greek, and because in explaining it away we make Homer talk unintelligibly. But how is it in the first passage? It is true that there is no absolute need of it there: but that very circumstance shows that we do Zenodotus an injustice if we accuse him of acting from mere capricious fancy. Zenodotus could never have thought of writing φή there, if it had not been a reading of his time; and as such it must at all events be treated with proper respect.

5. But I would call attention to one other circumstance. Throughout the whole of Homer the simple ὡς, when placed before the noun in the sense of *as*, never stands otherwise than at the beginning of an entire sentence with a verb or participle expressed; except in such cases, evidently elliptic, as Od. ξ, 441. Αἴθ' οὕτως, Εὔμαιε, φίλος Διὶ πατρὶ γένοιο, Ὡς ἐμοί. In strict comparisons, on the other hand, where before the nominative or accusative it answers to the Latin *instar* with the genitive, we never find ὡς in any part of Homer as in that *single* passage ὡς κύματα μακρὰ θάλασσης.* Everywhere we have either the simple ὥς after the noun, as θεὸς ὥς, λύκοι ὥς, δρυόχους ὥς; or when placed before the noun, we have ὥστε, as ὥστε κρήνη μελάνυδρος, ὥστε λέοντε δύω, ὥστε γυναῖκας; or ἠΰτε, as ἠΰτε κούρη, ἠΰτε νεβρούς, &c. Nor let it be asked why this is so. In languages we can do nothing with usage but observe it. This construction of ὡς, which appears so perfectly natural, which must have offered itself so frequently, does not recur in all Homer as it does in one passage; and in that very one we find that Zenodotus (who certainly did not object to that usage of ὡς) read φή; while in the other passage φή stands in the same kind of construction. In the first passage therefore it is not only a real reading, but one deserving of great attention. We may from a respect for tradition suffer the ὡς, though occurring but once in that way, to stand in our text, as we do the δεῖ; but whoever would reject the other reading as a de-

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* [There is another passage of the same kind, Od. ο, 478. ὡς εἰναλίη κήξ.—Ed.]

cided interpolation, must endeavour to restore to the other passage, where it now stands uncontradicted, the true Homeric reading which had been ejected by the rhapsodists.

6. But whence comes this φή, which at all events is pure Greek? It is said to have sprung from ᾗ with the digamma. That however is saying nothing, as the question only recurs, whence comes the digamma? For neither of the two articles, to one of which the particle ᾗ belongs, has, throughout the language and all the dialects, any trace of the digamma. And Hermann on Hymn. Merc. 241. very justly remarks, that ῃ cannot stand in this kind of expression: that is to say, ῃ has throughout the Epic language no other meaning than that of locality, *whither, where.* Nor do I know any reason why so much regard is still paid to the authority of the grammarians as to write ᾗ θέμις ἐστί (see Heyne on Il. β, 73.), while in Od. ι, 268. Δοίης δωτίνην, ἥτε ξείνων θέμις ἐστί (see note below) is left unchanged; and the passage of Od. ω, 286. ἡ γὰρ θέμις (for so it is right), ὅστις ὑπάρξῃ, proves the correctness of the construction with the nominative case of the relative, ἣ θέμις ἐστί (as it is right). Not that the other kind of construction, where the relative is attached to something preceding, would be in itself inadmissible,—for we find it so in Il. λ, 779. Ξείνιά τ' εὖ παρέθηκεν, ἅτε ξείνοις θέμις ἐστίν[1],—but because, as we said above, ᾗ does not occur anywhere else in the sense of *as*. Notwithstanding this I consider the derivation of the particle φή from the idea of the correlatives ᾗ, πῆ, τῇ (although I would by no means pledge myself for it) as not to be rejected. The transition namely from the idea of πῆ, *qua via*, to the other, *quo modo*, is most natural, and therefore certainly of the highest antiquity. Now as in all languages the interrogatives border closest on the relatives, πῆ (*quomodo*) may have very well meant in the oldest period of the language *sicut*. But φή bears the same relation to this πῆ as φανός does to πανός, φάρσος to *pars*

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[1] I am undecided whether to understand ἅτε here, as at Il. χ, 127. in the sense of *as*, or as a neuter plural. But in the passage quoted from Od. ι, 268. it would be much harsher to refer ἥτε to δωτίνη, as we might very well say θέμις ἐστὶ δωτίνην δοῦναι, ξείνια παραθεῖναι, but hardly δωτίνη θέμις ἐστὶ ξείνων.

(see φοξός, sect. 5.), φαινόλης to *pænula*, *flagrum* to πληγή, &c.[2] This φή thus modelled, in which therefore the old relation to τῇ was no longer felt, may very well have remained in the Epic language as a rarer form in the sense of *as*, while the same word retained still more strongly the local meaning of ᾗ, τῇ.

7. While we leave this point undecided, there is yet another remaining, viz. to determine the *accent* of this particle. Eustathius on Il. ξ, 499. has φῆ, according to the etymology just given; but how the grammarians write it in the Venetian scholiasts we do not see in Villoison's edition. We there read the following: ὁ μὲν Ζηνόδοτος καὶ τὸν δε καὶ τὸν φη ἐγκλίνει, ἵνα τὸ φὴ ταὐτὸν ὑπάρχῃ τῷ ὡς. The scholiast had for instance the reading δέφη, i. e. δ' ἔφη, before his eyes. Now as we have seen in art. 82. note 21. that these grammarians used the word ἐγκλίνειν of the *gravis* also in the construction, it is clear that Zenodotus wrote ὁ δὲ φὴ, &c. With which therefore the other scholium agrees, which says that Zenodotus and those who followed him wrote the words φὴ κώδειαν ὑφ' ἕν.

105. Φολκός, φοξός.

1. The two words φολκός and φοξός, from occurring in Homer but once, and then close to each other*, from coming there under the same category of meaning, and being similar in form, have so much in common, that all this induced a predisposition, by no means to be rejected, to treat them similarly as to etymology also. And this has been done. As the earliest commentators saw in these two epithets the roots or stems ἕλκω and ὀξύς, so the later have recognised in the φ of both words a strengthened digamma. In order to decide on these points we must first examine accurately their meanings.

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[2] The question, which of two sounds thus changing is the older, is on the whole an empty one. Generally speaking, in the ancient times of language the sound of words was most fluctuating, and became fixed as language by degrees was more and more formed; but not regularly, so that separate derivations may remain from the different ways in which a word was pronounced.

* [Il. β, 217. 219.—Ed.]

2. The word φοξός is in this respect certain; for the works of the old physicians show that it continued in constant use, not merely as a poetical word, but as one of daily occurrence. See Fœsii Œcon. Hippocr. in v. From this it is certain that it meant an unusual *pointedness* of the upper part of the head, whether more toward the front or back is uncertain. And this gives great probability to the account in the Etym. M., that hence was taken the appellation of those earthen vessels which were *thrown* into the kiln and became pointed instead of being round; an idea much strengthened by the quotation in Athenæus 11, p. 480. that Simonides called the Argive cups, which tapered toward the top, φοξιχείλους[1]: for what is otherwise a defect in vessels, gives a pretty poetical epithet for a cup made intentionally in this shape.

3. Now that this appellative comes from ὀξύς with the digamma we are certainly led to conclude, from the idea of ὀξύς as it appears in the explanations of the ancients, and also in the thing itself: for by all the interpreters Thersites is called ὀξυκέφαλος, and those vessels are described in the Etymol. as ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ὠξυμμένα. But against the digamma there is one great objection, that no trace is anywhere to be found of the word ὀξύς having had it; neither in Homer, where the word occurs so often, nor in any cognate form whatever, nor in a dialect, nor in any language more distantly related[2].

4. Somewhat more favourable to a similar view of φολκός is the verb ἕλκω, which has the aspirate, and from which is derived with great probability ὦλξ, standing in Homer in the hiatus (Il. ν, 707., compare Od. σ, 375.). But what is the meaning of the word? The ancients derived it (in order to produce the idea of *squinting*) from τὰ φάη and ἕλκειν; an improbable derivation, but as far as regards form, not to be

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[1] The verse runs thus: *Αὕτη δὲ φοξίχειλος Ἀργείη κύλιξ.* See Etym. M.

[2] Nay further, as the word certainly belongs to the same stem or family of words as *acutus*, *ἀκή*, &c., all these words and forms have nowhere the digamma or a V; nay, the old reduplication in *ἀκωκή*, *ἀκαχμένος*, presupposes that from the oldest times the word began with a vowel; since, of the words which probably once had the digamma, only *αἱρέω* (compare *ἀποαιρέω*)—and that not until in the later Ionic dialect—has the reduplication *ἀραίρηκα*.

rejected; for φάολκος would be a regular compound, from which might very easily come φολκός. But as ἕλκειν can only have that meaning in this express combination of words 'one who draws or drags his eyes,' how could φολκός, if without the significancy of φ it stood merely for ὁλκός, be taken in the sense of *squinting*? For the simple idea of *to draw, pull, drag along,* would lead to anything and everything rather than to a drawing aside of the pupils of the eye, as *to draw* is a much more indefinite idea than *to turn, turn aside,* whence στραβός. At all events we must easily feel that the derivation from ἕλκω alone is by no means convincing enough to form (with the change of the digamma into φ,—a change equally unknown in Greek,) one step of evidence.

5. In support of this change some may perhaps venture to quote the unusual forms φαρόω for ἀρόω and φή for ἦ; but the latter has been shown in the preceding article to be unavailable for such a purpose; and as little trace is there of the digamma in ἀρόω. Now as φαρόω is evidently connected with φάραγξ, and with the φάρσος (*a part*) of Herodotus, it will rather belong, with the Latin *pars,* to a very different stem or family of words, and the similarity of sound with ἀρόω will be mere chance[3]. Nor can we properly adduce, as an instance

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[3] Perhaps ἀρόω, *aro* with *area,* comes from the root ἔρα, Germ. *Erde* (Angl. earth), and was originally a more general idea in the sense of γεωργεῖν; much as in German *Pflug* (a plough) comes from the still more general idea of *pflegen* (to take care of, pay attention to), *colere.* The derivation of φαρόω, *to plough,* as given above, is more fully detailed in the Etym. M. v. ἀφάρωτος; where it is first said, φάρος γὰρ ἡ ἄροσις, and then —φάρος παρὰ τὸ φάρσαι ὃ ἔστι σχίσαι· καὶ γὰρ διαφάρους φασὶ (v. 1. διαφάρσους φαμὲν) χιτῶνας τοὺς εἰς δύο μέρη κεχωρισμένους, καὶ φάρσος τὸ ἀπόσχισμα τῆς ἐσθῆτος. See also Schneider under φάρω. A bad etymology is given by Heraclides in Alleg. Hom. 66. (p. 461. Gale); ἔστι φέρσαι τὸ γεννῆσαι. καὶ τὴν γῆν ἀφάρωτον, ὁ Καλλίμαχος εἶπε τὴν ἄγονον· ἀφάρωτος οἷον γυνή. Toup in his papers on Hesychius had written all sorts of things about this Fragment of Callimachus, which were not intended for the press, though they were afterwards printed in Opp. vol. 3. p. 499. Of the word γυνή no other amendment is there mentioned than γῆ, and it is not once observed that he afterwards (ad Suid. p. 483. Lips.) made a far better correction to 'Αφάρωτος οἷον ... γυή, as the beginning of a *versus senarius,* since it is clear from the Paris manuscript of the Etymologicum that the Fragment is taken from the Iambic verses of Callimachus. In the collection of

of the change, the *φ* in the pronouns *σφέ*, *σφίν*, &c., which, as we have seen in art. 82. note 14., belong to the same root with the pronoun ἕ, acknowledged to have the digamma: for here the influence of the sharp Greek *σ* on the neighbouring labial cannot be mistaken; which is the cause of *σφ* being so common a Greek combination, particularly at the beginning of words. At the same time I cannot deny the possibility that the aspirate at the beginning of a word may have been changed into a *φ*; but the probability in the case before us is not strong enough, particularly with the uncertainty of this derivation of *φολκός*, for us to consider the thing proved, and therefore reject other explanations.

6. Now let us not be swayed by any preconceived opinion or explanation of the ancients, but let us merely take the hint which the Etym. M. gives us of earthen vessels, and we have a much more probable derivation from *φώγειν*, *to bake*; consequently the word will be very naturally a shortened form of *φωξός*. That is to say, the potter probably called everything *φοξόν* which, from being exposed to too strong a fire, was warped, and consequently instead of being round became somewhat pointed. This appellation passed thence very naturally to objects which, without the same cause, had a similar deviation from the usual shape, and in this instance to the head[4].

7. And now comes the question, whether the explanation of *φολκός* by *squinting* is so certain. It must be remembered that the word is a *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον* in the whole range of Greek literature. It is true that, as Pollux mentioned this word without any remark (lib. 2. cap. 7.), we might conclude that it must have continued to be used in prose; but in that case its entire disappearance from all the remains of the Greek language would

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the Fragments No. 421. it is given imperfectly. Besides, the absurdity of the derivation given by Heraclides is clear from another Fragment of Callimachus (183. Bentl. and Blomf.) Ἢ *ἄφαρον φαρόωσι, μέλει δέ φιν ὄμπνιον ἔργον·* which would be nonsense if *ἄφαρος* were the same as *ἄγονος*. It means *not in a state of cultivation*; nor is there any reason why *ἀφάρωτος* in the first passage should have been anything else.

[4] That excellent critic Sylburg did not dwell long enough on the point before us, otherwise he would have made the same remark which I have; as he proposed (in the Etym. M. in v.) *φωξίχειλος* as an uncertain conjecture for *φοξίχειλος*.

be scarcely credible. We should recollect that Pollux collected a store of expressions for the rhetoricians of his time, who frequently raised their style by the use of old poetical language; he quotes for instance Homeric words, certainly not for the mere object of explaining them, but says, (for example lib. 3. c. 3.) τὴν μέντοι οὐ λαβοῦσαν ἕδνα ὀνομάσαις ἂν ἀνάεδνον Ὁμηρικῶς: consequently he quotes them for his own use; and in very well known words he may have occasionally left out Ὁμηρικῶς. Yet that φολκός was not a word of known and acknowledged meaning, and that even the tradition of it was uncertain, is evident from the different explanations given of it, which is not the case with φοξός; and among them we might introduce the ridiculous explanation in Hesychius, φολκός, στραβός· οἱ δὲ λιπόδερμον. A further doubt of the meaning of *squinting* arises from the way in which the appellatives follow each other in the passage itself:

> Φολκὸς ἔην, χωλὸς δ' ἕτερον πόδα, τὼ δέ οἱ ὤμω
> Κυρτὼ ἐπὶ στῆθος συνοχωκότε, αὐτὰρ ὕπερθεν
> Φοξὸς ἔην κεφαλὴν, ψεδνὴ δ' ἐπενήνοθε λάχνη.

It is most improbable that any one, particularly a poet of nature, should begin a long description with "he squinted, and was lame in one foot," as if they were two things belonging to and connected with each other, in order to pass at last to the head, introducing it with an αὐτὰρ ὕπερθεν.

8. The ancients probably knew as little as we do what φολκός really meant, and therefore sought to arrive at it by means of etymology. The same road is still open to us. No doubt there has existed a verb from which φολκός came: it is true that we do not now find it, but there are many words of the same family, which we will place together. Φάλκης, or φάλκις, was according to Pollux on board a ship τὸ τῇ στείρᾳ προσηλούμενον. According to Hesychius φάλκη is, ὁ τῆς κόμης αὐχμός· ἢ νυκτερίς. According to Suidas, ἐμφαλκωμένοις (probably ἐμπεφαλκωμένοις, from a verb ἐμφαλκόω) means περιπεπλεγμένοις, in a passage quoted in his Lexicon, as used of the twisted cordage by which the battering-ram was suspended. This last word alone bears evident signs of a verbal root ΦΕΛΚΩ, identical with *flecto*, *plecto* and πλέκω, as *fla-*

grum is with πληγή, &c. (see the preceding article, sect. 6.). The tangled hair leads us to the same point; and so does the part of the ship above mentioned; for as στεῖρα is the fore-keel which bends upward to the prow, so τὸ τῇ στείρᾳ προσηλούμενον is indisputably the *curved* part which joins the keel and the prow. No one, I trust, will mistake the bat to be a proof of the word meaning a defect in the eyesight, at least a defect so evident as is supposed to be meant by φολκός. On the other hand, all those twisted and curved objects lead to no meaning so natural for φολκός as *bandy-legged*; and we have at once the Latin *valgus*, which expressed the same defect, and of which we may very well suppose that it came softened from the Greek form into the Latin[5]. "Bandy-legged he was, and lame in one foot" is, I think, a beginning for the description of Thersites not unworthy of Homer.

106. Χραισμεῖν, ἀρκεῖν, ἀλέξειν.

1. The general acceptation of the verb χραισμεῖν is this, that from the adjective χρήσιμος (χράσιμος) was formed by an easy modification a verb χραισμέω, with the definite meaning of *to help*, and of which therefore ἔχραισμον (Il. ε, 53. η, 144. α, 28. ἔχραισμε, χραῖσμε, conj. χραίσμῃ) would be the aor. 2. The first thing to be done in this account is to correct, as I have done in other places, whatever offends against grammatical analogy. No aorist comes at once from a derivative verb in έω by rejecting its termination; but the simple form of the aor. 2. is to be considered as a stem or root for the inflection of the verb; from which, it is true, necessity has sometimes formed a present in έω, άω, &c., and sometimes not, as in τέτμον, ἔπεφνον. The present of this verb never occurs. The infin. χραισμεῖν (Il. α, 242. 589. &c.) is therefore infin. aor. 2., out of which arose in course of usage a fut. χραισμήσω (Il. υ, 296.

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[5] *Valgus* bears the same relation to the common radical form πλέκω, as *vitricus* does to *pater*, *veru* to πείρω, *vallus* to *palus*, *virgo virginis* to παρθένος.

φ, 316.), and again a new aorist ἐχραίσμησα (Il. λ, 120. π, 837. σ, 62.).

2. After having fixed the grammatical formation, the next point of consequence is the meaning. To find this we must never begin by searching for what etymology may offer, but examine the passages where the word occurs, provided they are sufficiently numerous, which will be the surest method even for discovering the etymology. Now the examples of χραισμεῖν are frequent enough in Homer to enable us safely to assert, from a comparison of them, that it never has (at least in his writings) the more general meaning of *to be useful, to help,* but without an exception the more definite sense of *to ward off.* Damm, in his article on this word, has first given instances of the full construction, as for example in Il. η, 144. ὅθ' ἄρ' οὐ κορύνη οἱ ὄλεθρον Χραῖσμε: and by examining the other passages we find, that even where no accusative is expressed, the evil to be warded off may always be inferred from the context, as in α, 589.

> Μή σε φίλην περ ἐοῦσαν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἴδωμαι
> Θεινομένην· τότε δ' οὔτι δυνήσομαι ἀχνύμενός περ
> Χραισμεῖν· ἀργαλέος γὰρ Ὀλύμπιος ἀντιφέρεσθαι.

We cannot however admit the supposition that the original idea suggested by χραισμεῖν was only that of a hostile attack, and that the idea of warding off was afterwards introduced by adding the dative of the person or thing defended (*dativus commodi*)[1], and that for two reasons; first, because the verb has equally the idea of warding off or defending where there is no mention of an attack made, as at Il. ξ, 66.

> Νέστορ, ἐπειδὴ νηυσὶν ἐπὶ πρύμνῃσι μάχονται,
> Τεῖχος δ' οὐκ ἔχραισμε τετυγμένον οὐδέ τι τάφρος:

and secondly, because the accusative after χραισμεῖν is never the concrete object to be warded off, whether person or thing, (which could hardly fail of being sometimes the case if the word originally sprung from the idea of a hostile attack,) but only such general ideas as ὄλεθρος, θάνατος.

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[1] The verb χράω, which sometimes has this meaning, still however only with the dative of the object attacked (Od. ε, 396. θαλερὸς δέ οἱ ἔχραε δαίμων), might have led to the mistake.

3. From this last remark I am decidedly of opinion that ἰόνθ' in the well-known passage of Il. α, 566, 567.

> Μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμωσιν ὅσοι θεοί εἰσ' ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ
> Ἆσσον ἰόνθ', ὅτε κέν τοι ἀάπτους χεῖρας ἐφείω,

is not ἰόντα with μέ understood (a supposition awkward enough in itself), but ἰόντε: and this reading is fully confirmed by comparing it with Il. ο, 104.

> Νήπιοι, οἳ Ζηνὶ μενεαίνομεν ἀφρονέοντες,
> Ἢ ἔτι μιν μέμαμεν καταπαυσέμεν ἆσσον ἰόντες
> Ἢ ἔπει ἠὲ βίῃ·

in both which passages the idea is the same, of the deities pressing toward Jupiter, to induce him, by persuasion as well as force, to forbear his threatened chastisement. Such examples of the dual for the plural as ἀλόντε, Il. ε, 487. put this beyond a doubt, and show clearly that originally the dual and plural forms were in general the same, as in ὔμμε and ὑμᾶς.

4. The verb χραισμεῖν then has nearly the same meaning and construction as ἀρκεῖν, ἀρκέσαι; for this latter has also the dative of the person defended, and is used only in the sense of warding off, i. e. it is always in connexion with some evil to be warded off, as at Il. ν, 371.

> Ἰδομενεὺς δ' αὐτοῖο τιτύσκετο δουρὶ φαεινῷ,
> Καὶ βάλεν ὕψι βιβάντα τυχών· οὐδ' ἤρκεσε θώρηξ
> Χάλκεος, ὃν φορέεσκε· μέσῃ δ' ἐν γαστέρι πῆξεν.

Nor has ἀρκεῖν, any more than χραισμεῖν, in any one instance an accusative of the person or weapon which is warded off; but when an accusative follows, it is always, with this verb as with the other, some general idea, as at Il. ζ, 16.

> Ἀλλά οἱ οὔτις τῶνγε τότ' ἤρκεσε λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον.

Ἀρκεῖν has one advantage however over χραισμεῖν, at least in the instances in Homer, namely, that with the dative and accusative it may have also ἀπό with a genitive; for example at Il. ν, 440. χιτῶνα Χάλκεον, ὅς οἱ πρόσθεν ἀπὸ χροὸς ἤρκει ὄλεθρον. This construction made it very natural to connect ἀρκεῖν with the similarly-sounding Latin verb *arcere*, and with εἴργω, ἕρκος, and to consider the idea of *warding* or *keeping off* as its original meaning, with which it was always supposed necessary to set out in explaining it in any passage of Homer. Nor would it be easy to eradicate from the mind of an etymologist of the present day the deep-rooted idea that ἀρκέω and *arceo* are identical. And yet the common meaning of ἀρκεῖν, *to be enough, to suffice*, cannot be deduced from the sense of *arcere* without force and harshness[2]. This supposition (of warding or driving off being the original meaning of ἀρκεῖν) looks the more suspicious from our never finding ἀρκεῖν τινά (an enemy), ἀρκεῖν βέλος; nay, still more so from the compound ἐπαρκεῖν being used precisely as the simple verb, e. g. Il. β, 873. οὔτε τί οἱ τόγ' ἐπήρκεσε λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον, and from the preposition of which it is compounded standing in direct opposition to the supposed meaning of *arcere*[3]; and lastly this suspicion is again strengthened by the old Epic epithet ποδάρκης. In addition to this the adjective ἄρκιος* (Il. κ, 304. μισθὸς ἄρκιος) shows that the meaning of *enough, to be enough*, although the verb does not occur in that sense in Homer, is an ancient original meaning, and not a mere derivative one of later times. In order then to be sure that we are not proceeding in error, let us forget for a moment that we find in two words some letters corresponding with a usage of language which after all is only limited, and let us try another way. We will suppose that ἀρήγω and ἀρκέω are connected together, just as εἴργω and ἕρκος are, and that ἀρκέω alone has the more definite meaning of *shelter* and *protection*; then ἐπαρκεῖν comes at once into unison with ἐπαρήγειν: and if we suffer ourselves to be led back through ἀρήγειν to the simple idea of Ἄρης, ἀρείων, ἄριστος, we have for both verbs the ground-idea of *to be good, strong*, from which come next the idea of *enough*, and the compound ποδάρκης: if lastly to this we add the dat. commodi, the ideas of *to help* and *protect*, ἀρήγειν and ἀρκεῖν τινί, arise of themselves. The accusative in Homeric usage is now explained with sufficient clearness to be a collateral relation added afterwards; by means of which, particularly in Greek, so many absolute ideas become transitive, and through which therefore the verb ἀρκεῖν acquired here the idea of *to ward off*, which however did not pass down into the usage of later times; as that very limitation to general ideas (death, destruction, &c.,) shows also that this was not an original case, nor one necessary to the verb: but as soon as it had this relation, the still nearer one could certainly be expressed no otherwise than by adding afresh the limitation of ἀπό: ἀρκεῖν τινὶ τὸν ὄλεθρον ἀπὸ τῆς χροός.

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[2] To connect this meaning of ἀρκεῖν with *arcere* it would be always necessary to supply the idea of *want*, to drive away *want*, though that idea is never found *expressed* with ἀρκεῖν either in Homer or elsewhere.

[3] Just as if we were to say, to *impel* death from a person, '*adercere* alicui mortem'. See the supplement to this article, and particularly the note at the end of it.

* [See art. 28.—Ed.]

5. The analogy of this verb will now undoubtedly serve to confirm all that is essential in the common derivation of χραισμεῖν. For as we recognised in ἀρκέω the ground-idea of *good* with the collateral one of *strength*, (although the general idea *to suffice any one* or *help him* is not found in the verb *in Homer*,) so in the case of χραισμεῖν we must not reject the idea of *good*, joined with the collateral one of *use*, *utility*, which meets us in the words χράω, χρηστός, χρήσιμος, although Homer does not give the verb the general idea of *to be useful to*, *to help*. And as the general meaning of ἀρκεῖν, *to suffice*, was preserved not in Homer but in the common language of Greece, so the same might be the case with χραισμεῖν if it remained in general use in the language of common life. And this is actually the case; only (which comes to the same thing) it is in a provincial dialect. The scholiast on Apollon. 2, 218. explains the verb χραισμεῖν there by βοηθεῖν, adding τὸ γὰρ χραισμεῖν Κλιτόριοι λέγουσι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν. The last word cannot possibly be used here in its Homeric meaning of *to ward off*, for then it would be no explanation; but in this as in all glosses the more unknown word is explained by one of every-day occurrence. Now ἐπαρκεῖν in the common language of Greece never had any other meaning than *to help*, *help out*; consequently χραισμεῖν continued to have this meaning in Arcadia: and all analogy requires that we should lay it down as the ground of the Homeric meaning also[4].

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[4] We might perhaps be led into an error by reading, at the same passage where that scholium stands, the following additional gloss: Αλλως· τὸ χραισμεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ παραινεῖν λαμβάνουσι Κλιτό-

6. It is true that the word χρήσιμος looks too new, for an aor. 2. (which commonly contains only the simplest root of a family of words) to be derived from it. But we must not take to our aid just this new adjective, which in the later storehouse of words is the one most similar to that verb. In the olden time, when the language was composed of a number of forms afterward lost, it is very possible that from χρᾷν (*commodare*, 'to offer', is the ground-idea) might have arisen in some other way a sister-form χραισμεῖν with the meaning of *to be of use to, offer help*, which in Homer's language attached itself to the idea of *help to ward off some ill*[5].

ριοι· κοινῶς δὲ τὸ βοηθεῖν. It would be possible indeed that χραισμεῖν (if its original idea were *good, useful*,) might mean not only *to be good*, but also, if we may use the expression, *to make good*, that is, *to explain or declare as good, to praise*. But can we really suppose such a coincidence of chances, as that the Clitorians used the word in both senses at the same time, and that each sense was introduced here by a different scholiast, one of whom must therefore have inserted his gloss for no purpose whatever? Should we not rather conclude that all this arose from the slight external difference between ἐπαρκεῖν and ἐπαινεῖν? I cannot myself entertain such a supposition for a moment. The first gloss is the only one which has any intelligible object here; the other arose entirely from an error of transcription in ἐπαινεῖν, and was afterward increased by the addition of another explanatory term, of which we see a thousand instances in the different medleys of commentators. The addition of κοινῶς δὲ τὸ βοηθεῖν should merely serve to bring the digression of the scholium back to the regular point. For under κοινὸν those grammarians comprehended every expression, however old or obsolete, which did not evidently belong to a dialect; here therefore nothing more is intended than an opposition between the Clitorian and the well-known Epic usage. This view is fully confirmed by the Paris Codex having only the miswritten and corrupt scholium. It does not therefore deserve the consideration which it has found in Schneider's Lexicon.

[5] When I compare the verbal form λελειχμότες (Hes. θ, 826.) derived from λείχω, and the more usual one λιχμᾶσθαι, (both meaning *to protrude the tongue as serpents do*,) with θερμός from θέρω, of which again a verbal form so simple as θέρμετε, θέρμετο occurs in the Homeric language, the following account appears to me most analogical. In the older language, in which many derivative forms (always, it is true, according to analogy, but as it were without the guidance of grammar,) crossed each other, there was among the terminations of verbal adjectives one in -μος, shortened from -μων (whence the language of later times allowed the formation of ἐπιλησμότατος from ἐπιλήσμων, Aristoph. Nub. 790.), which became in the more polished periods of the language the established form in -ιμος, -σιμος. Thus as θερμός was from θέρω,

7. Another remark should be made on χραισμεῖν, that in the nineteen passages of Homer where it occurs it is never found in a positive sense, but remained in ancient usage in negative sentences only, as *that is of no use to thee, helps thee not,* and similar expressions. For the only passage where χραισμεῖν stands without a negation, εἰ δύναταί τι χραισμεῖν, (Il. φ, 193.) is ironical, and the negative is therefore in the thought, though not expressed in the words*.

8. All the nineteen passages are moreover in the Iliad. In the Odyssey, and in the works of Hesiod, as far as I know, the word never occurs.

9. In the later Epic poets, of whom it cannot be supposed that an intentional bold extension of the Homeric usage of words was part of their system, we shall now easily see displayed, according to the above account, a faulty imitation of Homer; in Apollonius, for instance, in the following positive sentences, 2, 218. χραίσμετέ μοι: 2, 249. ἄμμι νόος ἀτύζεται, ἱεμένοισι χραισμεῖν: again at 3, 643. where ἀέθλῳ χραισμεῖν stands for "*to assist in the contest.*" The only passage which in the Homeric manner has the negative is 2, 1227. οὔ οἱ χραισμήσειν. This comparison shows how easily opportunities must have offered themselves to Homer to use this verb in other constructions than he has used it, if he had not been opposed by an established usage. The derivations χραισμή, χραισμήτωρ, belong to the later poets only: see Steph. Thesaur.

[*Supplement to the above Article, printed in the original at the end of Vol.* 2.]

1. In confirmation of the remark, that notwithstanding the verbs χραισμεῖν and ἀρκεῖν have in Homer no other sense than that of *warding off*, yet that the idea of *keeping off* or *driving*

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so from λείχω might come ΛΕΙΧΜΩΝ, ΛΙΧΜΟΣ, as an epithet of snakes from their protruding the tongue; and again from χράω might be deduced ΧΡΑΙΣΜΩΝ, ΧΡΑΙΣΜΟΣ, *able to help*. If now from the two former arise the verbs θέρμετο, λελειχμότες, then ἔχραισμον, as formed from the last, is quite analogical; although in later times the language established the aorist 2. only as the stem or root, and marked such derivatives by particular terminations, as εύω, όω, ίζω, &c.

* [There is another passage of the same kind, Il. ο, 32.—Ed.]

away, *arcere*, is not therefore the ground-idea of these words, we may quote in particular the verbs ἀλέξειν and ἀλαλκεῖν. For in these it is well known that *strength* (ἀλκή) and *to assist* (used absolutely without the accusative of the object to be opposed or warded off) is the ground-idea; e. g. Il. ζ, 109. Φὰν δέ τιν' ἀθανάτων....Τρωσὶν ἀλεξήσοντα κατελθέμεν: and γ, 9. μεμαῶτες ἀλεξέμεν ἀλλήλοισιν: and yet the same verb with such an accusative has completely the meaning of *to ward off*; nay, so completely, that even the concrete and physical object to be warded off is added in this accusative; e. g. Il. ι, 347. νήεσσιν ἀλεξέμεναι δήϊον πῦρ: at ν, 475. ἀλέξασθαι μεμαὼς κύνας ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρας: at ρ, 153. νῦν δ' οὔ οἱ ἀλαλκέμεναι κύνας ἔτλης. And herein we see that the usage of this verb goes even further than that of χραισμεῖν and ἀρκεῖν, which, as we observed above, take the evil in the accusative in the abstract sense only, as death, destruction, &c.

2. If then ἀλέξειν by the addition of such an accusative acquires this meaning, the same thing is natural in ἀρκεῖν also, without our being obliged to suppose the identity of this verb and the Latin *arcere*; on which point I think I have already said all that is necessary. And the idiom which by this supposition appears startling, ἐπαρκέσαι τινὶ ὄλεθρον, comes now into strict analogy with Il. υ, 315. Μήποτ' ἐπὶ Τρώεσσιν ἀλεξήσειν κακὸν ἦμαρ. For this expression evidently arises from ἐπαλέξειν τινὶ, *to assist any one*, Il. θ, 365. λ, 428., and in spite of the preposition takes the sense of *warding off*,—a sense which has also become established in the substantive ἔπαλξις[1].

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[1] In order to make the contradiction between this preposition and the supposed sense of ἀρκεῖν the more sensible, I invented in note 3. of the former part of this article a compound *adercere*, representing it as an impossible composition. I thereby injured my argument, for *adimere* might be adduced as an instance of a similar composition contradictory to the meaning. However this verb is certainly a striking anomaly, of which we are still wanting an explanation, and with which the abovementioned ἐπαρκεῖν τινί τι will as well bear a comparison as with the other ἐπὶ Τρώεσσιν ἀλεξήσειν.

THE END.

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
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